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PREFACE
I was in the United States in February 1958 when the 
PRRI-Permesta rebellion broke out in Indonesia* Both the 
rebels and some echoing Westerners asserted that if 
Indonesia was not in fact already communist, then 
certainly the Indonesian Communist Party was on the point 
of taking over the central government. The State 
Department’s apparent support for the rebels seemed to 
confirm that these assertions contained a strong element 
of truth; and the American newspapers did little to refute 
them. PKI was the largest communist party in Asia 
outside the Soviet bloc, and the results of the 1957 local 
elections indicated that it had the largest popular sup­
port of any party in Indonesia. PKI was also clearly in 
alliance with President Sukarno. In other words, the 
position of PKI was apparently much stronger than that of 
the communist parties in the other non-communist countries 
of Asia. In 1958 I had just concluded a study of the 
failure of the communists to capture control of the 
leftwing, nationalist upsurge in Bolivia, and I was there­
fore especially interested to know why PKI had grown so 
large, as well as to know if PKI was, as the rebels
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c la im e d , in  r e a l  c o n tr o l  o f  th e  c e n tr a l  government or  on 
th e  p o in t  o f  w in n in g  c o n tr o l .
T h ese , th e n , are  th e  c e n tr a l  q u e s t io n s  th a t  t h i s  
t h e s i s  s e e k s  to  answ er: why and how has PKI won mass sup­
p o r t  and th e  a l l i a n c e  o f  im portant non-com m unist p o l i t i c a l  
f o r c e s ,  and d oes t h i s  su p p ort and a l l i a n c e  mean th a t PKI 
c o n tr o ls  the c e n tr a l  government or i s  in  a p o s i t io n  to  
win c o n tr o l  in  th e  n ear  fu tu r e ?  I found th a t  the growth  
o f  PKI and i t s  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  has been  made under the  
le a d e r s h ip  o f  a group o f  young communists who won c o n tr o l  
o f  th e  P a rty  in  January 1951» That month i s  th e r e fo r e  
th e  op en in g  d a te  o f  th e  t h e s i s .  The c lo s in g  d a te ,
January 1961, was ch osen  a r b i t r a r i ly  b eca u se  th e  o v e r a l l  
p o l i c y  form u la ted  and im plem ented by the A id it  le a d e r s h ip  
i s  s t i l l  in  e f f e c t ,  and b eca u se  January 1961 i s  the l a s t  
month fo r  which I co u ld  o b ta in  f a i r l y  com plete in fo rm a tio n . 
Prom the s t a r t  o f  my stu d y  o f  PKI I was n o t concerned  
p r im a r ily  w ith  th e  P a r ty ’s r e la t io n s  w ith  Moscow and 
P ek in g , and i t  was found l a t e r  th a t  such  a l in e  o f  
r e se a r c h  would have proved f a i r l y  s t e r i l e  b eca u se  s in c e  
1948 the In d on esian  communist le a d e r s  have been l e f t  to  
fo rm u la te  t h e ir  own p o l i c i e s .
The r e se a r c h  fo r  t h i s  t h e s i s  was undertaken  w ith  a 
th r e e -y e a r  s c h o la r s h ip  from the A u str a lia n  N a tio n a l  
U n iv e r s i ty .  The f i r s t  s i x  months were sp en t in  stu d y in g
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a l l  a v a ila b le  E ng lish -language m a te r ia ls  on In d o n es ia , and 
in  le a rn in g  to  read  In d o n esian . During th e  n ex t s ix  
months a l l  a v a ila b le  m a te r ia ls  in  Indonesian  were s i f t e d .  
The Indonesian  v is a  was g ran ted  a t  l a s t ,  and I  went to  
Java fo r  alm ost e leven  months. Most o f t h i s  tim e was 
sp e n t in  D ja k a rta , b u t I  a lso  went to  J o g ja k a r ta  fo r  two 
p e r io d s , t o t a l l i n g  two months, in  o rd e r  to  o b ta in  a 
d i f f e r e n t  view o f  the s i t u a t i o n .  B r ie f  v i s i t s  were a lso  
made to  S u rabaja  and S u ra k a r ta . While in  Indonesia  I 
examined m a te r ia ls  in  l i b r a r i e s  in  D jak a rta  and J o g ja k a r ta , 
and c o l le c te d  as much p u b lish ed  communist l i t e r a t u r e  as 
was a v a i la b le .  Many government o f f i c i a l s  were i n t e r ­
view ed, e s p e c ia l ly  members o f  th e  M in is tr ie s  o f  A gri­
c u l tu re  and Labour. Much o f my in fo rm atio n  was gained , 
however, from in te rv iew s  w ith  n a t io n a l  and re g io n a l 
le a d e rs  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  and mass o rg a n iz a tio n s . The 
n a t io n a l  le a d e rs  o f  PKI would n o t meet me, b u t P a rty  
cad res a t  the  re g io n a l le v e l  proved a t  tim es f r ie n d ly  and 
in fo rm a tiv e .
S ev era l a sp e c ts  o f th e  th e s is  re q u ire  e x p la n a tio n . 
Because l i t t l e  o r no p rev io u s  re se a rc h  has been undertaken  
on most m a tte rs  d e a l t  w ith  in  th e  th e s i s ,  much d e s c r ip t iv e  
m a te r ia l  has had to  be in c lu d e d . The need to  in c lu d e  so
much d e s c r ip t iv e  m a te r ia l ,  and the  l im i t  on the le n g th  o f  
th e se s  o f  th e  A u s tra lia n  N a tio n a l U n iv e rs ity , made i t
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necessary to limit the scope of the Introduction* With 
regard to the general political background of the period 
studied, I have restricted myself to sketching a brief 
outline history of PKI to 1948. The wider background 
has been treated adequately in readily available English- 
language sources, and I decided against going over the 
same ground* But I could not omit a study, however 
brief, of the socio-economic situation in Java. Most of 
PKI*s advances have been made in Java, especially among 
the ethnic Javanese, and expansion into other areas has 
been made mainly from this base* It is essential to 
examine Javanese society in order to understand why PKI 
has been able to win broad support, and to understand the 
character and quality of this support* Most of the 
introductory chapter is devoted to such an examination 
because an adequate one has not been undertaken before.
It must be noted that I have been unable to divulge 
the names of the majority of my informants. The trans­
lations from Indonesian to English are my own. I have 
at times quoted Indonesian English-language materials, 
but where the original Indonesian was also available I 
have at times altered the English if I felt it did not 
accurately represent the meaning of the original.
There are many persons, of varied nationality, 
occupation, social status, and political persuasion, to
Vwhom I became indebted during my stay in Indonesia. For 
the information and hospitality they gave me, I express 
my thanks. Finally, I wish to thank in particular three 
members of the Australian National University: Professor 
Leicester Webb, my supervisor, for his constant encourage­
ment; Dr Bruce Graham, for his advice in shaping the rough 
draft into presentable form; and Dr Herbert Feith, for his 
relentless opposition to unsound opinion and the loose 
generalization.
SUMMARY OP THESIS
The Introduction is divided into two parts: an 
analysis of Javanese society, and an outline history of 
PKI to December 1948. Because PKI has made its greatest 
gains among the Javanese and in the villages as well as 
in the towns, an examination is made of socio-economic 
conditions in the rural and urban areas of Java. It is 
hoped that the examination points to some of the reasons 
for the rapid growth of the communist organization. The 
outline history of PKI to the end of 1948 is intended 
merely to sketch in the background of the Party before 
the opening date of the main part of the thesis.
Part One is concerned with the communist leaders* 
view of Indonesian society and the Indonesian revolution. 
What I have termed the Aidit leadership considered 
Indonesia to be a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country.
The basic enemies of the revolution were seen as the 
colonialists (imperialists) and the feudalists - in that 
order. The proletariat was clearly too weak to win 
power alone, but the Aidit leadership believed that 
because of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of 
Indonesia the workers could, given the correct strategy 
and tactics, win many allies. Because the peasantry and
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the petty bourgeoisie were oppressed and stifled by the 
imperialists and the feudalists, they were envisaged as 
being potential firm allies of the workers, while the 
national bourgeoisie, also the victim of imperialism and 
feudalism, was envisaged as an ally under certain 
conditions* But even such a range of allies might not 
be sufficient to guarantee victory for *the people*, and 
the communist leaders believed they might be obliged to 
form temporary alliances with certain sections of the 
compradore bourgeoisie at certain times in order to combat 
other sections.
Prom this analysis of the socio-political forces 
present in the revolution, the Aidit leadership decided 
on a broad national united front policy that entailed 
three main tasks: the creation of a mass communist party, 
the creation of much wider popular support through the 
work of mass organizations that were steeled by the Party, 
and the welding of an alliance with the non-communist 
political forces.
Part Two describes the building of the mass party. 
First the leadership of PKI is discussed, then the 
expansion of the Party and the political education of the 
membership, and, leading out of these, there is a 
discussion of the reasons for the exceptional solidarity 
shown by the PKI leaders and cadres during the ten years
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after January 1951. A last section analyses the available 
evidence as to the income and expenditure of the communist 
movement•
Part Three describes how the Aidit leadership built 
mass support. An opening section discusses the effort 
made to create a public image of the Party without which 
it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to 
attract mass support and to win the alliance of broad 
sectors of the other political forces. Most of Part 
Three is devoted to an analysis of how the Indonesian 
communists have won mass support by specific appeals to 
the different sections of 'the people*. An examination 
is made of the growth and activities of the communist-led 
mass organizations (which by the end of 1960 claimed about 
nine million members), but direct Party work is not 
ignored. At the same time an attempt is made to estimate 
the quality of the mass support won by PKI and its mass 
organizations. The sections of 'the people* dealt with 
specifically are: the workers, the peasants, the petty 
bourgeoisie, youth, women, ethnic groups and minorities, 
and the veterans of the revolution. Part Three is 
concluded with an analysis of PKI*s election work in 1955 
and 1957» and with a discussion of the votes obtained.
Part Pour is concerned with the application of the 
national united front policy to PKI's relations with the
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other political forces. PKI offered its friendship to 
all but the avowed anti-communists, and in return asked 
neither participation in the cabinet nor a share in the 
spoils of office. FNI was particularly eager to accept 
PKI's offer in order to strengthen its own hand against 
what it considered to be its most dangerous rival,
Masjumi. After the 1955 general elections, the power 
situation changed radically. PKI and Sukarno sought 
each other’s support against first the dissident 
regionalists and then the central army leadership. Too 
weak to take too independent a line, PKI was forced to 
give grumbling acquiescence to the curtailment of 
liberties and the restriction of parliamentary authority 
that were carried out by Sukarno after 1956 under the 
banner of guided democracy. As the first decade of the 
Aidit leadership came to a close, the political situation 
in Indonesia appeared to be moving in a direction 
unfavourable to PKI, but PKI could do no more than emit 
ineffectual protests.
The Conclusion further develops some of the main 
themes of the rest of the thesis. Attention is first 
given to the general situation in January 1961, with the 
special object of showing what factors induced the Aidit 
leadership to formulate and then to implement its national 
united front strategy. The actual implementation of the
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strategy in the years i951 to 1961 is then discussed, 
special attention being given to the question of whether 
or not PKI exercised a significant influence on the 
course of political events. Finally, PKI*s position at 
the beginning of 1961 is examined. It is suggested here 
that although PKI and its mass organizations had grown 
large, they were not of the quality that would allow the 
PKI leaders to use them as a means of taking power, at 
least in the near future. PKI was working among the 
poorer sections of society that were relatively free from 
strong social antagonisms. At the same time, it would 
appear that the national united front policy, involving 
moderation towards the ruling groups and wealthier classes, 
was unable to create a militant mood among PKI's sup­
porters. Such a mood was necessary if the massive commu­
nist organization was to become a. force capable of 
challenging and defeating those in power.
GLOSSARY
1• Names of Political Parties,
The following are the abbreviated names of parties
most frequently used in this thesis:
NU - Partai Nahdatul Ulama, Party of the Association of 
Islamic Scholars. NU was founded in 1926 as an 
association of Moslem scholars adhering to the four 
orthodox schools of Islamic law. It was formed 
partly as a reaction to the activities of the 
modernist Islamic association Muhammadijah. NU 
became a member of the all-embracing Moslem party 
Masjumi founded on November 7, 1945» but withdrew in 
August 1952 to constitute Itself as a political party.
Perti - Partai Islam Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah,
Islamic Party of the Islamic Educational Movement. 
Perti was founded originally as an Islamic edu­
cational association in Central Sumatra in 1928. In 
November 1945 Perti reconstituted itself as a 
political party.
PIR - Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya, Party of the Union 
of Great Indonesia, founded on December 10, 1948.
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PKI - Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist 
Party, founded on May 23* 1920.
PNI - Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist 
Party, founded on February 1, 1946.
PSI - Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist
Party. A Socialist Party was founded shortly after 
the proclamation of Indonesian independence on 
August 17* 1945* PSI was formed in January 1948 as 
a breakaway from the rest of the party that had 
fallen under communist control.
PSII - Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic 
Association Party, was founded in 1947* though a 
party of the same name and with some of the same 
leaders had been active before the Second World War.
2. Names of Mass Organizations.
The following are the abbreviated names of communist 
mass organizations frequently used in this thesis:
BTI - Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants* 
Organization, founded on November 25* 1945*
CGMI - Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Concen­
tration of Indonesian Student Movements, founded in 
November 1958.
xiii
Gerwani - Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Womens
Movement* Gerwani is the new name given to Gerwis 
in March 1954*
Gerwis - Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar, Movement of 
Enlightened Indonesian Women, founded on June 4»
1950.
IPPI - Ikatan Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia, League of
Indonesian High School Youth, was formed, with a 
slightly different name, in September 1945*
LEKRA - Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat, Institute of People’s 
Culture, formed on August 17> 1950*
Perbepsl - Persatuan Bekas Pedjuang Seluruh Indonesia,
All-Indonesian Union of Veterans, established on 
December 30, 1951.
SAKTI - Sarekat Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants’ 
Association, established on December 17» 1949«
Sarbupri - Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Indonesia, Indonesian 
Estate Workers’ Trade Union, founded in February 1947 
and constituting the largest union in SOBSI.
SOBSI - Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All- 
Indonesia Organization of Trade Unions, established 
on November 29> 1946.
xiv
3» Names of Newspapers and Periodicals,
BB - Bendera Buruh, Workers * Flag, the periodical of SOBSI.
BM - Bintang Merah, Red Star, PKI's monthly ideological 
journal.
FALP - For a Lasting Peace, for a People fs Democracy.1, the 
journal of the Cominform.
HR - Harian Rakjat, People’s Daily, the PKI newspaper.
ITUN - Indonesian Trade Union News, a periodical in 
English issued by SOBSI.
KP - Kehidupan Partai, Party Life. This is a continuation 
of PKI-Buletin, but has become primarily a forum for 
the exchange of practical experiences in the different 
fields of Party work.
PKI-B - PKI-Buietin, a multipurpose Party journal issued
from February 1952 to early in 1955 when its name was 
changed to Kehidupan Partai.
RI - Review of Indonesia, a PKI English language monthly 
which was originally mimeographed as Monthly Review, 
but from January 1957 has been printed with the 
present title.
ST - Suara Tani, Voice of the Peasants, the official 
journal of BTI.
TI - Times of Indonesia, an English-language, politically 
independent newspaper published in Djakarta from 1952 
until October 31, 1960, when its license was revoked.
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4* Government A d m in istra tiv e  A rea s.
The fo l lo w in g  two terms are u sed  in  t h i s  t h e s i s :
Kabupaten -  In d o n esia  i s  d iv id e d  in to  p r o v in c e s , the
p r o v in c e s  in to  r e s id e n c ie s ,  and the r e s id e n c ie s  in to  
k ab u p aten s. In  1958 th e r e  were 170 kabupatens in  
In d o n e s ia , in c lu d in g  80 in  Java .
Ket;jamatan -  Each kabupaten i s  d iv id e d  in to  s e v e r a l
kew edanaans, and th e se  in  turn  in to  k e tja m a ta n s.
In 1958 th e r e  were 2 ,8 2 6  ket,jam atans in  In d o n e s ia ,  
in c lu d in g  1 ,449  in  Java .
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INTRODUCTION
I. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN JAVA
1 • A General View of Rural Java
The Indonesian population is at present estimated to 
be about 92 millions, compared with 60.4 millions in 1930 
and it is growing at the rate of 1.5 to 2 millions per 
year. Between 1930 and 1952, when total population 
increased by about 18.5 millions, the population of the 
Indonesian municipalities rose from 3.2 millions to 7«1
Amillions. As only about 2.5 to 3 millions of the urban 
increase was due to migration from rural areas, it is 
evident that urban growth was far too slow to absorb even 
a significant part of the increasing rural population.
In Java,2 the population has increased from 41•? 
millions in 1930 to about 60 millions at present. This 
rise occurred in an island which was already densely 
crowded. It is estimated that in 1952 the average popu-
1
Indonesian Participants in the December 1955 United 
Nations Seminar on Population in Asia and the Par East, 
"The Population of Indonesia”, Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
Indonesia, February 1956, pp.94-5*2
All statistics for Java also include the island of 
Madura which is administratively part of East Java.
lation density for West Java (including Djakarta) was 346 
persons per square kilometre, for Central Java (including 
Jogjakarta) 460, and for East Java 380.1 This high 
density is not, in general, the result of urbanization 
but of a dense rural population. The greatest concen­
trations of rural population occur along the north coast 
from Tjirebon to Pekalongan; along the south coast from 
Banjumas to Jogjakarta, and then inland to around 
Surakarta; and along the lower Brantas from Kediri to 
Surabaja.2 The highest densities are in the kabupaten 
of Klaten (an estimated 1,038 persons per square kilometre 
in 1955)f and the kabupaten of Tjirebon (an estimated 773 
persons per square kilometre).^
Within Java approximately 60 per cent of the total 
land surface is used by peasants for food production and 
some cash crops, 7*6 per cent is used by estates for 
export crops, and 8.8 per cent is occupied by towns, roads 
and rivers.^ Only 23*4 per cent is forest-covered,
1 Indonesian Participants, "The Population of Indonesia", 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, February 1956, p.108.
2
Atlas Van Tropisch Nederland, Batavia, 1938, map 18a.
Indonesian Participants, "The Population of Indonesia", 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, February 1956, p*91»C News and Views Indonesia, August 17> 1959, vol.IV, no.7> 
p.14. Another official estimate is that in 1958 peasant 
agriculture occupied 63*3 per cent of the total land area 
of Java; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical 
Pocketbook of Indonesia 1960, Djakarta, 1960, p.48.
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although forestry experts estimate that 30 per cent of 
forest is the minimum required to safeguard the water 
supply. The forest is in scattered pockets, and much of 
it is planted teak stands. There is virtually no land 
available in Java for a further expansion of agriculture,"' 
and migration from Java to the thinly populated outer 
islands has been on a small scale.2 in other words, the 
increase in rural population has to be absorbed on the 
present agricultural area.
The basic crop in Java is irrigated rice, with maize, 
cassava, peanuts and soybeans grown in the dry season and 
on unirrigated land. Cultivation is everywhere labour- 
intensive, and agricultural implements are primitive.
Little fertilizer is used, and yields are low: 22.7 
quintals of dry stalk paddy per hectare in Indonesia,
1
An official commission estimated in 1937 that only about 
300,000 hectares of land were still available for culti­
vation in Java, that is, enough to absorb the population 
increase for 3i years; Karl J. Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement 
in the Asiatic Tropics. New York, 1945» p.162, note 9* In 
1960, the Indonesian Ministry of Agrarian Affairs calcu­
lated that 181,934 hectares of Neglected* land was 
available for food production in Java; Departemen Agraria 
(Ministry of Agrarian Affairs), "Tanah-Tanah Terlantar" 
(Neglected Lands), mimeographed document, Djakarta, I960, 4P« 
2
Prom 1951 to 1959 inclusive, only 231>474 migrants left 
Java to settle in the outer islands; Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 1960, p.16.
Acom pared  w i th  37*8 i n  C hina and 74*8 i n  I t a l y . ' L iv e s to c k  
( b u f f a l o s ,  g o a ts  and sh e e p )  and f i s h i n g  ( s e a  and in la n d )  
form  an  im p o r ta n t  a d d i t i o n a l  s o u r c e  o f  fo o d .  A lthough  
t h e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  l i m i t s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  have  b e en  re a c h e d  
i n  J a v a ,  i n d i c a t i o n s  a r e  t h a t  y i e l d s  c o u ld  be  much im­
p ro v e d  b y  r e l a t i v e l y  s im p le  m e a su re s ,  such  as i n c r e a s e d  
s u p p ly  o f  f e r t i l i z e r s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a g re e d  
t h a t  f i s h  p r o d u c t io n  c o u ld  be  g r e a t l y  expanded .
The p o p u l a t i o n  p r e s s u r e  i n  J a v a  h as  l e d  to  th e  f r a g ­
m e n ta t io n  o f  h o l d in g s .  S t a t i s t i c s  p r o v id e d  by  th e  
M i n i s t r y  o f  A g ra r ia n  A f f a i r s  f o r  19571 2 g iv e  th e  a r e a  o f  
sawah ( i r r i g a t e d  r i c e  l a n d )  i n  J a v a  as  3>227>694 h e c t a r e s ,  
owned by  5 , 788 ,247  p e r s o n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  an a v e ra g e  o f  O.56  
h e c t a r e s  p e r  owner. The s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  u n i r r i g a t e d  l a n d
4
1
See S ie  Kwat Soen, "The Use o f  F e r t i l i z e r s  i n  I n d o n e s ia "  
Ekonomi dan  Keuangan I n d o n e s i a , Sep tem ber 1954» p p .603-14» 
Soen e s t i m a t e d ,  f o r  exam ple , t h a t  up t o  1 m i l l i o n  h e c t a r e s  
o f  i r r i g a t e d  r i c e  la n d  i n  I n d o n e s ia  were p h o sp h a te  d e ­
f i c i e n t  and  would need  up to  100 ,000  to n s  a n n u a l ly  o f  
d o u b le  s u p e r p h o s p h a te ;  i n  f a c t ,  o n ly  5 ,0 0 0  to n s  were b e in g  
u se d  f o r  r i c e  c u l t i v a t i o n ,  compared w i th  4 0 0 ,000  to n s  i n  
I n d i a ,  and 2 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0  to n s  i n  J a p a n .
2
D epartem en  A g r a r i a ,  " D a f ta r  R a ta -R a ta  Luas Tanah Sawah 
T ia p - T ia p  P e m i l ik  Sawah dalam  P r o p i n s i ,  Tahun 1957" ( L i s t  
o f  L a n d h o ld in g  A verages o f  Owners o f  Sawah by P ro v in c e ,  
1957)> mimeographed docum ent, D j a k a r t a ,  no d a t e ,  3 P * > 
" D a f ta r  R a ta - R a ta  Luas Tanah D a ra t  T ia p - T ia p  P e m il ik  D a ra t  
dalam  P r o p i n s i ,  Tahun 1957" ( L i s t  o f  L a n d h o ld in g  A verages 
o f  Owners o f  U n i r r i g a t e d  Farm Land by  P r o v in c e ,  1957)» 
m im eographed docum ent, D j a k a r t a ,  no d a t e ,  4 P* As an 
e s t i m a t e d  50 p e r  c e n t  o f  p e a s a n t s  a r e  l a n d l e s s ,  i n  1957 
o n ly  0 .2 8  h e c t a r e  o f  sawah was a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e ac h  p e a s a n t  
and h i s  d e p e n d e n ts .
w e re : 4*369*099 h e c t a r e s ,  9*845*936 o w n ers , and an  a v e ra g e  
o f  u n d e r  0*5 h e c t a r e s  p e r  ow ner.^  L an d h o ld in g s  w ere 
d i s t r i b u t e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
Sawah
A rea
u n d e r
0 . 6 - 1
O
.CM1• 2 .1 - 5 5 . 1 - 1 0
1 0 . 1- o v e r




1 ,3 9 5 ,3 0 7
1 ,3 8 8 ,3 5 2
933 ,6 1 5
3 5 9 ,4 2 4
4 0 5 ,0 6 7
4 6 4 ,5 3 2
1 5 6 , 2 1 6
115 ,3 0 4
167,565
56 ,283
25 ,7 8 7
4 0 ,9 5 4
8 ,153
3 ,2 6 5







3 ,7 1 7 ,2 7 4 1 ,2 2 9 ,0 2 3 4 3 9 ,0 8 5 123 ,024 15 ,787 2 ,931 5 6 7
U n i r r ig a t e d  Land
A 1 , 9 0 8 , 8 2 1 3 0 4 , 0 7 9 198 ,663 92 ,785 11,993 2 , 2 6 8 756
B 2 ,9 5 6 ,9 7 4 3 7 6 , 8 7 3 1 8 7 ,8 4 4 7 0 , 2 2 7 6 , 3 7 3 7 5 4 137
C 2 ,2 7 8 ,1 4 3 3 9 3 ,3 3 2 2 3 7 ,8 1 4 111 ,394 1 3 , 9 6 8 1 ,7 4 8 421
7 ,1 4 3 ,9 3 8 1 ,0 7 4 ,2 8 4 624,321 274 ,406 3 2 , 3 3 4 4 ,7 7 0 1 ,3 1 4
A = W est J a v a .  B = C e n tr a l  J a v a .  C = E a s t  J a v a .
W hile th e  above f i g u r e s  do n o t  c a te g o r i z e  lan d o w n ers  
a c c o rd in g  to  t o t a l  l a n d h o ld in g s ,  t h a t  i s ,  saw ah p lu s  
u n i r r i g a t e d  l a n d ,  and do n o t  show how much la n d  was owned 
by  th e  few lan d o w n ers  w i th  more th a n  tw e n ty  h e c t a r e s ,  
d e t a i l s  p u b l is h e d  b y  th e  M in is t r y  o f  A g ra r ia n  A f f a i r s  do 
a t  l e a s t  i n d i c a t e  th e  a b se n c e  o f  l a r g e  lan d o w n ers  o v e r
1
I f  th e  d e t a i l e d  f i g u r e s  o f  saw ah and u n i r r i g a t e d  l a n d -  
h o ld in g s  and la n d o w n e rs , g iv e n  b e lo w , a r e  added  u p , th e y  
do n o t e q u a l  th e s e  g e n e r a l  f i g u r e s .  The m i n i s t r y 's  
r e p o r t s  do n o t  e x p la in  th e  d is c r e p a n c y .
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much of Java. There were no sawah owners with more than 
twenty hectares in 3 of the 19 kabupatens in West Java, 
none in 14 of the 28 kabupatens of Central Java, and none 
in 10 of the 29 kabupatens of East Java. Over half of 
the ’large’ landowners in West Java were in the residency 
of Djakarta which covered less than one-fifth of the 
province, and 71 of the 111 ’large’ sawah owners in Central 
Java were concentrated in the residency of Pekalongan. In 
Central Java there were nine kabupatens with no owner of 
more than 10 hectares of sawah, and four, all around 
Surakarta, with no owner of more than 2 hectares. In East 
Java two kabupatens had no owner of more than 10 hectares 
of sawah.1
The peasant organization BTI claimed in 1950> and.
PKI claimed in 1951> that 70 per cent of landowners in 
Java had less than one hectare of land (sawah plus un­
irrigated land), 20 per cent had 1 to 2 hectares, 8 per
pcent 2 to 4 hectares, and 2 per cent more than 4 hectares. 
Despite the land fragmentation indicated in these figures
1
No details were given for the residency of Kediri, which 
contains five kabupatens.
2
Kementerian Agraria (Ministry of Agrarian Affairs), 
Himpunan Keputusan Kongres/Konperensi Organisasi-Organisasi 
Tani"Massa (Compilation of the Decisions of Congresses and 
Conferences of Peasant Mass Organizations), Djakarta, 1951> 
p.25; PKI, "Masaalah Tani di Indonesia” (The Peasant 
Question in Indonesia), BM, June 15-July 1, 1951 > p.304*
and those of the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs, the intense 
population pressure on the limited agricultural land has 
caused the growth of a landless peasantry generally 
estimated at about 50 per cent of the rural population. 
With the collapse of Dutch authority in 1942, many land- 
hungry peasants moved onto estate and forestry lands. 
Official government sources in 1954 estimated that 28,000 
peasant families were occupying 80,000 hectares of estate 
lands in Java, and that in Java and Sumatra combined 
about 400,000 hectares of forestry land were occupied.^ 
Such squatters had no legal right to the land they were 
occupying, and after the transfer of sovereignty in 
December 1949 they came into conflict, often violent, 
with estate and government authorities endeavouring to 
evict them.
Alongside the fundamentally subsistence agriculture 
of the great majority of the Javanese peasantry has been 
juxtaposed modern estate agriculture. In 1958, estates 
occupied 629,900 hectares in Java, of which 342,600 were 
in West Java (mostly in the residencies of Bogor and 
Priangan), 209,100 in East Java, and 78,200 in Central 
Java.1 2 At the end of 1955, estates in Java with over
1 HR, August 16 and November 25, 1954«
2 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 
1960, p.62. 371,300 hectares of the estate lands in
Java were under crops; ibid., p.63.
oo
ten permanent workers were employing over 327,000 perma- 
nent workers and over 102,000 temporary workers* Sugar 
mills rented 52,000 hectares of land for sugar cane in
p1957» at rents fixed by the government. Forestry also 
provides rural work outside the sphere of subsistence 
agriculture, and in 1958 245>349 labourers were employed 
in forestry work in Java.
2. The Javanese Village4
(a) Occupations, landholding and social status.
The percentage of villagers engaged directly in 
agricultural production varies considerably with such
1
International Labour Office, Report to the Government 
of Indonesia on Social Security, Geneva, 1958, p.15*2
Biro Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics), 
Commercial Crops of Estates 1957» Djakarta, no date, p.18. 
3
Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 
I960, p.78.
The following paragraphs are concerned with the villages 
of the ethnic Javanese who number about 40 millions and 
inhabit Central Java, areas along the north coast of West 
Java, and most of East Java. The only recent work on the 
Sundanese village of West Java is Andrea Wilcox Palmer, 
"The Sundanese Village", in G. William Skinner (ed.),
Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Villas;e Indonesia:
a Symposium, New Haven, Connecticut, 1959, p p .42-51. How-
ever, the quite atypical voting behaviour of the area she 
studied suggests that perhaps her village is not typical of 
Sunda in general. No recent research has been made on the 
Madurese villages of Madura and the adjacent areas of Java. 
For a brief description of village forms in the different 
regions of Java, see B. ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia,
New York, 1948, pp.71-3*
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factors as the size of the village, and its proximity to 
towns, communications, the sea, estates, sugar mills and 
forests, and workable raw materials such as clay. In 
some villages 100 per cent of the population engages 
directly in agriculture, but such villages must now be 
only a small minority. Non-agricultural villagers include 
petty traders and owners of small shops, craftsmen in a 
diversity of work from basketry, weaving bamboo walls and 
food preparation to masonry, tile-making and bicycle 
repair. There is often a learned group, consisting of 
one or more of the following: gurus, teachers of tradition­
al Javanese lore, dalängs, conductors of puppet theatres 
or producers and instructors of Javanese dance drama,
kiajis, Moslem scholars, imams, mosque officials, and
1elementary school teachers. Where they are present, 
the learned people receive great respect from the other 
villagers. On occasion even the learned engage in agri­
culture, while most of the petty traders and craftsmen are 
only part-time specialists, pursuing their trades when 
agricultural work is slack. Each village also has its 
own village officials, at least a lurah (village head),
1 For a fairly full list of non-agricultural persons to 
be found in the Javanese village, see PKI, "Program 
Perubahan Tanah dan Tuntutan kaum Tani" (Programme of 
Land Change and Peasants* Demands), BM, December 195*1» 
pp.13-15.
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and a secretary, and often an irrigation official, a 
religious official, a messenger, and kamituas, heads of 
hamlets. These village officials, too, usually engage 
in agriculture besides performing their official functions.
An American sociologist has explained concisely the 
relation between land and social status in the Javanese 
village:
There is an extremely complex organization of rights 
in land, labor and the use thereof, and a clearly 
graded hierarchy of villagers based on clustering of 
these rights.
Any description of the pattern of landholding in Java is 
complicated by the continued village, that is, communal, 
right of disposal over about one-quarter of all land- 
holdings.2 The ’kernel* villagers, those who are 
envisaged as being the descendants of the original 
settlers in the village, and who may comprise up to 50 
per cent of the village households,3 receive life-long
1
Donald R. Fagg, ’’Authority and Social Structure; a Study 
in Javanese Bureaucracy” (Harvard University, Ph.D. thesis, 
1958), P.136.2
W. Hollinger, quoted in Clifford Geertz, The Social 
Context of Economic Change: an Indonesian Case Study, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956, p.lU. As almost all 
village-right land is sawah, then, if Hollinger’s figure 
is correct, up to 50 per cent of all sawah is still ulti­
mately owned by the village. Geertz found that 24 per 
cent of sawah in the subdistrict he studied was still 
village-right land; loc.cit.
3 Compton reported that generally about half the households 
in the villages of Modjokerto kabupaten of East Java
r i g h t  o f  u s i f r u c t  o v e r  e q u a l  a r e a s ,  u s u a l ly  l e s s  th a n  two 
a c r e s ,  and t h i s  r i g h t  i s  i n h e r i t a b l e ,  w h ile  th e  la n d  in ­
v o lv e d  c a n n o t be  s u b d iv id e d  o r  s o l d .  S hou ld  a k e rn e l  
v i l l a g e r  d i e  w ith o u t  h e i r ,  commit a s e r io u s  c r im e , o r  le a v e  
th e  v i l l a g e ,  a m e e tin g  o f  a l l  k e r n e l  v i l l a g e r s  d e c id e s  to  
whom to  t r a n s f e r  th e  l a n d ,  u s u a l ly  to  a v i l l a g e r  who owns 
a house  b u t  no la n d  and  who h as b e en  w a i t in g  th e  l o n g e s t .
No p e rs o n  may own two s h a r e s .  The v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s  
r e c e iv e  e x t r a  la n d  in  p r o p o r t io n  to  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n ,  and 
r e l i n q u i s h  i t  when th e y  v a c a te  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n . * 1 A long 
w ith  th e  r i g h t  t o  v i l l a g e  la n d  a re  many o b l i g a t i o n s ,  such  
a s  m a in ta in in g  v i l l a g e  ro a d s  and i r r i g a t i o n  c h a n n e ls  and 
t a k in g  p a r t  in  th e  n ig h t  w a tc h . The in d iv id u a l ly -o w n e d  
la n d  may be d is p o s e d  o f  a t  w i l l ,  b u t  th e r e  i s  s t r o n g  
s o c i a l  p r e s s u r e  a g a i n s t  a l i e n a t i o n  o f  t h i s  la n d  to  p e o p le  
o u t s id e  th e  v i l l a g e . 2
11
p o s s e s s e d  a s h a re  o f  v i l l a g e  la n d ;  Boyd R. Com pton, 
M o d jo k erto  I , I n s t i t u t e  o f  C u r re n t  W orld A f f a i r s  R e p o r t,
New Y ork, 1956» p.7*
1
H o l l in g e r  e s t im a te s  t h a t  27*5 p e r  c e n t  o f  a l l  v i l l a g e -  
r i g h t  la n d  i s  u se d  b y  th e  v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s ;  q u o te d  in  
G e e r tz ,  The S o c ia l  C o n te x t o f  Econom ic C hange, p . l4 >  n o te  8.
2
I b i d . ,  p . 1 4 .  G e e r tz  fo und  t h a t  even  i n  th e  m ost sub­
u rb a n  v i l l a g e  he s t u d i e d ,  o n ly  a b o u t 10 p e r  c e n t  o f  sawah 
was h e ld  by  p e rs o n s  o u t s id e  th e  v i l l a g e .  I t  s h o u ld  be 
n o te d  in  c o n t r a s t ,  how ever, t h a t  In d o n e s ia n  governm ent 
o f f i c i a l s  found  in  November 1959 t h a t  34 p e r  c e n t  o f  
2 0 ,4 8 8  ow ners o f  saw ah in  In d ra m a ju  d i s t r i c t ,  West J a v a ,  
w ere a b s e n te e  la n d  ow ners; Dewan P e rtim b an g a n  Agung 
(Suprem e A d v iso ry  C o u n c i l ) ,  "L aporan  P e n je l id ik a n
The l a n d l e s s  p e a s a n t s  and  th o s e  w ith  o n ly  d im in u t iv e  
h o l d in g s  must s e e k  la n d  to  s h a r e c r o p  or* su p p le m e n ta ry  work 
o u t s i d e  th e  v i l l a g e  o r  o f  a n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  n a t u r e ,  su ch  
a s  p e t t y  t r a d i n g ,  t r a d e s ,  h a n d i c r a f t s ,  and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
(much o f  t r a n s p o r t  i s  done by  human h a c k ) .  C o n d i t io n s  
f o r  s h a r e c r o p p in g  a r e  o f t e n  h eav y , th e  s h a r e c r o p p e r  u s u a l l y  
r e c e i v i n g  o n ly  o n e - t h i r d  t o  o n e - h a l f  th e  c ro p  from  sa w a h , 
and i n  some a r e a s  t h e r e  i s  added  *key money* and th e  o b l i -
A
g a t i o n  to  work w i th o u t  recom pense  f o r  th e  l a n d l o r d .
However, e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  la n d o w n e rsh ip  has n o t  d e ­
v e lo p e d  to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  has  i n  some o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  
J a y ,  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  v i l l a g e s  i n  E a s t  J a v a ,  found  t h a t :
12
L andre fo rm  d i d a e r a h  Kawedanaan In d ra m a ju "  (R e p o r t  o f  Land 
Reform I n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n  In d ra m a ju  D i s t r i c t ) ,  m im eographed 
m a n u s c r ip t ,  D j a k a r t a ,  1960, pp.3> 5* An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
o f  th e  d i s t r i c t  o f  B a tang  ( i n  P eka longan  k a b u p a te n ) , w hich  
i n c l u d e s  3 k e t ja m a ta n s  and 67 v i l l a g e s ,  found  t h a t  *There 
a r e  some v i l l a g e s  i n  w hich a lm o s t  a l l  th e  l a n d  ( saw ah ) i s  
owned by p e r s o n s  o u t s i d e  t h e  v i l l a g e *  -  b u t  o n ly  t h r e e  
su c h  v i l l a g e s  were a c t u a l l y  named; Dewan P e r t im b an g a n  
Agung, "K esim pulan  H a s i l  P e n j e l i d i k a n  d i  Kawedanan B a ta n g "  
(C o n c lu s io n s  o f  th e  R e s u l t s  o f  th e  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n  B a ta n g  
D i s t r i c t ) ,  mimeographed m a n u s c r ip t ,  D j a k a r t a ,  1960, 
p p .1 - 2 .  I t  s h o u ld  be n o t e d ,  how ever, t h a t  th e  P ek a lo n g an  
a r e a  has  th e  g r e a t e s t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  l a r g e  l a n d h o l d i n g s ,  
and t h e r e f o r e  a b s e n te e  la n d o w n e r s h ip ,  i n  C e n t r a l  J a v a .
1
PKI, "Laporan Mengenai P e k e rd ja a n  P a r t a i  d ik a la n g a n  kaum 
T a n i"  (R e p o r t  C o n c e rn in g  P a r t y  Work among th e  P e a s a n t s ) ,  
BM, A p ril-M ay  1959» p«134* On November 20, 1959, 
p a r l i a m e n t  p a s s e d  an a c t  p r o v i d in g  f o r  a minimum s h a r e  o f  
50 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  c ro p  f o r  th e  t e n a n t .  T h is  new law  i s  
now b e i n g  s lo w ly  im p lem en ted .
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a poor family without land rights, in this area 
at any rate, may reasonably expect to be able to 
claim a sharecropping right from a well-to-do 
neighbor without much fear of rejection."1
Willner writes that the wealthier in the village ’feel 
some measure of responsibility in providing work /for the 
landless laboured even when rationally of dubious eco­
nomic gain to himself* Geertz has suggested two main 
factors as retarding the growth of a large genuinely 
alienated and politically disinherited agricultural 
proletariat1: the capacity of the village to absorb an 
increase in population through an intensification of 
agriculture, and the capacity of the social structure to 
adapt to a more complex pattern of social differentiation.-^ 
Thus, Geertz points out, one piece of land of one acre may
1
Robert Ravenelle Jay, ’’Santri and Abangan: Religious 
Schism in Rural Central Java” (Harvard University, Ph.D* 
thesis, 1957)» p.52. Jay also wrote (ibid., p.5 8) 
that:
the coercive power of close neighbor and kin bonds, 
together with the shortage of land, permit only the 
tougher, more aggressive independent landholding 
households to resist demands for some kind of 
sharecrop concessions.
2
Ann Ruth Willner, ’’Social Change in Javanese Town- 
Village Life”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
April 1958, vol.VI, no.3, p.233.
3
Clifford Geertz, The Development of the Javanese 
Economy: a Socio-Cultural Approach, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1956, p.U7»
have an owner, a renter, a major tenant, a subtenant and 
a wage labourer, all drawing shares from its output, 
shares that are unequal but not radically so«
Many Javanese peasants are forced, by their general 
poverty, the seasonal nature of their income and the high 
expense of occasional ritual feasts, to borrow goods or 
money from moneylenders or to sell their crops at low 
prices long before they are harvested. Interest rates 
in the capital-scarce village are high.^ Where the 
moneylenders are ethnic Indonesians, rather than Chinese, 
their operations have led to a certain degree of concen-
ptration of landholdings, apparently moreso in West Java. 
However, ’risk capital is ... chronically short, and thus 
becomes the sought rather than the s e e k i n g This fact 
may partly explain the apparent lack or weakness of 
peasant resentment at the moneylenders who are helping to 
meet the great demand for capital that is as yet unmet by 
government or cooperative enterprise.^-
1
See Asmu, ’’Masaalah Landreform” (The Question of Land 
Reform), BM, January 1960, p.24*
2
Justus Maria van der Kroef, ’’Indonesia: Economic 
Dualism”, Current History, November 1953> vol.XXV, no.147 
p.293. Only ethnic Indonesians are allowed to own agri­
cultural land in Indonesia.
3
Jay, ’’Santri and Abangan”, p.52.
4
Professor A.G. Pringgodigdo, president of Airlangga 
University, told me that during the Japanese occupation,
lr,
Are the poor villagers conscious and resentful of 
their unfavourable social and economic position? Geertz 
believes that village society 'has, in fact, proved 
remarkably capable of absorbing a very dense population 
without developing a sharp class segregation of haves and
Ahave-nots*. Jay found a clear distinction between the 
'patrons* and those who must sharecrop, but also a refusal 
by the villagers to conceptualize the community as divided
pinto two socially unequal categories. Jay further found 
that there was much movement across this division, and 
that about half the families on the wealthier side had
while he was a wedana in the Banjumas region, the Japanese 
issued a regulation forbidding loans of more than twelve 
months' duration. The peasants, however, would not 
report many of their longer-term debts to the wedana 
because they felt that they had the duty to pay them*
When Pringgodigdo told the peasants that the interest 
rates were extortionate, they replied that when they were 
in need the Chinese moneylender was always ready to help 
with goods or money. He told me that the peasants 
thought of the moneylenders as a help rather than an 
enemy. If this attitude is as widespread as my impression 
would indicate, it helps explain why PKI apparently lost no 
popular support because of its attempt in 1959 to reverse 
the government's decision to evict all foreigners from the 
villages. It should be noted that in Java there were no 
reports of the villagers molesting the Chinese who were 
being evicted. For a more sanguine picture of the 'debt- 
serfdom* of the Javanese peasants, see D.H. Burger, 
Structural Changes in Javanese Society: the Village Sphere, 
Ithaca, New York, 1957, p*12.
1
Geertz, The Social Context of Economic Change, p.15*
Jay, "Santri and Abangan", pp.58-60.
2
1 Kattenburg,started in their youth on the poorer side, 
studying a village near Salatiga, reached the conclusion 
that:
to my mind at least, class distinctions play no 
effective role in the village ... in final account, rights, obligations, privileges and, indeed, status, 
are pretty well the same for all the villagers.2
While it would be rash to generalize from the ex­
perience of a few research workers, their general con­
clusions as to the minimal nature of social antagonisms 
are supported by my own conversations with many Javanese 
and by the great difficulty experienced by PKI and its 
mass organizations in their efforts to create or increase 
such antagonisms. The impact of the 1945 revolution, 
with the concomitant penetration of political parties and 
mass organizations into rural areas, election campaigns,3 
and increased primary education,^ has undoubtedly led to
1 Ibid., pp.60, 65*
2
Paul M. Kattenburg, A Central Javanese Village in 1950» 
Ithaca, New York, 1951> pp.13-14*
3 For a brief description of the social effects of the 
campaigns for the 1955 elections, see Herbert Feith, The 
Indonesian Elections of 1955» Ithaca, New York, 1957* 
gassim.
For a brief description of the discontented, more am­
bitious, younger generation in the village, see Boyd R. 
Compton, Village Notebook II. What to Believe In?, 
Institute of Current World Affairs Report, New York, 1955 
pp.8-13; also his Mod .joker to I, pp. 14-17.
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i n c r e a s e d  m a t e r i a l  and s o c i a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  among th e  
p o o r e r  v i l l a g e r s  and p e rh a p s  t o  th e  b e g in n in g s  o f  s o c i a l  
c o n f l i c t .  But th e  p o o r e r  v i l l a g e r s  a r e  s t i l l  f a r  from 
th e  p o i n t  o f  e x p r e s s in g  v i o l e n t  v e r b a l  o r  more a c t i v e  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i th  th e  i n e q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  e x i s t .
(b ) V i l l a g e  g o v e rn m e n t.
I n  each  ke t, jam a tan  t h e r e  a r e  b e tw ee n  f i f t e e n  and  
tw e n ty  k e l u r a h a n s , w hich  i n  t u r n  c o n s i s t  o f  two to  se v e n  
h a m le t s .  The lo w e s t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  u n i t  i s  th e  k e l u r a h an , 
w hich  may have a p o p u l a t i o n  o f  up t o  s e v e r a l  th o u s a n d  
p e r s o n s .  S in c e  1945 th e  l u r a h  has  been  e l e c t e d  b y  a l l  
v i l l a g e  m ales  ag ed  18 and o v e r .  The l u r a h  i s  g e n e r a l l y  
e l e c t e d  f o r  l i f e ,  o r  u n t i l  he r e s i g n s  o r  i s  d i s m is s e d  by 
a member o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  governm ent r u r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
s e r v i c e .  He u s u a l l y  n o m in a te s  th e  o t h e r  v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s ,  
b u t  h i s  c h o ic e  m ust be  e n d o rs e d  b y  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
s e r v i c e .  F o rm e r ly  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  l u r a h  was g e n e r a l l y  
h e r e d i t a r y , ' 1 and th e  l u r a h  a c t e d  a s  a p a t e r n a l  d e s p o t .
S in c e  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  th e  l u r a h  has  become l e s s  o f  a 
’ l i t t l e  k i n g ’ , a l th o u g h  he s t i l l  r e t a i n s  a m o n a rc h is t
1
A p p a r e n t ly  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  l u r a h  i s  s t i l l  u s u a l l y  
r e t a i n e d  w i t h i n  one o r  two f a m i l i e s  i n  each  v i l l a g e ,  b u t  
t h e r e  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  c o m p e t i t io n  b e tw e e n  members o f  th e  
l a r g e  f a m i l i e s ,  th e  c o m p e t i t o r s  o f t e n  s e e k in g  th e  a i d  o f  
a p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y .
c h a r a c te r  in  the more remote v i l l a g e s .  He s t i l l  r e t a in s  
th e  r e s p e c t  o f  h i s  v i l l a g e r s ,  h u t has been  no e f f e c t i v e  
b a r r ie r  to  th e  e n tr y  o f  an array  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  and 
mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  in to  the v i l l a g e .  P o l i t i c a l l y  he i s  
becom ing in c r e a s in g ly  the nominee and dependent o f  a 
p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty , or  he a ttem p ts to  m a in ta in  p o l i t i c a l  
n e u t r a l i t y  so  as n o t to  a n ta g o n ize  any major group in  h i s  
v i l l a g e .
The members o f  the r u r a l a d m in is tr a t iv e  s e r v ic e  used
to  e x e r c is e  c o n s id e r a b le  power and a u th o r ity  o ver  the
v i l l a g e r s ,  b u t such power and a u th o r ity  have b een :
r a d ic a l ly  c u r ta i le d  by the upsurge o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  
and d em ocra tic  f e e l in g  and by th e  developm ent o f  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  and mass o r g a n iz a t io n  a t  the  
l o c a l  l e v e l . *
The in f lu e n c e  o f  the r u r a l a d m in is tr a t iv e  s e r v ic e  i s  s t i l l  
f e l t  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e  more remote a r e a s , and 
PNI i s  s t i l l  dependent upon i t  fo r  m o b iliz in g  much o f  i t s  
v o te s  in  e l e c t i o n s ,  bu t l ik e  th a t  o f  th e  lu ra h s i t  i s  on 
th e  wane and has been unable to  p reven t the growth o f  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  in  the v i l l a g e s .
1
H erbert F e i t h ,  " Ind on esia" , in  George McTuman Kahin 
( e d . ) ,  Governments and P o l i t i c s  o f  S o u th e a st  A s ia , I th a c a ,  
New York, 1 959 f p .2 0 9 . See a l s o  Pagg, "A uthority  and 
S o c ia l  S tr u c tu r e " , e s p e c i a l ly  p p .2 3 2 , 4 2 0 -1 , 439> 460;  
and S e lo soem ard jan , " S o c ia l Changes in  Jo g ja k a rta "
(C o r n e ll U n iv e r s i ty ,  Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  1959)» p p .1 7 8 -8 6 .
e d u c a t i o n ,^  As th e  above d iag ra m  i l l u s t r a t e s ,  th e  s a n t r i
and  n o n - s a n t r i  may be  th o u g h t  o f  as  two su b -c o m m u n i t ie s ,  
b u t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  c o m p le te ly  e x c l u s i v e  b e c a u s e ,  by  and 
l a r g e ,  e a c h  sub-com m unity  r e c o g n iz e s  th e  p r e s t i g e f u l  
p e r s o n s  i n  th e  o t h e r  sub-com m unity , F u r t h e r ,  t h e r e
a p p e a r s  to  b e  a t e n d e n c y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a t  t h e  e l i t e  l e v e l ,  
f o r  th e  two com m unities  t o  merge as  one n a t i o n a l  s t a t u s  
sy s te m  em b ra c in g  p e r s o n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  e t h n i c  and  r e l i g i o u s  
b a c k g ro u n d ,
( a )  The e l i t e .
The s o c i a l  e l i t e ,  o f  a few th o u sa n d  p e r s o n s ,  i s  a 
n a t i o n a l  c o n g lo m e ra t io n  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  members o f  t h e  o ld  
J a v a n e s e  a r i s t o c r a c y  b u t  a l s o  many more who have r i s e n  t o  
p rom inence  by  a number o f  c h a n n e ls :  p a r t i e s  and mass
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  th e  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  b u s i n e s s ,  th e  armed 
f o r c e s ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  and so  on . The s a n t r i s  a r e  n o t  as 
w e l l  r e p r e s e n t e d  in  th e  e l i t e  as  in  th e  m idd le  and low er 
s o c i a l  c a t e g o r i e s .  The s a n t r i s  h a v e ,  by  and l a r g e ,  
e i t h e r  s c o r n e d  employment i n  t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y ,  which i s  one 
o f  th e  main av enues  to  m em bership  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  e l i t e ,
1
I t  m ust be n o t e d  t h a t  i n  In d o n e s ia  c o n s i d e r a b le  p r e s t i g e  
i s  s t i l l  a t t a c h e d  t o  a c h ie v e m e n ts  i n  fo rm a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  
w h i le  th e  same a p p l i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  J a v a ,  to  a r i s t o ­
c r a t i c  t i t l e s .
"because they are, in general, the indigenous commercial 
and industrial group with economic and religious outlets 
for initiative which the non-santris do not have (the 
remainder of private commerce and industry being 
effectively tied up by the Chinese); or, if santris do 
enter the bureaucracy, the armed forces, political parties 
and so on, and enter the social elite by those channels, 
they tend to lose their santriness and become absorbed 
by and indistinguishable from the non-santris. Further­
more, although santris comprise a high percentage of the 
small indigenous commercial and industrial group, they 
were largely excluded from a new element of the social 
elite created by the PNI-led first Ali Sastroamidjojo 
cabinet from which the largest santri party, Masjumi, 
was excluded: the government-sponsored and protected 
’national businessmen1•
It should be noted that a position of prominence in 
such as the political or economic sphere does not neces­
sarily bring entry into the social elite. For example, 
almost no persons prominent in PKI or the communist mass 
organizations are in the social elite; nor are more than 
a handful of the wealthy ethnic Chinese of Indonesian 
citizenship. It is also true that while most of the 
social elite are readily recognizable by obvious status
indicators - a large house in the right location, a large 
new car (preferably a Mercedes Benz), fine quality 
textiles purchased abroad, large receptions and even 
cocktail parties - not all members of the social elite 
need to possess such material attributes, nor does 
possession of them automatically ensure a position in 
the elite. The only sure way to recognize a member of 
the social elite is to know if he is invited to the homes 
of other members of the elite, and if he or his children 
marry other members of the elite.
(b) The middle status group.
In Indonesia the middle status group comprises that 
large number of white-collar citizens between the elite 
and those who have a blue collar or no collar at all. 
This middle group could almost be called the pegawai 
(government employee) class because the great majority 
of its members are associated with the bureaucracy: 
officials, clerks, technical staff, teachers, officers 
in the armed forces. The tremendous growth of the 
bureaucracy since the establishment of the Indonesian 
republic has been largely caused by three factors: the 
governments belief that anyone with qualifications, 
educational or revolutionary, is entitled to a position
in the bureaucracy; the political and family padding of 
ministries by individual ministers and their subordinates; 
and the increase in work done by the government, compared 
with colonial times. Employees of the central government 
apparatus have increased from about 150,000 in 1940 to 
570,000 in 1953**1 One effect of this expansion of the 
bureaucracy has been to prevent the growth of a literate 
unemployed, a source of radical politicians in many 
countries,
A significant indigenous commercial or industrial 
class has not yet emerged. After the transfer of 
sovereignty in December 1949* the major commercial and 
industrial enterprises were in the hands of Europeans or 
Chinese, and the Chinese, of whom about one million live 
in Java, dominated most other forms of economic activity 
requiring more than a minimum of capital and business 
skill. There were exceptions, indigenous Indonesians 
in some medium and small-scale industry, commerce and 
repair shops, and they were mostly santris. In 1957*
1
Geertz, The Social Context of Economic Change, p.149* 
note 118, The government’s National Planning Bureau 
claimed that at the end of 1953 there were 370*389 employees of the central government and 229*332 employees 
(excluding village officials) of autonomous government 
bodies, with the status of government personnel; Central 
Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 1960, p.236.
the Indonesian government confiscated all Dutch enter­
prises, which opened up a new range of positions for 
Indonesians, but as the larger concerns were retained 
under government control the new managers were, in fact, 
government employees, members of the bureaucracy. 
Indigenous Indonesians also constitute a part of the free 
professions, doctors and lawyers, and their more eminent 
members are in the social elite.
(c) The lower status group.
The gulf between the middle group and the lower 
group is a marked one in Java. In general the urban 
lower status group lives in the kampongs, though it must 
be noted that the housing shortage and the low government 
wages have forced many lower government employees also to 
live in kampongs; they are in the kampongs, but not of 
them.
Although I frequently asked Indonesian politicians 
and government officials how all the kampong dwellers 
earned a living, none was able to give a satisfactory 
answer. Under Dutch rule, at least until the 1930's, 
industrial development was discouraged, and in 1940 only 
an estimated 200,000 workers in Java were in industry 
using modern machinery; 2-g- millions, of whom many would
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"be in the small towns and villages, were estimated to 
be employed in small-scale industry.1 A survey of 
industry in 1955 indicated a little over 400,000 workers 
in Java employed in undertakings with over 50 workers.1 2 3
Only 140,248 workers were employed in undertakings with 
over 249 workers. Furthermore, about 35 per cent of 
those employed were women.3 Medium and large-scale
manufacturing accounts, therefore, for only a small part 
of the urban labour force. The rest is employed in a 
bewildering array of occupations, in small-scale manu­
facture and processing, transportation (by lorry, jeep, 
oplet, betjak, bicycles, carts and human back), repairs
1
A.M. de Neuman, Industrial Development in Indonesia, 
Cambridge, England, 1955, pp.20-1; Peter H.W. Sitsen, 
Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies, New 
York, 1942, p.5« A lower estimate is that in 1939 up 
to 600,000 workers were engaged in small-scale, non- 
mechanized industry; Jan O.M. Broek, Economic Development 
of the Netherlands Indies, New York, 1942, pp.81-2.2
International Labour Office, Report to the Government 
of Indonesia, pp.16-18. Over three-quarters of the 
companies circularized answered, and the report adds that 
by implication it was the smaller companies that did not. 
It should be noted that the industrial undertakings are 
not concentrated in any one part of Java. Of about 
400,000 workers in medium and large undertakings in Java, 
approximately 146,000 were in West Java, 151,000 in 
Central Java, and 103,000 in East Java.
3
For details of the percentage of women workers in 
certain industries, see below, p.442 , footnote 1 •
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of all kinds, small-scale trade, domestic service, and 
labouring jobs on such as construction, road sweeping, 
and grass cutting.
In the smaller enterprises, which employ the great 
majority of the urban labour force, it would be broadly 
correct to say that the employer, whether Chinese, santri 
or abangan, still exhibits a certain fatherly concern for 
his workers, a certain responsibility for them in times 
of family illness, death, or other difficulties.
The kampongs, especially in Djakarta and Surabaja, 
are densely crowded collections of bamboo houses that 
have arisen behind the shops and better houses on the 
paved roads. Conditions in the kampongs vary greatly 
from kampong to kampong and from city to city, but in 
general the homes are without their own water and 
electricity, and sewerage arrangements are primitive.
The poor living conditions of the kampong dwellers is 
reflected in their health and nutrition. The death rate 
among all Indonesians in Djakarta in the 1930's was 30 
per thousand, and about 30 per cent for children under one 
year; and, as Wertheim comments, conditions have, if 
anything, deteriorated since then.^
1 W.F. Wertheim, Effects of Western Civilization on 
Indonesian Society, New York, 1930, p.U&. For information
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In  1957 th e  M i n i s t r i e s  o f  Labour and H e a l th  made 
s u r v e y s  i n  D j a k a r t a  o f  a random sam ple o f  th e  f a m i l i e s  
o f  w o rk e rs  i n  m a n u fa c tu r in g  e n t e r p r i s e s . ”' Prom a su b ­
sam ple  o f  166 f a m i l i e s ,  th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  Labour found  t h a t  
an  a v e ra g e  95*83 p e r  c e n t  o f  e x p e n d i tu r e  was on con­
su m p tio n  ’i n  o r d e r  to  l i v e ’ , and 4 » 17 p e r  c e n t  on su c h  as 
t a x e s ,  i n t e r e s t  on l o a n s ,  and e n t e r t a i n m e n t .  Of th e  
e x p e n d i tu r e  on co n su m p tio n ,  6 0 .0  p e r  c e n t  was on fo o d ,  o f  
w hich  49*12 p e r  c e n t  was on r i c e  a lo n e .  The m i n i s t r y ’s
r e p o r t ,  w r i t t e n  i n  1959, added  t h a t  ’I t  can  be e s t i m a t e d  
t h a t  th e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  i s  a l r e a d y  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  and  
i s  becom ing  w o r s e . ’ The M in i s t r y  o f  H e a l th  s u r v e y  
c o v e re d  180 f a m i l i e s .  I t  fo u n d  t h a t  o n ly  30 p e r  c e n t  
a t e  t h r e e  t im e s  a d a y ;  t h a t  th e  a v e ra g e  w o r k e r s ’ c a l o r i e  
i n t a k e  was o n ly  7 0 . 4  p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  c a l c u l a t e d  minimum 
r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  and f o r  th e  members o f  t h e i r  f a m i l i e s ,  o n ly  
80 .1  p e r  c e n t .  V itam in  d e f i c i e n c y  was w id e s p re a d .
on th e  d eve lopm en t o f  towns in  I n d o n e s i a ,  and l i v i n g  con­
d i t i o n s  o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  u rb a n  p o p u l a t i o n  b e f o r e  w o r ld  
war I I ,  se e  W.P. W ertheim  ( e d . ) ,  The In d o n e s ia n  Town,
The Hague and Bandung, 1958, 379 p*
1
K em en te r ian  P e rb u ru h a n ,  L aporan  K em en te r ian  P e rb u ru h a n ,  
A p r i l  1 9 5 7 -A p r i l  1959 ( M in i s t r y  o f  Labour R e p o r t ,  A p r i l  
1957-A p r i l  1959)» D j a k a r t a ,  1959, p p .2 5 - 8 ;  and  L aporan  
K em en te r ian  P e rb u ru h a n ,  A p r i l - D ju n i  1958, D j a k a r t a ,  1958, 
p p .8 - 9 .
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Wage statistics are useless unless put against cost 
of living indices - which are not available in Indonesia* 
Continual inflation, especially rapid in the period 1957 
to 1960, has meant that any wage increases have quickly 
lost their purchasing power*1 Careful studies suggest 
that real wages are lower than pre-war. To quote 
Higgins:
Available data indicate that national income per 
capita is below the 1939 level, probably below the 
1929 level, and may even be below the level of 
1919• There is no clear evidence that per capita
real income is currently rising*1 2
The communist trade union federation has estimated that
real wages of government workers fell from an index of
100 in 1954 to 58 in 1959.3
1
The supply of currency is a rough indicator of inflation. 
It has risen from 240.0 million rupiahs in March 1938, to 
3,328.1 millions at the end of 1951, 7,473.7 millions at 
the end of 1954, 14,091.4 millions at the end of 1957, 
and 19,871*7 millions at the end of 1958. By the end of 
July 1959 the supply reached 33,988 million rupiahs. The 
severe monetary measures in August cut this to 20,999 
millions, but by the end of the year, the supply had 
increased again to 26,383*1 millions. Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Statistical Pocketbook 1960, p.183.
2
Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia^ Economic Stabilization 
and Development, New York, 1957, p.xv. See also D.W. 
Fryer, "Indonesia ’s Economic Prospects", Far Eastern 
Survey, December 1954, vol.XXIII, no.12, pp.177-8; and 
S. Daniel Neumark, "The National Income of Indonesia, 
1951-1952", Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, June 1954, 
pp.348-91.
ITUN, March 1960, p*4.3
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In the absence of industrial expansion that equals 
the rate of urban growth,^ there is less work per head of 
urban population* This situation has not led to a 
massive army of unemployed, rather it has led to a pattern 
similar to that in the villages: greatly increased under­
employment, more persons doing the same amount of work, 
but not the creation of a socially disinherited, unem-
pployed proletariat.
1
Indonesia does not have adequate statistics of in­
dustrial production, but such figures as imports of 
industrial raw materials, provided in the annual reports 
of the Bank Indonesia, indicate general slow growth in 
production since 1950 with a recession in 1958 as a result 
of the confiscation of Dutch enterprises in December 1957 
and the outbreak of civil war in February 1958* But only the imports of malt, paper, cloves and bar iron were 
higher in 1958 than in 1940.
2
Estimates of the number of unemployed in Indonesia 
range widely from 15 millions by PKI leader Njoto towards 
the end of 1954 (quoted in Justus Maria van der Kroef, 
"Indonesia’s Economic Difficulties”. Far Eastern Survey» 
February 1955, vol.XXIV, no.2, p.21), to 1,736,000 by the Ministry of Labour in 1958 (Bank Indonesia, Report 
for the Year 1958-1959. Djakarta, 1959, p.234)* Njoto's figure must have included the partly employed or the 'not 
fully employed', and if so his figure seems reasonable.
The Indonesian National Planning Bureau in 1954 estimated 
that 30 to 40 per cent of the Indonesian labour force, 
and more in Java, was underemployed; National Planning 
Bureau, ’’Indonesia's Economic Developments 1953”, Ekonomi 
dan Keuangan Indonesia, July 1954, p.436.
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I I .  THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, 1920-1946
The f i r s t  s o c i a l i s t - o r i e n t e d  o r g a n iz a t io n  i n  In d o n e s ia  
was th e  ISDV ( th e  I n d i e s ’ S o c ia l  D em o cra tic  A s s o c ia t io n ) ,  
fo u n d ed  i n  1914 "by fo u r  Dutchmen r e s i d e n t  in  In d o n e s ia *
By 1920 th e  more e x tre m e  l e f t i s t s  i n  th e  ISDV had  e s ­
t a b l i s h e d  c lo s e  c o n ta c t  w ith  In d o n e s ia n  l e f t i s t s  i n  th e  
n a t i o n a l i s t  S a r e k a t  Is la m  (Moslem A s s o c ia t io n ) .  On May 
2 3 , 1920 th e  In d o n e s ia n  Communist P a r ty  was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  
w i th  i t s  h e a d q u a r te r s  a t  th e  Sem arang b ra n c h  o f  S a re k a t
«I
I s la m .
1
F o r th e  h i s t o r y  o f  PKI up to  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  commu­
n i s t  r e v o l t s  o f  1926 and 1927, s e e :  D.N. A i d i t ,  S e d ia ra h  
G-erakan Buruh In d o n e s ia  ( H is to r y  o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  L abour 
M ovement) ,  D j a k a r t a , 1952, 64 p . ; H arry  J .  B enda, ’’The 
Communist R e b e l l io n s  o f  1926-1927 in  I n d o n e s ia ” , P a c i f i c  
H i s t o r i c a l  R ev iew , 1955» vol.X X IV , n o .2 , p p .1 3 9 -52 ;
H a rry  J .  Benda and  R uth T. McVey ( e d s . ) ,  The Communist 
U p r is in g s  o f  1926-1927 in  In d o n e s ia :  Key D ocum ents,
I t h a c a ,  New Y ork , 19&0, 177 p . ; J .T h .  P e t ru s  B lu m b erg er,
Le Communisme aux  In d es  N e e r l a n d a i s e s , P a r i s ,  1929,
19Ö p . ; G .S. B o u sq u e t, A F re n c h  V i e ~ o f  th e  N e th e r la n d s  
I n d i e s , London, 1940, p p .2 4 -2 7 ; George McTurnan K ah in , 
N a t io n a lis m  and  R e v o lu tio n  i n  I n d o n e s ia , I t h a c a ,  New Y ork, 
1952, p p .7 4 -8 7 ; N e th e r la n d s  E a s t  I n d ie s  G overnm ent, 
" O f f i c i a l  R e p o r t,  D a ted  J a n u a ry  1927, o f  th e  Governm ent 
o f  th e  D utch E a s t  I n d ie s  on th e  Communist D is tu rb a n c e s  o f  
November 1926” , i n  A n n u a ire  de D ocum en ta tion  C o lo n ia le  
C om paree, 1927 , v o l . I ,  B r u s s e l s ,  1928, p p .1 S i-2 0 0 ;  PKI,
40 Tahun PKI (PKI 40 Y e a r s ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  196O, p p .7 -3 0 ;
B. S c h r ie k e ,  "The C auses and E f f e c t s  o f  Communism on th e  
W est C o a s t o f  S u m a tra ” , i n  h i s  In d o n e s ia n  S o c io lo g ic a l  
S t u d i e s :  S e le c te d  W r i t in g s , p a r t  I ,  The Hague and Bandung, 
1955 , P P .8 3 -1 6 6 ; Je an n e  S . M in tz , "M arxism i n  I n d o n e s ia ” , 
i n  F ra n k  N. T rä g e r  ( e d . ) ,  M arxism  in  S o u th e a s t  A s ia ,
D uring th e  n e x t 6^ y e a r s ,  the communists attem p ted  
f i r s t  to  cap tu re  c o n tr o l  o f  S arek at Is lam , and when th e y  
f a i l e d ,  to  e s t a b l i s h  a p a r a l l e l  o r g a n iz a t io n . A change 
in  p o l ic y  turned  th e  P a r ty ’s major e f f o r t  to  trad e union  
a c t i v i t y .  The Dutch c o lo n ia l  government was qu ick  to  
e x i l e  the more prom inent com m unists, le a v in g  the P arty  
in  the hands o f  e x tr e m is t s  who le d  the P arty  in to  an i l l -  
o rg a n ized  s e r i e s  o f  r e v o l t s  in  West Java in  November 1926 
and on th e  w est c o a s t  o f  Sumatra in  January 1927« At 
th e  tim e o f  th e  r e v o l t s ,  th ere  were about 3>000 P arty  
members.
The government e a s i l y  q u e l le d  th e  r e v o l t s ,  a r r e s te d  
1 3 ,0 0 0  s u s p e c t s ,  im p rison ed  4 , 5 0 0 , and in te r n e d  1 ,3 0 8  in  
a c o n c e n tr a t io n  camp in  West I r ia n .  PKI was d e c la r e d  
i l l e g a l .  A lthough th e  P arty  d id  n o t re-em erge as a
A
s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  fo r c e  u n t i l  1946, i t s  a n ti-D u tc h  
a c t io n  in  the e a r ly  1 9 2 0 ’s p la c e d  i t  in  a p o s i t io n  o f  
n a t i o n a l i s t  honour as the f i r s t  modern n a t i o n a l i s t  m artyr  
a t  the hands o f  Dutch c o lo n ia l is m .
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S ta n fo r d , C a l i f o r n ia ,  1939, p p .177-87; Robert Van N i e l ,  
The Emergence o f  th e  Modern In d on esian  E l i t e , The Hague 
and Bandung, 1960, p . 154 e t  s e q . ; and A lexandre Von Arx, 
L ’E v o lu tio n  P o l i t iq u e  en In d o n es ie  de 1900 a 1942 ,
P r ib o u rg , S w itz e r la n d , 1949, p p .10 5 -2 0 8 .
1
For th e  o f f i c i a l  PKI s to r y  o f  communist underground  
a c t i v i t i e s  d u r in g  th e se  tw enty  y e a r s ,  s e e  PKI, 40 Tahun 
PKI, pp .31-43*
PKI was re-established on October 21, 1945» "but the 
exiled veteran leaders did not return until 1946, when 
they took control and ensured that the Party pursued a 
policy of cooperation with other socialist and nationalist 
political forces. It is to be noted, however, that many 
of the returning communists, and many of those who had 
been members of the communist underground, did not enter 
PKI, Many went into the Socialist Party, the Indonesian 
Labour Party, and Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth). 
Kahin does not consider this development to have been 
part of a long-term plan.
For two years during the revolution, the open and 
covert communists followed a policy of support for the 
Republican government, especially in its negotiations 
with the Dutch. In return they received large represen­
tation in the appointed parliament and, at times, signifi­
cant representation in the cabinet. At the same time the
40
1
For the history of PKI from its re-establishment in 1945 
to the outbreak of the Madiun rebellion in September 1948, 
see Hartono, "The Indonesian Communist Movement 1945-1948: 
its Development and Relations with the Soviet Union” 
(Columbia University, Master!s thesis, 1959)» 116 p.; 
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p.158 
et seq.; Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian 
Revolution, Ithaca, New York, 1957» pp.9-70; PKI, 4o Tahun 
PKI, pp.44-57; and PKI, Lahimja Partai Komunis Indonesia 
dan Perkembangannja (The Birth and Growth of the 
Indonesian Communist Party), Djakarta, 1951» PP*15-23«
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open and covert communists were active in the mass 
organizations (or which the labour federation SOBSI, the 
peasant organization BTI, and Pesindo were the most im­
portant), and were later to use their positions to capture 
control of them.
The first Republican cabinet, installed on August 31» 
19U5, included Amir Sjarifuddin. He was then known as a 
leftwing socialist leader of the wartime underground but 
was to declare in 1948 that he had been a communist for 
thirteen years. The first working committee of the 
appointed parliament included Sjarifuddin as vice-chairman, 
and also Tan Ling Djie, then known as a leader of the 
Socialist Party but who was already a member of the 
'illegal PKI' which was coordinating the work of the 
communists in the various parties. Sjarifuddin was in­
cluded in the first Sjahrir cabinet as Minister of 
Defence, a position he retained in the second Sjahrir 
cabinet that also included a communist, Wikana, as 
Minister Without Portfolio.
Sjahrir's third cabinet, appointed on October 2,
1946, included among its 31 members one open communist 
and three covert communists. Sjarifuddin retained the 
post of Minister of Defence. In March 1947 PKI was 
rewarded for its support of the government by an increase 
in its parliamentary representation from 2 to 35 when the
size of parliament was enlarged from 212 to 514 members. 
After the enlargement of parliament, two young communists, 
who were to win control of the Party in January 1951» 
became prominent in parliamentary work: Njoto as chairman 
of the PKI group in the working committee of parliament, 
and D.N. Aidit as chairman of the PKI group in the full 
meeting. In the new working committee of parliament, 
the communist-socialist alliance, Sajap Kiri (Left Wing), 
received 17 of the L7 seats.
The cabinet which succeeded Sjahrir's third, and 
which was in office from July 5» 1947 to January 23» 1948, 
went far towards giving the communists a position from 
which they might have been able to win full control of 
the Republican government. Of the 34 ministers, 
Sjarifuddin was both Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence, two open communists were Ministers of State, a 
covert communist was Deputy Prime Minister and another 
was a third Minister of State. It was widely believed 
that Sjarifuddin was using his position to advance his 
allies within the army and to establish secret arms and 
ammunition caches in the mountains. The communists 
were unable, however, to consolidate their position for 
two main reasons. First, the Dutch began their first 
major attack on the Republic at the end of July 1947» and 
the cabinet was therefore preoccupied with the struggle for
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survival and then with precarious negotiations with the 
Dutch. Second, the government felt forced to sign the 
highly favourable Renville agreement with the Dutch.
This caused the opposition, already concerned at the 
communist strength, to combine and bring down the govern­
ment after less than seven months of existence. The 
post-1950 Party leadership was to criticize ’the transfer 
of state power to the bourgeois class in February 1948’ 
as ’the peak of basic errors committed by PKI during the 
revolution * • ^
In this way the most important instrument in the 
class struggle, that is, state power, was entirely 
removed from the hands of the people, and from 
that moment became the instrument for oppressing 
the people.
The Sajap Kiri refused to accept a junior position in 
the next cabinet, that of Vice-President Hatta, but in 
January 1948 a large part of the intellectuals and other 
democratic socialists in the Socialist Party split away 
to form PSI which supported the new cabinet. On February 
26, 1948 the Sajap Kiri was reorganized as the Front 
Demokrasi Rakjat (People’s Democratic Front). The Front 
soon launched strong attacks, including strikes, against 




On A ugust 11, 1948, M usso, a com m unist v e te r a n  o f  
th e  1 9 2 0 ’s ,  r e tu r n e d  to  In d o n e s ia  a f t e r  o v e r twenty- 
y e a r s  o f  e x i l e  in  th e  S o v ie t  U nion and was im m e d ia te ly  
acknow ledged  a s  th e  l e a d e r  o f  PK I. Musso drew  up a 
le n g th y  r e s o l u t i o n  w h ich  c a l l e d  f o r  th e  r e o r g a n iz a t io n  
o f  th e  com m unist f o r c e s  i n to  one o p e n ly  com m unist p a r t y ,  
and  p r e s e n te d  a new f o rm u la t io n  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i te d  
f r o n t  p o l i c y .  The p le n a ry  m ee tin g  o f  th e  PKI c e n t r a l  
com m ittee  a d o p te d  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  on A ugust 2 7 , w hereupon 
th e  l e a d e r s  o f  th e  S o c i a l i s t  and L abour p a r t i e s  p u b l ic ly  
d e c la r e d  t h a t  th e y  h a d  b e en  com m unists f o r  many y e a rs  
and announced  th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p a r t i e s .
On S ep tem ber 1 , 1948, th e  new 16-member p o l i tb u r e a u  
o f  th e  e n la rg e d  PKI was an n o u n ced , and in c o r p o r a te d  th e  
p ro m in e n t l e a d e r s  o f  th e  th r e e  fo rm er co m m u n is t-led  
p a r t i e s .  P a r ty  l e a d e r s  to u re d  th e  c o u n try  to  e x p la in  
th e  new o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  p o l i c i e s  to  c a d re s  
and members o f  PKI and  th e  n o w -d is s o lv e d  p a r t i e s ,  and a 
s t a r t  was made in  s i f t i n g  an d  r e g i s t e r i n g  th o s e  members 
o f  th e  d i s s o lv e d  p a r t i e s  who w ere c o n s id e re d  s u i t a b l e  
f o r  m em bership i n  th e  e n la rg e d  PKI. But b e fo r e  th e
1
PKI, D ja la n  B aru u n tu k  R e p u b lik  In d o n e s ia  (New Road 
f o r  th e  In d o n e s ia n  R e p u b l ic ) ,  ( s e v e n th  e d i t i o n ) ,  D ja k a r ta  
1953, 34  p .
new p o l i c i e s  c o u ld  "be f u l l y  im p lem en ted , th e  Madiun
1
r e b e l l i o n  b e g an  on S ep tem ber 18, 1948.
I t  a p p e a rs  t h a t  th e  M adiun r e b e l l i o n  b eg an  when 
com m unist and  p ro -co m m u n is t c i v i l i a n s  and army o f f i c e r s  
in  th e  Madiun a r e a  p a n ic k e d  a t  th e  g o v e rn m e n ts  p la n  to  
d e m o b il iz e  many o f  th e  co m m u n is t- le d  arm ed u n i t s .
A lth o u g h  i t  i s  p ro b a b le  t h a t  PKI was p r e p a r in g  f o r  an 
e v e n tu a l  arm ed s t r u g g l e ,  th e  r e b e l l i o n  in  Madiun was 
p re m a tu re  and  p o se d  th e  PKI l e a d e r s  th e  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t io n  
o f  w hat to  d o :  to  do n o th in g ,  and  s e e  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  in  
th e  arm ed f o r c e s  e l im in a te d ;  o r  to  j o in  th e  r e b e l s ,  and 
t r y  to  tu r n  th e  p re m a tu re  u p r i s i n g  i n to  a s u c c e s s f u l  
r e v o l u t io n .  Some o f  th e  p o l i t b u r e a u  m em bers, in c lu d in g  
A lim in , m e re ly  w ent i n t o  h id in g ;  o th e r s  w ere a r r e s t e d  
b e fo r e  th e y  c o u ld  ta k e  any  a c t i o n ;  b u t  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  
th e  to p  e c h e lo n  le a d e r s  w ent to  Madiun and to o k  o v e r th e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  th e  r e b e l l i o n .
The governm en t a c te d  s w i f t l y ,  r e c a p tu r in g  Madiun 
w i th in  two w eeks, and t o t a l l y  c ru s h in g  th e  r e b e l l i o n  
w i th in  two m on ths . Musso was k i l l e d  in  a s k i rm is h  a t
1
The b e s t  a c c o u n t o f  th e  M adiun r e b e l l i o n  and th e  e v e n ts  
l e a d in g  up to  i t  i s  K a h in , N a t io n a l is m  and R e v o lu tio n  i n  
I n d o n e s ia , p p .2 5 9 -3 0 3 . A lso  good i s  H a rto n o , "The 
In d o n e s ia n  Communist Movement 1 9 4 5 -1 9 4 8 " , p p .8 4 -9 6 . For 
th e  more im p o r ta n t  PKI a c c o u n ts  o f  th e  r e b e l l i o n ,  s e e  
b e lo w , p .2 4 2  , f o o tn o te  1 •
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the end of October, but the other communist leaders were 
captured. In all, some 36,000 PKI members, sympathizers 
and suspected sympathizers wrere imprisoned.'1 Many second- 
echelon leaders were killed in the fighting or shot after 
capture, but the PKI suffered the most severe blow in 
December 1948 when the army shot the eleven most prominent 
communist prisoners rather than free them in face of 
advancing Dutch troops. Among those shot were five 
politbureau members, including Amir Sjarifuddin, and the 
two top leaders of SOBSI, the trade union federation.
The chairman of the Indonesian Labour Party was also 
killed during the rebellion.
Most of the communists captured or arrested at the 
time of the rebellion were freed when the Dutch attacked 
and before charges could be brought against them. Many 
took to the hills and joined the Republican guerrilla 
bands. When the Dutch finally withdrew at the end of 
1949, the government took no further action against them.
7
PKI, Lahirn.ja, p.23. The personal observation of those 
who helped put down the rebellion confirms that many 
thousands were arrested.
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I. PROLOGUE
After the Madiun rebellion and the second Dutch 
attack on the Republic in December 1948, PKI was broken 
and disorganized. Reorganization of the Party was not 
vigorously undertaken until the last months of 1950 when 
a group of young communists began to take control. The 
leader of the young communists was D.N. Aidit. He and 
his colleagues, who constituted the Aidit leadership, 
began to grope their way towards a new overall policy for 
the Party. In 1951 and the first months of 1952, they 
shaped a broad, national united front policy by which the 
communists were to organize large segments of the popu­
lation and to align themselves with a wide range of non-
Acommunists against the anti-communists. The new policy
1
The terms anti-communist and non-communist as used in 
this thesis require explanation. To be anti-communist 
is to be openly anti-communist, verbally or otherwise.
To be non-communist is to be neither openly pro-communist 
nor openly anti-communist. A non-communist may be, in 
sentiments or in theory, anti-communist, but for some 
reason (often political expediency) unwilling to express
was p u t  i n to  e f f e c t  and  b ro u g h t  PKI a re m a rk a b le  s e r i e s  
o f  s u c c e s s e s .  At th e  same t im e , th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  
n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  was p r o g r e s s iv e ly  r e f i n e d  and 
e l a b o r a t e d .
A i d i t  and  h i s  f e l lo w  l e a d e r s  w ere M a r x is t - L e n in i s t s
in  t h a t  th e y  a n a ly z e d  th e  In d o n e s ia n  s i t u a t i o n  in  te rm s
o f  th e  b ro a d  t h e o r i e s  o f  M arx ism -L en in ism , b u t ,  l i k e  Mao
T s e - tu n g ,  th e y  w ere im p re sse d  w ith  th e  n eed  to  fo rm u la te
t h e i r  own p o l i c i e s  and t a c t i c s  w ith  d i r e c t  r e f e r e n c e  to
th e  o b j e c t i v e  f a c t s  ( a s  th e y  saw them ) o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n
s i t u a t i o n .  As A id i t  s a i d  i n  March 1957:
We In d o n e s ia n  com m unists a r e  n o t  dogm atic  in  
th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  M a rx is t  and L e n in i s t  
t e a c h in g s ;  we a re  c r e a t i v e .  M a r x i s t - L e n in i s t  
th e o r y  i s  o n ly  a g u id e ,  th e  d e c i s i v e  th in g  in  
o u r  p o l i c y  b e in g  th e  c o n c r e te  s i t u a t i o n  in  
I n d o n e s i a .1
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h i s  an ti-com m un ism . I t  s h o u ld  be n o te d  t h a t  many 
I n d o n e s ia n s ,  an d  e s p e c i a l l y  th o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  PNI and 
S u k a rn o , c o n s id e r  o p e n ly  e x p re s s e d  an ti-com m unism  to  be 
i n  some way r e a c t i o n a r y ,  p ro -W e s te rn , and t h e r e f o r e  p ro ­
i m p e r i a l i s t ,  a c o n t r a v e n t io n  o f  I n d o n e s i a 's  in d e p e n d e n t 
p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  c o ld  w ar. T h is  b e l i e f  i n h i b i t s  th e  
open e x p re s s io n  o f  h o s t i l i t y  to  communism among a l a r g e  
s e c t i o n  o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e .  I t  sh o u ld  
a l s o  be  n o te d  t h a t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  anyone may s h i f t  from  
b e in g  non-com m unist to  a n ti- c o m m u n is t ,  and  v i c e - v e r s a .
One o f  th e  c o n s ta n t  c o n c e rn s  o f  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  h as 
b e e n  to  remove o r  p r e v e n t  any  g ro u n d s f o r  th e  p o l i t i c a l l y -  
im p o r ta n t  non-com m unists becom ing a n t i - c o m m u n is t .
1
R I, M arch 1957» P*3
The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h ip  h as  f r e q u e n t ly  acknow ledged  i t s
in d e b te d n e s s  to  th e  r e v o lu t io n a r y  and  p a r l ia m e n ta r y
e x p e r ie n c e s  o f  f o r e i g n  com m unist p a r t i e s .  I t  i n s i s t s ,
h o w ev er, t h a t  th e  In d o n e s ia n  r e v o lu t io n  p o s s e s s e s  c e r t a i n
1
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  a r e  u n iq u e . F o re ig n  e x p e r ie n c e  
m ust b e  s t u d i e d :
B ut th e  m ost im p o r ta n t  th in g  f o r  th e  In d o n e s ia n  
com m unists i s  th e  p ro b lem  o f  w e ld in g  th e  g e n e r a l  
t r u t h s  o f  M arx ism -L en in ism  w ith  th e  c o n c re te  2 
p r a c t i c e  o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  r e v o lu t io n  i t s e l f .
A l l  th e  e v id e n c e  s t r o n g l y  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  r e p e a te d
a s s e r t i o n s  o f  t h e  n e e d  to  fo rm u la te  a p o l ic y  b a se d  on th e
1
W hile t h e r e  i s ,  f o r  ex am p le , a c lo s e  p a r a l l e l  b e tw een  
th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p ^  o v e r a l l  a n a ly s i s  o f  In d o n e s ia n  
s o c i e t y  and  t h e  In d o n e s ia n  r e v o lu t io n  and Mao T s e - tu n g 's  
a n a l y s i s  o f  C h in ese  s o c i e t y  and  th e  C h in ese  r e v o lu t io n  
(co m p are , f o r  e x am p le , D.N. A i d i t ,  In d o n e s ia n  S o c ie ty  and 
th e  In d o n e s ia n  R e v o lu t io n , D ja k a r ta ^  1958, £>9 p . , w ith  
Mao T s e - tu n g , ,fThe C h in ese  R e v o lu t io n  and th e  C h in ese  
Communist P a r t y ” , i n  h i s  S e le c te d  W orks, v o l . I I I ,  London, 
1954> p p .7 2 - 1 0 1 ) ,  th e  PKI l e a d e r s  have  b een  a t  g r e a t  
p a in s  t o  show t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  im p o r ta n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw een  
th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  and C h in ese  re v o ­
l u t i o n s .  As exam ples o f  th e  e x p la n a t io n  o f  th e s e  
d i f f e r e n c e s ,  s e e  a sp e e c h  by  S ak irm an  on O c to b e r 2 ,  1950> 
g iv e n  in  R is a la h  Peru n d in g a n  195 0 /1 9 5 1 ( In d o n e s ia n  
P a r l ia m e n ta r y  D eb a te s  1 9 5 0 / i9 5 1 )»  v o l . I I I ,  p p .1142-3;  
i n t e r v ie w  w ith  A i d i t ,  q u o te d  in  A. Doak B a r n e t t ,  Echoes 
o f  Mao T s e - tu n g  in  D j a k a r t a , A m erican U n i v e r s i t i e s  * F i e ld  
S t a f f  R e p o r t ,  New Y ork , 1955» PP*7-11; D.N. A i d i t ,  D ja la n  
ke D em okrasi R a k ja t  b a g i  In d o n e s ia  (The In d o n e s ia n  Road 
to  P e o p le fs D em ocracy)7 D ja k a r t a ,  1955> P*37; and D.N. 
A i d i t ,  The B i r th  and  Growth o f  th e  Communist P a r ty  o f  
I n d o n e s ia ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1958, p.27*
2
D.N. A i d i t ,  "R e v o lu s i O k to b er dan R a k ja t- R a k ja t  T im ur” 
(The O c to b e r  R e v o lu tio n  and th e  P e o p le s  o f  th e  E a s t ) ,
BM, O ctober-N ovem ber 1957» P«383*
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In d o n e s ia n  s i t u a t i o n  was n o t  a v e rb a l  sm o k e -sc re e n  
m ask ing  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  and  d i r e c t i o n  o f  PKI by e i t h e r  
Moscow o r  P e k in g . In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  i t  a p p e a rs  h ig h ly  
l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  was c o n c e iv e d  in  
1951 and  e a r l y  1952 by  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  a lo n e ,  
w i th o u t  o u t s id e  g u id a n c e  o r  p ro m p tin g . H e rb e r t  P e i t h ,  
o b s e rv in g  th e  new n a t i o n a l  f r o n t  p o l ic y  a s  i t  was f i r s t  
a p p l i e d  i n  1952 , c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  i t  was m ost u n l ik e l y
A
t h a t  th e  change was made a t  S o v ie t  d i r e c t i o n .  He l i s t e d  
f o u r  r e a s o n s  f o r  h i s  c o n c lu s io n .  F i r s t ,  th e  change had  
no b a s i s  i n  c o n te m p o ra ry  com m unist th e o ry  e ls e w h e re .
S econd , th e  change p r e - d a t e d  th e  l a t e r  S o v ie t  a t te m p t  to  
c u r r y  fa v o u r  w ith  A sian  n e u t r a l i s m .  T h ir d ,  t h e r e  was no 
co m p arab le  change in  th e  p o l i c y  o f  o th e r  S o u th  o r  S o u th e a s t  
A s ian  com m unist p a r t i e s  a t  t h a t  t im e . And, f o u r t h ,  con­
te m p o ra ry  S o v ie t  comment on In d o n e s ia  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  PKI 
was l e a d in g  Moscow r a t h e r  th a n  fo l lo w in g  i t .
I t  i s  p ro b a b le  t h a t  a f t e r  th e  f i a s c o  o f  M adiun,
Moscow w ro te  o f f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  com m unists a s  a l o s t  
c a u s e .  T hat i s ,  Moscow c o n s id e re d  PKI no lo n g e r  w o rth y  
o f  a t t e n t i o n .  O nly a f t e r  1954» when th e  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  
A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p 's  n a t i o n a l  u n i te d  f r o n t  p o l i c y  had
1
H erbert F e ith ,  The W ilopo C a b in et, 1952-1953; a Turning  
P o in t  in  P o st-R e v o lu tio n a r y  In d o n e s ia , I th a c a , New York,
1950 , p p .9 2 -3 .
"become apparent, did the interest of international 
communism focus anew on PKI. At that stage, the cold 
war was entering a more complex stage, with the Russians 
attempting to extend their sphere of influence by winning 
favour among the neutralists in the underdeveloped and 
newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America*
The lack of interest shown by Moscow in PKI until 
after the period in which the national united front was 
formulated is indicated by the Cominform journal, the 
number of foreign communist delegates to PKI congresses, 
and the number of PKI delegations invited abroad.
Prom the end of 1948 until August 1954» the Cominform 
journal, "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy.'", 
made little mention of Indonesia, and none whatsoever 
during 1952, the year in which PKI began to implement its 
form of the national united front. Prom August 1954 
until 1956, when the journal was discontinued, articles 
on PKI appeared regularly - written by Aidit, not by 
Russian 'experts'. In March 1954» only one foreign 
communist attended the PKI fifth congress, compared with 
seven who went to the sixth congress in September 1959•
And from July 1950, when Aidit and Lukraan returned from 
abroad, until the beginning of 1956, only two PKI 
delegations visited the Soviet bloc, and none before
December 1952. In contrast, between January 1956 and 
January 1960, thirteen PKI delegations visited the Soviet 
bloc.
The tentative conclusion to be drawn from the above 
evidence is that after Madiun, the Soviet leaders con­
sidered PKI to be of little interest. It was only after 
the Aidit leadership^ policy had brought such obvious 
successes, and after the Soviet leaders became aware of 
the possibility of winning allies among the neutralists 
in many underdeveloped and newly independent countries, 
that the Soviet and other foreign communist parties began 
to show an increasingly keen interest in PKI. This new 
interest did not take the form of interference. Rather, 
the foreign parties studied the PKI policy in order to 
see if it could have wider application. Hence, many PKI 
delegations were invited abroad, and PKI received con­
siderable attention in the Gominform journal. Perhaps 
in order to provide the foreign parties with material on 
PKI's policy and tactics, in mid-1954 the Indonesian 
communists began to publish a monthly periodical in 
English devoted to the work of the Party and its mass 
organizations in the Indonesian situation.
There are certain parallels between the circumstances 
in which Aidit and Mao Tse-tung formulated their overall 
policies. Both Aidit and Mao won control of parties that
were freed from Soviet guidance in policy. Earlier 
Soviet intervention in both Indonesia and China had 
helped cause the near-extinction of the local communist 
parties, with the result that Moscow considered the small, 
decimated parties to have little or no chance of winning 
power, and therefore to be no longer worthy of inter­
vention. In formulating their own overall policy, both 
Aidit and Mao used Marxist-Leninist analytical tools and 
studied the experience of foreign parties. But each of 
the leaders was deeply imbued with the atmosphere of his 
own country, and used his own assessment of the local 
situation as the principle basis of an overall policy 
designed to bring his party to power. In each case, a 
broad, national united front policy was chosen. Mao has 
led the Chinese Communist Party to power in the highly 
favourable circumstances of the Japanese War, but the 
success of Aidit's policy in post-revolutionary Indonesia 
is still in the balance.
II. INDONESIA IS A SEMI-COLONIAL, SEMI-FEUDAL COUNTRY
The Aidit leadership's theory of the Indonesian 
revolution is based on the assumption that Indonesia is a 
semi-colonial, semi-feudal country. At first the Party
1 Theleaders merely asserted this to he self-evident, 
semi-colonial position of Indonesia was widely recognized 
by Indonesians outside PKI, and was emphasized by the 
heavy terms of the Round Table Conference agreement which
phad ended the war with the Netherlands, by the control 
of Indonesia’s export and import trade by large foreign 
companies, by the extent of the foreign estate agri­
culture, and by the exploitation of Indonesia’s oil 
wealth by foreign companies. On the other hand, PKI at 
first did not elaborate on what was termed the semi- 
feudal nature of Indonesia, perhaps because it was not 
until 1953 that the Party was concerned with expanding 
into the rural areas.
An early account of Indonesia’s semi-colonial 
position was given by Aidit in May 1953» He repeated 
the PKI assertion that by the Round Table Conference 
agreement the Dutch imperialists had retained their 
control over Indonesia. Among the terms of the agreement
1 See, for example, PKI, Konstitusl PKI (PKI's Consti­
tution), Djakarta, 1951 > p*11*
2 The results of the Round Table Conference, as accepted 
by the Indonesian and Dutch delegations on November 2, 
1949» are to be found in Round Table Conference Results, 
The Hague, no date, pp.7-78*
D.N. Aidit, Menudju Indonesia Baru (Towards a New 
Indonesia), (second edition), Djakarta, 1955> pp.27-31*
that he particularly attacked were the position of the 
Netherlands monarch as head of the Indonesian-Dutch 
Union, the control of the Dutch government over 
Indonesia's financial and foreign policies, the enormous 
debt to the Netherlands, the restoration to the coloni­
alists of their former rights in industry, commerce, 
finance and agriculture, and the control by Dutch civil 
and military officials of the Indonesian state apparatus 
and armed forces.
That means Indonesia has what is called 'the 
right of self-government1 2, but in fact real 
power, in the political, economic and 
military spheres, is retained in the hands 
of the Dutch imperialists, and the Indonesian 
door is opened wide by the RTC agreement to 
political, economic and military penetration 
by the American imperialists and other 
imperialist countries.'1
Although the first agrarian programme drawn up under 
the Aidit leadership and issued on November 10, 1951 bad 
referred to the 'landownership of a feudal and imperialist
onature', a clear definition of what was meant by serai- 
feudalism was not given until July 1953* In that month 
Aidit wrote a major article, "The Future of the Indonesian 




PKI, "Program Perubahan Tanah dan Tuntutan kaum Tani" 
(Programme of Land Change and Peasants' Demands), BM, 
December 1951* p.8.
1 He stated that afterParty work in the rural areas, 
capitalism had operated in Indonesia complete feudalism 
no longer existed, but that ’important and heavy 
remnants’ remained. The most significant remnants he 
listed were:
1. the continued monopoly rights of the large 
landowners, with the result that the majority of peasants 
could not own land and were forced to rent land on the 
landlords * terms;
2. the payment of most of the crops as land rent in 
kind, so that the majority of peasants were kept in 
poverty;
3* the payment of land rent in the form of work on 
the landlords * land, ’which places the majority of 
peasants in the position of serfs’; and
4. the heavy debts of the majority of peasants, which 
placed them 'in the position of slaves vis-a-vis the 
landowners'•
In short, Aidit argued, 'there is still feudal exploi­
tation of the peasants'.
Such semi-feudal conditions, Aidit claimed, made 
impossible the economic development of Indonesia.
T D.N. Aidit, "Haridepan G-erakan Tani Indonesia” (The 
Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement), BM, July 
1953, pp.332-40.
5:'
Agricultural techniques were primitive, the internal 
market was shrinking as agricultural production declined 
and the relative prices of manufactured goods increased, 
and industrialization was impossible so long as 70 per 
cent of the population remained too poor to afford 
industrial goods.
The PKI programme endorsed by the fifth national 
congress in March 1954 devoted its first section to a 
description of Indonesia as being semi-colonial and semi-
ifeudal. Once more the Round Table Conference agreement 
was attacked because it 1enslaves Indonesia and maintains 
her position as a semi-colony*. As a result of the 
colonialists* control of the Indonesian economy, *our 
country is in the grip of a continuous economic crisis 
and is already close to collapse', so that talk about 
development plans, industrialization and the like came to 
nothing.
Although our land is fertile there is not enough food in our country to meet the people's minimum 
needs ... As a result of the unlimited power 
of monopoly and of the embargo against trade with 
China enforced by the American capitalists, the 
price of export goods ... declines gravely, and 
it is increasingly difficult to find markets for 
these goods. Indonesian money declines and the 
price of goods rises. As a result of competition
1
PKI, Program PKI (PKI's Programme), Djakarta, 1954»
pp.5-10.
from the Netherlands, America and Japan, the very small number of national industries and 
trading enterprises is crushed and bankrupt.
Except for a small number of feudal landlords, 
compradores and high officials, the greater , 
part of the Indonesian people lives miserably.
The programme also pointed out that 20 per cent of all
cultivated land, that is the best and most fertile land,
was still in the hands of colonialist estates. On the
matter of feudal remnants in Indonesia, the programme
added nothing to Aidit's article of July 1953.
When Indonesia unilaterally abrogated the Round
Table Conference agreement in April 1956 and then
cancelled her debts to the Netherlands, the PKI was
forced to show new grounds for continuing to describe
Indonesia as serai-colonial. This Aidit did in a booklet
"Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution”
2written in July 1957« He examined the degree of 
political and economic sovereignty enjoyed by Indonesia. 
Dealing with the political question, he pointed out that 




D.N. Aidit, Masjarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia 
Djakarta, 1957» PP»39-44» This booklet was published in English as: Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian 
Revolution, 69 p. I have used the English version, but I have altered the English of some of the direct 
quotations.
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territory, was still occupied by the Dutch, and that as
for the rest of the country:
The political independence which the Indonesian 
people now possess is not full and stable 
political independence but only half and is 
under the constant threat of the reactionaries•
The internal reactionaries working in collabo­
ration with the Dutch, American and other 
imperialists are doing all they can to restrict 
and destroy the political independence of the 
people. And besides this, the national 
bourgeoisie is trying to limit the political 
independence of the working class and other 
progressive people.1
According to Aidit, an analysis of the economic 
sphere also gave *extremely clear evidence that Indonesian 
society is still semi-colonial*. The big foreign capi­
talists :
by utilizing their dominant position in the 
sphere of the economy and by means of their 
mercenaries ... also participate in determining 
political developments in Indonesia.
They controlled the oil reserves, estates, sea transport,
some land transport, the import, export and internal
trade, and the banks. As if to emphasize that the
abrogation of the agreements with the Netherlands had not
altered the situation, Aidit claimed that:
The policy of the imperialists in the field of 
economic affairs is not in principle different 
from what it was at the time when Indonesia 
was fully colonized* They have continued to 
run their old enterprises and have opened up
1
Aidit, Indonesian Society, pp.39-UO
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some new ones. This means that they can 
directly make use of Indonesia’s raw materials, 
extract Indonesia’s mineral wealth, and utilize 
cheap Indonesian labour power. They are 
economically squeezing national industry, that 
owned by the state and that owned by the 
national bourgeoisie. The result is that the 
big foreign capitalists stand in the way of 
developing the productive forces in our country.
The banks and finances as well as the goods for 
sale in the hands of the imperialists play the 
decisive role in the economic life of our country at the present time.1 2
In order to safeguard their capital and facilitate
their exploitation of the people, Aidit continued, the
imperialists used compradores and usurers:
to throw out wide nets of exploitation 
extending from the busy commercial harbours 
on the coast and from the towns right out 
to the most remote villages.
Furthermore, they had placed their compradores in the
bourgeois parties and so converted those parties into
faithful servants of their interests.
In December 1957 the Indonesian government took over
2all Dutch businesses. Once again the PKI had to justify 




In 1952 the White Engineering Corporation of New York 
undertook an investigation of foreign capital in 
Indonesia. Its report to the Indonesian government 
showed that 70 per cent of the 2,100 million dollars of 
foreign investments were Dutch. The general findings 
of the report are quoted in RI, March 1957» p.29*
an d  in  Decem ber 1958 th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  s u b m itte d  a
1
new c o m p ila t io n  o f  e v id e n c e  to  s u p p o r t  i t s  c a s e .  A 
b low  had  b e e n  s t r u c k  a g a i n s t  th e  D u tc h , th e  c e n t r a l  
com m ittee  a d m i t te d ,  b u t  th e  D utch  s t i l l  o c c u p ie d  W est 
I r i a n ;  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  c o n f i s c a te d  D utch  e n t e r p r i s e s  
was s t i l l  u n c e r t a i n ;  In d o n e s ia  s t i l l  made much u se  o f  
D u tch  c a p i t a l i s t  c h a n n e ls  in  i t s  f o r e ig n  t r a d e ;  D utch  
c a p i t a l  in  th e  o i l  i n d u s t r y ,  t h a t  i s ,  i n  th e  A ng lo -D u tch  
S h e l l  Company, was s t i l l  u n to u c h e d ; D utch p u p p e ts  s t i l l  
o c c u p ie d  im p o r ta n t  p o s i t i o n s  in  th e  g o v ern m en t, th e  s t a t e  
a p p a ra tu s  and th e  econom ic f i e l d ;  arm ed gangs were s t i l l  
a c t i v e l y  o p e r a t in g  in  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  D utch  c o lo n i ­
a l i s t s ;  th e  s k y , s e a  and  c o a s t l i n e  o f  In d o n e s ia  was s t i l l  
c o n s t a n t ly  t h r e a te n e d  by D utch  a i r c r a f t  and  su b m a rin e s ; 
and  th e  D utch c o l o n i a l i s t s  s t i l l  h ad  in f lu e n c e  in  th e  
f i e l d s  o f  e d u c a t io n  and  c u l t u r e .  The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  
d e c la r e d  t h a t  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  'D u tch  
im p e r ia l is m  i s  s t i l l  th e  f i r s t  enemy o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  
p e o p le ' .
The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  m ust have b e e n  aw are t h a t  th e  
d im in is h e d  econom ic p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  D utch  had  made i t  
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  PKI to  p e r s i s t  i n  a t t r i b u t i n g  a se m i-
1
PKI, B ahan-B ahan u n tu k  K ongres N a s io n a l  ke-V I P a r t a i  
Komunis In d o n e s ia  ( M a te r ia l s  f o r  P K I 's  S ix th  N a t io n a l  
C o n g re s s ) ,  D ja k a r ta ,  1958, p p .8 - 9 .
colonial status to Indonesia, and Party leaders began 
talking of American imperialism as ’increasingly 
occupying important positions in Indonesia in the 
economic, political and cultural spheres*. According to 
the central committee, the American imperialists main­
tained military bases in West Irian, controlled right- 
wing parties and individuals to promote their interests, 
carried out cultural infiltration via films and education, 
and were engaged in a programme of assistance to the 
rebels in Sumatra and Indonesia. All this was cited as 
’proof that U.S. imperialism already constitutes a 
constant danger threatening Indonesia’s sovereignty and 
independence *.
In the central committee report presented to the 
sixth national congress in September 1959» Aidit once 
more stated that:
For the imperialists, Indonesia continues to 
be a place for the investment of their capital 
and a storehouse for cheap labour. They strive 
not only to defend what capital they already 
have invested in Indonesia, but also to increase
He also added an extra paragraph in denunciation of 
American imperialism.
1 D.N. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi dan Kablnet Gotong Rojong 




Lukman, in his speech to the sixth congress, justi­
fied at some length the Party*s continued description of
1Indonesia as semi-colonial, semi-feudal. He said that
except for Dutch-occupied West Irian, Indonesia had
political independence. On the other hand, the
Indonesian economy was in large part still controlled "by
the imperialists and dependent upon the economy of the
2imperialist states. In order to emphasize the political
importance of economic considerations, he declared:
Supposing the whole of Indonesian territory 
was already under the control of the 
Indonesian Republic, but the Indonesian 
economy was still controlled by or very 
dependent on the imperialist countries, in 
such a situation Indonesia could not yet be 
said to be completely independent because 
political power cannot possibly be separated 
from economic power, and economic power is 
even precisely the basis of political power.
Therefore it is impossible for a country to 
have complete power in the political sphere 
if its economy is still controlled or 
greatly dependent on other, imperialist, 
countries. Thus it is clear that if a 
country is not yet independent in the eco­
nomic sphere, neither is it yet completely 
free in the political sphere.3
1
Lukman, Tentang Konstitusi PKI (Concerning PKI*s Consti­
tution), Djakarta, 1959» pp.17-10.
2
Aidit claimed in 1958 that 41 per cent of Indonesia^ 
exports went to the United States, 35 per cent to Western 
Europe, 16 per cent to African and Asian countries 
excluding China, 4 per cent to Australia, and only 4 per 
cent to the Soviet bloc; D.N. Aidit, "Economic Diffi­
culties and the Communist Party*s Proposals", World 
Marxist Review, September 1958, p.71.
3
Lukman, Tentang Konstitusi, loc.cit.
Lukman added nothing to Aidit*s July 1953 description of 
the semi-feudal condition of Indonesia, a description 
which remains the basic Party exposition of the matter 
largely because there have been no major subsequent 
changes in agrarian relations*
In short, PKI chooses to envisage Indonesia as being 
8till semi-colonial, semi-feudal. The continued presence 
of colonial and feudal elements ensures that the great 
majority of the Indonesian people remain in a state of 
poverty, and obstructs general economic and industrial 
development. It is only ’a small number of feudal 
landlords, compradores and high officials*, to re-quote 
the March 1954 PKI programme, who do not suffer from the 
country*8 semi-colonial, semi-feudal condition.
III. THE BASIC TARGETS OF THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION
The PKI general programme issued by the central com­
mittee in April 1951 declared that the Indonesian revo­
lution *is aimed against imperialism, feudalism and the 
compradore bourgeoisie*. This bald statement was 
expanded in the programme of March 1954:
PKI, Konstitusi, 1951» p*12.
1
As long as the /semi-colonial, semi-feudai7 situ­
ation in Indonesia is unchanged, that is, as long 
as the power of imperialism has not been over­
thrown nor the remnants of feudalism eradicated, 
the Indonesian people cannot possibly free 
themselves from poverty, backwardness, lameness 
and powerlessness in facing up to imperialism«
The power of imperialism and the remnants of 
feudalism in Indonesia will never be abolished 
in Indonesia while state power in our country is 
still held by the landlords and compradorss who 
are firmly connected with foreign capital because 
they want to preserve imperialist exploitation 
and feudal remnants in our country, because they 
are most afraid of the Indonesian people.1 2
Thus the main targets of the revolution are imperialism,
with its Indonesian compradore agents, and feudalism.
The Aldit leadership has, however, made a clear
tactical distinction between the two main enemies. This
distinction was most lucidly explained by Aidit in his
speech to PKI*s national peasant conference in mid-April
p1959. He declared that the two tasks of overthrowing 
the power of the foreign enemy, imperialism, and the 
internal enemy, feudal landlord domination, were 'from the 
strategic angle ... very closely interconnected and 
inseparable*. Strategically inseparable because the 
imperialists were using the feudalists in order to govern 
and exploit the people, and because for the revolution to
1
PKI, Program PKI. p.10.
2
D.N. Aidit, "Fly High the Banners of 'Land to the 
Peasants* and Fight for One Victory After Another'*, RI 
supplement, June-July 1959* p.12.
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succeed it had to mobilize the peasants, which could only 
be done by providing them with land, which in turn meant 
taking the land from the feudal landlords. Aidit then 
went on to say:
If viewed from the tactical angle these two 
tasks, that is the tasks of overthrowing the 
power of imperialism and the power of 
feudalism, cannot be executed at one and the 
same time. If viewed from the tactical angle 
of the particular conditions of the present 
moment, the head of the revolutionary spear 
should in the first place be pointed at the 
foreign enemy (imperialism) and those 
feudalists and bourgeois who have become the 
agents of this foreign enemy. The oppression 
of foreign imperialism is widely felt by our 
people. Imperialism is the most criminal 
enemy with the most intensive exploitation.
Thus, at a certain moment and under certain 
conditions as at present, we must concentrate 
all our efforts for a blow against imperialism 
in order thus to be able to settle the first 
contradiction, the contradiction between the 
Indonesian nation and imperialism.
In other words, the enemies of the revolution are
considered too strong to be tackled both at the same time.
They must be smashed in turn, first imperialism and then
feudalism.
IV. THE DRIVING FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION
As communists, the PKI leaders believed that the 
proletariat constituted the basic driving force of the 
Indonesian revolution, the basic support of the Party.
An analysis of the strength of the proletariat showed, 
however, that the proletariat was far too weak to destroy 
the power of imperialism and feudalism. Because the 
proletariat was so weak, the Aidit leadership undertook 
a socio-political analysis of the other major social 
forces in Indonesia in order to determine which might be 
won as disciplined allies, which might be won as allies 
under certain circumstances, and which were implacable 
enemies.
1 • The Proletariat
According to Aidit, the Indonesian proletariat 
consists of about 500,000 workers in modern industry 
(transport workers, factory workers, miners, workers in 
repair shops, etc.), more than 2 million workers in small 
industry and handicrafts in the towns, and a large number 
of workers on estates, in forestry work and in miscel- 
laneous occupations. Their total number is about six 
millions or, with their families, about 20 millions.
They therefore comprise about 25 per cent of the total 
population.1 2
1
Aidit, Indonesian Society, p.61.
2
Aidit*s figures appear to be exaggerated. In a booklet 
issued in 1959, the leaders of the communist trade union 
federation, SOBSI, stated that:
The exploitation and poor living conditions suffered 
by the Indonesian proletariat are obvious to all 
Indonesians. Aidit could state, without fear of contra­
diction, that 'the Indonesian proletariat is exploited by
three forms of brutal exploitation, that is, imperialism,
1capitalism and feudalism'. In December 1958 the central
committee reported that 'the living conditions of the
2Indonesian workers are getting worse and worse' - which 
was a deterioration in an already deplorable situation.
The decline was stated to be the result of the rapid and 
continuous rise in the price of basic daily essentials, 
and the increasing contraction of work opportunities be­
cause of the failure to develop state and private industry.
the Indonesian workers constitute only 10 per 
cent of the total Indonesian population, while 
the peasants constitute not less than 70 per 
cent. The remaining 20 per cent of the popu­lation is comprised of other groups, such as 
students, small urban industrialists, national 
industrialists and intellectuals.
The SOBSI leaders also stated that:
most of the workers consist of casual labourers, 
both in government work, such as forestry, 
autonomous areas, estates, and general works, 
and in private enterprise, such as in sugar 
enterprises, oil companies, fishing, agriculture, 
and so on.
SOBSI, Masaalah Front Persatuan Buruh (The Question of the
Workers' United Front), Djakarta, 1959» p.l4*
1




According to PKI's analysis, the Indonesian
proletariat, 'as is also the case of the proletariat in
other countries1, has fvery fine qualitiesf. First,
because it works in the most advanced economic units, the
proletariat has a strong understanding of organization
and discipline* Second, because it owns no means of
production, the proletariat is not individualistic in
nature and cannot fear the loss of its property in the
revolutionary struggle* Third, because it suffers the
three forms of brutal exploitation, the proletariat is
more resolute and thoroughgoing in the revolutionary
struggle than the other classes. Fourth, because
Indonesia unlike Europe is not fertile soil for social
reformism, 'the proletariat in its entirety is very
revolutionary indeed, of course with the exception of the
small number who have become the scum*. And, fifth,
because the Indonesian proletariat has been led by the
PKI since it first appeared in the revolutionary struggle,
it is politically the most conscious class in Indonesian
society. Therefore the proletariat is:
the basic force pushing the Indonesian revo­
lution forward. The Indonesian revolution 
will not succeed unless it is under the
1
Aidit, Indonesian Society, loc.cit*; see also PKI, 
Mengapa Front Nasional (Why the National Front), Djakarta, 
1957*PP.8-10.
leadership of the Indonesian proletariat ...
Without the proletariat taking an active part, 
nothing will ever run properly in Indonesian 
society. '
On the other hand, the PKI leaders recognize that
the Indonesian proletariat has 1 2certain unavoidable 
2weaknesses*. It is numerically weak compared with the 
peasants, it is young compared with the proletariat in 
capitalist countries, and it has a low cultural level 
compared with the bourgeoisie. By itself it is not 
strong enough to win victory. It must build 'revo­
lutionary unity in all situations with all other revo­
lutionary classes and groups*.
2. The Peasantry
What the PKI means when it refers to the peasants 
'is mainly the poor and middle peasants that make up the 
majority of the inhabitants of the villages'.-^ As a 
group, the peasantry is viewed as suffering not only the 
remnants of feudalism, but also the depradations of Darul 
Islam and PRRI-Permesta bandit gangs that allegedly 
receive assistance from the landlords and foreign estate
1




Ao’meps as well as arms from the imperialists. Because
of their suffering, the peasants as a whole ’can be, for
the working class, not only the most numerous ally but
2also the most loyal and most trusted ally’. In 
recognition of the size and revolutionary nature of the 
peasantry, the PKI agrarian programme issued in November 
1951 stated that the worker-peasant alliance was all- 
important for the success of the revolution.-^ The Aidit 
leadership’s increased awareness of the role of the 
peasantry in the revolution was shown in Aidit ’s decla­
ration in July 1953 that ’The agrarian revolution is the 
essence of the people’s democratic revolution in 
Indonesia* .^
Once the Aidit leadership accepted the peasantry as 
a revolutionary force, it proceeded to grade separate 
groups within the peasantry according to their revo­
lutionary potential. The November 1951 agrarian 
programme included a guide for classifying the peasantry 
into rich peasants, medium peasants, poor peasants and
1
See, for example, PKI, Program PKI, p.8; and PKI, 
Bahan-Bahan, p.15*
2
PKI, Mengapa Front Nasional, p.7.
3 PKI, ’’Program Perubahan Tanah”, BM, December 195*1 > p*24*4




a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a b o u r e r s .  But i t  was n o t  u n t i l  m id-1957
t h a t  A id i t  gave  a p u b l ic  e x p la n a t io n  o f  t h e  r e v o lu t io n a r y
2v a lu e  o f  th e  r e s p e c t iv e  p e a s a n t  g ro u p s .
A id i t  w ro te  t h a t  a l th o u g h  some r i c h  p e a s a n ts  le n d
money, e x p l o i t  p e a s a n t  l a b o u r e r s ,  and a r e  by  n a tu r e  se m i-
f e u d a l ,  th e y  g e n e r a l l y  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  la b o u r  th e m se lv e s
an d  so  form  p a r t  o f  th e  p e a s a n t r y .  I f  a c o r r e c t  a p p ro a c h
i s  made to  them , th e y  can  ta k e  a n e u t r a l  s ta n d  i n  th e
s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  th e  l a n d lo r d s  and can  jo in  th e  s t r u g g l e
a g a i n s t  im p e r ia l is m . The medium p e a s a n ts  a r e  e c o n o m ic a lly
in d e p e n d e n t ,  g e n e r a l l y  n e i t h e r  e x p l o i t  o th e r s  n o r  e a rn
i n t e r e s t  on lo a n s ,  and  s u f f e r  from  th e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f
th e  i m p e r i a l i s t s ,  th e  l a n d lo r d s  and th e  b o u r g e o i s ie .
Some do n o t  own enough la n d  f o r  t h e i r  own u se  and  m ust
r e n t  la n d  from  th e  l a n d lo r d s .  T h e re fo re ,  th e y :
can  n o t  o n ly  become p a r t  o f  th e  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  
r e v o lu t io n  and th e  a g r a r i a n  r e v o l u t io n ,  b u t  th e y  
can  a l s o  a c c e p t  s o c i a l i s m .  T h is  i s  why th e y  
a re  one o f  th e  im p o r ta n t  f o r c e s  p u sh in g  th e  
r e v o lu t io n  fo rw a rd  and a r e  a r e l i a b l e  a l l y  o f  
th e  p r o l e t a r i a t .
A id i t  ev en  s t a t e d  t h a t :
t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  to  th e  r e v o l u t io n  i s  a d e c i s iv e  
f a c t o r  f o r  v i c t o r y  o r  d e f e a t  b e c a u se  th e  medium 
p e a s a n ts  w i l l  co m p rise  th e  m a jo r i ty  in  th e  
c o u n tr y s id e  a f t e r  th e  a g r a r i a n  r e v o l u t io n .
1
PKI, "Program  P eru b ah an  T an ah " , BM, December 1951»
p p . 15- 2 2 .
2
A i d i t ,  In d o n e s ia n  S o c i e ty , p p .6 0 -1 .
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Prior to the agrarian revolution, Aidit continued, 
the poor peasants and the agricultural labourers would 
continue to form the majority in the villages. They do 
not own land or do not have sufficient land for their own 
use, and must rent land or work as labourers for the 
landowners. In short:
they are the village semi-proletariat, they are 
the largest force pushing the revolution 
forward and it is natural for them to be the 
most reliable of the allies of the proletariat 
and a basic part of the forces of the Indonesian 
revolution.
However, they can attain their emancipation, Aidit 
claimed, only under the leadership of the proletariat.
3* The Petty Bourgeoisie
Aidit, writing in 1957» defined the petty bourgeoisie,
’other than the peasantry', as 'the urban poor, the
intellectuals, the small traders, the handicraft workers,
the fishermen, the independent workers and so on*. He
declared that these groups:
have a status which is almost the same as that 
of the middle peasants. They also suffer the 
oppression of imperialism, feudalism and the 
big bourgeoisie and are every day pushed 
further and further towards bankruptcy and 
ruin. This is why they are one of the forces 
pushing the revolution forward and are a 
reliable ally of the proletariat. They can 




Aidit also pointed out that as some sections of the petty 
bourgeoisie fell easily under the influence of the 
bourgeoisie, the Party had to devote special attention to 
revolutionary propaganda and organizational work among 
them.
Aidit*s description of the composition and political 
character of the Indonesian petty bourgeoisie is an almost 
direct translation of sections of the analysis of the 
Chinese petty bourgeoisie contained in Mao Tse-tung’s 
“The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist 
Party"^ - though Aidit added fishermen and the urban 
poor to the definition. Apparently Aidit took over 
Mao's analysis regardless of its relevance to the 
Indonesian situation. Earlier in the period of the 
Aidit leadership, for example in the April 195*1 PKI 
General Programme, the petty bourgeoisie was not specifi­
cally included among the driving forces of the revolution. 
In fact, the only group to be listed in 1951 as a revo­
lutionary force and later included in the definition of 
the petty bourgeoisie was the intelligentsia. Only when 
the national united front policy was being implemented
1 See Mao Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the 
Chinese Communist Party", in his Selected Works, vol.III,
pp.90-2.
2
PKI, Konstitusi, 195*1» p.11*
successfully and when the Party leaders were tidying up 
their theoretical analysis of the Indonesian revolution, 
did the Aidit leadership define their concept of the 
petty bourgeoisie and list the petty bourgeoisie as the 
third of the three basic driving forces of the revolution.
The groups that comprise the petty bourgeoisie as 
defined by Aidit vary greatly in social status and in 
political behaviour. To put the Indonesian urban poor 
and fishermen in the same category as the high-status and 
wealthy doctors and lawyers is almost ludicrous. Politi­
cally, the urban poor, the fishermen, small traders and 
handicraft workers, unless they were santri, have provided 
a ready source of support for PKI and its mass organi­
zations. On the other hand, the intellectuals and 
independent workers have been, in general, leaders, 
members or supporters of what the communist leaders call 
the national bourgeois and reactionary parties.
Why, then, has the Aidit leadership defined the 
petty bourgeoisie as it has, and why has the petty 
bourgeoisie been described as a revolutionary force? 
Perhaps the PKI leaders do believe that given the correct 
policy and tactics the Party could rally as revolutionary 
forces all the groups within the petty bourgeoisie as 
defined. Such a belief could arise from a study of the 
success of the Chinese Communist Party. It is also
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  u s e d  th e  c a t e g o r y  o f  
p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s i e  a s  a p o t p o u r r i  o f  g ro u p s  t h a t  d i d  n o t  
f i t  i n t o  th e  o t h e r  more r e a d i l y  i d e n t i f i a b l e  s o c i o ­
p o l i t i c a l  c a t e g o r i e s  -  and i f  t h i s  i s  th e  c a s e ,  i t  would
a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  h e te ro g e n e o u s  n a tu r e  o f  th e  p e t t y
1
b o u r g e o i s i e  as  d e f i n e d .  The P a r ty  l e a d e r s  have b e e n
a w a re ,  t o o ,  t h a t  th e y  n e ed e d  members o f  th e  p e t t y
b o u r g e o i s i e ,  who a r e  g e n e r a l l y  more s e l f - a s s u r e d ,  b e t t e r
e d u c a te d  and f i n a n c i a l l y  b e t t e r - o f f  th a n  th e  w orke rs  and
p e a s a n t s ,  a s  c a d re  and  f i n a n c i a l  s o u r c e s  f o r  t h e  P a r t y
2a n d  i t s  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
4• The B o u rg e o is ie
A c co rd in g  to  t h e  u sag e  o f  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p ,  th e  
b o u r g e o i s i e  i s  n o t  so much a s o c i a l  a s  a p o l i t i c a l  
c a t e g o r y .  The b o u r g e o i s i e  c o m p r ise s  t h o s e  p e r s o n s  o f
1
A l f r e d  Meyer, i n  h i s  s tu d y  o f  L e n in ism , n o te s  t h a t :
An i d e o l o g i c a l  s tu d y  s u r v e y in g  th e  u s e s  o f  th e  
te rm  / p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s i§ 7  would . . .  c o n s t i t u t e  
a v i r t u a l  h i s t o r y  o f  M a rx is t  s o c i a l  t h e o r y .
Such a s tu d y  would r e v e a l  th e  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  
t h i s  c o n c e p t ,  w hich  has b e en  u se d  a s  a l a b e l  
f o r  a n y  g ro u p  n o t  f i t t i n g  i n t o  th e  s im p le  
b i p o l a r  schemes Marxism s e e k s  to  a p p ly .
A l f r e d  G-. M eyer, L e n in ism , C am bridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1957 
p . 115> f o o t n o t e .
2
Prom my own l i m i t e d  sa m p lin g  o f  communist c a d r e s ,  
how ever ,  i t  would seem t h a t  th e y  were drawn m a in ly  from 
a g roup  t h a t  has  been  ig n o r e d  b y  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  
i t s  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s :  th e  w h i t e - c o l l a r  w o rk e rs  
i n  governm ent and  p r i v a t e  em ploym ent, i n c l u d i n g  t e a c h i n g .
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social status higher than the petty bourgeoisie (not 
including the doctors and lawyers), and who lead, join or 
support political parties other than those of the extreme 
left. The bourgeoisie is sub-divided into the compradore 
bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.
The Aidit leadership labelled as compradore bourgeois 
those sections of the bourgeoisie which were pro-Western, 
or not so outspokenly anti-Western, and which were 
avowedly anti-communist. Although the label compradore 
bourgeois has been applied irrespective of whether the 
victims had business relations with foreign capitalist 
companies, Aidit has attempted to remain within the 
bounds of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy by explaining that 
some of the compradores had capital alliances with the 
large foreign capitalists, while others were paid 'out of 
special funds or other forms of bribes provided by the
Aimperialists’. But despite their obvious hatred for the 
compradore bourgeoisie, the PKI leaders have been aware of 
the possibilities of exploiting the 'contradictions* 
between the compradores serving different imperialist 
masters:
When ... the Party's policy at a given time is 
directed against only one particular imperialism, 
then a part of the compradore bourgeoisie can be
Aidit, Indonesian Society, pp.50-1.1
^ o
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an additional force in the fight against that particular imperialism. But, even so, the 
compradore bourgeoisie remains very reactionary 
and still aims at crushing the Communist Party, 
the proletarian movement and other democratic 
movements.'
The national bourgeoisie, according to the usage of 
the Aidit leadership, is that section of the bourgeoisie 
which is outspokenly opposed to Western imperialism, and 
which is not implacably anti-communist. The Aidit 
leadership envisages the national bourgeoisie as having 
a dual character: on the one hand its development is 
stifled by imperialism and feudalism; but on the other, 
because it is economically and politically weak and has 
class ties with imperialism and feudalism, the national 
bourgeoisie does not have the courage to attack in a 
fundamental manner the two basic targets of the revo-
plution. The vacillating character of the national
bourgeoisie was explained by Aidit in his speech to the
fifth national congress of the Party in March 1954:
The Indonesian national bourgeoisie, because it is also oppressed by foreign imperialism, can, 
in certain situations and within certain limits, 
participate in the fight against imperialism.
In such certain situations, the Indonesian 
proletariat must build unity with the national 
bourgeoisie and defend that unity to the 
utmost ...
1
Aidit, D.jalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat, p.53«
Aidit, Indonesian Society, p.57*
2
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B ecause  th e  I n d o n e s ia n  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  
i s  weak i n  t h e  economic and  p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d s ,  
u n d e r  c e r t a i n  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  th e  
n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e ,  which i s  i n  n a t u r e  
v a c i l l a t i n g ,  can  become u n r e l i a b l e  and b e t r a y .  
T h e re fo re  t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t  and PKI must a lw ays 
be  p r e p a r e d  f o r  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i n  a 
c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n  th e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  
w i l l  n o t  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  th e  u n i t e d  f r o n t  b u t ,  
i n  y e t  a n o th e r  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t  may p o s s i b l y  
r e j o i n  th e  f r o n t .
The PKI l e a d e r s  have  shown w id e ly  v a r y in g  d e g re e s  o f
c o n f id e n c e  i n  t h e i r  own a b i l i t y  to  win th e  n a t i o n a l
b o u r g e o i s i e  to  th e  s i d e  o f  th e  r e v o l u t i o n .  I n  m id-1957
A i d i t  w ro te  t h a t  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  weak c h a r a c t e r  o f  th e
n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e ,  ' i t  i s  n o t  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  p u l l
t h i s  c l a s s  to  th e  l e f t  and make i t  s t a n d  f i r m l y  on th e  s i d e
o f  th e  r e v o l u t i o n 1 p r o v id e d  t h a t  th e  p r o g r e s s i v e  f o r c e s
2were s t r o n g  and th e  PKI t a c t i c s  were c o r r e c t .  N a t io n a l  
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e v e n t s  i n  1959 and 1960 removed much 
o f  t h i s  c o n f i d e n t  t o n e .  When th e  Nehru governm ent 
e v i c t e d  th e  c o m m u n is t - le d  c a b i n e t  i n  K e r a l a ,  A i d i t  warned 
th e  P a r t y  t h a t  'e v e n  though  th e  p r o l e t a r i a t  w an ts  to  ta k e  
th e  p e a c e f u l  p a t h  to  win v i c t o r y  f o r  i t s  p o l i c y ,  th e  
b o u r g e o i s i e  w i l l  n o t  v o l u n t a r i l y  a c c e p t  t h i s  p a t h ’ b u t  
c a s t  a s i d e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  and dem ocracy  when th e y  were
1
A i d i t ,  D .ialan ke Dem okrasi R a k ja t ,  l o c . c i t .
A i d i t ,  I n d o n e s ia n  S o c i e t y , p .5 8 .
2
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harmful to its interests« This was a roundabout
reference to the anti-democratic practices of the
Indonesian ruling group. In February 1960, Aidit wrote
directly of the Indonesian situation that ’some groups
of the national bourgeoisie, jointly with the compradore
bourgeoisie, want to take the road of military or personal 
2dictatorship1 23.
5* The Landlord Class
The Aidit leadership sees the landlords as oppressing 
the peasant masses, as opposing their emancipation, and 
as possessing the land that is required for distribution 
to the peasant masses in order to mobilize those masses 
on the side of the revolution. Therefore the landlords 
are 'a target of the revolution’.^ They are not neces­
sarily, however, an immediate target. The PKI leaders 
have concluded that when, for tactical reasons, the 
primary target of the revolution is foreign imperialism, 
then it is desirable and possible to obtain the neutrality
1
RI, September-October 1959» pp.8-9«
2
D.N. Aidit, "For National Unity”, World Marxist Review, 
February i960, p.21.
3 Aidit, Indonesian Society, p.57.
and  even  a l l i a n c e  o f  s e c t i o n s  o f  th e  l a n d l o r d  c l a s s  i n
th e  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  im p e r ia l ism *
A i d i t  d e c l a r e d  in  1957 t h a t :
Based on th e  above a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  c l a s s e s  i n  
I n d o n e s ia n  s o c i e t y ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  which c l a s s e s  
and g ro u p s  a r e  th e  p i l l a r s  o f  im p e r ia l i s m  and 
f e u d a l i s m ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e  l a n d l o r d s  and th e  
com pradores*  They a r e  o b s t a c l e s  s t a n d i n g  i n  
th e  way o f  th e  r e v o l u t i o n  and t h a t  i s  why th e y  
a r e  t h e  enem ies o f  th e  peop le*  The above 
a n a l y s i s  a l s o  makes c l e a r  which c l a s s e s  and 
g roups  a r e  th e  b a s i c  d r i v i n g  f o r c e  o f  th e  
r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e  w ork ing  c l a s s ,  t h e  
p e a s a n t s  and th e  p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s ie *  I t  a l s o  
makes c l e a r  which c l a s s  can  ta k e  p a r t  i n  th e  
r e v o l u t i o n ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s ie *
T h is  i s  why th e  w o rk e rs ,  t h e  p e a s a n t s ,  th e  
p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s i e  and th e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  
a r e  th e  p e o p le  and make up th e  f o r c e s  o f  th e  
r e v o l u t i o n ,  th e  f o r c e s  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  
f r o n t*  '
In  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  from  i t s  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  s o c i o ­
p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  an a n a l y s i s  b a s e d  on th e  
p a s t  and c o n t i n u i n g  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  PKI i t s e l f  and o f  f o r e i g n  
comm unist p a r t i e s ,  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  c o n c lu d ed  t h a t  th e  
p r o l e t a r i a t  a lo n e  was n o t  a b le  to  co m p le te  th e  r e v o l u t i o n  
( t h a t  i s ,  to  b r i n g  th e  P a r t y  to  p o w e r) .  B ecause con ­
d i t i o n s  were u n f a v o u r a b le  f o r  a c o u p - ty p e  s e i z u r e  o f  
pow er, PKI had  to  t r y  to  o r g a n iz e  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  o t h e r




broad sections of society, namely the peasantry and the 
petty bourgeoisie. But even this combination was 
insufficient to guarantee victory. It was also 
necessary to seek allies among the other major political 
forces (namely among what was termed the national 
bourgeoisie), and, in the struggle against imperialism, 
to win the alliance of sections of the landlord class and 
to exploit the contradictions that were believed to exist 
between the different sections of the compradore 
bourgeoisie.
V. THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT
The PKI leaders believe that although the enemies 
of the revolution, namely the imperialists, compradores 
and feudal landlords, *are in a stage of disintegration 
and decay ... it would be a mistake for us to under-
Aestimate the strength of these enemies . ..* Because the 
enemies are still strong, the struggle to defeat them * is 
a bitter, difficult and protracted struggle*. *It is a 
mistake to believe that this struggle can be completed 
within a short space of time and hastily.* Having also 
examined the strength of the different social classes and
1
Ibid., p.51
their position vis-a-vis the revolution, the PKI leaders
concluded that in order for the revolution to succeed:
the working class, the peasants, the petty 
bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie must 
unite in one national front.
The alliance of the working class and the 
peasants must be the foundation of this 
national united front.
The working class must lead the national 
united front.
Only a national united front that is formed 
on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, 
led by the working class and formed as the 
result of the broadest people’s movement and 
the revolutionary struggle of the masses, 
will make possible the establishment by the 
Indonesian people of a people’s democratic 
government that implements the programme of 
people’s democracy and leads the people to 
victory.*
In order to win the support of and leadership over 
the other revolutionary classes and groups, the prole­
tariat :
must aid the peasants' struggle for land, the 
intellectuals* struggle for their basic rights, 
the national bourgeoisie’s struggle against 
foreign competition, and the entire Indonesian 
people’s struggle for national independence and 
democratic liberties.1 2
1
PKI, Program PKI, pp.21-2. This statement was repeated 
in the PKI programme endorsed in the September 1959 
congress; Njoto, Tentang Program PKI (Concerning PKI’s 
Programme), Djakarta, 1959> P»52.
2
PKI, Program PKI, pp.19-20; Njoto, Tentang Program PKI,
p.51.
Further, the proletariat must not only assist the other 
sections of the people, but must also practice self- 
abnegation :
The basic principle we must adhere to in the 
conduct of the national struggle is to 
subordinate the class struggle to the national 
struggle ... Only by subordinating the class 
and Party interest to the national interest, 
which is the interest of the whole revo­
lutionary people, and by defending the class 
and Party interest in a limit-conscious manner, 
can our cooperation with the other classes and 
groups be profitable and can cooperation be achieved.1
In other words:
class political and economic demands must be 
based on the condition that they will not harm 
the cooperation between the classes which, 
according to their common interest, must 
cooperate; and ... all demands in the class 
struggle must be based on the needs of the 
national struggle.2 3
As the leaders of ’the organized vanguard and highest 
form of class organization of the Indonesian proletariat 
the PKI leaders have been faced with the problem of what
1
This quotation is from Aidit’s report to the PKI central 
committee plenum held at the end of December 1960; D.N. 
Aidit, "Madju Terus Mengempur Imperialisms dan 
Feodalisme.’'* (Continue to Advance to Destroy Imperialism 
and Feudalism.’), HR, January 2, 1961.
2
This quotation is from Anwar Sanusi's speech to the PKI 
central committee plenum held at the end of December 
1960; HR, January 18, 1961.
3 This phrase is contained in all three Party consti­
tutions written by the Aidit leadership.
form  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  sh o u ld  ta k e  i n  I n d o n e s ia .  
The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  i n h e r i t e d  a c o n c e p t  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  
u n i t e d  f r o n t  from th e  A ugust 1948 p o l i t b u r e a u * s  "New 
Road" r e s o l u t i o n  drawn up by  th e  v e t e r a n  communist Musso 
a f t e r  h i s  r e t u r n  from two d e c a d e s  o f  e x i l e  i n  th e  S o v ie t  
U nion . A i d i t ,  Lukman, N jo to  and Sudism an, th e  most 
im p o r ta n t  members o f  th e  p o s t - 1 9 5 0  l e a d e r s h i p ,  had  a l l  
b e e n  p r e s e n t  a t  t h e  p o l i t b u r e a u  m e e t in g ,  and  have 
c o l l e c t i v e l y  g iv e n  s u b s e q u e n t  en d o rsem en t t o  t h e  
h i s t o r i c a l  im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n .
The "New Road" r e s o l u t i o n  had  c a l l e d  f o r  th e  c r e a t i o n  
o f  a n a t i o n a l  f r o n t  i n  w hich  PKI would p l a y  th e  l e a d i n g  
r o l e .  A w id e ly  a c c e p t a b l e  n a t i o n a l  programme was f i r s t  
t o  be  draw n up in  o r d e r  to  a t t r a c t  * a l l  p r o g r e s s i v e  and  
a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  p eo p le *  i n t o  th e  f r o n t .  The f r o n t  was 
t o  be form ed from  b e lo w ,  w i th  members o f  a l l  p a r t i e s  as 
w e l l  a s  n o n - p a r t y  p e r s o n s  e l i g i b l e  f o r  m em bership as  lo n g  
a s  th e y  a g re e d  t o  th e  programme. F r o n t  co m m ittees  were 
t o  be  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  t h e  c e n t r e  and i n  the  r e g i o n s ,  t h e i r  
members to  b e  e l e c t e d  d e m o c r a t i c a l l y .  H e re ,  t h e n ,  was 
a p l a n  f o r  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n a t i o n a l  f r o n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  
l i n k e d  w i th  b u t  s e p a r a t e  from  th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  and
1
PKI, D ja la n  Baru u n tu k  R e p u b lik  I n d o n e s ia  (New Road f o r  
th e  I n d o n e s ia n  R e p u b l i c ) ,  ( s e v e n th  e d i t i o n ) ,  D j a k a r t a ,  
1953, p p .3 1 - 3 .
with which the PKI leaders hoped to win disguised control
over the members of other parties and over non-party
persons. The communist rebellion at Madiun in September
1948 removed any possibility of implementing the plan.
As Lukman was to write later:
For some time after the "New Road" resolution, 
there ... existed rather widely among we 
communists stiff and formal thinking about , 
the organization of the national united front.
During 1950, PKI made frequent calls for the formation of
'one complete national united formation' or 'a national
united front', but gave no further details of what the
2front would involve. On February 1,195*1» Lukman 
himself wrote an article entitled "Towards the United 
Front".3 it was, however, merely a vague restatement 
of some of the proposals contained in the "New Road" 
resolution, and called for unity of action based on a 
joint programme to further the common anti-imperialist
1 M.H. Lukman, Tentang Front Persatuan Nasional 
(Concerning the National United Front), Djakarta, 1960, 
p.54; see also p.55.
2 See, for example, the appeals made in parliament by 
communist representative Hutomo Supardan on October 2, 
1950, and by his colleague Peris Pardede on October 9» 
1950; Risalah Perundingan 1950/1951» vol.III, p.1187> 
and vol.IV, p.1678.
M.H. Lukman, "Menudju Front Persatuan" (Towards the 
United Front), BM, February 1, 195*1» PP*57-9-
objective. Unlike the August 1948 resolution, Lukman*s 
article avoided any mention of the organizational structure 
the proposed unity should have. And then the organi­
zational basis of the front seemed to arrive ready-made.
On March 24, 1951, the leaders of the minor Moslem 
party PSII called a meeting of leaders of several 
political parties to seek a basis for overcoming the 
problems facing the nation. Six days later eleven 
political parties signed a charter of cooperation, a joint 
programme, and a constitution for the new body, the 
Political Parties* Consultative Council (BPP). The 
members of the BPP included, besides PKI, the minor 
Moslem parties PSII and Perti, the nationalist communist 
Murba party, the Labour Party, and the small nationalist 
parties Parindra, PRN, and PRI.
Despite certain qualifications, the PKI leaders were 
jubilant at the formation of the BPP. They warned Party 
members that the BPP *is not yet in accordance with the 
concept of the national united front as we desire it*, 
and that the other parties in the BPP were not yet 
prepared to accept the PKI proposal that Individuals as 
well as organizations be admitted as members of the new
1 These documents are given in BM, March 15-April 1,
1951, pp.168-71.
0 oO  J
body.^ But they also said that 'we can do much, very 
much.'' with the BPP. Lukman wrote that 'the Consulta­
tive Council with its joint programme is one form of the
pnational united front at a certain stage'. He was 
certain, he wrote, that the joint actions based on the 
joint programme would force the BPP to adapt its organi­
zation along lines designed by PKI - that is, along lines 
similar to the "New Road” resolution. On May 11, 1951» 
Aidit declared that the creation of the intended national 
united front had already begun with the creation of the 
BPP.3
The optimism of the PKI leaders was soon proved to 
be groundless. Most of the members of the BPP viewed it 
as a short-term means of applying pressure in the current 
cabinet crisis. When the BPP was ignored by the cabinet 
formateursthe majority of its members lost interest in 
it. Although PKI and its mass organizations worked hard
1
Editorial in BM, March 15-April 1, 1951, pp.161-4.
2 M.H. Lukman, "Mewudjudkan Front Nasional" (To Realize 
the National Front), BM, March 15-April 1, 1951» p.172.
3 Sin Po, May 12, 1951.
k Under the 1950 Indonesian constitution, when a cabinet 
resigned the president appointed one or more cabinet 
formateurs to form the next cabinet. The formateurs 
were not necessarily party leaders or even members of 
political parties, and they did not necessarily sit in 
the subsequent cabinet.
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to build the BPP into a nation-wide system of committees, 
the other members showed no further interest and within 
a year it had disappeared completely.
The failure of the BPP drove home forcibly to the 
PKI leaders the certainty of what they must already have 
felt probable: that no political party was likely to 
transfer part of its control over its members to another 
political organization which, covertly but still 
obviously, was controlled by the PKI. It had also 
become evident that PKI’s appeals for a national coalition 
government were of no avail while the PKI was so small 
that its support was hardly worth seeking. A new concept 
of the national united front was required. As a result, 
in the latter part of 1951 and the first months of 1952 
the PKI leaders undertook a thorough re-examination of the 
Indonesian political situation and of the national united 
front policy. Drastic changes were made in the methods 
of winning the broad masses of the people, in the Party’s 
attitude to the parties of the national bourgeoisie, and 
in the nature of the Party.
Before the failure of the BPP, the Aldit leadership 
appears to have hoped to win the support of the broad 
sections of the masses by subverting the followers of the 
other parties and organizations. With the exception of 
the trade union federation, SOBSI, the communist-led mass
organizations remained diminutive. In August 1951» 
however, Aidit declared that the national front consisted 
of:
the workers* front, the peasants* front, the 
cultural front, the youth front, the students' 
front, the women's front, the poor urban 
people's front, the ex-armed fighters' front, 
the peace front, the Irian struggle front, the 
parties' united front, and the national 
industrialists' front.'
The agitation and propaganda secretariat of the PKI 
central committee on April 26, 1952 wrote in a similar 
vein, but indicated that it would be the communist-led 
mass organizations that would organize the fronts uniting
pthe various sections of society. In short, the PKI 
leaders now set the Party the task of uniting the masses 
through the Party's own mass organizations. This was a 
long-term task, but the leaders had acknowledged the 
protracted nature of the revolution. The period of 
futile appeals for national coalition governments was 
ended. The Party would work to build its own mass 
support with which to force or bargain an entry into the 
national government.
At the same time, the Party drastically revised its 
attitude towards the non-communist political forces.
1
HR, August 16, 1951«
PKI-B, April 26, 1952.
2
Sakirman wrote in I960 that at the time of the mass
arrest of communists and communist sympathizers in August
1951> PKI was faced with a choice between two political 
1lines. The Party could either consider the ruling
classes to be one Compact and intact* anti-communist
force, or it could consider the ruling groups to be
heterogeneous. If they were compact and intact, then
the Party would have to oppose them all, but if they were
heterogeneous the Party could work to isolate their
reactionary wing, and neutralize, or if possible attract,
their non-reactionary elements. According to Sakirman
the choice was not an easy one, and *a part of the higher 
2cadres * believed that the entire national bourgeoisie 
had betrayed the revolution by uniting with the reaction­
aries to crush the communists at the time of the Madiun 
’affair*, by acquiescing to the Round Table Conference 
agreement, and by helping to formulate the 1950 consti­
tution. That is, some of the PKI cadres believed that
1
Sakirman, "Apa Arti Sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan 
Demokrasi Terpimpin** (The Meaning of PKI’s Support for 
the 1945 Constitution and Guided Democracy), part I,
BM, May-June 1960, pp.213-14«2
In PKI usage, the term cadre is applied to an active 
Party worker with fairly important responsibilities within 
the Party. The implication is that a cadre has received 
relatively thorough political education.
because the national bourgeoisie had betrayed the revo­
lution in the past, it would always do so in the future.
The PKI leaders spent their time in hiding after the 
August 1951 arrests in an intensive study of Lenin*s 
"Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" and several 
brochures by Mao Tse-tung. Finally they decided that:
1. the ruling groups within the current cabinet were 
not compact;
2. the national bourgeoisie was not irrevocably 
wedded to the reactionary, anti-communist forces, but 
part or even all of it could be won to a mutually advan­
tageous alliance with the progressives *; and
3. even the reactionary groups were rent by conflicts 
which PKI could exploit to advantage. For example, there 
were conflicts between those in the government and those 
outside, and between the pro-British and pro-American 
groups.
The basis of this change was the realization that 
PKI could neither build a large Party and large mass 
organizations, nor win power without the tolerance and 
alliance of large segments of the non-communist political 
forces. The Aidit leadership has therefore constantly 
emphasized the need to unite with the greatest possible 
section of the non-communist forces. An exposition of 
what the national united front policy meant in terms of
the PKI's relations with the non-communist political 
forces was contained in Aidit*s speech to the central
Acommittee on July 31» 1956. He divided the Indonesian 
social-political forces into three broad categories: the 
diehard force, consisting of feudalists and compradores 
who plot with foreign imperialism1; the progressive force, 
consisting of workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie 
and revolutionary intellectuals, and by which he clearly 
meant those people within or influenced by the PKI or 
its mass organizations; and the middle force, consisting 
of 'the national bourgeoisie and all other patriotic and 
anti-colonial forces including the left (rather progressive) 
landlord group*. Aidit said that the PKI's political 
line must be 'with all its might and tirelessly to build 
up the progressive force, to unite with the middle force 
and to isolate the diehard force'.
Aidit went on to say that:
It is a fact that in the parties that represent 
the diehard force and the middle force there 
exist several groups which can basically be 
divided into left, centre and right groups. In 
order to be able to unite the greatest strength, 
the communists must analyze these groups so that 
we can always establish a correct attitude in 
order to be able to unite all that can be united, 
and in order to isolate the truly diehard.
1
D.N. Aidit, "Bersatu untuk Menjelesaikan Tuntutan 
Revolusi Agustus 1945"» (Unite to Complete the Demands 
of the August 1945 Revolution), HR, August 1, 1956.
Even within the diehard parties, he continued, some 
leaders and members were anti-communist but not pro­
imperialist, not yet aware that to be anti-communist 
assisted the imperialists, while others were anti­
imperialist and not averse to cooperation with the commu­
nists. ’The communists must unite with such people.*
This readiness to seek cooperation with as many as 
possible of the political forces, even the most reaction­
ary, in the pursuit of certain common goals, is a major 
characteristic of the Aidit leadership’s concept of the 
national united front as applied to the non-communist 
political forces. It stems from the leadership’s 
analysis of the relative weakness of the progressive 
force in face of the other internal and external forces, 
and the resultant need to build the broadest possible 
unity in order to advance step by step against the enemies 
of the revolution.
Thus the Aidit leadership came to create its own 
concept of the national united front. In his speech of 
July 319 1956, Aidit made this concept clear. He said 
that the revolution would be successful ’only if there is 
a united front, if the proletariat has many friends’, and 
added that ’there are two kinds of fronts and two kinds 
of friends*. There was the united front between the 
proletariat, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie; and
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the unity or friendship between the proletariat and the 
people who exploit it, that is, between the proletariat 
and the employers and government people who represent the 
interests of the national bourgeoisie* In other words, 
the Aidit leadership came to conceive of the national 
united front as entailing unity in two separate spheres 
and of two distinct qualities: the unity of the masses 
directly led and controlled by the Party and its mass 
organizations, a disciplined unity embracing the truly 
revolutionary classes; and the unity, in the form of 
friendship and cooperation, between PKI and the non­
communist political forces, a unity that PKI must work 
painstakingly to create and maintain, a unity that is 
limited to certain common objectives*
The primary task of the national united front policy 
has been, however, the creation of a large and disciplined 
communist party* Only with such a party could the PKI 
leaders v/eld the unity of the revolutionary classes under 
communist leadership, either directly or through the 
intermediary of mass organizations. Only with such a 
party could they play a significant part in directing the 
course of national politics, and would they be suf- 
ficently strong to warrant other forces seeking alliance 
with them. And only with such a party, also in control 
of mass organizations, could they hope to prevent the
establishment of a bourgeois dictatorship once imperialism 
and feudalism had been shattered. The first step on the 
road of building a mass party was taken in March 1952 
when a campaign was begun to increase Party membership
Awithin six months from 7,910 to 100,000.
Thus the Aidit leadership in the later months of 
1951 and the early part of 1952 formulated its own 
concept of the national united front in conformity with 
its analysis of the Indonesian revolution and the forces 
present in the revolution. The concept envisaged and 
even now envisages no rapid victory, but many years of 
hard and patient work to alter the balance of forces in 
Indonesia. In the implementation of this concept, the 
PKI has faced three main tasks:
1. To build PKI into a disciplined, mass party.
2. To attract, mobilize, organize and lead the three 
most revolutionary classes, and to do the same for any 
other elements in society which might prove susceptible.
3. To gain the tolerance and cooperation of as many 
as possible of those political forces that are not anti­
communist, and to use their tolerance and cooperation to
1
PKI-B, March 7, 1952, pp.3-6; PKI, UP Tahun PKI (PKI 
UP Years), Djakarta, 196P, p.72.
several ends: toleration of the growth of the Party and 
its mass organizations, the destruction of the strength 
of imperialism and feudalism in Indonesia, the isolation 
and destruction of the anti-communist Indonesian political 
forces, and communist participation in a !national unity 
government1 as a step towards communist control of a 
People's Democratic Republic of Indonesia,
The main body of this thesis is concerned with the 
implementation of the national united front policy of the 
Aidit leadership, and with an estimate of the progress it 
has brought towards communist control of Indonesia,
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BUILDING THE PARTY 
I. THE PARTY LEADERSHIP
1• The Party Leadership, December 1948 to January 1951
In the period between December 1948 and the final 
Dutch withdrawal in December 1949» a provisional PKI 
central committee worked spasmodically in an effort to 
maintain a rudimentary Party organization* The great 
majority of the surviving leaders and members were afraid, 
however, to associate openly with the Party until they 
were certain it was not going to be persecuted further 
for its rebellion at Madiun. When the Dutch withdrew, 
Ngadiman Hardjosubroto, who was acting secretary-general, 
was chosen by the Party to sit in the working committee 
of the Republican parliament, and took his place there 
in December 1949« Ngadiman was then appointed a member 
of the Indonesian parliament and moved from Jogjakarta, 
in which city the PKI headquarters were still located, 
to Djakarta in January 1950. Djaetun, a veteran commu­
nist who had been active in the PKI in the 1920's, and
n> o
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had suffered exile in West Irian and Australia from 1926 
to 1946, took over the post of acting secretary-general.^ 
But Djaetun was only a front figure.
Throughout most of 1950, PKI operated on three levels. 
First, there was the legal PKI, with an office in 
Jogjakarta, and with Djaetun as secretary-general. Second, 
the Socialist and Indonesian Labour parties were revived. 
The leader of the Socialist Party was Tan Ling Djie, an 
Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent. The Indonesian 
Labour Party was led by Asmu and Sakirman. Third, there
was an ’illegal PKI* which directed the work of the open 
parties, and also maintained a clandestine Party organi­
zation. In other words, Musso's plan for the organization 
of the communist parties into a single, public Marxist- 
Leninist party was quietly ignored.
During 1949 and 1950 no one person exercised leader­
ship of the ’illegal PKI’, and therefore of the legal PKI 
and the Socialist and Labour parties. The foremost
pleader was Tan Ling Djie, with Ngadiman Hardjosubroto 
1 Much of the information on the period December 1948 to 
January 1951 was provided in statements made to the author 
by Djaetun.
2
This was confirmed by Djaetun and Darsono (a veteran 
communist who returned to Indonesia in 1950 after many 
years of exile, during which he had broken with the commu­
nists) in conversations with the author. The Aidit 
leadership later made Tan Ling Djie the scapegoat for the 
’errors* committed in this period.
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perhaps the second figure. These two were the survivors 
of the four-man general secretariat of the politbureau 
that had been announced on September 1, 1948, and their 
rise to the top two places in the Party was a natural 
process after the death of the other two general secre­
tariat members. Alimin, a veteran Party member, retained 
considerable prestige, and in March 1950 he was reported 
to be the head of PKI's agitation and propaganda secre­
tariat, of which he had been a member in 1948. But 
Alimin could not be a serious contender for control of
the Party because of his age (he was b o m  in 1889), and
1of marked ill-health which began in late 1949. Also 
within the leadership, but of a lesser stature, was 
Wikana, who had been a Minister of State in the Amir 
Sjarifuddin cabinet from July 1947 to January 1948, and 
who had been elected head of the youth section of the 
politbureau announced on September 1, 1948.
In July 1950* two young communists returned to 
Indonesia after eighteen months abroad: Dipa Nusantara 
Aidit, and M.H. Lukman. They had left Indonesia at the 
time of the Madiun rebellion and had gone to Viet Nam
2where they reportedly fought with the Viet Minh guerrillas,
1 —Alimin, Riwajat Hidupku (The Story of My Life), Djakarta, 
1954, p.44.2
Sin Po, July 25, 1950.
and to China, where they attended the Asian-Australasian
trade union conference in Peking in December 1949>
ostensibly as representatives of the trade union feder- 
1 2ation SOBSI. Aidit was 26 years old on his return, 
but already had been active for several years in the left- 
wing movement in Indonesia. He claims to have joined the 
PKI as early as 1943» and to have taken part in the semi­
legal youth organizations which prepared the August 17> 
1945 proclamation of Indonesian independence. In the 
middle of 1946 he went to work for the PKI central com­
mittee and at the fourth PKI congress in January 1947 
was elected to membership of that committee. In 1947 he 
became a member of the Republican parliament and chairman 
of the PKI parliamentary group. In the same year he was 
also a member of the executive of the Indonesian Socialist 
Youth, and of the executive council of the People*s 
Democratic Front which united most of the socialist and 
communist organizations. At the beginning of 1948 Aidit 
became a candidate member of the PKI politbureau and in 
August became a full member and a member of its labour
1
Sin Po, November 18, 1949*
2
For brief biographies of Aidit, see D.N. Aidit, Menempuh 
Djalan Rakjat (Along the People*s Road), (fourth edition), 
Djakarta, 1954» PP*3-4; and BM, September-October 1953> 
PP.479-80.
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Asecretariat. His companion, Lukman, was 30 years old 
and had been raised in the Dutch concentration camp in 
West Irian to which his father had been sent for his part 
in the 1926 communist rebellion. Lukman, too, had taken 
part in the youth movement during the Japanese occupation 
and the early days of the revolution, and had also worked 
for the PKI headquarters from mid-1946. He was elected 
to the central committee in 1948» and in August 1948 to 
the politbureau, in which he was a member of the agitation 
and propaganda section.
Upon their return Aidit and Lukman worked for the 
politbureau*s agitation and propaganda secretariat which 
on August 15, 1950, and despite obstruction from Tan Ling 
Djie, began to republish, twice a month, the Party’s 
periodical "Bintang Merah" (Red Star). Also on the 
editorial staff were Peris Pardede, then only 32, and
pNjoto. Njoto, Aidit and Lukman, were to constitute a 
triumvirate which still controls the PKI. In August 1950 
Njoto was aged 25, and like his companions already had an 
active record in the communist movement. He had taken
1
For brief biographies of Lukman, see BM, September- 
October 1953> pp.481-2; and HR, September 7, 1955.
2
PKI, 40 Tahun PKI (PKI 40 Years), Djakarta, 1960, p.66. 
For brief biographies of Njoto, see BM, September-October 
1953» PP.483-4; and HR, September 7, 1955*
10 3
part in the underground movement during the Japanese 
occupation, and in November 1945 had helped establish 
the PKI organization in Bekasi, of which he soon became 
secretary-general. Later he represented PKI in the 
working committee of the Republican parliament, and be­
came chairman of the PKI group in the committee. In 
mid-1948 he became a member of both the central committee 
and politbureau of the Party.
The "Bintang Merah" editors claimed in the issue of 
January 1-15, 195*1 that the periodical had reappeared:
at a time when Party members were seeking a way 
out of the darkness caused by the confusion of 
the Party leadership, at a time when Party 
members ... did not receive clear leadership in 
the organizational and political spheres.1
The editors further claimed that the reorganization of
the Party in the regions, which gathered force after
August 1950, was in large part due to the stimulus and
leadership given by "Bintang Merah". They also claimed
that the periodical gave the basis and leadership for
developing the criticism and self-criticism among Party
leaders and ordinary members which led to the ouster of
those leaders who clearly ’did not fulfil conditions’.
And if the claim is correct that "Bintang Merah" circu-
1
Editorial, "Memasuki Tahun 1951” (Entering 195i)» BM, 
January 1—15, 1951> P*4.
l a t i o n  was i n c r e a s e d  from 3>000 i n  August 1950 to  10 ,000
A
a t  th e  end o f  th e  y e a r ,  t h e n  p re su m ab ly  th e  p e r i o d i c a l  
would have h a d  an  i n f l u e n c e  a l s o  e x te n d in g  f a r  o u t s i d e  
th e  P a r t y ,  w hich  a t  t h a t  tim e h ad  p e rh a p s  3 o r  5>000 
members.
The i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  n e w ly - r e tu r n e d  l e a d e r s  was soon  
f e l t .  On O c to b e r  19> 1950, th e  I n d o n e s ia n  Labour P a r t y  
o f f i c i a l l y  d i s s o l v e d  i t s e l f  i n  a c c o rd a n c e ,  a s  i t  d e c l a r e d ,  
w i th  M u sso 's  p l a n ,  and  i t s  l e a d e r s  e x p r e s s e d  th e  p io u s  
hope t h a t  Tan L ing  D j i e ' s  S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y  would soon  
f o l lo w  s u i t . ^  However, n o t  a l l  th e  ’o ld*  communist 
l e a d e r s  were w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  m eekly  and w i th o u t  
q u e s t i o n  th e  new l e a d e r s  and t h e i r  p o l i c i e s .  As p ro m i­
n e n t  com m unists from  th e  p r e v io u s  p e r i o d ,  a t  l e a s t  W ikana, 
Ngadiman H a r d jo s u b r o to , Tan L ing  D j ie  and  A lim in  o p e n ly  
d i s a g r e e d  w i th  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  on m a t t e r s  o f  p o l i c y .  
But b e c a u s e  th e  o l d e r  l e a d e r s  were n o t  th em se lv e s  u n i t e d ,  
th e y  d i d  n o t  p r e s e n t  a compact r e s i s t a n c e  and were q u i c k l y  
e l i m i n a t e d  one b y  one .
The f i r s t  o f  t h e  o l d e r  l e a d e r s  t o  be  p u b l i c l y  d i s c i ­
p l i n e d  was W ikana. In  th e  t h i r d  c o n fe r e n c e  o f  t h e  
I n d o n e s ia n  S o c i a l i s t  Y outh , w hich  was h e ld  from November 
4 - 1 2 ,  1950, he was n o t  r e - e l e c t e d  to  t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s
1 2
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e x e c u t iv e  c o m m ittee .  F u r t h e r ,  an a r t i c l e  o f  h i s  i n  
"Bin t a n g  Me r a h ” e n t i t l e d  "Mass Youth O r g a n iz a t i o n " ,  was 
s e v e r e l y  c r i t i z e d  by  th e  e d i t o r i a l  b o a rd  f o r  ’e r ro n e o u s  
and c o n fu s e d  t h o u g h t ’ .*1 The b o a rd  c a l l e d  him i n  f o r  
lo n g  d i s c u s s i o n s  and  o b l ig e d  him to  r e c a n t .  On December 
29 he was made to  r e s i g n  from  a s tu d y - g r o u p  o r g a n iz e d  by  
th e  n a t i o n s l i s t - c o m m u n i s t  Murba p a r t y ,  and  which th e  new
p
l e a d e r s  denounced  a s  a ’T r o t s k y i t e  e f f o r t ’ h a rm fu l  t o  PKI.
Ngadiman H a r d jo s u b r o to  was a l s o  d i s c i p l i n e d  in  
December 1950. On December 2 ,  a s t a te m e n t  was i s s u e d  i n  
th e  name o f  th e  PKI s e c r e t a r i a t  w hich  c a l l e d  f o r  a con­
f e d e r a t i o n  b e tw ee n  a :
D em o cra tic  R e p u b lic  o f  I r i a n ,  f r e e  from th e  Round 
T ab le  C o n fe ren ce  a g re e m e n t,  and th e  U n i t a r y  S t a t e  
o f  th e  R e p u b lic  o f  I n d o n e s ia  n o t  y e t  f r e e d  from 
th e  a g r e e m e n t .3
The PKI c e n t r a l  com m ittee  im m e d ia te ly  denounced th e  
s t a t e m e n t  as  th e  work o f  ’ th e  T r o t s k y i t e  and a d v e n t u r i s t  
g ro u p * , and d i s c l a im e d  a u t h o r s h i p . ^  When i t  was found  
t h a t  Ngadiman, a p p a r e n t l y  w ith  Tan L ing  D j i e ’s know ledge, 
had  i s s u e d  th e  s t a t e m e n t ,  th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  removed
105
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BM, J a n u a r y  1 -1 5 ,  1951» P«26.
2
L o c . c i t .
3
The f u l l  t e x t  o f  th e  December 2 ,  1950 s t a t e m e n t  i s  g iv e n  
i n  S in  Po, December 6 ,  1950.
4
S in  P o , December 11, 1950.
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1him as a PKI member of parliament, and he was excluded 
from the leadership of the Party.
The other prominent ^ l d 1 communist to resist openly 
the policies of the young leaders at this time was Tan 
Ling Djie himself. By the end of December the new 
leaders were sufficiently entrenched within the central 
committee to take Tan to task in a plenary session of 
the committee held in the first week of January 1951.
There he:
deviously defended his reformist and legalistic 
policy concerning West Irian, and also deviously 
defended the importance of continuing the 
Socialist Party in order, he said, to gather 
people who were pro-communist but *dare not enter PKI*.2
The central committee went against him, cancelled his 
statement on West Irian, and decided to dissolve the 
Socialist Party. His defeat Resulted in his being 
deserted by the centrist group in the central committee.*3 
The new, five-member politbureau elected by the 
central committee was announced on January 7, 1951•^
It consisted of Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, Sudisman, and the
1
BM, January 1-15, 1951, p.22.2
D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus untuk Sukses-Sukses jang Lebih 
Besar" (Continue to Advance for Greater Successes) in his 
Pilihan Tulisan (Selected Works), vol. I, Djakarta, 1959,p.202.3 kIbid., p.203 BM, January 1-15, 1951, P*50
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a g e d  and  a i l i n g  A lim in . A i d i t ,  now o c cu p y in g  th e  p o s t  
o f  f i r s t  s e c r e t a r y ,  and Sudism an, w ere e l e c t e d  a s  th e  
l e a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  s e c r e t a r i a t .
A
S ud ism an , aged  30, had  a s i m i l a r  p o l i t i c a l  "background to  
t h a t  o f  th e  new t r iu m v i r a t e  l e a d e r s h ip :  he had  jo in e d  PKI 
d u r in g  th e  J a p a n e se  o c c u p a t io n ,  was s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  o f  
th e  In d o n e s ia n  S o c i a l i s t  Y outh from  i t s  fo rm a tio n  in  
November 1945* worked in  th e  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  P eo p le* s  
D em o cra tic  F r o n t ,  and  i n  A ugust 1948 became a f u l l  member 
o f  th e  PKI p o l i t b u r e a u ,  in  w hich he headed  th e  o r g a n i ­
z a t io n  s e c t i o n .  From Ju n e  1950 to  J a n u a ry  1951 he was 
j o i n t  s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  o f  th e  l e g a l  PKI, and  l e n t  h i s  
s u p p o r t  to  th e  A id it-L u k m an -N jo to  t r i u m v i r a t e .  A i d i t ,  
Lukman, N jo to  and P a rd ed e  w ere ch o sen  a s  th e  e d i t o r i a l  
b o a rd  o f  "B in ta n g  M erah” . S ak irm an  was c h o sen  to  head  
th e  PKI p a r l ia m e n ta r y  g ro u p , a p o s i t i o n  h e ld  p r e v io u s ly  
b y  Ngadiman H a rd jo s u b ro to . The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  i t s e l f
p
c o n s i s t e d  o f  f o u r te e n  p e r s o n s ,  s t i l l  i n c lu d in g  Tan L ing 
D j ie  and W ikana, b u t  n o t  N gadim an.
1 “
For b r i e f  b io g r a p h ie s  o f  Sudism an , see  P a r la u n g a n ,
H a s i l  R a k ja t  M em ilih  Tokoh-Tokoh P arlem en  (The R e s u l ts  o f  
th e  P e o p le fs E le c t io n  o f  Members o f  P a r l ia m e n t ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  
1958, p p .295-6; and HR, S ep tem ber 7, 1955»
2
PKI, P u tu s a n -P u tu s a n  S id a n g  P len o  C e n t r a l  Com ite P a r t a i  
Komunis In d o n e s ia  (D e c is io n s  o f  th e  PKI C e n tr a l  Com m ittee 
Plenum  M e e tin g ) , D ja k a r ta ,  1953* p*6 .
108
The new leadership had met little opposition from 
the older leaders, for several reasons. First, the more 
prominent and capable of the 'old' leaders had been 
killed, and the surviving leaders did not have a suf­
ficiently large or loyal following within the Party to 
stand against the new leadership. Tan Ling Djie had the 
added disadvantage of being of Chinese descent, and was 
thereby unable to occupy publicly the top position of the 
PKI in a country where anti-Chinese feeling was strong. 
Second, the ^ld* leaders were divided among themselves 
on matters of personality and policy, and did not present 
a united front against the new leadership. Third, and 
partly because of the divisions in the 'old* leadership, 
the Party during 1950 was in a chaotic condition. Little 
progress was being made in the task of reshaping the Party 
organization that had been shattered by the Madiun re­
bellion and the second Dutch attack, and there was a lack 
of leadership on both organizational and political policy. 
Into this situation came the new, young, dynamic leaders. 
They claimed to have clear ideas on organizational and 
political policy, and they claimed, in defence of their 
legitimacy, to be the true implementers of Musso's August 
1948 resolution. Perhaps they also claimed to have the 
approval of the Chinese communist leaders, from whose 
country they had just returned. Of great, and perhaps
crucial importance was their dynamism. They launched 
into the publication of "Bintang Merah", feverishly began 
to re-build the Party organization, and worked hard to 
subdue their opponents. The result was that by January 
7, 195*1» PKI had a new leadership, and the ’old* leaders 
were relegated to minor positions.
2• The Party Leadership Since January 1951
Among the fourteen members of the central committee 
in January 1951» the new leadership was faced with three 
who were discontented with the new leaders, the new 
policies and the relatively lowly status to which they 
had been relegated: Tan Ling Djie, Alimin and Wikana.
As soon as the Aidit leadership had established firm 
control over the lower organizations of the Party and 
was assured of the loyalty of most members of the central 
committee, it moved to expel the three recalcitrants from 
the central committee.
The first move was made against Tan Ling Djie. In 
August 1952 the central committee established a control 
commission to investigate those of his activities which 
were held to conflict with Party policy. Although he 
dutifully performed self-criticism and admitted many
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e r r o r s ,  th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  term ed  h i s  s e l f - c r i t i c i s m  
a s  n o t  c o m p le te ly  s in c e r e *  The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  plenum 
w hich  met from  O c to b er  6 - 8 ,  1953 > drew  up a r e s o l u t i o n  
which a c c u se d  him o f  m a in t a in in g  h i s  ’e r r o r s  o f  sub ­
j e c t i v i s m ,  l e g a l i s m  and l i q u i d a t i o n i s m *  and o f  i n s i n c e r i t y
A
i n  p e r fo rm in g  th e  t a s k s  s e t  by  th e  c o n t r o l  com m ission .
A cam paign a g a i n s t  ’Tan L ing  D j i e - i s m ’ was lau n c h ed  as  a
pmeans o f  p u r i f y i n g  th e  P a r t y  i d e o l o g i c a l l y ,  and  Tan
h i m s e l f  was removed from th e  c e n t r a l  c o m m ittee .  He was
n o t  e x p e l l e d  from th e  P a r t y ,  b u t  was g iv e n  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y :
to  pu rge  h i m s e l f  o f  non-com m unis t i d e o lo g y ,  to  
c o r r e c t  h i s  e r r o r s ,  to  p r o l e t a r i a n i z e  h i s  
id e o lo g y ,  and  to  d e v e lo p  h im s e l f  a s  b r o a d l y  as  
p o s s i b l e  i n  o r d e r  to  become a good P a r t y  member
b y  p e r fo rm in g  t a s k s  t o  be s e t  by  th e  p o l i t b u r e a u  and by 
g r e a t e r  s tu d y  o f  th e  t h e o r i e s  o f  M arx ism -Lenin ism  i n  r e ­
l a t i o n  to  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  In d o n e s ia n  r e v o l u t i o n .
In  June  1953» a t  a tim e  when d i s c u s s i o n s  were b e in g  
h e ld  c o n c e rn in g  th e  f o r m a t io n  o f  a new c a b i n e t ,  t h e r e  were 
r e p o r t s  o f  d i s a g re e m e n t  b e tw ee n  A lim in  on th e  one hand and 
th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  o v e r  what c o u rs e  o f  a c t i o n  PKI s h o u ld  
t a k e .  On June  25 A lim in  was made t o  i s s u e  a s t a t e m e n t  
t h a t  no such  d i s a g re e m e n t  e x i s t e d ,  and t h a t  he a g re e d  f u l l y
1
" R e s o lu s i  T erhadap  Kawan Tan L ing  D j i e "  ( R e s o lu t io n  
C o n c e rn in g  Comrade Tan L ing  D j i e ) ,  i b i d . ,  pp.4-5«
2
See b e lo w , p p . 141-4
in
w ith  A i d i t ' s  v ie w s . -1 D e s p i t e  t h i s ,  th e  O c tober  1953
c e n t r a l  com m ittee  plenum removed him from th e  p o l i t b u r e a u
p
' i n  v iew  o f  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  and h e a l t h ’ , though  f o r  th e  
tim e b e in g  he r e t a i n e d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  on th e  c o m m ittee .
He was r e p l a c e d  by S ak irm a n , who was a l r e a d y  ch a irm an  o f  
th e  PKI p a r l i a m e n ta r y  g roup  and a l o y a l  s u p p o r t e r  o f  th e  
A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p .  Sakirman-^ was a u s e f u l  a d d i t i o n  to  
th e  PKI l e a d e r s h i p  a s  one who was a b le  to  cem ent p e r s o n a l  
c o n t a c t s  v i t a l  t o  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  
be tw een  th e  P a r t y  and th e  non-com m unis t p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s .  
He had  a h i g h e r  l e v e l  o f  e d u c a t io n  th a n  th e  o t h e r  PKI 
l e a d e r s ,  h a v in g  g ra d u a te d  b e f o r e  th e  war from th e  Bandung 
t e c h n i c a l  h ig h  s c h o o l .  And he  had  a lo n g  r e c o r d  o f  
c o o p e r a t i o n  w i th  th e  non-com m unis t n a t i o n a l i s t s .  I n  1941 
he had  j o in e d  G erindo  (Movement o f  t h e  I n d o n e s ia n  P e o p l e ) ,  
w hich in c lu d e d  a few com m unists and many n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  
and  w i t h i n  w hich  he became a member o f  th e  West J a v a  
c o m m is s a r ia t ,  th e r e b y  g a in in g  th e  a c q u a in ta n c e  o f  many 
n a t i o n a l i s t  l e a d e r s .  D u r in g  th e  r e v o l u t i o n  he h ad  become 
f i r s t  cha irm an  o f  th e  P e o p l e ' s  Army s t a t i o n e d  i n  M agelang,
•____
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PKI, P u tu s a n - P u tu s a n , p .4 .
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For b r i e f  b io g r a p h ie s  o f  Sakirm an, se e  P arlaungan , H a s il  
R akjat M em ilih , p p .286 -7 ; and HR, September 7 , 1955«
and l a t e r  a m a j o r - g e n e r a l  in  th e  In d o n e s ia n  n a t i o n a l  arm y, 
s e r v i n g  i n  th e  h e a d q u a r t e r s .  In  J a n u a r y  1950 he became 
a member o f  p a r l i a m e n t .  F u r th e rm o re ,  he i s  th e  b r o t h e r -  
i n - l a w  o f  S a r to n o ,  a p ro m in e n t  PNI l e a d e r  and s p e a k e r  o f  
p a r l i a m e n t  from  1950 to  1959•
At th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  plenum o f  O c to b e r  1953 A i d i t  
was e l e c t e d  s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  o f  the  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  
s e c r e t a r i a t ,  w i th  Lukman and N jo to  as h i s  d e p u t i e s .
Sud ism an , who had  s h a r e d  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  th e  s e c r e t a r i a t  
s i n c e  June 1950, l o s t  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  b u t  rem a in ed  on the  
f iv e -m em b er  p o l i t b u r e a u .
By th e  t im e  o f  t h e  PKI f i f t h  n a t i o n a l  c o n g r e s s ,  w hich  
ended  on March 21 , 1954, th e  number o f  f u l l  members o f  th e  
P a r t y ,  t h a t  i s  members w i th  v o t in g  r i g h t s ,  had r e a c h e d
A
4 9 ,0 4 2  -  a t e n f o l d  i n c r e a s e  s i n c e  J a n u a r y  1951« T h is
l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  i t s e l f  c o n s o l i d a t e d  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p ' s  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  P a r t y  b e c a u se  th e  new members had  b e e n  
a t t r a c t e d  i n t o  th e  PKI by  A i d i t ' s  p o l i c i e s  and  program m es, 
th e y  were r e c e i v i n g  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n  from c a d r e s  l o y a l  
to  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p ,  and th e y  had  no l o y a l t i e s  t o  th e  
' o l d '  l e a d e r s .  The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  was a l r e a d y  a s s u r e d  
o f  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l '" a n d  l o c a l  P a r t y  c a d r e s ,  and
1
D.N. A i d i t ,  "Some R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  F i f t h  N a t io n a l  C o n g ress  
o f  t h e  In d o n e s ia n  Communist P a r t y " ,  FALP, O c to b e r  15 , 1954,
P«3*
from this position of strength made the fifth congress 
the occasion for removing the last of the disgruntled 
‘old* leaders from the central leadership. Although 
Alimin sat on the five-man congress presidium,^ he failed 
to receive enough votes to he re-elected onto the central
pcommittee•“ It was not announced whether Wikana stood 
for re-election, hut he too lost his place on the central 
committee, Alimin and Wikana were replaced hy Nursuhud 
and Karel Supit,^ who had proved themselves able and 
disciplined Party workers under the Aidit leadership.
The membership of the central committee remained at 13*
As the claimed membership of the Party increased from 
about 4» or 5>000 in January 195*1 to 165,206 in March 1954» 
and one million by the end of 1955» the work to be done by 
the Partyfs central leadership increased considerably, and 
it became necessary to widen its membership. It appears 
that the Aidit leadership was at first reluctant to in­
corporate new members in the central leadership, perhaps 
through fear of unwittingly importing potential opposition 
into what had proved to be a reliable central committee.
But as time passed, the Aidit leadership was able to judge 
which of the lower Party workers were most able and most
1
TI, March 18, 1954.
HR, March 22, 1953.
3
2
HR, July 4» 1956,
114
loyal. In the March 1954 congress, three young commu­
nists were elected as candidate members of the central 
committee: A. Anwar, Anwar Kadir and Siswojo, born in 
1926, 1916 and 1925 respectively* The central committee 
plenum which met on August 7> 1955 endorsed the election 
of three more candidate members: Tjugito, S* Utarjo and 
Ruslan Kamaludin,"1 born in 1921, 1923 and 1919 respective­
ly* The central committee plenum which met from July 31 
to August 3 9 1956 elected Siswojo to full membership of
0the committee, to replace Bachtarudin who had died in 
June* At the same time the central committee secretariat 
was enlarged to include Sudisman, Jusuf Adjitorop and 
Siswojo*
These slight increases in the membership of the 
central leadership were soon found inadequate to meet the 
increased work entailed by a further increase in Party 
membership to one and a half millions at the beginning of 
1959» and by the greatly increased Party work in parliament, 
the Constituent Assembly, and the local councils*-^ The
1 2 
HR, August 9, 1955. HR, August 6, 1956.
3 The number of PKI representatives in parliament increased 
from 19 before to 32 after the September 1955 elections;PKI had 60 members elected to the Constituent Assembly in 
the December 1955 elections; and PKI representation in the 
regional and local councils of Java increased from a 
negligible number to 624 in 1956, when the councils were
ex p a n sio n  and r e o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  the c e n tr a l  le a d e r sh ip  
organs were undertaken  by the c e n tr a l  com m ittee plenum  
w hich ended on A p r il 3 , 1958.
The p o l i t b u r e a u  was e n la r g e d  by th e  p ro m o tio n  o f  
A d j i t o r o p  to  c a n d id a t e  m em bersh ip , and  a p o l i t b u r e a u  d a i l y  
c o u n c i l ,  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  A i d i t ,  Lukman, N jo to  and Sudism an, 
was e s t a b l i s h e d  to  p r o v id e  l e a d e r s h i p  to  th e  P a r t y  b e tw ee n  
p o l i t b u r e a u  m e e t in g s .  A l l  f i v e  c a n d id a te  members o f  th e  
c e n t r a l  com m ittee  were e l e v a t e d  to  f u l l  m em bership , th u s  
i n c r e a s i n g  th e  s i z e  o f  th e  com m ittee  from  13 to  18 members. 
Ten o f  th e  members h ad  c o n t in u e d  to  s i t  i n  th e  com m ittee  
s i n c e  J a n u a r y  1951« The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  s e c r e t a r i a t  
was r e o r g a n i z e d ,  and  g iv e n  th e  t a s k  o f  p e r fo rm in g  th e  
c o m m it te e !s r o u t i n e  d a i l y  work. I t s  s e v e n  members con­
s i s t e d  o f  Sudism an and A d j i t o r o p  from th e  p o l i t b u r e a u ,  
p lu s  f i v e  o t h e r  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  members o f  whom o n ly  one 
had  s a t  i n  t h e  com m ittee  s i n c e  J a n u a ry  1951* The
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formed on the b a s i s  o f  the 1955 p ar liam en tary  e l e c t i o n s ,  
and to  973 in  th e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  1957 a f t e r  l o c a l  
e le c t io n s  had b een  h e ld .
1
D.N. A id i t ,  "Fase Baru dan P en jesu a ian  O rg a n isa si Dengan 
S itu a s i"  (A New Phase and B rin g in g  the O rg a n iza tio n  in to  
Line w ith  th e  S i t u a t io n ) ,  BM, M arch-April 1958, pp .lU l|.-9; 
"Putusan-Putusan Sidang P leno ke-V I C en tra l Comite PKI" 
(D e c is io n s  o f  the S ix th  P len ary  S e s s io n  o f  th e  PKI C en tra l 
C om m ittee), BM, M arch-A pril 1958, p.153»
i n c l u s i o n  o f  so  many p o s t-1 9 5 1  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  members 
i n  t h e  s e c r e t a r i a t  d e m o n s t r a te d  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p ^  
c o n f id e n c e  i n  th e  l o y a l t y  o f  th e  new members*
The PKI s i x t h  n a t i o n a l  c o n g r e s s ,  h e ld  from Septem ber 
7 - 1 4 ,  1959 r e s u l t e d  n o t  o n ly  i n  th e  c o n f i r m a t io n  o f  th e  
c o n t r o l  o f  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p ,  b u t  a l s o  i n  th e  f u r t h e r  
e n la rg e m e n t  o f  th e  P a r t y  c e n t r a l  o r g a n s ,  and  th e  r e a d ­
m is s io n  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s l y  o u s te d  ’old* l e a d e r s ,  p resu m ab ly  
p u r i f i e d ,  to  p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  th e  c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p .
A i d i t  was cha irm an  o f  th e  com m ission  which drew up th e  
l i s t s  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  a l l  c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p  o r g a n s ,  and 
th e  l i s t s  were a d o p te d  un an im o u sly  and unchanged  by th e  
c o n g r e s s .  I t  i s  c e r t a i n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  th e  e n la rg e m e n t  
o f  th e  c e n t r a l  o rg a n s  and th e  r e t u r n  o f  ’o ld*  l e a d e r s  were 
i n  no way a t h r e a t  to  A i d i t ' s  l e a d e r s h i p .
A i d i t  was e l e c t e d  to  th e  new p o s t  o f  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  
c h a i rm a n ,  w i th  Lukman and N jo to  a s  h i s  d e p u t i e s .  The 
p o l i t b u r e a u  was unchanged  e x c e p t  f o r  th e  a d d i t i o n  o f  
N jono , th e  c h a irm a n  o f  SOBSI, a s  a c a n d id a t e  member. The 
c e n t r a l  com m ittee  was e n la r g e d  to  35 f u l l  members and 11 
c a n d i d a t e  members. The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  s e c r e t a r i a t ,  
w i th  Sudism an as  i t s  h e a d ,  was f u r t h e r  e n la r g e d  by  th e  
a d d i t i o n  o f  K a re l  S u p i t .
1
PKI, Dokumen-Dokumen Kongres N a s io n a l  ke-V I PKI 
( Documents o f  P K I1s S i x t h  N a t io n a l  C o n g re s s ) ,  D j a k a r t a ,
1960, p p . 2 1 8 -2 0 .
X  X  i
The r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  'o ld *  P a r t y  l e a d e r s  had 
b e g u n  some t im e  b e f o r e  th e  s i x t h  c o n g r e s s .  A l im in ,
Wikana and Tan L ing  D j ie  had  b e en  e l e c t e d  as PKI r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e s  t o  th e  C o n s t i t u e n t  Assem bly i n  th e  December 
1955 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  and i n  December 1956 Tan L ing  D j ie  
and  Wikana were e l e c t e d  as se c o n d  d e p u ty  ch a irm an  and 
s e c r e t a r y  r e s p e c t i v e l y  o f  th e  P a r t y  g roup  i n  th e  a s s e m b ly .1 
Ngadiman H a r d jo s u b r o to  was r e p o r t e d ,  i n  1959» to  be 
c h a irm a n  o f  t h e  PKI c e n t r a l  e l e c t i o n  com m ittee  e n t r u s t e d  
w i th  t h e  t a s k  o f  p r e p a r i n g  th e  P a r t y 1s cam paign in  th e  
fo r th c o m in g  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .  In  th e  s i x t h  c o n g r e s s ,  
Wikana r e t u r n e d  t o  th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  as a f u l l  member, 
Tan L in g  D j ie  and Ngadiman were e l e c t e d  to  m em bership o f  
th e  c e n t r a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  com m ission , and A lim in  was 
h o n o u re d  b y  a p l a c e  on th e  c o n g re s s  p r e s id iu m .  A i d i t  
was s u f f i c i e n t l y  s u r e  o f  h i s  own c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  P a r t y  to  
re -e m p lo y  th e  u n d o u b te d  t a l e n t s  o f  Y/ikana, Tan L ing  D j ie  
and  Ngadiman in  u s e f u l ,  b u t ,  i n  te rm s  o f  pow er, unim­
p o r t a n t ,  p o s i t i o n s .
A n o t a b l e  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  th e  
PKI s i n c e  J a n u a r y  1951 has  b e e n  th e  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  th e
1
PKI dan P e r w a k i l a n , December 1956, p .2 0 1 .  In  1958» 
th e y  were r e p o r t e d  to  be  o n ly  o r d i n a r y  members o f  th e  
g r o u p ’s n ine-m an  l e a d e r s h i p  co m m ittee ;  PKI dan P e r w a k i l a n , 
f o u r t h  q u a r t e r  o f  1958, p .2 9 .
membership of the inner core. Of the 14 central 
committee members in January 1951» 11 are still members. 
Only Bachtarudin, who has died, Alimin, who is too senile 
for such a position, and Tan Ling Djie are no longer in 
the committee. And of the five full members of the 
politbureau elected in September 1959, four were members 
in January 1951• The control over the Party of these 
four - Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and Sudisman - is complete. 
Not only do they control the politbureau and its daily 
council, and the central committee and its secretariat, 
but they also have exercised personal supervision over 
Party work in parliament and the Constituent Assembly.*1 
Furthermore, they have even maintained a close personal 
supervision over Party publications. When PKI began to 
publish its own newspaper, "Harian Rakjat" (People's 
Daily), in July 1951» Njoto was given the task of super­
vising its contents, a task he still performs. With the 
publication of the newspaper, the importance of the 
periodical "Bintang Me rahH was reduced, and its editor-
1
In 1954f Aidit, Lukman and Njoto entered parliament, 
replacing communist members who had resigned, and they 
continue to sit there. In December 1956, when Sakirman 
was elected fourth deputy chairman of the Constituent 
Assembly, Lukman took over his post of chairman of the 
PKI parliamentary group. Aidit, Lukman and Njoto also 
entered the Constituent Assembly which existed from 
November 1956 to June 1959*
no
ship was transferred in August 1951 to the veteran, 
Djaetun, and later to Supeno, a member of the ,fHarian 
Rakjat" editorial staff* In January 1957» however, the 
editorship was returned to a board consisting of Njoto, 
Sudisman and Pardede*
II. THE EXPANSION AND EDUCATION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP
1.  1951
The Aidit leadership took over a party that was small 
and ill-organized, and most of whose members were lacking 
even the rudiments of Marxist-Leninist knowledge. The 
two primary tasks of the new leaders were to put the Party 
organization into order, and to begin the work of politi­
cal education.
In January 1951 the Party organization was still 
chaotic as a result of the Madiun rebellion, the second 
Dutch attack on the Republic, and the failure of the post- 
Madiun leaders to give clear and energetic direction.
Total Party membership was about 4, or 5,000. The task
1
This figure is deduced from Aidit’s statement (D.N. 
Aidit, "Ideological Work in the Communist Party of 
Indonesia", World Marxist Review, July 1959, p*24) that 
there were 7,910 full and candidate members at the 
beginning of 1952, and from the undoubted growth of the 
Party during 1951« There is doubt, however, as to the 
accuracy of Aidit*s figure. At another time he stated
of re-establishing the Party organization was begun in 
earnest after the return of Aidit and Lukman to the Party 
leadership in July 1950* In September 1950, the 
newspaper "Sin Po" reported that PKI branches were already 
active throughout Sumatra (where the Party had stayed 
aloof from the Madiun rebellion and so continued its 
public activities unimpaired) and in Java in Djakarta, 
Banten, Sukabumi, Jogjakarta, Surakarta, north Kedu,
4Blitar, and Banjumas. It was expected that branches 
would soon be revived in Semarang, Bandung, Besuki, 
Pekalongan and Tjirebon in Java as well as in Menado, 
Makasar, Banjarraasin and Timor in the outer islands.
During October 1950, the Party was revived in Surabaja,
pBodjonegoro, Madiun and Malang.
The revival of former PKI branches and the establish­
ment of new ones continued after the Aidit leadership won 
full control of the Party in the first week of January
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that PKI membership had reached ’the teens of thousands' 
(belasan ribu) by August 1951; D.N. Aidit, "Menudju 
Persatuan Nasional dengan Semangat Revolusi Agustus" 
(Towards National Unity with the Spirit of the August 
Revolution), PKI-B, August 1954> p.102. On the other 
hand, this apparent discrepancy could be explained if the 
government’s mass arrest of communists in August 1951 had 
caused many members to break their contact with the Party 
through fear of further government action.
1
Sin Po, September 26, 1950»
BM, November 1, 1950, pp.186-7*
2
1951* In each locality where reorganization was effected 
elections were held and leaders chosen who were in 
agreement with the new central leadership. The Party in 
Sumatra, however, required special treatment, probably 
because the pre-Madiun leaders there had remained un­
changed. On February 1, 1951 the central committee sent 
Pardede and Hutapea to reorganize the Party in Sumatra.
By March it was already reported that undesirable elements 
had been excluded from the leadership there, and central 
committee commissariats, led by trusted pro-Aidit members 
of the central committee, were established in North,
ACentral and South Sumatra.
By May 195*1» Aidit declared that the Party organi­
zation was being built not only in Java and Sumatra as in 
the past, but also in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and 
Nusatenggara.1 2 He also claimed that the number of Party 
members and candidate members was already far more than in 
1948, and that the basic Party organizations in places of
1
See BM, March 1, 1951» pp*156-8 for the details of the 
reorganization of the Party in Sumatra.
2
D.N. Aidit, "Garis-Garis Pokok Perdjuangan Ideologi 
Didalam PKI" (The Fundamental Lines of the Ideological 
Struggle in PKI), BM, May 15-June 1, 195*1» P«2ö5» 
Kalimantan is the Indonesian name for the Indonesian part 
of Borneo, Sulawesi is the name for Celebes, and 
Nusatenggara is the name given to the Lesser Sundas 
stretching from Bali in the west to the Indonesian part 
of Timor in the east.
work and r e s i d e n c e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  P a r t y  f r a c t i o n s  w i th in
mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  had a l r e a d y  begun to  f u n c t i o n .  The
work o f  ex p an d in g  th e  P a r ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n  s u f f e r e d  a blow
when, i n  A ugust 1951» th e  governm ent a r r e s t e d  some 2 ,0 0 0
com m unists and ’o t h e r  p r o g r e s s i v e s *  on an  u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d
«1
c h a rg e  o f  p l o t t i n g  a coup d ’e t a t .  Many o f  t h e  l e a d e r s  
who evaded  a r r e s t ,  i n c l u d i n g  A i d i t ,  went i n t o  h i d in g  from 
which th e y  d id  n o t  emerge u n t i l  th e  f o rm a t io n  o f  a new 
governm ent i n  A p r i l  1952.
T hus, a y e a r  a f t e r  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  had  won con­
t r o l  o f  t h e  P a r t y ,  th e  P a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  was f u n c t i o n i n g  
n o t  o n ly  th ro u g h o u t  th e  m ajo r c e n t r e s  o f  J a v a  and Sum atra  
b u t  a l s o  i n  th e  o t h e r  i s l a n d s .  F u r th e rm o re ,  th e  l e a d e r ­
s h i p  o f  th e  P a r t y  had become more homogeneous th a n  e v e r  
b e f o r e .  The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  had e x e r c i s e d  i t s  power 
u n d e r  th e  J a n u a r y  1947 and A p r i l  1951 P a r t y  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  
t o  n o m ina te  t h e  com m issars  who h ead ed  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a t  
th e  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l ,  and had  e n s u re d  t h a t  th e  l e a d e r s  i n  
th e  new ly  o r g a n iz e d  o r  r e v iv e d  b ra n c h e s  were p e rs o n s
1
A i d i t ,  The B i r t h  and  Growth o f  th e  Communist P a r t y  o f  
I n d o n e s i a , D j a k a r t a ,  1958, p .3Ö . George Me Tu m a n  K ah in , 
" I n d o n e s ia n  P o l i t i c s  and N a t io n a l i s m "  i n  W ill iam  L. 
H o l la n d  ( e d . ) ,  A s ia n  N a t io n a l i s m  and th e  W est, New York, 
1953» p . l8 9 >  s t a t e s  t h a t  i n  A ugust 1951 15>000 p e rs o n s  
were a r r e s t e d ,  o f  whom many were com m unis ts .  I  can  se e  
no r e a s o n ,  how ever, why A i d i t  s h o u ld  have u n d e r s t a t e d  
th e  m agnitude  o f  t h e  a r r e s t s .
amenable to the central leadership. At the beginning 
of 1952 there were 7>910 full and candidate members of 
PKI.
At the same time as reviving and expanding the Party 
organization, the Aidit leadership began the ideological 
and organizational education of the cadres and members. 
Aidit, in an article written at the beginning of March 
1951> warned that the Party suffered from ideological 
deficiences and that during the struggle for victory,
PKI could be affected by the dangers of ’left* and right
Aopportunism, that is adventurism and capitulationism.
At the same time he warned against sectarianism, which 
entailed ignoring the importance of attracting the broad 
mass of the workers and the importance of the national 
united front. The Party’s general programme, included 
in the April 1951 constitution, introduced the Party 
members to other dangerous deviations that could isolate 
PKI from the people and which had to be fought and 
avoided:
tailism, commandism, closed door policy, isolation 
policy, paternalism, individualism, liberalism, 
bureaucracy, intrigue, nepotism and militarism.2
1 D.N. Aidit, "Membolsewikkan PKI" (Bolshevizing PKI), 
BM, March 1, 1951» pp.129-34.2
PKI, Konstitusi PKI (PKI’s Constitution), Djakarta,
1951 > pTTST
An a r t i c l e  by A i d i t  i n  May 1951 p i n p o i n t e d  two o t h e r  
d i s e a s e s  p r e s e n t  i n  the  P a r t y  which l e d  sometimes to  
' l e f t *  and sometimes t o  r i g h t  d e v i a t i o n . ^  They were 
dogm atism ,  which d i d  n o t  a c c e p t  t h a t  'Marxism i s  n o t  a 
dogma b u t  a g u id e  f o r  a c t i o n * ;  and e m p i r i c i s m ,  whose 
a d h e r e n t s  h e l d  f i r m l y  t o  t h e i r  own r e s t r i c t e d  e x p e r i e n c e s ,  
and  who d i d  n o t  u n d e r s t a n d  o r  w i s h  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  th e  
im p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e o r y  f o r  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p r a c t i c e *  In  
o r d e r  t o  remedy o r  a v o i d  such i d e o l o g i c a l  d e v i a t i o n s ,  t h e  
new c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p  e m p h as ized  t h e  n e e d  to  s t u d y  n o t  
o n l y  th e  c o n c r e t e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  b u t  a l s o  th e  
more i m p o r t a n t  and r e l e v a n t  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  l i t e r a t u r e .
I n  o r d e r  to  p r o v i d e  s t u d y  m a t e r i a l s ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  
com m it tee  announced on March 1, 1951 t h a t  i t  had  formed 
a commission t o  t r a n s l a t e  communist  works i n t o  I n d o n e s i a n * 1 2 
The f i r s t  books l i s t e d  f o r  t r a n s l a t i o n  w ere :  S t a l i n * s  "The 
F o u n d a t io n s  o f  L e n i n i s m ” , L e o n t i e v ' s  " P o l i t i c a l  Economy", 
"The H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  CPSU(B)", and Liu  S h a o - c h i ' s  "On th e  
P a r ty " *  They were t o  be  f o l l o w e d  by  L e n i n ' s  " I m p e r i a l i s m ,  
t h e  H ig h e s t  S ta g e  o f  C a p i t a l i s m " , " S t a t e  and R e v o l u t i o n " ,  
and  " L e f t - w in g  Communism, an  I n f a n t i l e  D i s o r d e r " ,  Mao 
T s e - t u n g ' s  "On New Democracy" ,  S t a l i n ' s  "Marxism and t h e
1
A i d i t ,  " G a r i s - G a r i s ", BM, May 15-June  1, *1951» p .2 6 6 .
2
BM, March 1, 1951, p p .1 3 2 ,  156.
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National and Colonial Questions", Engels* "Utopian and 
Scientific Socialism", and Rutgers* "Indonesia". And 
so began the systematic translation into Indonesian of 
the communist classics, basic tools with which the PKI 
leaders hoped to create a Party united on ideology and 
thereby on policy matters too.
Brochures and pamphlets were not the only means used 
to make known international communist writings. For 
example, the periodical "Bintang Merah" contained Mao 
Tse-tung*s "Strategic Problems of China*s Revolutionary 
War" in serialized form during the later part of 1950 and 
the first part of 1951> and during 1951 "the translated 
works included Stalin*s "Theory" and "The Foundation of 
Leninism", Mao Tse-tung*s "On Eradicating Liberalism in 
the Party", and Hong Ha*s "The Victory of the Vietnamese 
People and its Army". From July 1, 1951 the PKI 
published its own daily newspaper, "Harian Rakjat", which 
began with only 2,000 copies, but which played and plays 
an important role in disseminating Party instructions and 
in providing materials for the organizational and political 
education of its readers. As soon as **Harian Rakjat" was 
published, "Bintang Merah" became a monthly instead of a 
twice-monthly, and was then temporarily forced by 
financial problems to cease publication from the end of
1
1951 to  A ugust 1952. When "B in ta n g  M erah" t e m p o r a r i ly  
c lo s e d  down, th e  a g i t a t i o n  and p ro p ag an d a  s e c r e t a r i a t  o f  
th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  b eg an  to  p u b l is h  a m im eographed p e r i ­
o d i c a l  " P K I-B u le tin "  w hich  a p p e a re d  on a v e ra g e  a b o u t once 
e v e ry  th r e e  w eeks. The new p e r i o d i c a l  c o n ta in e d  P a r ty  
s ta te m e n ts  and new s, a r t i c l e s  by  P a r ty  l e a d e r s  on a wide 
ran g e  o f  i d e o l o g i c a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  m a t t e r s ,  
and  an in c r e a s in g  num ber o f  t r a n s l a t i o n s  from  th e  Cominform 
jo u r n a l  "F or a L a s t in g  P e a c e , F o r a P e o p le 's  D em ocracy ." '.
In  S u ra b a ja ,  from  a b o u t th e  end o f  1950» a l a r g e  'w e e k ly  o f  
p e o p le 's  d e m o c ra c y ',  "Zaman B aru" (New Age) was p u b l is h e d  
u n d e r  PKI c o n t r o l .  By th e  end o f  1 9 5 2 , when i t s  e d i t o r ,  
N a ib ah o , was a p p o in te d  c h i e f  e d i t o r  o f  "H arian  R a k ja t" ,  
"Zaman B aru" a p p e a re d  i r r e g u l a r l y .  M isc e lla n e o u s  P a r ty
p u b l i c a t i o n s  d u r in g  1951 in c lu d e d  th e  A p r i l  1951 P a r ty
2c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and a s h o r t  h i s t o r y  o f  th e  PKI. One o f  
th e  P K I-le d  p e a s a n t  o r g a n iz a t io n s  p u b l is h e d  a t r a n s l a t i o n  
o f  S t a l i n ' s  "The P e a sa n t Q u estio n " .-^
A cco rd in g  to  A i d i t ,  th e  g o v e rn m e n t's  mass a r r e s t  o f  
com m unists in  A ugust 1951  r e s u l t e d  in  a f r e s h  b u r s t  o f
1
PK I-B . March 7» 1952, p p .6 - 7 .
2
PKI, Konst l t u s t , 1951» 61+ p . ; PK I, L a h im ja  P a r t a i  
Komunis In d o n e s ia  dan  P erkem bangann ja  (The B i r th  and Growth 
o f  th e  Communist P a r ty  o f  I n d o n e s ia ) ,  D ja k a r ta ,  1951» 29 p* 
3
S t a l i n ,  M asalah  T ani (The P e a s a n t Q u e s t io n ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  
1951, 74 p .
1 «w
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study of those of Lenin*s works which in a popular way 
expounded Marxist strategy and tactics."1 The Party 
leaders in hiding turned to Lenin*s works in order to 
seek a way out of the difficult situation PKI was in. As 
a result, extra work was undertaken to translate Lenin*s 
works, adding to those begun in March 1951 such as "What 
is to be Done”, "Prom Where to Begin”, ”To the Village 
Poor”, "Thesis”, and "Marxism and Revisionism”.
Little information has been published as to the work 
of formal cadre training in 1951* On April 16, 1951» the 
Djakarta Raja section of the Party opened a course for 
Party functionaries at which Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and 
Sudisman gave instruction on the fundaments of Leninism, 
the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
putopian and scientific socialism, and Party organization.
A leading Party cadre told me in 1960 that he had attended 
a central committee cadre school in Djakarta in 1951» but 
this might have been the one officially organized by the 
Djakarta section. A report in "Harian Rakjat" mentioned 
in April 1952 that courses had been organized in Subang 
and Krawang, on the initiative of the communist-led mass
T
D.N. Aidit, Lenin dan Indonesia (Lenin and Indonesia), 
Djakarta, 1960, pp.31-2.
2
BM, April 15-May 1, 1951, p.253.
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organizations, in order to give cadres the minimum 
knowledge required in building the national united front.1 
But although this report added that it was hoped to extend 
these courses into other areas, it did not say how long 
the original courses had been in operation. Within the 
Party itself, from the time of the August 1951 arrests, 
periodic discussions concerning theory and concerning 
practical work were begun in the Party committees, 
fractions in mass organizations and representative
pcouncils, and in lower levels of the organization.
2. The First Membership Drive
At the beginning of 1952 the politbureau decided to 
try to increase Party membership to 100,000 within six 
months.^ During 195i the Aidit leadership had re­
organized the Party, purged the national and regional 
leadership of elements considered hostile to itself, and 
had begun the work of ideological and cadre training.
The Party was strong enough to bring in new members on a 
large scale, and to begin the primary task of the national
T
HR, April 8, 1952.
2
D.N. Aidit, Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia 
(The Indonesian Road to Peopled Democracy)7 Djakarta, 
1955, P.45.3 PKI, UP Tahun PKI, p.72.
united front policy, that is, to build the Party into a 
mass, nation-wide machine. Only a great increase in PKI 
membership would enable PKI to find large numbers of 
capable cadres, to successfully build and control mass 
organizations among the different sections of society, to 
mobilize millions of voters in the coming elections, to 
seek entry into the civil service and armed forces which 
contained only insignificant numbers of Party members, and 
so to mobilize and control a broad national united front 
which, it was hoped, would eventually control political 
life in Indonesia. It is possible, too, that the August 
195i arrests spurred the Aidit leadership to expand the 
Party, for the arrests showed that the removal of only a 
relative handful of leaders could virtually paralyze the 
small Party, and they also showed that PKI control over 
its mass organizations was still extremely tenuous.^
A PKI national conference, which met early in March
p1952, took two important decisions. First, it decided
1
Because Party work among the peasants was still little 
developed, the small communist-led and communist- 
influenced peasant organizations could not have been 
expected to give the Party significant support at the 
time of the August arrests. But most of the cadres and 
almost all the members of SOBSI also responded with 
indifference to the arrest of the PKI and SOBSI leaders. 
2
Aidit, "Madju Terus" in his Pilihan Tulisan, vol. I, 
p.203; also his D.jalan ke Demokrasi, p.h6.
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to promote the study of theory within the Party, as a 
means of combatting sectarianism, capitulationism and 
adventurism which had appeared among the Party ranks at 
the time of the August arrests* Second, it endorsed the 
plan to expand membership to 100,000 within six months.
On March 7 the central committee published a resolution 
calling for a membership drive which would result in the 
Party becoming a mass party,1 an objective that had not 
been envisaged since 1926 at least.
It would have been surprising had there not been some 
opposition within the Party to the new policy, and the 
resolution in fact incorporated a series of arguments 
designed to counter objections to the creation of a mass 
party. To those members who said that the Party needed 
quality, not quantity, the central committee explained 
that:
quantity is necessary in order to achieve quality. 
Prom a large quantity it is far more possible to 
achieve higher quality. Therefore we need 
quantity as well as quality.
To emphasize this point the central committee stressed
that ’Party cadres cannot appear all of a sudden. People
cannot enter the Party as good cadres’ but must enter as
ordinary members, the best among them being selected and
PKI-B, March 7, 1952, pp.3-6.1
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trained as new cadres. The resolution also explained 
that only by increasing the number of members could the 
Party broaden and strengthen its relations with the 
masses, and that only with the organized strength of the 
broad masses could the Party achieve its goals. In 
order to remove the fear that the membership drive might 
lead to the recruitment of undesirable elements or to the 
lowering of the quality of members, the resolution ex­
plained that organizational methods would prevent this. 
That is, the implementation of the stringent provisions 
embodied in the April 1951 constitution governing the 
entry of new members and the elevation of candidate 
members to full membership, and the practice of criticism 
and self-criticism would prevent such an occurrence. 
Finally, the resolution stated that in order to maintain 
the political and theoretical level of the Party, the 
membership drive had to be accompanied by the implemen­
tation of the other central committee resolution con­
cerning the education of Party members and cadres.
The success of the membership drive was immediate. 
Towards the end of May 1952 PKI was already claiming
A100,000 members. This was followed by a period of 
1 Sudisman, "Peladjaran Fundamentil Selama 32 Tahun 
Berdirinja PKI" (The Fundamental Lesson of 32 Years of 
PKI), PKI-B, May 20, 1952, p.12.
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consolidation in which the membership rose more slowly 
to 126,671 at the end of 1952 and 165*206 in March 1954»^
In May 1953» the central committee gave its comments on 
the drive«1 2 3 By the end of 1952 the Party had 8,467 
committees, fractions^ and groups. The best efforts had 
been made by the Party organizations in Priangan (Bandung), 
Surakarta and Madiun. But not all was satisfactory. Only 
1J per cent of members and candidate members were women, 
and the Party leaders in Banten, Tapanuli (North Sumatra) 
and Kalimantan still did not consider that women were 
Mature* enough to enter the Party. Some Party com­
mittees even had shown indifference to the whole member­
ship campaign. For example, after the delegates from 
Kedu returned home from the March 1952 national conference, 
’the instructions and plan were discussed a little in the 
daily committee, and then ... deposited in the refriger­
ator’ and forgotten for a year.
In terms of social targets, the campaign appears to 
have been aimed primarily at the towns in general and
1
PKI, Bahan-Bahan untuk Kongres Nasional ke-VT Partai 
Komunis Indonesia (Materials for PKl's Sixth National 
Congress), Djakarta, 1958* p.54.
2
PKI-Bt May 1953, pp.78-81.
3 A fraction is a group of communists operating in a non­
par ty organization such as parliament, a trade union, and 
a peasant association.
SOBSI a c t i v i s t s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  PKI, s in c e  1926, had had
v e ry  l i t t l e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  work in  th e  r u r a l  a r e a s ,  and i t
was n a t u r a l  t h a t  th e  d r iv e  was aim ed a t  th e  to w n s, w ith
w hich  th e  c a d re s  were f a m i l i a r  and w here th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s
1
o f  r a p id  s u c c e s s  w ere g r e a t e s t .  R e p o r te d ly  one o f  th e
m ain o b je c t iv e s  o f  th e  d r iv e  was to  c o n s o l id a te  c o n t r o l
o v e r  SOBSI by  b r in g in g  a g r e a t e r  num ber o f  lo w e r - le v e l
2a c t i v i s t s  u n d e r  P a r ty  d i r e c t i o n .  T h a t i s ,  to  e n su re  
t h a t  i f  th e  governm ent t r i e d  to  c u rb  SO B SI's a c t i v i t i e s ,  
a s  i t  had  in  A ugust 1951, i t  w ould have  to  a r r e s t  n o t  
m e re ly  a few  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s ,  b u t  w ould have to  f e r r e t  
o u t  and  a r r e s t  th o u sa n d s  o f  com m un ists . As f o r  th e  
g e o g ra p h ic a l  s p re a d  o f  th e  P a r ty ,  A i d i t  c la im e d  t h a t  th e  
f i r s t  m em bership  d r iv e  h ad  e x te n d e d  PKI to  M adura,
•Z
S u la w e s i ,  K a lim a n ta n , Maluku (M oluccas) and  N u s a te n g g a ra , 
a l th o u g h  th e  g r e a t  m a jo r i ty  o f  members rem ain ed  i n  Ja v a  
a n d , s e c o n d a r i ly ,  S u m a tra . The g e o g ra p h ic a l  s p re a d  o f
1
F e i th  s t a t e s  t h a t  b e fo r e  1953 PKI had  e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s e l f  
i n  v i l l a g e s  in  many p l a n t a t i o n  and  m in in g  a r e a s  and in  
some o t h e r  a r e a s ,  b u t  t h a t  PKI p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  was 
l a r g e l y  c o n f in e d  to  th e  tow ns; H e rb e r t  P e i th ,  The 
In d o n e s ia n  E le c t io n s  o f  1955» I t h a c a ,  New Y ork , 1957» p«29# 
2
Boyd R. Com pton, In d o n e s ia n  Communism: The Ranks S w e l l , 
A m erican  U n i v e r s i t i e s ’ F ie ld  S t a f f  R e p o r t,  New York7 1954,
p . 8 .
A i d i t ,  D ja la n  ke D em okrasi, p .47»
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the Party was illustrated by the establishment in October 
1953 of a Party subsection in Lombok, Nusatenggara.
As the March 7 central committee resolution on the 
expansion of membership had emphasized, the campaign was 
to be accompanied by the implementation of a central 
committee resolution on the education of Party cadres and 
members. The latter resolution was not published, but 
Lukman, in September 1952, did write his comments on the
pwork done to implement it. He stated that the Party 
had only recently begun to effect the education of Party 
cadres and members in a wide and more organized manner; 
but, as according to the resolution, all Party organi­
zations in the regions were obliged to organize courses 
for all Party members, arrange periodic discussions of 
theory, organize self-study, arrange lectures, organize 
public meetings and other efforts to propagandize Party 
policy, and arrange for regional publications by either 
the Party or other progressive groups. By such efforts 
it was hoped gradually to raise the theoretical and 
political level of all members, as well as gradually to 
increase the public's understanding of Party policy.
1
HR, October 23, 1953.2
M.H. Lukman, "Tentang Agitasi dan Propaganda Partai" 
(Concerning Party Agitation and Propaganda), BM, 
September 1952, pp.62-3.
Such e f f o r t s ,  which Lukman r e c o g n iz e d  would be  a t  f i r s t
accom pan ied  by  a l l  k in d s  o f  d e f i c i e n c e s ,  were e x p e c te d  i n
t h e  lo n g  run  to  g iv e  b i r t h  t o :
a number o f  c o u rse  l e a d e r s ,  d i s c u s s i o n  l e a d e r s ,  
l e c t u r e r s ,  s p e a k e r s  i n  p u b l i c  m e e t in g s ,  w r i t e r s  
f o r  r e g i o n a l  p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  e t c . ,  from th e  most 
p r o g r e s s i v e  P a r t y  members. T h is  means th e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a P a r t y  p r o p a g a n d i s t  and a g i t a t o r  
g ro u p .
In  o r d e r  t o  im prove th e  work o f  c a d r e s ,  Lukman a l s o  
recommended r e g u l a r  m e e tin g s  o f  th e  p r o p a g a n d i s t s  and 
a g i t a t o r s  to  d i s c u s s  e x p e r i e n c e s  g a in e d  i n  c a r r y i n g  on 
t h e i r  w ork , and p o in te d  to  th e  need  f o r  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  
c a d r e s  t o  m a s te r  b o t h  In d o n e s ia n  and  th e  l o c a l  lan g u a g e  
o f  th e  a r e a  in  which th e y  worked. I n d o n e s ia n  was 
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  w r i t i n g  l e t t e r s  and r e p o r t s ,  g iv in g  news 
t o  th e  p r e s s ,  and  w r i t i n g  a r t i c l e s  and t r a n s l a t i o n s ; 
m a s te ry  o f  th e  l o c a l  la n g u a g e  would e n a b le  th e  c a d r e s  t o  
work f a r  more e f f i c i e n t l y  among th e  m a sse s ,  whose 
know ledge o f  I n d o n e s ia n  was o f t e n  s l i g h t .
L i t t l e  e v id e n c e  rem a in s  a s  t o  th e  m a t e r i a l s  s t u d i e d  
w i t h in  th e  P a r ty  d u r i n g  1952, a l th o u g h  A i d i t  d id  m en tio n  
t h a t  th e y  in c lu d e d  Mao T s e - t u n g 's  "On th e  P r a c t i c e  and 
E x te r m in a t io n  o f  L ib e r a l i s m  i n  th e  P a r ty "  and L iu  Shao- 
c h i* s  "On th e  Mass L in e " .^  In  March 1953> Sudism an
1
A i d i t ,  D ja la n  ke D em o k ras i , p .6 0
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  e d u c a t io n  c o u rs e s  had b e g u n  i n  an  o r g a n iz e d  
manner a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  th e  P a r ty  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and  t h a t  
th e  s e c t i o n  and s u b s e c t i o n  com m ittees  were g iv in g  l e c t u r e s  
a t  l e a s t  once a month on th e  h i s t o r y  and  p o l i c y  o f  PKI, 
th e  t a s k  o f  b u i l d i n g  th e  w o r k e r s 1 2 u n i t e d  f r o n t ,  th e  PKI 
a g r a r i a n  programme, th e  p o l i c y  o f  p e a c e ,  p e o p l e ’s d e ­
m ocracy , th e  c u l t u r a l  s t r u g g l e ,  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t ,  
and  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s * ^  He 
a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  w i t h i n  a p e r i o d  o f  s i x  months a l l  P a r t y  
members had  to  s tu d y  and u n d e r s t a n d  s e v e n te e n  s p e c i f i e d  
communist w orks , i n c l u d i n g  s i x  w r i t t e n  by  I n d o n e s i a n s ,  
f i v e  b y  C h in e s e ,  t h r e e  b y  R u s s ia n s ,  two by  u n i d e n t i f i e d  
a u t h o r s ,  and th e  Communist M a n i f e s to .^
136
1
Sudism an , ”J .V .  S t a l i n ,  P e n t j i p t a  dan O r g a n i s a t o r  P a r t a i  
Komunis" ( J .V .  S t a l i n ,  Communist P a r t y  C r e a to r  and 
O r g a n iz e r ) ,  BM, March 9^5 ,^ p*111*
2
I b i d * , p .1 1 0 .  The In d o n e s ia n  works were th e  PKI 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  and a g r a r i a n  programme, D ja la n  Baru u n tu k  
R e p u b lik  I n d o n e s ia  (New Road f o r  th e  I n d o n e s ia n  R e p u b l i c ) ,  
Kewad.jiban F r o n t  P e r s a tu a n  Buruh (The D uty o f  t h e  W o rk e rs ’ 
U n i te d  F r o n t ) ,  L a h i r n j a  PKI, and  A i d i t ’s  Menempuh D;ja l a n  
R a k j a t * The C h in ese  works were Mao T s e - t u n g Ts New 
Democracy and P e o p l e ’s D em o cra tic  D i c t a t o r s h i p , L iu  Shao- 
c h i Ts The Mass L ine  and  N a t io n a l i s m  and I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , 
and  Kian L i n g ' s  The Method o f  T hough t, Work, C r i t i c i s m  and  
S e l f - c r i t i c i s m * S t a l i n fs The N a t io n a l  Q u e s t io n  and  
D i a l e c t i c a l  and H i s t o r i c a l  M a te r i a l i s m  and L e o n t ie v  *s 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  M a rx is t  P o l i t i c a l  Economy were t h e  R u ss ia n  
w orks .
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T hat n o t  a l l  went w e l l  w i th  th e  p la n  f o r  e d u c a t io n  
w i t h i n  th e  P a r ty  was shown by  a c e n t r a l  com m ittee  
s t a t e m e n t  i n  May 1953* The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  p o in te d  
o u t ,  f o r  exam ple , t h a t  th e  p la n  f o r  D ja k a r t a  R a ja  was 
o n ly  15 p e r  c e n t  a c h ie v e d  b e c a u s e  o f  a b s e n te e i s m  among 
b o t h  members and c a d r e s ,  and t h a t  h i g h e r  c a d r e s  had made 
o n ly  ’ f rag m e n ta ry *  s tu d y  o f  t h e o r y ,  w h i le  th e  s t a f f  o f  
t h e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  c o m m is s a r ia t s  and  th e  members o f  
t h e  s e c t i o n  com m ittee  d a i l y  c o u n c i l s  ’o f t e n  " f o r g e t ” to  
s tu d y  t h e o r y  and  to  h o ld  d i s c u s s i o n s  c o n c e rn in g  t h e o r y ’ * 
Lukman, i n  h i s  a r t i c l e  o f  Sep tem ber 1952, had p r e d i c t e d  
t h a t  many sh o r tc o m in g s  would a p p e a r  when th e  P a r ty  
l a u n c h e d  i t s  f i r s t  l a r g e - s c a l e  e d u c a t io n  cam paign , b u t  he 
h ad  a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  d e s p i t e  i n e v i t a b l e  sh o r tc o m in g s  a 
body  o f  t e a c h e r s  and c a d r e s  would be form ed which c o u ld ,  
w i th  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  c r i t i c i s m  and s e l f - c r i t i c i s m ,  t e a c h  
o t h e r s ,  expand t h e i r  own know ledge, and  th u s  g r a d u a l l y  
r a i s e  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  P a r ty  e d u c a t io n *
In  th e  s p h e r e  o f  p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  g r e a t  though  uneven 
s t r i d e s  were made b e tw ee n  th e  o p e n in g  o f  th e  membership 
d r i v e  and  th e  f i f t h  n a t i o n a l  c o n g re s s  i n  March 1954« 
"H ar ian  R a k ja t"  s lo w ly  i n c r e a s e d  i t s  c i r c u l a t i o n  
from  2 ,0 0 0  in  J u l y  1951 t o  1 2 ,500  i n  O c to b e r  1953 and to
1
PK I-B, May 1953, p p . 78-81
15»000 in February 1954.1 "Bintang Merah" did not fare 
so well. It was republished in August 1952 and has 
continued as a monthly down to the present* From a peak 
of over 10,000 copies in the first half of 1951» when it 
was the only official Party periodical, it had declined 
to only 7 »500 or 8,000 copies in May 1953*2 During 1952 
and 1953 "Bintang Merah” contained central committee 
comments on national and international affairs, articles 
on theory and practical work, and translations of works 
by foreign communists* In order to increase its circu­
lation, and thereby its educational importance, the 
central committee agitation and propaganda secretariat 
early in 1953 ordered all Party functionaries to read 
"Bintang Merah” from cover to cover and to send in their 
criticisms every month.^
"PKI-Buletin” was published regularly, but in October 
1952 its form was changed. For the first time it was 
printed, instead of mimeographed, and so became available 
in sufficient numbers for all lower Party committees to 
receive it. The translated editorial of ”For a Lasting 
Peace, For a People's Democracy.'" became a regular 
feature added to its usual contents of official Party
1
HR, October 31, 1953» and February 25, 1954.
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statements, occasional articles by Party leaders, and
comments on methods of work within the Party. When the
form was changed, the editors stated that the lower Party
committees would still have to translate "PKI-Buietin”
into the regional languages.1 23
During 1952 few translations were yet available of
works by foreign communists, but in 1953 translation and
publication was greatly increased. By the end of 1953
at least forty, mostly booklet-size, works were available.
Lenin, Stalin, Dimitrov, Kalinin, Mao Tse-tung and Liu
Shao-chi were among those whose works were translated,
2and from the available evidence it would appear that Mao 
Tse-tung and Lenin, in that order, were most frequently 
translated at that time. A report by an American 
observer suggests, however, that the large number of 
translated Chinese works was due not&the efforts of PKI 
but to the Chinese government which was shipping in large 
quantities of pamphlets and booklets translated into 
Indonesian.3
1
PKI-B, October 10, 1952, page reference lost.
2
The evidence consists of the notices appearing in 
Harian Rakjat of the literature available in the Party’s 
bookshops.
3 Compton, Indonesian Communism, p.6.
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A central committee note of January 18, 1953 
expressed continued dissatisfaction with the circulation 
of Party publications and with the collection of funds
Afor them. The note complained that many Party com­
mittees were not doing a good job of circulating Party 
and other progressive publications, and as a remedy 
ordered all committees to appoint a Party member to be 
an agent for the publications. These agents were to 
supplement, not replace, the work of existing non-Party 
agents. The note also listed 30 Party committees which 
owed money to "Bintang Merah" and 36 with debts to 
"PKI-Buletin", and called upon them to pay their debts.
The preparations for the fifth national congress 
were converted into a massive campaign not only for the 
propaganda of Party policies and programmes among the 
general public, but also for educating Party members and 
candidate members. The congress materials, including the 
new draft constitution and programme, were drafted in the 
central committee plenum of early October 1953» and were 
then widely circulated and publicized. 150,000 copies 
of the draft programme were published, in Sundanese, Batak
1
PKI-B, February 10, 1953» pp.18-19
1 fi. 1
and Madurese as well as in Indonesian. About 1,500 
public meetings, attended by over 2 millions, were held 
to explain the draft programme to people outside the 
Party. Within the Party, in the four months prior to 
the congress, meetings were organized at all levels and 
conferences held between equal levels of the Party 
organization to discuss the draft constitution, programme,
pand the central committee general report.
3• The Second Membership Drive
The PKI fifth national congress which met in March 
1954, made two decisions of importance to the education 
and expansion of Party membership: it endorsed the 
campaign against *Tan Ling Djie-ism*, and it endorsed the 
plan for a second membership drive.
Although Tan Ling Djie was removed from his position 
on the central committee in October 1953, the campaign 
against the error of Tan Ling Djie-ism was developed on a 
large scale only in the period around the fifth national 
congress. The congress endorsed both the central com­
mittee resolution of October 1953 which condemned Tan Ling
1
D.N. Aidit, "Kongres Nasional ke-V Partai Komunis 
Indonesia" (PKI's Fifth National Congress), in his Pilihan 
Tulisan, vol. I, p.280; FALP, January 22, 1954, p.6.
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D j i e ’s a c t i v i t i e s ,  and th e  more im p o r ta n t  "R eport on
2
Tan L ing  D j i e - i s m " .  The cam paign a g a i n s t  Tan L ing  
D j i e - i s m  was n o t  u s e d  to  e x p e l  Tan L ing  D j i e ,  f o r  he was 
a l lo w e d  t o  rem ain  w i t h i n  t h e  P a r t y  b e c a u s e  he a c c e p te d  
th e  c e n t r a l  c o m m it te e ’s d e c i s i o n s  and p ro m ised  t o  c o r r e c t  
a l l  h i s  e r r o r s . ^  Nor was i t  u se d  to  p u rg e  h i s  f o l lo w e r s
b e c a u s e ,  i n  th e  words o f  th e  " R e p o r t" ,  he had r e c e i v e d  
o n ly  th e  p a s s i v e  h e lp  o f  s e v e r a l  c e n t r i s t s  who l a t e r  
abandoned  him when he was d e f e a t e d  i n  J a n u a r y  195i • No
announcem ents  were e v e r  made o f  anyone e l s e  b e in g  a c c u s e d  
o f  Tan L ing  D j i e - i s m .  I t  i s  p ro b a b le  t h a t  th e  cam paign , 
w hich  was c a r r i e d  o u t  i n t e n s i v e l y  th ro u g h o u t  th e  P a r t y ,  
had  an e d u c a t i o n a l  p u r p o s e ,  t h a t  i s ,  t o  i n c r e a s e  th e  
c a d re s *  and  members* knowledge and  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  th e  
b a s i c  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ,  i d e o l o g i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n te n t  
o f  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p ’s n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  p o l i c y .
In  o t h e r  words th e  cam paign  was a u s e f u l  fram ew ork w i t h i n  
which to  u n d e r ta k e  th e  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n  o f  o ld  and new 
members.
1
" R e s o lu s i  T erhadap  Kawan Tan L ing  D j i e "  in  PKI, P u tu s a n -  
P u tu s a n ,  p p .4 - 5 .
2
" R e f e r a t  T en tan g  Tan L ing  D j ie - i s m e "  (R e p o r t  on Tan L ing  
D j i e - i s m ) ,  HR, March 19» 1954.
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L o c . c i t .
The "Report on Tan Ling Djie-ism" analyzed the error 
in detail. In the field of organization, Tan Ling 
Djie-ism was condemned as basically liquidationist. It 
advocated the creation of a working class party other 
than PKI, which was 'tailism* because the working class 
already had sufficient political consciousness to support 
an openly communist party. In the sphere of policy, Tan 
Ling Djie-ism was described as 'legalistic*, as 'nothing 
other than bourgeois liberalism’, because it wished to 
tone down the Party programme, to divert the members too 
much from the class struggle, to place excessive emphasis 
on the parliamentary struggle. This error in policy, 
declared the "Report", had its roots in a grave under­
estimation of the strength of the masses and a gross 
exaggeration of the strength of the reactionaries. But 
it was in the realm of ideology that Tan Ling Djie-ism 
received most bitter condemnation.
'Tan Ling Djie-ism in the ideological field has its 
source in subjectivism*, which resulted in dogmatism and 
empiricism. It was dogmatist because it attempted to 
imitate uncritically overseas experience without taking 
into consideration the conditions in Indonesia. It was 
empiricist because it considered unimportant the work of 
raising the theoretical knowledge of Party members.
As the result of the two subjectivist ideologies, 
dogmatism and empiricism, our Party was tossed 
about between two diseases. Subjectivism 
caused our Party to be unable to take a correct 
attitude, that is, an objective, truly scientific 
attitude. In one situation our Party committed errors by pursuing a rightist policy, reformist 
policy, following behind the masses who were 
already more progressive. But in another 
situation our Party committed ’left* errors, 
pursuing adventurism, going far ahead of the 
masses who were still trailing behind. Therefore 
the history of our Party after Tan Ling Djie-ism 
gained control was the history of right and 'left' 
errors at the same time, the history of capitu- 
lationism and adventurism together.
Besides endorsing the campaign against Tan Ling
Djie-ism, the fifth national congress also endorsed a one-
4year plan for the second membership drive. At the time of
congress, membership was 165,206, of whom 49>042 were full
2members and 116,164 candidate members. The goal of the 
second membership drive was not published. Aidit, however,
1
PKI, 40 Tahun PKI, p.77.2
Aidit, "Some Results’1 2, PALP, October 15, 1954, P*3. A candidate member is one who has not yet completed the 
period of candidacy (of from six months to two years, de­
pending on the candidate member’s social and political 
background) which is demanded of all prospective Party 
members. A candidate member has the duties and rights of 
a full member, except that he may not vote in Party 
meetings, nor may he be elected to Party offices. The 
period of candidacy is used 'to give basic Party education 
to the candidate member and also to ensure supervision by 
Party organizations of his political quality.’ PKI, 
Konstitusi Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI*s Constitution), 
(third edition), Djakarta, 1956, pp.29-30.
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wrote on May 2 3 , 1954 th a t  in  v iew  o f  the P arty  programme, 
the cu rren t t a c t i c a l  and o r g a n iz a t io n a l  l i n e s  and cadre  
a c t i v i t y ,  * i t  w i l l  not be s im p ly  lu ck  i f  PKI a t  the end 
o f  t h i s  year  i s  a P arty  w ith  a m i l l i o n  members and 
can d id a te  members*, n o t  j u s t  r e g i s t e r e d  but organ ized  and 
r e c e iv in g  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t i o n . -1
The seco n d  m em bership cam paign  d id  n o t  a c h ie v e  as  
r a p i d  a g row th  a s  A i d i t  had  h o p e d . P ro b a b ly  th e  f i g u r e  
o f  one m i l l i o n  by  th e  end o f  1954 was u n r e a l i s t i c  g iv e n  
th e  number o f  c a d r e s  and members and  th e  s t i l l  l i m i t e d  
g e o g r a p h ic a l  s p r e a d  o f  th e  P a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  March 
1954. I t  seems t h a t  th e  P a r t y  l e a d e r s  had  a l lo w e d  
th e m se lv e s  to  become o v e r - o p t i m i s t i c  as  a r e s u l t  o f  th e  
e a s e  w i th  w hich  th e  f i r s t  m em bership cam paign had  been  
c o m p le te d .  At th e  end  o f  O c to b e r  1954 A i d i t  c la im e d -a  
t o t a l  o f  h a l f  a m i l l i o n  members and c a n d id a t e  members, 
and  i n  F e b ru a ry  1956 one m i l l i o n .  Membership f i g u r e s  
w ere  n o t  p u b l i s h e d  b e tw een  t h e s e  two d a t e s ,  b u t  a v a i l a b l e  
e v id e n c e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  th e  g r e a t e s t  g row th  o c c u r r e d  b e f o r e  
A ugust 1955* F e i t h ,  i n  h i s  monograph on the  1955
1
A i d i t ,  " P e rk u a t  P e r s a tu a n  N a s io n a l  dan P e rk u a t  Parta iJ**  
( S t r e n g th e n  N a t io n a l  U n i ty  and S t r e n g th e n  th e  P a r t y ) ,  i n  
h i s  P i l i h a n  T u l i s a n , v o l .  I ,  p.297*
2
FALP, November 19» 1954* p .2 ;  BM, February-March 1956,
p . 112.
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elections, mentioned the rapid extension of Party member­
ship prior to the September elections,*1 while Aidit, in 
his report to the central committee plenum on August 7» 
1955* referred to the success already achieved in the 
campaign to extend the Party*s organization and member­
ship*^
During the second membership drive, the PKI organi­
zation was spread, although thinly, over most of Indonesia. 
This was shown by the results of the parliamentary 
elections of September 1955* PKI received votes in all 
of the fifteen electoral districts, and more than 5 per 
cent of the total votes cast in nine of them: the four 
districts in Java, the three districts in Sumatra, and 
East Kalimantan and West Nusatenggara.-^ But, presumably 
reflecting the strength of its organization in the 
different regions, PKI received 37*2 per cent of its votes 
in East Java, 37*7 per cent in Central Java, 13*8 per cent 
in West Java, including Djakarta Raja, and only 11*3 per 
cent outside Java where the only two sizeable communist
1
Keith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955» p.24.
2
D.N. Aidit, Untuk Kemenangan Front Nasional dalam 
Pemilihan Umum (For the Victory of the National Front in 
the General Elections), Djakarta, 1955» P»25«
3 A. van Marie, "The First Indonesian Parliamentary 
Elections", Indonesie, 1956, vol. IX, p.262.
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votes were in North Sumatra (12.2 per cent of the total 
votes cast) and South Sumatra (12•i per cent).
Most of the PKI votes in the September 1955 elections 
came from the rural areas, and it is important to note 
that the second membership drive had been aimed especially 
at the peasants. Until July 1953 Party work among the 
peasants had been negligible except in the estate areas, 
where SOBSI unions were strong. In that month Aidit 
wrote a major article which was used as the basis of the 
Party1 23s agrarian programme (endorsed by the fifth congress), 
and which marked the beginning of increasingly intensive 
work in the villages by the Party and the communist-led
Apeasant organizations. In November 1954 Aidit claimed
that ’an extremely important factor' in the expansion of
the Party's organization and membership was the im-
2provement in the work among the peasants. A year later 
he re-emphasized the urgency of extending Party membership 
in the villages.^
_
D.N. Aidit, "Haridepan G-erakan Tani Indonesia" (The 
Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement), BM, July 1953> PP.332-40.
2
D.N. Aidit, "For Broad Unity of All National Forces in 
Indonesia", FALP, December 31, 1954» p*4*
3 D.N. Aidit, Pertahankan Republik Proklamasi 1945i 
(Defend the 1945 Proclamation Republic.*), Djakarta, 1955> 
p.29.
Thus, by the second membership drive PKI not only 
grew numerically and extended geographically, but it also 
widened the social basis of its membership. Whereas 
before the second drive the Party*s membership had con­
sisted largely of urban petty bourgeois and workers, the 
peasants became the largest group, a position they still 
maintain. The rapid expansion of membership prior to the 
1955 elections had been necessary in order to mobilize the 
votes needed to ensure PKI a more important role in 
national politics, which were then revolving largely round 
parliament.
The rapid rise in Party membership again posed the 
problem of how to maintain the ideological purity of the 
Party, .As Aidit told the central committee in November 
1954:
It is wrong if we think that bourgeois ideology 
and bourgeois influence is only outside the 
Party, especially as many new people have 
entered our Party bringing with them bourgeois 
and feudal ideological vestiges and habits ••• 
Besides, the enemies of the Party certainly 
try to enter our Party in order to break the 
Party*s organization from within and to weaken 
the ideology of the Party members,'
Because of this situation, Aidit declared, it was neces­
sary to intensify the vigilance of members and cadres,
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D.N. Aidit, Untuk Persatuan jang Lebih Luas dari Semua 
Kekuatan Nasional di Indonesia (For the Broader Unity of 
all National Forces in Indonesia), Djakarta, 1955» pp«31-2.
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and ideological work within the Party. Every new member 
had to be given an understanding of the structure of the 
Party organization, of the limitless strength of the 
people, of the Party*s leadership role, and of the 
importance of the national united front. Every political 
view expressed by the central committee or the province 
committees or the Party congress had to become material 
with which to educate the members politically.
In the same speech, Aidit also devoted special 
attention to the need for the proper education of cadres 
some of whom, he declared, still did not understand 
either the essential character of the worker-peasant 
alliance or the agrarian relations in the villages. As 
a remedy for the cadre shortcomings, cadre courses had to 
be extended to Party committees at all levels, and at the 
same time made more systematic and practical. Furthermore, 
the cadres from the level of section committee upwards 
were expected to accustom themselves to reading and dis­
cussing the classical writings of Marxism-Leninism. Aidit 
said that in July and August 1954 a beneficial campaign 
had been organized for the study by cadres of Lenin’s 
"Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder", although 
several provinces still had not seriously implemented the 
campaign.
D e s p i te  th e  i n s i s t e n c e  by  th e  c e n t r a l  P a r ty  l e a d e r ­
s h ip  i n  th e  se c o n d  h a l f  o f  1955 t h a t  th e  c a d re s  and 
members s h o u ld  b e  g iv e n  a s y s te m a t ic  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n ,  
s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  p r e v e n te d  th e  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  t h i s  t a s k  
In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  th e  P a r ty  was o b l ig e d  to  c o n c e n tr a te  
a l l  i t s  r e s o u rc e s  on th e  cam paign f o r  th e  S ep tem ber 1955 
p a r l i a m e n ta r y  and  th e  Decem ber 1955 C o n s t i tu e n t  A ssem bly
p
g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  ' In  th e  seco n d  p l a c e ,  th e  c a d r e s ’ 
low l e v e l  o f  g e n e r a l  e d u c a t io n  p ro v ed  a s e r io u s  o b s ta c le  
to  t h e i r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  M a r x is t - L e n in i s t  t e x t s ,  and  
th e  P a r ty  was o b l ig e d  to  i n s t i t u t e  g e n e r a l  know ledge 
c o u r s e s ,  r a n g in g  from  th e  e r a d i c a t i o n  o f  i l l i t e r a c y  to  
g e o g ra p h y , h i s t o r y  and la n g u a g e s , b e fo r e  i t  c o u ld  p ro c e e d  
w ith  c o u rs e s  in  M arx ism -L en in ism ,3
N jo to , s p e a k in g  to  th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  plenum  on 
A ugust 1 , 1956, sum m arized th e  e d u c a t io n a l  work a c t u a l l y  
p e rfo rm ed  b y  th e  PKI s in c e  i t  had become a mass p a r t y
1
S e e , f o r  ex am p le , A i d i t ,  U ntuk Kem enangan, p p .2 7 -8 ; 
P e r ta h a n k a n , p p ,2 8 -9 ; and M.H, Lukman, ”Tugas P a r t a i  
S esudah  P e m ilih a n  Umum” (The P a r t y ’s T ask  A f te r  th e  
G e n e ra l E l e c t i o n s ) ,  BM, Novem ber-December 1955» PP*379-81 
2
N jo to , ’’M asaalah  P e n d id ik a n  d id a la m  P a r t a i ” (The 
Q u e s tio n  o f  E d u c a tio n  in  th e  P a r t y ) ,  in  D.N. A i d i t ,  
B e rs a tu  u n tu k  M e n je le s a ik a n  T u n tu t a n - T u n tu ta n  R e v o lu s i  
A gu stu s 19U5 (U n ite  to  C om plete th e  Demands o f  th e  
A ugust 1945 R e v o lu t io n ) ,  D ja k a r ta ,  1956, p .64*
3
Lukman, ’’Tugas P a r t a i ” , BM, Novem ber-Decem ber 1955>
p .3 8 0 .
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w ith  o v e r h a l f  a m i l l i o n  m em bers. He s a id  t h a t  th e  
P a r ty  had  as  y e t  b e en  u n a b le  to  e s t a b l i s h  a c e n t r a l i z e d  
sy s te m  o f  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n ,  b u t  t h a t  on s e v e r a l  
o c c a s io n s  th e  c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h ip  had  i s s u e d  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
to  th e  lo w e r P a r ty  o r g a n iz a t io n s  t h a t :
a .  a l l  members and  c a n d id a te  members s h o u ld  be  g iv e n  
a th o ro u g h  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  P a r ty  c o n s t i t u t i o n  and 
program m e, and t h a t  th e y  a l s o  s h o u ld  fo llo w  and  u n d e rs ta n d  
a l l  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  and p o l i tb u r e a u  s ta te m e n t s ;
b .  P a r ty  c a d re s  s h o u ld  s tu d y  c l a s s i c a l  works o f  
M arx ism -L en in ism  such  a s  L en in*s ’’L e ftw in g  Communism, an  
I n f a n t i l e  D i s o r d e r ” and  th e  ”H is to r y  o f  th e  CPSU(B)”. 
F u r th e rm o re , P a r ty  co m m ittees  from  th e  p r o v i n c i a l  l e v e l  
downwards had  a l r e a d y  begun  to  o rg a n iz e  v a r io u s  k in d s  o f  
c o u rs e s  w hich  u se d  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  i n s t r u c t i o n s  and 
g u id e s ,  and  had made t h e i r  own e x p e r im e n ts  in  m ethods o f  
t e a c h in g .  B ut i n  th e  p e r io d  o f  th e  seco n d  m em bership 
d r i v e ,  e d u c a t io n  was c o n ce rn ed  p r i m a r i l y  w ith  c a d r e s .
N jo to  e x p la in e d  t h a t  t h i s  was n e c e s s a r y  *because th e y  a re  
th e  backbone i n  c a r r y in g  ou t th e  P a r ty * s  t a s k s * ,  and 
b e c a u se  w ith o u t p r i o r  c a d re  e d u c a t io n  i t  w ould n o t  be 
p o s s ib l e  to  e d u c a te  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  P a r ty  o r  have  u n i ty
1
N jo to ,  ’’M asaalah  P e n d id ik a n ” , i n  A i d i t ,  B e rs a tu  u n tu k ,
pp.64-75.
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of ideology, policy and organization in the Party. In 
short, the rapid expansion of Party membership had 
created a grave shortage of cadres. As the Party was 
not yet in a position to provide thorough political 
education for all members, its educational work was 
concentrated primarily on the creation of an informed 
and ideologically attuned cadre force.
Party publishing also made considerable strides 
between March 1954 and August 1956. "Marian Rakjat" 
increased in circulation from 15,000 in February 1954 to
23.000 in January 1955 and to 55,000 in January 1956«
At the last date its circulation compared with 48,000 for 
the socialist newspaper "Pedoman", 40,000 for PNI's "Suluh
Indonesia", 38,000 for the independent but pro-PNI
2"Merdeka", and 34,000 for Masjumi's "Abadi". A three 
month campaign to extend sales was launched in January 
1956, but succeeded in increasing circulation by only 
3,000.3 "Bintang Merah", from a low of 7,500-8,000 
copies at the end of 1952, increased its circulation to
20.000 in the second half of 1954 and to 25,000 at the 
_
HR, February 25, 1954; January 26, 1955; and January 
21, 1956.
2 3HR, January 21, 1956. HR, March 23, 1956.
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end  o f  1955»"1 At th e  e n d  o f  1953 " P K I-B u le tin "  became 
a m o n th ly , w hereas p r e v io u s ly  i t  had a p p e a re d  e v e ry  two 
o r  t h r e e  weeks* On J a n u a ry  1 , 1955 i t s  name was changed  
to  "K ehidupan P a r t a i "  ( P a r ty  L i f e ) ,  w ith  th e  i n t e n t i o n  
t h a t  h e n c e fo r th  i t  w ould p ro v id e  a p la c e  f o r  s h o r t  
a r t i c l e s  by  r e g io n a l  and l o c a l  c a d re s  on t h e i r  e x p e r ie n c e s , 
a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  im p o r ta n t  P a r ty  s ta te m e n ts  and some 
a r t i c l e s  t r a n s l a t e d  from  f o r e ig n  com m unist s o u r c e s .
A s u r p r i s i n g  new P a r ty  m o n th ly  a p p e a re d  in  th e  m idd le  
o f  1954 -  an  E n g lis h  lan g u a g e  "M onthly R eview " p ro v id in g  
news o f  PKI and a l s o  o f  th e  m ajo r p o l i t i c a l  d ev e lo p m en ts  
i n  I n d o n e s ia .  At f i r s t  "M onthly Review " was mimeo­
g ra p h e d , b u t  from  J a n u a ry  1957 was p r i n t e d ,  i l l u s t r a t e d ,  
and w e ll-p ro d u c e d  u n d e r th e  t i t l e  "Review o f  In d o n e s ia " .  
The p u rp o se  o f  th e  rev ie w  i s  u n c e r t a i n .  I t s  e d i t o r  t o l d  
me s im p ly  t h a t  i t  i s  in te n d e d  f o r  com rades and  f r i e n d s  
a b ro a d . One can  o n ly  su rm ise  t h a t  i t s  a p p e a ra n c e  
r e f l e c t e d  th e  g row ing  p r e s t i g e  o f  th e  PKI in  th e  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  com m unist w o rld , and  t h a t  i t  was in te n d e d  f i r s t l y  
to  k eep  th e  f o r e i g n  com m unist p a r t i e s  in fo rm e d , in  a 
lan g u a g e  th e y  u n d e rs ta n d ,  o f  n a t i o n a l  and P a r ty  e v e n ts  in
1
BM, J a n u a ry  1955> in s id e  f r o n t  c o v e r ;  N lo to ,  "10 Tahun 
B in ta n g  M erah" (10  Y ears o f  B in ta n g  M erah ), BM, Novem ber- 
December 1955> P«371*
I n d o n e s ia ,  and  s e c o n d ly , p e rh a p s ,  to  s e rv e  a s  c o m p a ra tiv e  
m a t e r i a l  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  su c h  a s  th e  In d ia n  Communist 
P a r t y .
By th e  b e g in n in g  o f  November 1954 PKI had i s s u e d ,  
b e s id e s  t r a n s l a t i o n s  from  f o r e ig n  com m unist l i t e r a t u r e ,  
1 5 0 ,0 0 0  c o p ie s  o f  th e  P a r ty  program m e, 100 ,000  c o p ie s  o f  
i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and 2 5 0 ,0 0 0  c o p ie s  o f  i t s  e l e c t i o n  
m a n i f e s to .  150 ,000  c o p ie s  o f  th e  e l e c t i o n  programme 
w ere p r i n t e d  in  J a v a n e s e ,  S u n d a n e se , B a ta k , and  In d o n e s ia n  
i n  A ra b ic  s c r i p t .  At th e  end  o f  1955> th e  PKI p u b l i s h in g  
com pany, J a j a s a n  Pem baruan, r e p o r te d  t h a t  d u r in g  th e  y e a r  
i t  h ad  p u b l is h e d  30 d i f f e r e n t  books and p a m p h le ts  in  a 
t o t a l  o f  1 ,1 3 6 ,0 0 0  c o p ie s . 1 2 Of t h i s  num ber, th e  t r a n s ­
l a t i o n s  from  f o r e ig n  s o u rc e s  a p p e a r  to  have b e en  
p re d o m in a n tly  from  C h in ese  a u th o r s ,  w ith  some a l s o  from  
L en in  and S t a l i n .
The e d u c a t io n a l  im p o rta n c e  i s  c l e a r  o f  th e  i n c r e a s in g  
c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  ''H a ria n  R a k ja t"  and th e  P a r ty  p e r i o d i c a l s ,  
and  o f  M a r x is t - L e n in i s t  c l a s s i c s  t r a n s l a t e d  i n to  In d o n e s ia n .
1
HR, November 4> 1954* In  1955 th e  C e n tr a l  J a v a  
p ro v in c e  com m ittee  p u b l is h e d  th e  P a r ty  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i n ­
c lu d in g  th e  P a r t y 's  g e n e r a l  program m e, i n  J a v a n e s e .
P e rh a p s  o th e r  p ro v in c e  co m m ittees  p u b l is h e d  i t  i n  o th e r  
r e g io n a l  la n g u a g e s .
2
HR, December 3 1 , 1955
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At the same time, the 1955 election campaigns also
provided valuable education: for ordinary members and
candidate members through the availability sind study of
the Party constitution, programme and election manifesto;
for all, but especially cadres, through the practical
work of winning and mobilizing millions of electors.
As the Party membership swelled rapidly during the
second membership drive, a new organizational form had to
be found that could permit the control, education and
activation of the ordinary members and candidate members.
The old branches were swamped by large numbers of new
members and could no longer perform this function. It
was therefore decided to organize all members into groups
of at the most seven persons.
The group was incorporated into the March 1954 
1constitution, but intensive work to bring all members
into groups was started only at the beginning of 1955 when
2Aidit wrote an important article on the subject. The 
purpose of the groups was fourfold:
1. to eradicate illiteracy among members by 
organizing anti-illiteracy courses or obliging members 
to attend government courses;
1
PKI, Konstitusi, 1954» (third edition), pp.56-7*
2
D.N. Aidit, "Mengaktifkan Grup Partai" (To Activate the 
Party Group), in his Pilihan Tulisan, vol.I, pp.361-6.
2 . to  o rg a n iz e  t h e i r  members to  r e p o r t  on th e  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  th o u g h ts  and  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  p e o p le  w ith  
whom th e y  l i v e d  and w orked , and  se n d  th e s e  r e p o r t s  to  
th e  b ra n c h  c o m m itte e s , w hich i n  tu r n  s e n t  them to  th e  
h ig h e r  c o m m itte e s ;
3» once a g ro u p  h ad  b e en  e s t a b l i s h e d  some months and 
was a l r e a d y  h o ld in g  p e r i o d i c  m e e tin g s , i t  was to  b e g in  
th e  b a s i c  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n  o f  i t s  members by  d i s ­
c u s s io n s  on P a r ty  o r g a n iz a t io n ,  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  
m em bers, th e  P a r ty  program m e, th e  u n l im i te d  s t r e n g th  o f  
th e  p e o p le ,  and th e  im p o rta n c e  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i te d  
f r o n t ;
4* to  c o l l e c t  m em bership f e e s .
At th e  b e g in n in g  o f  1955 th e  PKI began  to  e s t a b l i s h
A
s p e c i a l  g ro u p s f o r  women. T h is  was deemed n e c e s s a r y  in  
f a c e  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  b a s h f u ln e s s  and s e l f - e f f a c e m e n t  
o f  In d o n e s ia n  women.
4* The F i r s t  3 -Y e ar P la n  o f  O rg a n iz a t io n  and E d u c a tio n
The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  plenum  w hich m et from  J u ly  31 
to  A ugust 3 9 1956 drew  up a t h r e e - y e a r  p la n  f o r  o rg a n i­
z a t io n  and  e d u c a t io n  w h ich  w ent i n to  o p e r a t io n  on A ugust
1
M.H. Lukman, "Bagaim ana M e n tjip ta k a n  K ader W an ita"  (How 
to  Form Women C a d re s ) ,  KP, J a n u a ry  1 , 1955» PP*5-6*
17» 1956. The a c t u a l  p la n  was n o t  made p u b l i c ,  b u t  i t s  
o u t l i n e  a s  w e l l  a s  i t s  r e s u l t s  may be g a th e re d  from  a
A
num ber o f  PKI s o u r c e s .
Prom th e  a v a i l a b l e  s o u r c e s ,  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  
o b j e c t iv e s  o f  th e  p la n  w ere :
1. to  e x te n d  m em bership by  5 0  p e r  c e n t  from  one 
m i l l io n  to  one and a h a l f  m i l l i o n s ;
2 . to  s p re a d  m em bership  and o r g a n iz a t io n  more e v e n ly  
th ro u g h o u t I n d o n e s ia ;
3 . to  open new P a r ty  o f f i c e s  and im prove th e  o r g a n i ­
z a t io n  o f  a l l  o f f i c e s ,  to  a c t i v a t e  th e  v a r io u s  com m ittees*  
b u re a u x , and  in c r e a s e  th e  num ber and im prove th e  d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  o f  f u l l - t i m e  c a d r e s ;
4 . to  o rg a n iz e  e v e ry  member in to  a g ro u p , w ith  women 
in  s p e c i a l  g ro u p s , and to  make th e  g ro u p s a c t i v e ;
1
A i d i t ,  "F ase  B a ru " , BM, M arch -A p ril 1958, p p . 149-52 ; 
" I d e o lo g ic a l  W ork", WorTd M a rx is t  R eview , J u ly  1959» 
p p .2 4 -5 ;  U ntuk D em okrasi d an  K ab in e t  Gotong R ojong (F o r 
Dem ocracy and a M utual C o o p e ra tio n  C a b in e t ; ,  D ja k a r t a , 
1959» p p .131-3 J "Ubah Im bangan K ekuatan  u n tu k  M elaksanakan  
K o n sep si P r e s id e n  S o ek am o  100%.*" (Change th e  B a lan ce  o f  
Power in  O rder to  Im plem ent P r e s id e n t  S u k a rn o 's  C oncept 
1 0 0 $ .') , HR, J u ly  5» 1957; a ls o  Amir Anwar S a n u s i ,  R e s u l ts  
o f  th e  F i r s t  T h re e -Y e a r P la n , m im eographed t r a n s l a t i o n ,  
D ja k a r t a ,  1959» p p .2 - 5 ;  and  PKI, B ahan-B ahan , p p .5 5 -6 ;  
R e s o lu s i  t e n ta n g  L aporan  Umum CC PKI kepada  K ongres 
N a s io n a l  k e -V I (R e s o lu t io n  C o n cern in g  th e  PKI C e n tr a l  
C o m m itte e 's  G e n e ra l R e p o rt to  th e  S ix th  N a t io n a l  
C o n g re s s ) ,  D ja k a r ta ,  1959» p p .6 9 -7 0 , 7 7 -8 0 ; PKI 40 T ahun ,
p p .8 8 -9 0 .
5* to promote all candidate members to full member­
ship after they had completed their supervized period of 
candidacy; and
6. to increase the payment of membership fees and 
donations, and to ensure that they be forwarded in stipu­
lated percentages to the higher committees.
The education objectives were:
1. to eradicate illiteracy within the Party;
2. to organize Party schools and courses;
3• to organize seminars at the central committee and 
provincial committee levels on such matters as economic 
problems, and also to organize conferences in theory;
4« to extend Party publishing and to increase 
distribution of the publications, with an emphasis on 
increasing the circulation of "Harian Rakjat";
5 * to establish libraries in committee offices; and
6. to establish educational institutions for non- 
Party progressives, especially to create a people’s 
university.
Quotas were set for each committee, and special plan 
bureaux were created in the central committee and the 
provincial committees.
Although not all the plan’s objectives were realized 
important gains were made: Party membership was increased 
organizational work advanced, and educational activity 
systematized.
Membership had reached the goal of one and a half
millions by the beginning of 1959,^ at which figure it
remained until the sixth national congress held from
September 7-14, 1959» Peasants had still constituted
less than half the total membership in March 1954, but
2by December 1958 they had become the majority group.
The proportion of peasants in the membership was still 
growing at the time of the sixth congress, while that of 
workers remained the same, despite the fact that their 
number was increasing.  ^ The promotion of candidate
members to full membership was accelerated until by 
September 1959 about 50 per cent, or 750*000, of the 
total members were full members, compared with only 30 
per cent, or 49,042, at the time of the fifth congress in 
March 1954*^ Thus between the two congresses the number 
of full members had increased fifteen-fold. Aidit, 
however, still complained that the percentage of candidate 
members was still too high due to the tardiness of some
1
Aidit, ’’Ideological Work", World Marxist Review, July 
1959, p.24.2
PKI, Bahan-Bahan» p.53*
3 PKI, Resolusi tentang Laporan Umum, p.66.
4 D.N. Aidit, "The Sixth National Congress of the Communist 
Party of Indonesia", RI, November-December 1959, p.45*
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committees to promote them, and to the insecurity in the 
rebel areas which prevented the smooth operation of the
AParty there.
A significant result of the plan was the large 
increase in the number and percentage of women members.
The Party instruction of January 1955 to increase the 
number of women members and to organize them into special 
groups was at first implemented slowly owing to the 
shyness of Indonesian women, but also because many male 
committee members refused to see any value in women as
pParty members. In February 1957 guidance was published 
on how to attract women from the different social strata; 
during 1957 several provincial committees held conferences 
on how to attract and activate women members; and not only 
special groups but also special political schools and 
courses were organized so as to permit the more rapid 
political development of women members.  ^ in September
1 Loc.cit.
2
Suharti Suwarto, ’’Mendjelang Konferensi Nasional Wanita 
Komunis” (Awaiting the National Conference of Communist 
Women), BM, September 1957» p*343*
3 Setiati Surasto, ”Memperluas Keanggotaan Partai 
dikalangan Wanita” (To Extend Party Membership among 
Women), KP, February 1957» pp.19-21; Suharti Suwarto, 
"Mendjelang”, BM, September 1957» p.342; Ibrahim, "Sedikit 
Pengalaman tentang Menjelenggarakan KPS Wanita” (A Little 
Experience in Organizing a Section-level Women's Political 
Course), KP, December 1958, pp.242-4.
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1957 the number of women members had been 100,000, with 
the percentage of women members ranging from 6 to 17 per
Acent in Java and lower in the outer islands. As late 
as May 1958 the number of women members was still given 
as 100,000, but a PKI national conference to discuss
2Party work among women and held at the end of that month 
heralded a rapid increase. By December 1958 there were 
150,000 women members, and 258,000 at the time of the 
sixth congress.3 At the time of the national conference 
of May 1958 there were already five women sitting in 
parliament, six in the Constituent Assembly, and 180 in 
regional and local councils, who had been elected on the 
PKI ticket.
As for the geographical spread of the Party during
the period of the plan, the chairman of the central
planning bureau, Amir Anwar Sanusi, told the sixth
congress that ’the activities of the Party are now evenly
. 4spread over all parts of the country’. He backed the
1
Suharti Suwarto, ’’Mend je lang ", BM, September 1957>
pp.343-4.2
For the main documents of the conference, see BM, June 
1958, pp.241-85*
3
PKI, Bahan-Bahan, p.54; Anwar Sanusi, Results of the 
First Three-Year Plan, p.3.G Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, 
loc.cit. This report contains most of the published 
statistics on the results of the plan.
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statement by claims of membership increases of 38 per 
cent in West Sumatra and 40 per cent in North Sulawesi, 
despite atrocities committed on Party members by rebels 
in these areas, and of 63«5 per cent in Kalimantan.
In Java, the increase had been 36 per cent, with the 
lowest, 31 per cent, in East Java. As for the growth 
of the Party organization, Anwar Sanusi reported that in 
Kalimantan the number of subsections had increased by 
45 per cent, while in Java the number of branches had 
risen 250 per cent, and of subsections 42 per cent.
At the end of the plan, within Java only 1.3 per cent of 
the 1,449 ket;lamatans (the level at which the subsection 
is established) and 15.8 per cent of the 21,047 villages 
(the level at which the branch is established) were without 
a Party organization.
In order to cope with the increase in membership and 
organization, the number of full-time functionaries in
1the provincial and island committees was almost doubled. 
The number of full-timers in the sections (established 
for each kabupaten, for medium-sized towns and for areas 
of large cities) increased 400 per cent and in the sub­
sections 300 per cent. The number of committee members 
at all levels was increased seven-fold. Prom these 
statistics it appears that during the plan PKI increased 
its cadre force even more rapidly than membership. At
t h e  same t im e ,  t h e  equ ipm ent  o f  th e  P a r t y  o f f i c e s  was 
i n c r e a s e d .  F o r  example ,  t h e  number o f  t y p e w r i t e r s  i n  
t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  comm ittee  and s e c t i o n  committee  o f f i c e s  
was i n c r e a s e d  b y  600 p e r  c e n t .
A l th o u g h  a r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  i n  membership  was e f f e c t e d ,  
g r e a t  c a r e  was s t i l l  t a k e n  t o  p r e v e n t  th e  e n t r y  o f  
u n d e s i r a b l e  e l e m e n t s  i n t o  th e  P a r t y .  T h is  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  
by  an a r t i c l e  p u b l i s h e d  i n  "Kehidupan P a r t a i ’’ i n  May 1958, 
which d e t a i l e d  th e  method u se d  i n  b r i n g i n g  a new p e r s o n
A
i n t o  t h e  P a r t y .  Four  s t a g e s  were l i s t e d :  p r e p a r a t i o n ,  
w a tc h in g  o v e r  t h e  r e c r u i t ,  c a u t i o n ,  and i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
The b a s i c  t a r g e t s  were th o s e  who had  v o te d  communist i n  
t h e  l a s t  e l e c t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  f o r  ’r a t h e r  a lo n g  t i m e ’ , 
t h e  c a d r e s  would n o t e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  r e c r u i t ’s name, a g e ,  
r e s i d e n c e ,  s o c i a l  o r i g i n s ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  work,  e t c . ,  
q u e s t i o n i n g  h i s  f r i e n d s  and a c q u a i n t a n c e s  t o  o b t a i n  th e  
i n f o r m a t i o n .  Then beg an  t h e  s e co n d  s t a g e ,  t h a t  o f  
e d u c a t i n g  him t o  l i v e  s e l f l e s s l y  and to  be  p r o g r e s s i v e  
i n  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  o u t l o o k  and method o f  t h i n k i n g .  To 
e n c o u ra g e  him i n  such  ways, P a r t y  w o rke rs  would pay 
p e r i o d i c  v i s i t s  t o  h i s  house  i n  o r d e r  to  e x p l a i n  P a r t y
1
P a r j o n o ,  ’’T j a r a  Mempersiapkan P e lu a s a n  Anggota u n tu k  
Memperkuat P a r t a i "  (The Method o f  P r e p a r i n g  t h e  E x t e n s i o n  
o f  Membership i n  O rder  t o  S t r e n g t h e n  th e  P a r t y ) ,  KP, May 
1958, p p . 5 6 - 9 .
policy and convince him of the correctness of the Party*s 
political position; they would provide him with pro­
gressive reading materials (at least "Harian Rakjat" 
every day); invite him to art evenings, receptions or 
lectures organized by the Party and other progressive 
organizations; invite him to public meetings and 
demonstrations; encourage him to take part in delegations 
to press both social-economic and political demands; and, 
if necessary, give him the responsibility of leading 
small actions. The aim of the second phase was to 
develop the recruit's political and organizational 
awareness so that he voluntarily requested to join the 
Party.
But, at that stage, caution was required. A close 
check would be made of his friends and associates to see 
whether they were reactionary or progressive. If they 
were reactionary, the cadres had to convince him of the 
criminal nature of the reactionaries' actions. Finally, 
if the recruit passed through the first three stages 
successfully, there was the period of investigation.
A thorough check would be made of the records of the 
preceding stages, especially of his assistance in imple­
menting Party policy, his diligence in reading Party 
literature and his loyalty to the people's everyday 
demands. If he passed this check he was accepted into
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the Party. At the end of the article the author warned 
committee members not to use the guide in order to keep 
the entry of new members to a minimum, not to practice 
'closed-doorism1; that is, the cadres had to use great 
care with potential members, but not to the extent of 
impeding the growth of the Party. Although it was not 
mentioned in the article, the careful supervision of 
those who entered PKI was continued during the period of 
candidate membership when any undesirable elements that
Ahad evaded earlier detection could be weeded out.'
Little information has been published on the success 
achieved in pursuing the last objective of the organi­
zational section of the first three-year plan, to increase 
the entry of membership fees and donations and to ensure 
that they were forwarded in stipulated percentages to the 
higher committees. Prom the little evidence available, 
it appears that by the end of the plan PKI was still 
unable to solve either the problem of collecting a large 
percentage of membership fees or of ensuring that the
1
Under the provisions of the April 1951, March 1954 and 
September 1959 Party constitutions, anyone wishing to 
enter PKI had to spend from six months to two years as a 
candidate, depending on their social origin and previous 
political activity. Even after the period of candidacy 
their promotion to full membership required sponsorship 
by long-standing Party members and the endorsement of 
higher committees.
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lo w e r  com m ittees  fo rw a rd e d  th e  s t i p u l a t e d  p e r c e n ta g e s  o f
income t o  th e  h ig h e r  c o m m itte e s ,
PKI e d u c a t i o n a l  work a l s o  expanded c o n s i d e r a b ly
d u r in g  the  p l a n .  In  f a c t ,  th e  s i x t h  n a t i o n a l  c o n g re s s
c la im e d  t h a t  ' i n  g e n e r a l ,  th e  q u o ta s  a c h ie v e d  i n  th e  f i e l d
o f  e d u c a t io n  a re  much b e t t e r  th a n  t h a t  i n  th e  f i e l d  o f  
2
o r g a n i z a t i o n '•
The work t o  e r a d i c a t e  i l l i t e r a c y  w i th in  th e  P a r ty
h a s  n o t  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  p u b l i c l y .  In  mid-1957> a t  a tim e
when th e  number o f  i l l i t e r a t e s  i n  th e  P a r t y  was 'n o t  
t 3
s m a l l 1 234, th e  a g i t a t i o n  and p ropaganda  s e c t i o n  o f  th e  
c e n t r a l  com m ittee  i s s u e d  two b o o k l e t s  f o r  u se  i n  th e  
e r a d i c a t i o n  o f  i l l i t e r a c y  b o t h  w i t h in  and o u t s i d e  th e  
P a r t y . ^  The o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  members i n t o  g roups  must 
have f a c i l i t a t e d  a n t i - i l l i t e r a c y  work, b u t  i n  1960 
com m ittee  members com pla ined  to  me o f  th e  c o n t in u e d  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  i l l i t e r a c y  among n o t  o n ly  o r d i n a r y  members 
b u t  f u n c t i o n a r i e s  as h ig h  a s  th e  s e c t i o n  and s u b s e c t io n  
l e v e l s .
-
T h is  e v id e n c e  i s  d i s c u s s e d  b e lo w  i n  th e  s e c t i o n  d e a l i n g  
w i th  communist funds  i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  p p .2 1 6 -9 .
2
PKI, R e s o lu s i  t e n t a n g  L appran  Umum, p .79*
3
A i d i t ,  "Ubah Imbangan K e k u a ta n " ,  HR, J u l y  1957*
4
IiO C .  C 1 1  •
Under th e  t h r e e - y e a r  p l a n  a sy s te m  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
s c h o o l s  and c o u r s e s  was e s t a b l i s h e d  th ro u g h  a l l  l e v e l s  
o f  th e  P a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  from  th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  t o  
t h e  b r a n c h e s .  The c e n t r a l  co m m ittee  o r d e r e d  t h a t  a l l  
s c h o o l s  and  c o u r s e s  t e a c h  f o u r  s u b j e c t s  w henever th e
A
e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l  o f  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t  would p e r m i t .
The f o u r  s u b j e c t s  w e re :  th e  h i s t o r y  o f  s o c i e t y ,  which was 
d e s ig n e d  t o  a c q u a in t  s t u d e n t s  w i t h  t h e  M a r x i s t - L e n in i s t  
v iew  o f  s o c i e t y  and th e  law s o f  s o c i a l  d ev e lo p m en t;  th e  
b a s i c  p ro b lem s o f  t h e  In d o n e s ia n  r e v o l u t i o n ,  which was 
d i r e c t e d  to w a rd s  c r e a t i n g  u n a n im i ty  o f  th o u g h t  on th e  
s t r a t e g y  and t a c t i c s  o f  th e  I n d o n e s ia n  r e v o l u t i o n ;  th e  
p rob lem s o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t ,  aimed t o  s e c u r e  
u n a n im i ty  i n  t h e  P K I’s im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  t h i s  p o l i c y  i n  
th e  I n d o n e s ia n  s i t u a t i o n ;  and t h e  b u i l d i n g  o f  th e  P a r t y ,  
which showed th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  L e n i n i s t - t y p e  p a r t y  
and o f  th e  a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  a l l  com m unists i n  i t s  
d e v e lo p m e n t.  T e x ts  have  b e en  p u b l i s h e d  f o r  each  s u b j e c t  
a d a p te d  to  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  and  p o l i t i c a l  
aw aren ess  o f  th e  s t u d e n t s .
Each ’s h i f t 1 o f  th e  c e n t r a l  s c h o o l ,  o r g a n iz e d  b y  th e  
c e n t r a l  c o m m itte e ,  l a s t e d  f u l l - t i m e  f o r  one m onth. I t
1
A i d i t ,  " I d e o l o g i c a l  Work", W orld M a rx is t  Review, J u l y  
1959» P P .2 4 -5 .
included two extra subjects: dialectical and historical 
materialism, which was also taught by some provincial- 
level schools, and the international working class 
movement. The duration of each ‘shift* in the 
provincial, section and subsection schools has not been 
published, but information is available about a
Aprovincial-level school for women cadres held in Makasar.' 
In order to avoid the women students* staying in a hostel, 
which was the normal practice for male students, the 
school was held for three hours, three days a week for 
five weeks - or for 45 hours in all. The time was spent 
in lectures, discussion groups and discussion classes; 
self-study at home was required; and the course ended 
with an examination. Prom Surabaja there is information
pabout the duration of branch schools. As the Party 
leaders had determined that a branch political school 
should be completed within seven days, the students met 
for two hours on each of the seven days, making a total 
of fourteen hours of classwork.
At the lowest level the Party faced great difficulties 
in giving political education because the students in the
1 Ibrahim, "Sedikit Pengalaman", KP, December 1958» pp.242-
4.2
Wahjoedi, "Pengalaman Mengadjar dalam Sekolah Politik" 
(Experience in Teaching in Political Schools), KP,
December 1958, p.241.
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branch schools were people:
whose general knowledge is still low, a large 
part of them are illiterate, while those who 
are not illiterate still have a very limited 
desire to read.1 2
Not all branch schools covered the four subjects stipu­
lated by the central committee. One in Surabaja, for 
example, met for 2j hours on six successive nights but 
taught only the history of the development of society; 
the people who attended were heads of groups
Absenteeism was also a problem in the schools and 
courses. Where the students stayed in a hostel for the 
period of the school, which occurred on at least the 
central and provincial levels, absenteeism was not 
significant. But in the lower levels absenteeism 
occurred for a number of causes: students had to work 
overtime, or were too tired or too lazy or lost interest. 
An added cause was the wet season. Leaders of all 
communist-led mass organizations complained to me of the 
fall in attendance when the roads were quagmires and the 
students had no rainclothes and could not afford to come 




Achmad Sjafii, ”Pengalaman Sekolah Politik” (Experiences 
with a Political School), HP, August 1958» pp.148-9*
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that during rain attendance at the political school fell
Aby 3 0 per cent.
Less than a year after the plan went into effect, 
Aidit told the central committee plenum of July 4» *1957 
that ’In general there is already rather enough attention 
to education for high and middle Party cadres1.2 3 After 
this speech, the emphasis of Party education was shifted 
to the lower cadres and activists, the committee members 
in the subsections and branches and the leaders of groups. 
By the time of the sixth congress over 270,000 cadres and 
activists had graduated from the Party schools or com­
pleted a Party course. ^ They ’form the Party’s backbone, 
which can never be broken*. According to Aidit, the 
270,000 comprised ’the majority of cadres from the centre 
to the basic committees*.^4
Concerning the implementation of the plan for 
seminars and conferences, Aidit told the central committee 
plenum which met from March 31 to April 3 1958 that 
conferences in theory were not yet being held as desired,
_
Simat, ’’Sekolah Politik dan Pengaruhnja” (Political 
Schools and Their Influence), KP, June 1958, p.81.
2
Aidit, ”Ubah Imbangan Kekuatan”, HR, July 5* 1957*
3 Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, p.4*
4 Aidit, ’’The Sixth National Congress”, RI, November- 
December 1959> p«45»
but that the central committee and some provincial
committees were already arranging seminars on specific
topics. The seminars and special conferences arranged
by the central committee during the period of the plan
included a seminar on Party work among students, held at
about the beginning of 1958, a national conference on
«1Party work among women, held in May 1958, a national
2seminar on economics, held in February 1959» and a 
national conference on Party work among peasants and 
fishermen, held in April 1959* The provincial com­
mittees also arranged conferences and seminars which were 
probably devoted to the same topics as, and held in 
preparation for, the national meetings.
One of the principal goals of the seminars and 
conferences was to exchange experiences in the work of 
building the Party among the different sections of 
society. But for the high and middle cadres who took 
part, there was the danger that their work within the 
Party organization might result in their losing contact
1 For the main documents of the Party conference on work 
among women, see BM, June 1958, pp,241-85•
2 For the main documents of the seminar on economics, see 
Ekonomi dan Mas.jarakat, no.2-3> 1959*
3 For the main documents of the Party conference on work 
among peasants and fishermen, see BM, April-May 1959»
pp.121-222,
with the actual condition of the masses To avoid this
danger, the central committee organized a six-month ’go 
down* and ’three-togethers* campaign in preparation for 
the national conference on Party work among peasants and
afishermen.' All Party committees from the central
committee down instructed certain cadres to ’go down* to
the villages to study at first hand agrarian relations
and the living conditions of the peasants. While in the
village, in order to better understand the peasants and
win their support, the cadres had to practice the ’three-
togethers’: ’living together, eating together and working
together with the peasants, especially with ... the poor
2peasants and agricultural labourers*. The communist- 
led mass organizations followed the Party and organized 
’go down’ movements among their own cadres and activists. 
’Going-down* has continued since the national conference 
on work among the peasants, and cadres have been sent into 
urban kampongs and fishing villages as well as into rural 
areas. The movement has a greater value than just 
educating cadres in the realities of the life of the
1
B.O. Hutapea, "Some Lessons from the First National 
Peasants Conference of the CPI”, RI, August 1959, P»33*
2
"Laporan Mengenai Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan kaum 
Tani” (Report on Party Work among the Peasants), BM,
April-May 1939, p.138.
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masses, for it has also provided the Party leadership 
with a store of social and economic data which permits 
the Party to formulate popular demands and slogans.
During the period of the first three-year plan, the 
Party cadres and activists were expected to do more for 
their political education than attend schools and courses, 
participate in seminars and conferences, and join in the 
’go down* movement. They were also expected to study on 
their own, and. guides to self-study were published in
A’’Kehidupan Partai”. Anwar Sanusi reported in September 
1959 that cadres at the provincial and section committee 
levels were studying on their own such classical Marxist- 
Leninist works as the ’’Communist Manifesto’’, Lenin’s 
’’Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder”, and his 
’’Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic 
Revolution”. The cadres were also encouraged to read 
communist novels which had been translated into 
Indonesian, such as Gorki’s ’’Mother”, Julius Pucik’s 
’’Report from the Gallows”, and Mihail Sholokov’s 
’’Impressions of a Soviet Soldier”. Cadres were also 
expected to read ’’Harian Rakjat”, the various Party
1
Siswojo, ’’Beladjar-Sendiri ” (Self-Study), KP, November 
1956, pp.21-3; Jono, ’’Beladjar Sendiri", KP, May 1958» 
PP.65-7.2
Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, p.U*
periodicals, pamphlets and booklets, and all Party- 
documents that were circulated to their respective 
committees.
The schools, courses, seminars, conferences, *go 
down* movement and self-study movement of the first three- 
year plan were concerned with the Party cadres and 
activists. The Party did not yet have the resources for 
a mass education campaign among the ordinary members.
For the 1,200,000 or so members and candidate members who 
had not achieved the position of cadre or activist, basic 
political education continued to be received through the 
group. Instruction on the Party constitution and 
programme was continued, but apparently a special effort 
was made to organize study movements that would familiar­
ize the ordinary members with the line of the moment 
taken by the central Party leadership.1 Cadres from the 
subsection or even section, that is, those who had 
benefited most from the education campaign, went into 
the groups to explain decisions taken by the central 
committee plenums, and any important Party document which
1
Rewang, "Memperbaiki Gerakan Mempeladjari Putusan- 
Putusan CC dikalangan Anggauta dan Tjalon-Anggauta" (To 
Improve the Movement among Members and Candidate Members 
to Study Central Committee Decisions), KP, May 1958,
pp.60-2.
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l a i d  down th e  P a r t y  l i n e  a t  a g iv e n  t im e ,  su c h  a s  th e  
p o l i t b u r e a u fs New Year m essages* The m e e tin g s  o f  o r d i ­
n a r y  members would th e n  d i s c u s s  how to  im plem ent th e  
P a r t y  l i n e  i n  t h e i r  own l o c a l i t y .
The f o u r t h  o b j e c t i v e  o f  th e  e d u c a t i o n a l  s e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  p l a n  was th e  e x te n s io n  o f  P a r t y  p u b l i s h i n g  and th e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  P a r t y  l i t e r a t u r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  r a i s i n g  th e  
c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  "H a r ia n  R a k j a t ”. Work tow ards  t h i s  
o b j e c t i v e  had  m ixed s u c c e s s .
The g r e a t e s t  f a i l u r e ,  p e rh a p s ,  i n  th e  whole p l a n  was 
met i n  th e  a t t e m p t  to  i n c r e a s e  th e  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  "H a r ia n  
R a k j a t " .  In  March 1956, f i v e  months b e f o r e  th e  p l a n  
went i n t o  e f f e c t ,  th e  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  ,rH a r ia n  R a k j a t ” was 
5 8 ,0 0 0 .  By F e b ru a ry  1957 i t  h a d  r e a c h e d  6 0 ,0 0 0 ,  compared 
w i th  a t o t a l  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  th e  75 d a i l y  new spapers  i n
A
I n d o n e s ia n  o f  747*250. D e s p i t e  cam paigns to  i n c r e a s e  
c i r c u l a t i o n ,  i n  w hich  even  A i d i t  and o t h e r  c e n t r a l  
com m ittee  members to o k  p a r t ,  and d e s p i t e  th e  g r e a t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  th e  number o f  P a r ty  members, com m ittee  members 
and o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  th e  c i r c u l a t i o n  was s t i l l  6 0 ,0 0 0  f o u r
p
y e a r s  l a t e r .  In  December 1960, a l th o u g h  ”H a r ia n  R a k ja t "  
m a in t a in e d  th e  l a r g e s t  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  any  n ew spaper  i n
1 2 
HR, F e b ru a ry  4* 1957* HR* December 3 1 ,  1960.
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I n d o n e s ia ,  b u t  th e r e  was o n ly  one copy  f o r  e v e ry  250 
P a r ty  m em bers.
A ll th e  p e r i o d i c a l s  from  th e  p e r io d  b e fo r e  th e  p la n  
c o n tin u e d  p u b l i c a t i o n .  "B in ta n g  Me r a h 11 a p p e a re d  
r e g u l a r l y .  "K ehidupan P a r t a i "  re a p p e a re d  in  O c to b er 
1956. Prom May to  Decem ber 1957 i t  a p p e a re d  o n ly  tw ic e  
b e c a u se  o f  t e c h n i c a l  p r i n t i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and  th e  l a c k  
o f  a r t i c l e s  b e in g  s e n t  i n  from  th e  r e g io n s .  D u rin g  
1958 and 1959 i t  was p u b l is h e d  r e g u l a r l y .  The E n g l i s h -  
la n g u a g e  m on th ly  "Review  o f  I n d o n e s ia " ,  i n i t i a l l y  
m im eographed, was p r i n t e d  from  J a n u a ry  1957 and a p p e a re d  
r e g u l a r l y .
A p a rt from  th e  p e r i o d i c a l s  c o n tin u e d  from  th e  p re v io u s  
p e r io d ,  s e v e r a l  new ones a p p e a re d  d u r in g  th e  t h r e e - y e a r  
p la n .  The f i r s t  was "PKI dan  DPR" (PKI and P a r l ia m e n t)  
w hich  b eg an  p u b l i c a t i o n  i n  June  1956. I t s  t i t l e  was 
changed  to  "PKI dan  P e rw a k ila n "  (PKI an d  th e  R e p re s e n ta ­
t i v e  C o u n c ils )  a f t e r  th e  1957 l o c a l  e l e c t i o n s .  T h is 
q u a r t e r l y  i s  in te n d e d  to  g iv e  news o f  PKI a c t i v i t i e s  in  
p a r l i a m e n t ,  th e  C o n s t i tu e n t  A ssem bly , and th e  l o c a l  
r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  c o u n c i l s .  In  J a n u a ry  1957 a p p e a re d  th e  
f i r s t  num ber o f  "Mimbar Kom unis" (Communist Forum) w hich 
has th e  s u b - t i t l e  "P roblem s o f  P eace an d  S o c ia l i s m " .
"Mimbar K om unis" c o n ta in s  t r a n s l a t e d  a r t i c l e s  and sp e e c h e s  
by  f o r e ig n  co m m u n ists , and s e e k s  t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  th e  PKI
cadres with the experience of foreign communist parties. 
It was at first published every two months, but then 
became a monthly. Early in November 1957 PKI began to 
publish an English-language quarterly entitled ’’Marxist 
Science” which was aimed at the intelligentsia and 
scientists and contained news of the scientific advances 
in the Soviet bloc. It was soon changed to ”Ilmu Marxis 
(Marxist Science) in Indonesian. The most recent 
periodical is the quarterly ’’Ekonomi dan Masjarakat” 
(Economics and Society). This appeared in March 1959 
and contains articles by both Indonesians and foreigners 
on economic, financial and social matters. All the new 
periodicals have been published regularly, but their high 
price must prohibit their purchase by any but Party
Acommittees and a few relatively wealthy Party members.'
During 1956, the PKI published 700,000 copies of
pbooks, booklets and pamphlets - a decrease compared
1
In 1960, the price per copy of the PKI periodicals in 
Indonesian was about 3«50 rupiahs for Bintang Merah, one 
rupiah for Kehidupan Partai, six rupiahs for PKI dan 
Perwakilan, four rupiahs for Mimbar Komunis, seven 
rupiahs for Ilmu Marxis, and eight rupiahs for Ekonomi 
dan Mas.jarakat. The daily wage for an urban or estate 
worker was about ten to twenty rupiahs; for an 
agricultural labourer, 7«50 to fifteen.
2
Njoto, ”Soal Pendidikan dan kaum Inteligensia” (The 
Problem of Education and the Intellectuals), HR, July 5> 
1957.
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with 1955* "but the 1955 figure had been bloated with the
large printing of the new PKI constitution and the PKI
programme and election manifesto used in the 1955
election campaigns, A target of one million copies was
set for 1957» "but there was no report of its having been
achieved. In 1958, the communist publishing house
issued 52 different books and pamphlets as well as over
150 issues of different periodicals. By the end of that 
year there were available in Indonesian in booklet, 
pamphlet or article form many works of Lenin, Stalin and 
Mao Tse-tung, as well as some by Liu Shao-chi, Ho Chi 
Minh, Marx and Engels, Dimitrov, Sharkey and lesser 
foreign communist figures. Communist fiction available 
in Indonesian included works by Gorki, Julius Fucik, and 
Ilya Ehrenburg, This wealth of translated material 
enabled the Party cadres to study many of the classical 
writings of Marxism-Leninism as well as much that has 
been written of the practical experiences of foreign 
communist parties, especially those of the USSR, China 
and Viet Nam.
Although translations from foreign communist sources 
constituted a majority of the titles published by the 
PKI, the great majority of total copies were of PKI
1
HR, January 3, 1959
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materials: speeches and articles by the Party leaders, 
documents of central committee plenums, new printings of 
the Party constitution and programme, the materials for 
discussion in the sixth congress, course guides for 
Party schools and courses, and occasional important 
central committee statements, such as New Year messages* 
The largest publishing undertaking has been the two 
volumes of Aidit's selected works, covering the period 
from August 1951 to the sixth national congress in 
September 1959* The first volume, of 537 pages, appeared 
in mid-1959, but the second volume was delayed until May
A1960. These two volumes made readily available for 
study the most important articles and speeches on PKI in 
the period of the national united front.
The three-year plan also called for increased 
publishing activity by the Party's regional organizations. 
Several local Party periodicals appeared, including the 
twice-monthly "Suara Ibukota" (Voice of the Capital) 
published by the PKI in Djakarta Raja from the middle of 
March 1959» "Warta Sunda" (Sunda News) published in 
Bandung, "Suara Persatuan" (The Voice of Unity) published 
in Semarang, "Buietin PKI Djawa Timur" (East Java PKI
1
Aidit, Pilihan Tulisan, vol.I, 537 p» 5 vol.II, Djakarta, 
I960, 590 p.
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Bulletin) published in Surabaja, and "Lombok Bangun" 
(Lombok Awakes) published in Mataram, Lombok. At the 
time of the 1957 and 1958 local elections in Java, South 
Sumatra, Riau and Kalimantan, election programmes were 
published in booklet form by the Party organizations in 
at least the five province-level regions of Java (that is, 
Djakarta Raja, West Java, Central Java, the special 
territory of Jogjakarta, and East Java), and also in some 
of the cities, such as Surabaja and Jogjakarta. The 
Party organizations at the kabupaten level also issued 
election programmes, but these were mostly mimeographed.
A little work was done in publishing in the regional 
languages. In 1957, for example, there was mention of 
a work by Mao Tse-tung translated into Sundanese, and one 
by Stalin into Javanese.
Because in Indonesia wages for workers are low and 
the price of printed materials relatively very high, PKI 
faced the problem of how to make its publications 
available to the large number of cadres, members and 
sympathizers who could not afford to buy them. As a 
partial solution to the problem, the plan aimed to 
establish a library in every committee. To what extent
1
N., "Buku-Buku Teori dalam Bahasa-Bahasa Daerah" (Books 
of Theory in Regional Languages), BM, January-Pebruary 
1957, p.76.
the plan has been successful in this sphere has not been 
disclosed publicly, but the work has been taken 
seriously. The value of the libraries was, however, 
limited by the illiteracy widespread among the ordinary 
members and lower cadres and by the ’very limited desire
Pto read’ among those who were literate.
The final objective of the three-year plan in the 
field of education was the creation of educational 
institutions for non-Party progressives, especially the 
creation of a people’s university. A committee to 
organize the Universitas Rakjat (UNRA, People’s 
University) was established on September 19* 1958 on the 
initiative of PKI leaders and well-known fellow- 
travellers. ^ Siswojo, a member of the PKI central 
committee, became its chairman.^ On October 31» a 21- 
person council of curators was formed and included Aidit 
Sakirman and Njono, the chairman of SOBSI.^ Aidit was 
elected chairman of the council on January 17» 1959*^
1
See, for example, Kisman, ’’Sedikit Pengalaman 
Mengusahakan Perpustakaan*’ (A Little Experience in 
Organizing a Library), KP, December 1958, pp.245-7*2
Wahjoedi, ’’Pengalaman Mengadjar”, KP, December 1958, 
pp.240-1.
3 4HR, September 24» 1958. HR, September 22, 1958.
5 ~ 6HR, November 3, 1958. HR, January 20, 1959*
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When t h e  UNRA com m ittee  was f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  i t
announced  t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  was ft o
d e v e lo p  s c i e n t i f i c  know ledge among th e  p e o p l e ’ • A i d i t ,
how ever, r e v e a l e d  th e  t r u e  o b j e c t i v e  i n  an a r t i c l e  i n
2
’’World M a rx is t  R eview ”. He w ro te  t h a t  UNRA was in te n d e d
f o r  th o s e  P a r t y  members and  o t h e r  p r o g r e s s i v e s  who were
u n a b le  to  a t t e n d  th e  n a t i o n a l  o r  r e g i o n a l  P a r t y  s c h o o ls
f o r  l a c k  o f  p l a c e s  o r  b e c a u s e  t h e i r  d a i l y  o c c u p a t io n s  d i d
n o t  a f f o r d  them t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y .  He f u r t h e r  n o te d  t h a t :
The c u r r i c u lu m  o f  th e  U n i v e r s i t y  i s  c l o s e l y  
l i n k e d  w i th  th e  u r g e n t  t a s k s  o f  th e  P a r t y ,  
nam ely  th e  b u i l d i n g  o f  a n a t i o n a l  f r o n t  and 
th e  P a r t y .  The e d u c a t io n  i s  aimed a t  
e l i m i n a t i n g  i d e o l o g i c a l  c o n f u s io n ,  a t  
d e e p e n in g  th e  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  p r e s e n t  and 
f u t u r e  t a s k s .
UNRA c o u r s e s  opened  i n  D ja k a r t a  and J o g j a k a r t a  i n  
December 1958 .^  W ith in  a y e a r  t h e r e  were b ra n c h e s  i n  
e i g h t  o t h e r  to w n s :  K e b a jo ran  B a ru ,  Bandung, S u r a k a r t a ,
1
HR, Sep tem ber 2 2 ,  1958.
2
A i d i t ,  ’’I d e o l o g i c a l  Work” , W orld M a rx is t  R eview ,
J u l y  1959, p .2 5 .
3
Most o f  t h e  f o l lo w in g  i n f o r m a t io n  was o b ta in e d  from  
S is w o jo ,  ’’I n t e n s i f y  t h e  A n t i - I m p e r i a l i s t  S t r u g g le  on th e  
I d e o l o g i c a l  F r o n t ” , R I, S e p te m b e r-O c to b e r  1959, p*32;
HR, Sep tem ber 28 , 1959; and e s p e c i a l l y  from  in t e r v i e w s  
w i th  H. P o rk a s ,  th e  n a t i o n a l  s e c r e t a r y  o f  UNRA, D ja e tu n ,  
th e  p r e s i d e n t  o f  UNRA in  J o g j a k a r t a ,  and S u j i t n o ,  a 
member o f  th e  s e c r e t a r i a t  o f  th e  S u r a b a ja  UNRA.
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Semarang, Surabaja, Malang, Palembang and Medan, 
Assistance in equipping UNRA was asked of foreign 
diplomatic representatives in Indonesia, They gave 
’much assistance’. For example, the East German 
International Relations Bureau and the Indonesia-Soviet 
Friendship Association gave books and film projectors.
Students are admitted to UNRA if they have a junior
\
high school level of education or the equivalent or if 
they are capable but have not had the opportunity to 
study. UNRA, in spite of its name, is not for the 
people. The fees are too high to permit workers or 
peasants to attend. The UNRA leaders said in interview 
that their students consisted of lower civil servants, a 
few teachers, and cadres and activists from the trade 
unions, youth, women and other mass organizations. In 
at least some cases the mass organizations pay the fees 
for their members.
It is difficult to estimate the number of students 
in UNRA. In September 1959 the UNRA chairman claimed
2,816 enrolled students, but this figure has to be 
qualified, and the qualification throws some light on the 
difficulty faced by PKI in obtaining sustained activity
1
In 1960 the entrance fee was fifty rupiahs; the monthly 
fee for each course was twenty to thirty rupiahs.
from  i t s  members
i s :
In  S u r a b a ja  600 s t u d e n t s  b egan  th e  
c o u r s e s ,  b u t  w i t h in  a y e a r  o n ly  300 were l e f t ;  i n  
J o g j a k a r t a  350 s t a r t e d ,  b u t  a y e a r  l a t e r  o n ly  be tw een  
100 and 150 were l e f t .  Of th e  s t u d e n t s  who c o n t in u e d  
th e  c o u r s e s  ’v e ry  few i n d e e d ’ , a c c o r d in g  t o  th e  UNRA 
n a t i o n a l  s e c r e t a r y ,  a t t e n d e d  e v e r y  c l a s s .  So many 
d ro p p ed  o u t  b e c a u s e  th e y  l o s t  i n t e r e s t  o r  b e c a u se  i t  was 
to o  much e f f o r t  t o  a t t e n d  o r  t h e y  found  th e  f e e s  to o  
h ig h .  The r e a s o n s  f o r  a b s e n te e i s m  among th o s e  who 
c o n t in u e d  were s e v e r a l :  th e  wet s e a s o n ,  many p e o p le  had  
t o  work o v e r t im e  o r  a t  two jo b s  and so  had  l i t t l e  tim e 
o r  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  a t t e n d  n i g h t  c l a s s e s ,  and  th e  c a d re s  
o f  th e  P a r t y  and th e  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s  were o f t e n  s e n t  
o u t  o f  t o m  f o r  days  o r  w eeks.
In  May 1960, th e  pe rm anen t s t a f f  o f  UNRA in c lu d e d  
se v e n  a t  th e  c e n t r e ,  and f i v e  i n  S u r a b a j a .  I  d id  n o t  
f i n d  th e  num bers e l s e w h e r e .  At th e  end  o f  1959 t h e r e  
were 250 UNRA t e a c h e r s  th ro u g h o u t  I n d o n e s i a ,  They 
r e c e i v e d  no p a y ,  o n ly  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s .  The UNRA 
h e a d q u a r t e r s  i s s u e s  m imeographed m on th ly  c o u rs e  g u id e s ,  
which th e  s t u d e n t s  m ust b u y  f o r  two r u p ia h s  each  m onth, 
UNRA p o s s e s s e d  no  b u i l d i n g s  o f  i t s  own by  th e  m idd le  o f  
1960, and had t o  r e n t  p r e m is e s .
As o f  May 1960, UNRA o f f e r e d  f i v e  c o u r s e s ,  each  
l a s t i n g  two y e a r s .  The one ta k e n  b y  th e  g r e a t  m a j o r i t y
of students was political science which covered seven 
subjects: Marxist political science, the Indonesian 
independence movement, Indonesian society and economy, 
the history of Indonesia, constitutional law, geography, 
and the history of the world. Political science was 
taught in all UNRA branches. The second most important 
course was English, taught in eight branches, with an 
emphasis on translation from English to Indonesian, 
’because many published materials arrive in English’, and 
on conversation, ’because many foreign guests come to 
Indonesia’. Journalism was taught in two branches, its 
importance for PKI being obvious. In the art course, 
which is taught in two branches, UNRA endeavoured to teach 
the students to see society and to portray a situation 
from it. The national secretary pointed out that 
pictures and caricatures are very important in Indonesia 
where a high percentage of the population is illiterate* 
Indonesian language and literature were taught in 
Djakarta.
One day before the first three-year plan ended on 
August 17> 1959, the central committee established two
T
The editor of a Surabaja newspaper told me of the 
example of the local newspaper Trompet Masjarakat which 
was led by a non-communist but which frequently carried 
pro-communist material because its journalists were 
communists.
1new e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  D j a k a r t a , 1 A cam paign 
t o  r a i s e  fu n d s  f o r  a c e n t r a l  com m ittee  house  o f  c u l t u r e  
was opened  i n  A ugust 1956, and r a i s e d  4 m i l l i o n  r u p i a h s .  
The house  was f i n a l l y  opened on A ugust 16, 1959 w i th  
N jo to  as  c h a irm a n  o f  th e  s u p e r v i z i n g  co m m ittee .  At th e  
same t im e ,  A i d i t  p r o c la im e d  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  th e  
A l ia rc h a m  academy o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s ,  w hich  was to  t e a c h  
M arx ism -L en in ism  and a l s o  to  s tu d y  th e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  
from  th e  M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  v ie w p o in t .
The p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s i x t h  n a t i o n a l  c o n g re s s  
were u se d  as  a s t im u lu s  to  t h e  c o m p le t io n  o f  th e  t h r e e -  
y e a r  p l a n ,  and  a means o f  h e ig h t e n i n g  P a r t y  a c t i v i t y  i n  
g e n e r a l  and s t r e n g t h e n i n g  th e  t i e s  o f  th e  P a r t y  w i th  th e  
m asse s .
On J a n u a r y  5 ,  1959, th e  p o l i t b u r e a u  c a l l e d  f o r  a 
n a t io n - w id e  c o m p e t i t io n  i n  fo u r  f i e l d s :  s e r v i c e s  t o  th e  
p e o p le ,  p ro m o tio n  o f  th e  p e o p le * s  c u l t u r e ,  e d u c a t io n  work 
w i t h in  th e  P a r t y ,  and th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  t h e  P a r t y  o r g a n i -
p
z a t i o n .  In  th e  c o n g r e s s ,  th e  b a n n e r s  f o r  th e  b e s t  work 
were won b y  West J a v a  i n  the  f i e l d s  o f  e d u c a t io n  and 
s e r v i c e  t o  th e  p e o p le ,  C e n t r a l  J a v a  i n  th e  p ro m o tio n  o f
1
R I, S e p te m b e r -O c to b e r  1959, p .33«
R I , F e b ru a ry  1959, p . 6 .
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the people’s culture, and South Kalimantan in the field
Aof Party organization.
The most spectacular activity in the preparation for 
the sixth congress was the formation of voluntary work 
brigades of Party members. These served a triple 
purpose: to raise the work enthusiasm of ordinary members 
and candidate members, to bring the cadres into closer 
contact with the people, and to increase the people’s 
support for the Party, The incomplete list of work done 
by the brigades included the repair or construction of 
3,2i+9 kilometres of roads, 985 kilometres of drains,
2,280 houses, 80 school buildings, 5,119 public 
lavatories, 3,133 public bathing places, and 1,477 
bridges; the construction of 139 dams; the establishment 
of 351 anti-illiteracy centres; and the killing of 
186,698 field mice.1 2
But probably the most important result for the Party 
of the congress preparations was the intensive discussion
1
PKI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p.221. West Java won second 
place in the promotion of the people’s culture, and third 
place in Party organization; Central Java won second 
place in Party organization and third in education; East 
Java won second place in education, third place in both 
service to the people and the promotion of the people’s 
culture; and North Sumatra won second place in service to 
the people,
2
Aidit, ’’The Sixth National Congress”, RI, November- 
December 1959, p.40.
in all levels of the Party of the draft constitution, 
draft programme, and draft central committee general 
report which had been published in December 1958«
After 1958 the former heated attacks on the 
ideological deviations and the heinous ’isms’ that could 
arise during the implementation of the national united 
front gave way to far more gentle reminders that these 
dangers still existed. The draft of the central 
committee report to be presented to the sixth congress, 
which was published in December 1958, reiterated the 
need to wage ceaseless war against subjectivism. But 
although the report as finally presented to the congress 
retained an outline of methods for combatting subjectiv­
ism, it dropped the sentence which had stated that 
‘subjectivism still exists up to the present’. That the 
Aidit leadership considered ideological deviation to have 
become a minor problem was shown markedly in Aidit’s 
speech in May 1959, "Building the Organization is 
Important, but Building Ideology is Even More Important."* 2
_ _
M.H. Lukman, Tentang Konstitusi PKI (Concerning PKI’s 
Constitution), Djakarta, 1959, pp«5Ü-5; Njoto, Tentang 
Program PKI (Concerning PKI’s Programme), Djakarta, 1959* 
pp.8-9.2
D.N. Aidit, "Building the Organization is Important, but 
Building Ideology is Even More Important", RI supplement, 
June-July 1959, 8 p.
Instead of attacking a long list of deviations and 
errors, Aidit merely stressed the need to study the 
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism in order to avoid the 
errors caused by bourgeois ways of thinking.
When the second break occurred between the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, the PKI leaders dutifully warned 
against *modern revisionism1. Its manifestations, the 
PKI leaders declared, were self-satisfaction, chauvinism, 
and slanders against the socialist peace camp, the Soviet 
Union and the Soviet Communist Party. But although 
Aidit told the sixth congress of the continuing danger of 
modern revisionism, he boasted in February 1960 to the 
world communist parties that ’the Tito brand of 
revisionism has not found the slightest response in the 
Communist Party of Indonesia.
In order to explain why, during the first three-year 
plan, the Aidit leadership ceased its violent attacks on 
errors of ideology and methods of work, it is necessary 
to note the changes that had taken place within the Party. 
In brief, before 1956, and especially in the first years
1 PKI, Bahan-Bahan, pp.68-9.
2 Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, pp.156-7.
3 D.N. Aidit, ’’For National Unity”, World Marxist Review, 
February 1960, p.26.
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a f t e r  J a n u a r y  195*1 > th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  u sed  s t r i d e n t  
cam paigns  i n  o r d e r  t o  j u s t i f y  th e  rem ova l o f  th e  ’o l d 1 
l e a d e r s ,  and to  f r i g h t e n  any  o f  t h e i r  r e a l  o r  su p p o sed  
f o l lo w e r s  i n t o  a c q u ie s c e n c e  to  th e  new p o l i c i e s .  
F u r th e r m o r e ,  th e  new P a r t y  l e a d e r s h i p  had n e i t h e r  th e  
m a t e r i a l  n o r  human r e s o u r c e s  t o  c o n d u c t  a l a r g e - s c a l e  
e d u c a t i o n a l  cam paign w i t h i n  th e  P a r t y ,  and made th e  
a t t a c k s  on th e  v a r i o u s  e r r o n e o u s  ’ i s m s ’ i n  o r d e r  t o  
p i n p o i n t  th o s e  e r r o r s  w h ich ,  a f t e r  a  r e a d i n g  o f  the  
h i s t o r y  o f  th e  PKI and  f o r e i g n  communist p a r t i e s ,  were 
deemed most l i k e l y  to  o c c u r  d u r i n g  a p e r i o d  o f  th e  
n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t .
By th e  t im e  th e  t h r e e - y e a r  p la n  was p u t  i n t o  
o p e r a t i o n ,  th e  need  f o r  s t r i d e n t  a n t i - e r r o r  cam paigns 
was removed. F i r s t l y ,  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  was s e c u re  
i n  i t s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  P a r t y  and i n  th e  l o y a l t y  o f  i t s  
members. The ’o l d ’ l e a d e r s  had  lo n g  s i n c e  b e en  removed, 
t h e r e  h ad  b e en  no s i g n s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  s u p p o r t  f o r  them , 
th e  new l e a d e r s h i p  showed no s i g n s  o f  d i v i s i o n ,  and th e  
l a r g e  P a r t y  t h a t  had b e e n  b u i l t  s i n c e  J a n u a r y  195*1
A
d e m o n s t r a te d  a s u r p r i s i n g  s o l i d a r i t y .  S e c o n d ly ,  th o s e  
c a d r e s  who had  e a r l i e r  e x h i b i t e d  e r r o r  o r  te n d e n c y  to
1
The q u e s t i o n  o f  s o l i d a r i t y  w i t h i n  PKI d u r in g  th e  p e r i o d  
o f  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  i s  d i s c u s s e d  b e lo w , p p . 195-207 .
error had been weeded out or corrected. And thirdly, 
the Party now had sufficient teachers, funds and 
translated literature to permit the launching of a 
massive political education campaign which could tackle 
political education systematically and so remove the 
need for particular anti-*isms’ campaigns.
5. Towards the Second 3-Year Plan
By the time of the PKI sixth national congress in 
September 1959* political freedom in Indonesia had been 
considerably curtailed. On June 4 the central war 
administrator had imposed a temporary ban on all 
political activities. Prom August 1 closed meetings 
were allowed only if the military authorities had been 
given prior notice. A ban was retained on public 
meetings and demonstrations and on all political 
activities in those regions where military operations 
against the rebels were in progress. In practice, 
however, after August 1 the political parties and their 
mass organizations still had to ask permission from the 
war administrators to hold closed meetings. Sometimes 
a representative of the military would attend them.
When PKI asked permission to hold its congress, it was 
widely rumoured, and from sources in high government
l o o
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c i r c l e s ,  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  r e f u s e d  p e r m is s io n
and  r e t r a c t e d  t h e i r  r e f u s a l  o n ly  a f t e r  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
o f  S ukarno .
D e s p i t e ,  and p e rh a p s  s t i m u l a t e d  b y ,  t h e  g row ing 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  th e  PKI l e a d e r s  
e x p re s s e d  to  th e  s i x t h  c o n g re s s  t h e i r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to  
draw up and  e x e c u te  a se co n d  t h r e e - y e a r  p la n  o f  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n  and  e d u c a t i o n .  They a l s o  showed th e  m ajo r  l i n e s  
th e  p l a n  was e x p e c te d  to  t a k e .
In  th e  f i e l d  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  th e  o b j e c t i v e  was a g a in  
th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  m em bership and  th e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  th e  
P a r t y  m ach ine . S p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  was t o  be  g iv e n  to  
w inn ing  new members from th e  w ork ing  c l a s s .
In  a t t r a c t i n g  new members, o r i e n t a t i o n  to  th e  
w ork ing  c l a s s  i n  th e  towns and v i l l a g e s  i s  
im p o r ta n t  i n  o r d e r  to  s a f e g u a r d  th e  c o m p o s i t io n  
o f  th e  P a r ty  m em bership  so  t h a t  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  
o f  th e  p r o l e t a r i a n  e le m e n t  i n  th e  P a r t y ,  
a l th o u g h  i t  does n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a m a j o r i t y ,  a t  
l e a s t  rem a ins  p r o p o r t i o n a t e  to  e le m e n ts  from 
c l a s s e s  o t h e r  th a n  th e  w o rk in g  c l a s s .  '
In  o r d e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  th e  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  w o rk in g  c l a s s
members, Lukman c a l l e d  on a l l  P a r t y  co m m ittee s  to  d e v o te
s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  e le m e n ta r y
p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n  f o r  w o rk in g  c l a s s  c a n d i d a t e  members
so  t h a t  th e y  c o u ld  become f u l l  members a s  soon  as  the
minimum p e r i o d  o f  c a n d id a c y  was c o m p le te d .
Lukman, T en tan g  K o n s t i t u s i  PKI, p*37«
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Aidit gave some of the broad objectives in the field
Aof education:
1. to educate all Party functionaries and activists 
and a majority of the rank and file;
2. to make the study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
the most important subject in all Party schools and 
courses, and to teach the international working class 
movement in all schools and courses;
3« to train cadres of theory, politics, and 
organization .
In the central committee report to the sixth 
congress, Aidit called on the provincial committees to 
present detailed and objective reports to the central 
committee planning bureau in order to enable the bureau
pto draw up a realistic plan. The national rate for the 
plan went into operation on January 1 1960, but no 
details had been made public by the end of the year.
The uncertainty of the general political situation 
in Indonesia and the restrictions on political freedom 
make it unlikely that the second three-year plan will 
enjoy the smooth operation of its predecessor. At the
Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, p.149; "The Sixth National 
Congress", RI, November-Deeember 1959, pp.45-6.
2
Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, p.149*
end  o f  A ugust I9 6 0 ,  t h e  l o c a l  wap a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  o f  S ou th  
S u m a tra ,  S o u th  K a lim an tan  and S ou th  and S o u th - E a s t  
S u la w e s i  p l a c e d  te m p o ra ry  b a n s  on PKI a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e i r  
a r e a s .  Prom Sep tem ber 13 t o  November 30 a n a t io n - w id e  
b an  was im posed on a l l  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and when i t  
was l i f t e d ,  t h e  b a n  on communist a c t i v i t i e s  rem a in ed  in  
f o r c e  in  a t  l e a s t  S ou th  S um atra /D jam bi and  S ou th  
K a l im a n ta n .  W hile th e  b a n s  a r e  i n  f o r c e  on p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  g e n e r a l  and  communist a c t i v i t i e s  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  b o th  th e  e x p a n s io n  and o rg a n iz e d  e d u c a t io n  o f  
P a r t y  m em bership must come t o  a v i r t u a l  h a l t ,  and th e  
r e c r u i tm e n t  o f  new members has  p ro b a b ly  been  made f a r  
more d i f f i c u l t  b y  th e  i n c r e a s i n g  r e p r e s s i o n  o f  PKI, th e  
g e n e r a l  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  w i th  and d e c r e a s in g  im p o r ta n c e  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  and th e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  o b v io u s  h o s t i l i t y  
o f  th e  army, n a t i o n a l i s t , and  Moslem l e a d e r s  t o  PKI, 
d e s p i t e  S u k a r n o 's  c o n t i n u i n g  p a t r o n a g e  o f  th e  P a r t y .
The s u c c e s s f u l  work o f  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  in  
b u i l d i n g  a mass p a r t y  i s  i n  s t r i k i n g  c o n t r a s t  w i th  th e  
h a l f - h e a r t e d ,  l a c k a d a i s i c a l  e f f o r t s  made b y  th e  o th e r  
p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  i n  I n d o n e s i a .  The PKI l e a d e r s  have 
been  b u i l d i n g  a v a s t  P a r t y  n e tw o rk ,  w in n in g  and 
o r g a n i z in g  th e  a l l e g i a n c e  o f  m i l l i o n s  o f  members and 
s u p p o r t e r s ,  and t r a i n i n g  a l a r g e  body o f  c a d r e s ,  a l l  i n  
p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  an i r r e v e r s i b l e  s e i z u r e  o f  pow er. At th e
same time, the leaders of the other parties have, in 
general, been unconcerned with the masses, except to use 
traditional civil and religious authorities to mobilize 
mass support when it was regrettably necessary for 
occasions such as elections* They have been preoccupied 
with the intrigue and manoeuvring within the political 
elite for government office which they are so eager to 
use for their own short-sighted interests*
The successful construction of a large, united Party 
has been closely interwoven with the implementation of 
the second main task of the national united front policy, 
that is, attracting and organizing large sections of 
society* The means of attracting mass support have 
brought in the large Party membership, while the creation 
of a large, disciplined Party has permitted the organi­
zation of mass support reaching far beyond the confines 
of the Party*
6* Solidarity Within PKI Under the Aidit Leadership
Since the Aidit leadership assumed full control of 
the PKI in January 1951» there has been only one overt 
challenge, by Alimin in 1956, to the wisdom of the 
leadership’s policies. Ten years free from ’Mensheviks* 
’Trotskyites’, ’Titoists* and other ’traitors’ puts PKI
A
i n t o  a s p e c i a l  c a t e g o r y  among communist p a r t i e s .  T h is  
s o l i d a r i t y  r e q u i r e s  e x p l a n a t i o n .  The fo l lo w in g  e x p la ­
n a t i o n  i s  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  o n ly  th e  c a d r e s  o f  th e  P a r t y ,  
t h a t  i s  th e  com m ittee  members and o t h e r  f u n c t i o n a r i e s , 
from  whom any  r e v o l t  a g a i n s t  th e  P a r t y  l e a d e r s h i p  would 
he  e x p e c te d .  I t  i s  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  th e  r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  
s o l i d a r i t y  t h a t  e x i s t s  among two g ro u p s  o f  c a d r e s :  th e  
m idd le  and  lo w e r  c a d r e s ,  and th e  l e a d e r s  a t  th e  n a t i o n a l  
l e v e l .
The s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  P a r t y  i s  th e  f i r s t ,  and  m ost 
o b v io u s ,  f a c t o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  th e  s o l i d a r i t y  w i th  th e  
c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p  t h a t  i s  fo und  among th e  m idd le  and 
low er c a d r e s .  A l l  b u t  f o u r  o r  f i v e  th o u sa n d  o f  th e  more 
th a n  1-g- m i l l i o n  p r e s e n t  members o f  th e  PKI have e n t e r e d  
th e  P a r t y  s i n c e  J a n u a r y  195*1* The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  has 
t h e r e f o r e  b e en  a b le  t o  u se  th e  te c h n iq u e  o f  d e m o c ra t ic  
c e n t r a l i s m  to  p r e v e n t  th e  r i s e  o f  e le m e n ts  c o n s id e r e d  
h o s t i l e  o r  p o t e n t i a l l y  h o s t i l e  to  i t s e l f .  Any p e r s o n  
w ish in g  to  e n t e r  PKI i s  f i r s t  th o r o u g h ly  s c r u t i n i z e d  and  
th e n  m ust sp e n d  a p e r i o d  o f  s i x  months to  two y e a r s  o f  
c a n d id a c y ,  d e p en d in g  upon h i s  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l
1
I t  a l s o  means t h a t  th e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  on PKI 
i s  made more d i f f i c u l t  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  a r e  v i r t u a l l y  no 
im p o r ta n t  ex -com m un is ts  from  th e  p o s t - 1 9 5 0  p e r i o d .
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background, during which he is closely watched. Then, 
if he is accepted as a full member, his election to a 
committee post requires the endorsement of a higher 
committee. Should he become a full-time cadre, he can 
gain promotion only if he proves fully satisfactory to 
the leadership. Therefore, because the Aidit leadership 
has used great care in supervizing the promotion of 
committee members and full-time cadres, there has been 
little chance that elements hostile to the central 
leadership could rise far within the Party.
At the same time as exercising this control, the 
central leadership has constantly stressed that 1 there 
must be democratic life within the Party'. It has 
encouraged cadres and ordinary members to air grievances, 
criticisms and queries within the privacy of Party 
meetings, and has worked to remove them by patient 
explanations and education. Errors committed by cadres 
have been met, since 195*1» not by vituperation or 
expulsion but again by patient correction and education. 
This method has meant that any nascent opposition to the 
central leadership has been aired, discussed and removed
1 D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisme dan 
Peodalisme" (Continue to Advance to Destroy Imperialism 
and Feudalism), HR, January 2, 1961.
b e f o r e  i t  r e a c h e d  th e  p o i n t  o f  deep  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  o r  
e x p u l s io n s  o r  w i th d ra w a ls  from  th e  P a r t y .
The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  h a s  e x e r t e d  c o n s i d e r a b le  e f f o r t  
t o  p r o v id e  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n  f o r  i t s  c a d r e s .  The 
p o l i t i c a l  s c h o o l s  and c o u r s e s  have b e e n  t a u g h t  b y  h i g h e r  
c a d r e s  l o y a l  t o  the  c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p ,  and  th e y  have 
u se d  o n ly  m a t e r i a l s  w hich  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  c o n s i d e r s  to  
j u s t i f y  i t s  own p o l i c i e s  and t a c t i c s .  T h is  e d u c a t io n  
h as  b e e n  d o u b ly  e f f e c t i v e  due  t o  th e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
o r i g i n s  o f  th e  c a d r e s .  Most c a d r e s  e n t e r e d  th e  P a r t y  
a f t e r  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  had won c o n t r o l ,  and have no 
f i r s t - h a n d  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  th e  o l d e r  i d e o l o g i c a l  o r  
p e r s o n a l  d i s p u t e s  w i t h i n  PKI o r  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commu­
n i s t  movement. Most c a d r e s  e n t e r e d  th e  P a r t y  e i t h e r  
i l l i t e r a t e  o r  s e m i - l i t e r a t e  and w i th  no  p r e v io u s  
p o l i t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e .  T h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t io n  has  
come s o l e l y  from  what m igh t b e  te rm ed  A i d i t  c h a n n e l s ,  and 
th e y  have  no a c c e s s  t o  communist l i t e r a t u r e  o t h e r  th a n  
t h a t  w hich  th e  c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p  w r i t e s  o r  t r a n s l a t e s  
from f o r e i g n  s o u r c e s .^
1
T here  i s  th e  d a n g e r  f o r  th e  P a r ty  l e a d e r s ,  how ever, 
t h a t  th e  more th e y  g iv e  p o l i t i c a l  e d u c a t i o n  to  t h e i r  
c a d r e s ,  and th e  more comm unist l i t e r a t u r e  th e y  make 
a v a i l a b l e  i n  I n d o n e s i a n ,  th e  more t h e y  i n c r e a s e  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a p o l i t i c a l l y  s e l f - a s s u r e d  body  o f  
c a d r e s  m igh t be c r e a t e d  from  w hich  th e y  c o u ld  be  a t t a c k e d  
on M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t  g r o u n d s .  Such a d a n g e r  would loom
A n o th e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  i n  m a i n t a i n in g  th e  
s o l i d a r i t y  o f  th e  m idd le  a n d  low er  c a d r e s  w i th  the  
c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p  h a s  b e e n  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  
to  d i s t r i b u t e  re w a rd s  and  p r o v id e  means f o r  s t a t u s  ad­
vancem ent t o  l o y a l  P a r t y  w o rk e rs .  The p a t r o n a g e  a t  th e  
d i s p o s a l  o f  th e  P a r t y  l e a d e r s  i n c l u d e s  p o s i t i o n s  i n  the  
P a r t y  i t s e l f  and i n  th e  many c o m m u n is t- le d  mass o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n s ,  a l l  o f  w hich  have been  exp an d in g  r a p i d l y  and 
th e r e b y  p r o v i d i n g  wide p ro m o tio n  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  I t
i n c l u d e s  a l s o  p o s i t i o n s  i n  g o v e rn m e n ta l  b o d ie s  a t  t h e
1
n a t i o n a l  and  l o c a l  l e v e l s ,  and  i n  karrrpong a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  
e l e c t e d  v i l l a g e  g o v e rn m e n ts ,  and c o o p e r a t i v e s .  The 
P a r t y  l e a d e r s  a l s o  d e c id e  w hich  c a d r e s  s h a l l  p a r t i c i p a t e  
i n  th e  many d e l e g a t i o n s  i n v i t e d  t o  th e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  th e  
S o v ie t  b l o c .
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l a r g e  i f  n a t i o n a l  o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i m p e r a t i v e s  f o r c e d  an  
a l t e r a t i o n  i n  th e  P a r t y ' s  p r e s e n t  o v e r a l l  s t r a t e g y ,  o r  i f  
a s p l i t  o c c u r r e d  w i t h in  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p .
1
39 p erson s were e le c t e d  to  p a r lia m en t on the PKI t i c k e t  
in  Septem ber 1955; 60 were e le c t e d  to  the C o n stitu e n t  
Assem bly in  December 1955* A fte r  th e  Septem ber 1955 
e l e c t i o n s ,  PKI was a l lo c a t e d  624 s e a t s  in  the p r o v in c ia l  
and l o c a l  c o u n c i ls  in  Java a lo n e , and in  the 1957 lo c a l  
e le c t io n s  in c r e a se d  t h i s  to  973* S in ce  1956 PKI an d /or  
i t s  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  have r e c e iv e d  a number o f  s e a t s  in  
the N a tio n a l C o u n c il, th e  Supreme A d visory  C o u n c il, and 
the N a tio n a l P lan n ing  C o u n c il. Between 55 and- 75 members 
o f  the new, ap p o in ted  p a r lia m e n t, i n s t a l l e d  in  June 1960, 
owe t h e ir  p o s i t io n s  to  membership in  PKI or i t s  mass 
o r g a n iz a t io n s .
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The apparent validity of the policies and tactics 
of the Aidit leadership is also a factor which tends to 
maintain the cadres1 loyalty to the leadership. Under 
Aiditfs direction, PKI has grown from insignificance to 
being by far the largest and best-organized party in the 
country and the leader of mass organizations embracing 
over 8 million members. Under his care, PKI has 
approached, in the eyes of its members, steadily closer 
to government power. Aidit is not only honoured in his 
own country by President Sukarno, but also abroad by the 
leaders of two of the world's most powerful countries, 
the Soviet Union and China. In such a situation it is 
not surprising that his leadership has been virtually 
unchallenged - especially if victory and the distribution 
of far greater rewards (in status if not in material 
wealth) appear imminent.
An important factor which tends towards the soli­
darity of PKI as a whole, and of the cadres in particular, 
is the existence of a Party-centred community. We have 
seen how the Party can provide routes for status ad­
vancement. The Party and its mass organizations also 
provide a defence against hostile or potentially hostile 
forces, such as the landlord, the employer, the village 
head or a government official. They provide assistance 
in times of material need, such as when there are births,
illness or death in the family. When cadres travel 
away from their homes, their families are looked after.
The Party and its mass organizations give education, 
both political and basic literacy, they organize sports, 
provide kindergartens, establish cooperatives. They not 
only provide employment to many cadres but also come to 
furnish them with their circle of friends. In short, a 
community is established within the general community - 
and the Aidit leadership has taken care that the cadres 
benefit most from the Party-centred community. Because 
serious opposition to the central leadership might lead 
to expulsion from the Party community, such opposition 
cannot be engaged in lightly.
A final factor, and a nebulous one, is the tradition 
of authoritarianism that is strong within especially 
Javanese society, from which the great majority of PKI 
members are derived. One does not openly disagree with 
one's 'superiors*. The most one does is to give public 
agreement and then quietly disregard what the 'superiors' 
have said or ordered.1 This tradition operates in
1
Prom the little the PKI leaders have published concerning 
opposition within the Party to their policies or 
instructions, it is clear that many of the lower committees 
give formal agreement to policies and then quietly shelve 
those they do not like. For example, some committees 
which opposed the concept of a mass party 'forgot' to 
implement the first membership drive, while some have
f a v o u r  o f  o v e r t  o b e d ie n ce  to  th e  l e a d e r s  o f  any  o rg a n i­
z a t i o n ,  a s  lo n g  a s  th e  l e a d e r s  a r e  s t i l l  r e c o g n iz e d  a s  
l e a d e r s  o r  s u p e r i o r s .  B ecause th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  has 
so  f a r  p ro v e d  s u c c e s s f u l ,  i t  r e t a i n s  th e  o v e r t  l o y a l t y  
and  o b e d ie n c e  o f  th e  c a d re s  a s  w e ll  as o f  th e  o r d in a r y  
m em bers. But t h i s  t r a d i t i o n  d o es n o t  o p e ra te  among 
th o s e  who r e g a rd  th e m se lv e s  as n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s ,  and  th e  
phenom enon o f  a d ecad e  o f  s o l i d a r i t y  among th e  c e n t r a l  
l e a d e r s h ip  r e q u i r e s  a d d i t i o n a l  e x p la n a t io n  to  th e  one 
a l r e a d y  g iv e n  ab o v e .
Of th e  f o u r te e n  members o f  th e  c e n t r a l  co m m ittee  in  
J a n u a ry  1951 > o n ly  th r e e  have  b e e n  rem oved f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
r e a s o n s :  Tan L ing  D j ie ,  A lim in  and  Y /ikana. B ut a l l  
t h r e e  w ere e l e c t e d  on th e  PKI l i s t  to  th e  C o n s t i tu e n t  
A ssem bly  in  Decem ber 1955> and W ikana was r e tu r n e d  to  th e  
c e n t r a l  com m ittee  in  S ep tem ber 1959 . Tan L ing  D jie  
f u l l y  c o n fe s s e d  h i s  e r r o r s  by  th e  tim e  o f  th e  f i f t h  
c o n g re s s  i n  March 195 4 > W ikana was n o t  p u b l i c l y  c h a s t i s e d  
a f t e r  1951» and o n ly  A lim in  has p u b l i c l y  opposed  th e
c o n tin u e d  to  be  slow  in  p ro m o tin g  c a n d id a te  members t o  
f u l l  m em bersh ip . Many co m m ittees  w hich  were u n a b le  to  
s e e  th e  v a lu e  o f  women members d id  n o t  o p e n ly  q u e s t io n  
o r  oppose  th e  d i r e c t i v e  to  in c r e a s e  women m em bersh ip ; 
th e y  q u i e t l y  ig n o re d  i t .  S t i l l  o th e r  co m m ittee s  have 
ig n o re d  b u t  n o t  o p e n ly  q u e s t io n e d  d i r e c t i v e s  to  c o l l e c t  
m em bership  dues o r  to  fo rw a rd  s t i p u l a t e d  p e rc e n ta g e s  o f  
th o s e  c o l l e c t e d  to  th e  h ig h e r  c o m m itte e s .
O A °>£ *v o
Aidit leadership. Nor have any of the other members of 
the central committee, including those who have entered 
since 1951» opposed the Aidit leadership - either 
publicly or, if the lack of rumours is any evidence, 
within the Party. This is an unusual record of 
solidarity for the central leadership of any communist 
party.
Apart from the factors discussed above as operating 
among the middle and lower cadres which also affect those 
above them, the explanation of this solidarity at the 
national level is to be found in an examination of the 
two groups that constitute the central leadership: the 
group which has entered the central leadership since 
January 1951» and the group which formed the central 
committee in 1951« The new group has been promoted by 
the Aidit leadership for ability but also for loyalty to 
the leadership. While the Party continues to grow 
stronger, and the leadership’s policies thereby 
vindicated, it is not to be expected that this group of 
hand-picked, mostly very young communists who have 
received their only political education from the Aidit 
leadership, will give rise to an opposition to the Aidit- 
Lukman-Njoto triumvirate.
The 1951 group in the central committee has also 
accepted the leadership of the triumvirate with very few
public signs of resentment or disagreement. This is due 
to the personalities of the triumvirate, and especially 
to their success in guiding the Party. Aidit, Lukman 
and Njoto have maintained their unity, and only sparse 
and unsubstantiated anti-communist rumours have at any 
time indicated disagreement between them. Not only 
have these three worked together in a collective and 
amicable manner, but they have apparently succeeded in 
achieving the same result with the other members of the 
central leadership.
But of far greater importance in maintaining the 
solidarity of the central leadership has been the success 
achieved under the guidance of the triumvirate. This 
success has strengthened the triumvirate’s position in 
four ways. First, it has increased the stature of the 
triumvirate vis-a-vis the other members of the central 
leadership. Second, with the enormous increase in the 
size of the Party, the overwhelming majority of members 
and non-central leaders know only the triumvirate as the 
legitimate Party leaders, have been subjected to their 
system of political education, and have no old loyalties 
or particular reasons for new ones towards the other 
members of the central leadership. Third, the unbroken 
and continuing success of the triumvirate’s policies and 
tactics removes both grounds for opposition or grounds
t h a t  m igh t g a in  much s u p p o r t  w i th in  th e  P a r ty .  F o u r th ,  
when f i n a l  s u c c e s s  seem s c lo s e  "because o f  th e  A id i t  
l e a d e r s h i p ’s g u id a n c e , why r i s k  t o t a l  d e f e a t  "by a t t a c k i n g  
th e  t r iu m v i r a t e ?
The o n ly  p u b l ic  c h a l le n g e  to  th e  wisdom o f  th e  A id i t  
l e a d e r s h i p ’s p o l i c i e s  h a s  come from  A lim in , th e  o n ly  
v e te r a n  com m unist o f  a n y  n o te  to  s u rv iv e  th e  Madiun 
r e b e l l i o n .  W hile A id i t  was a t t e n d in g  th e  tw e n t i e th  
c o n g re s s  o f  th e  Communist P a r ty  o f  th e  S o v ie t  U nion , 
A lim in  on March 2 6 , 1956 c i r c u l a t e d  among th e  re m a in in g  
l e a d e r s  o f  th e  PKI a s ta te m e n t  in  w hich  he s t r o n g l y  
denounced  th e  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  P a r ty  and  th e  p o l i c i e s  i t
A
was p u r s u in g .
A lim in  c la im e d  t h a t  an  ’o p p o r tu n is t  g roup  o r  s o f t  
g ro u p ’ had  ta k e n  o v e r th e  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  P a r ty ,  and 
had  th e n  p r a c t i s e d  c l a s s  c o l l a b o r a t i o n ,  s t i f l e d  dem ocracy  
w i th in  th e  P a r ty ,  n e g le c te d  th e  r e v o lu t io n a r y  i d e o l o g i c a l  
e d u c a t io n  o f  i t s  m em bers, and b ro u g h t  th e  P a r ty  to  th e  
l e v e l  o f  ’an o r d in a r y  b o u rg e o is  p a r t y  t h a t  no lo n g e r  
te a c h e s  c l a s s  c o n s c io u s n e s s ’ . The P a r ty  had  grown 
q u a n t i t a t i v e l y ,  b u t  was now weak i n  q u a l i t y .  A lim in  
e x p re s s e d  ’d is a p p o in tm e n t ,  c o n c e rn  and a n x i e t y ’ a t  th e
1
A lim in ’s s ta te m e n t  i s  g iv e n  in  f u l l  i n  HR, J u l y  
1956.
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'increasingly unclear1 2political leadership given by 
the Party, Finally, he warned of the great danger that 
the 'ideological and political deviation’ being followed 
by the Party would not bring the Party to victory. To 
cleanse the Party, he pleaded for 'The broadest self- 
criticism and criticism ... freely or without fear ... 
and against anyone’.
Alimin's criticisms would have been comprehensible 
to the old guard of PKI who had studied Marxist-Leninist 
literature widely and which still remembered the militant 
extremism that led to the 1926 communist rebellion in 
Indonesia, But almost all the old guard had died or had 
been killed or had left the Party. For the reasons that 
have been outlined above, Alimin's statement fell on 
barren ground and received no overt support within the 
Party. After confession of error on May 10, 1956, he 
was again obstinate and left the Party on August 8, 1956.
In November 1958 and September 1959, although he had
re-established contact with the Party headquarters, Alimin
2published booklets which conflicted with Party policy,
1 Aidit, Bersatu untuk Menjelesaikan, pp.97-8; HR,
August 9, 1955*2 Alimin, Peladjaran Karl Marx (The Teachings of Karl 
Marx), Djakarta, 1958, 15 n.; Perdjuangan Klas Karl Marx 
(The Class Struggle of Karl Marx), Djakarta, 1959, 12 p.
but which produced no ripple within the Party. When I 
met him in May 1960 he was old, senile, ailing, lonely, 
no longer visited by Party members and obsessed with what 
he considered to be the Party leadership’s flouting of 
the elementary principles of Marxism-Leninism. He 
confirmed that his opposition to the Aidit leadership 
evoked no response in the Party. The solitary nature 
of his opposition only illustrated the solidarity among 
the post-1951 leadership.
Prom the available evidence, it appears that while 
the Aidit-Lukman-Njoto triumvirate retains its solidarity, 
and while the triumvirate’s policies and tactics lead to 
continued PKI advances, there is little possibility that 
the solidarity that has existed for a decade among Party 
cadres will break down. A break-down might occur only 
if there is a drastic change in the Indonesian or 
international political scene requiring a correspondingly 
drastic re-orientation in Party policies and tactics.
At that point, which could be occasioned, for example, by 
the death of Sukarno, severe government repression of PKI, 
the development of a revolutionary mood, or a militant 
line by Moscow or Peking against the neutralist, bourgeois 




7. An 'Illegal PKI'?
PKI claims to have maintained, an 'illegal PKI' from 
the end of the communist rebellion of 1926-7 to the
Areturn of Musso in August 1948« With the outbreak of 
the Madiun rebellion in September 1948 and the Dutch 
occupation of the remaining Republican territory in Java 
in December, PKI was forced to go underground again.
An illegal PKI* was retained throughout 1950 to guide 
the legal PKI, the Indonesian Labour Party and the 
Socialist Party. In other words, an 'illegal PKI* had 
existed for all but one month of the 25 years preceding 
the January 1951 change in the PKI leadership. Since 
then there have been reports and rumours of two kinds of 
illegal PKI: active guerrilla bands, and secret groups 
which prepare for an eventual revolutionary situation.
The purpose of the following paragraphs is to examine the 
scanty available evidence in order to estimate whether 
the Aidit leadership has undertaken the organization of 
one kind or both kinds of illegal PKI.
There is no doubt that armed bands were active in 
East Java during the first half of 1951* Peith and
PKI, 40 Tahun PKI, pp.31-51.1
Kahin describe them as PKI-connected or PKI-finaneed.^ 
These groups in East Java mostly ceased operations
before the end of 1951» "but an armed force in Central
2Java, known as the MMC, carried out armed attacks until 
as late as 1955* Kahin goes so far as to claim that in 
1952 the PKI leaders concentrated their armed bands into 
the MMC area ’and gave intensive military and political 
training to youths brought in from East and Central Java 
for short periods on a rotating basis’. Some slight 
confirmation that the Aidit leadership was at least 
contemplating guerrilla warfare (and Aidit and Lukman 
had returned in July 1950 after eighteen months in China 
and with the Viet Minh) is given by the translation by 




Herbert Peith, ’’Indonesian Politics, 1949-1957: the 
Decline of Representative Government” (Cornell University, 
Ph.D. thesis, 1961), p.327; Kahin, ’’Indonesian Politics” in Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West, p.140.
2
MMC stands for Merbabu-Merapi Complex. Merbabu and 
Merapi are two adjacent volcanos in Central Java.
3 George McTuman Kahin, ’’Indonesia” in Kahin (ed.),
Major Governments of Asia, Ithaca, New York, 1958» p.557> 
note 25. The anti-communist newspaper Pedoman on January 
14* 1955 also mentioned rumours that the MMC area was 
being used to train military cadres.
4 Mao Tse-tung’s ’’Strategic Problems of China’s 
Revolutionary War” was serialized in Bintang Merah and 
also published in booklet form; Vo Nguyen Giap’s What is 
the Liberation Army? was published in booklet form. These
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The com m unist l e a d e r s  have d e n ie d  p u b l i c l y  any
A
c o n n e c t io n  w ith  th e  MMC, and a s  e a r l y  a s  May 1951 
b lam ed  th e  i m p e r i a l i s t s  f o r  th e  t e r r o r i s m  w hich was
pl a b e l l e d  com m unist b y  th e  a n ti-c o m m u n is ts .  F u r th e rm o re , 
i n  an a r t i c l e  in te n d e d  f o r  i n t e r n a l  P a r ty  consum ption  
o n ly ,  th e  PKI l e a d e r s  i n  J u l y  1951 condemned th e  p lu n d e r ­
in g  o f  p e a s a n t  p r o p e r ty  in  th e  MMC area .-^  T hese 
p r o t e s t a t i o n s  o f  in n o c e n c e  do n o t  o f  th e m se lv e s  p rove  
in n o c e n c e . How ever, non -com m unists  I  spoke w ith  i n  th e  
M erbabu-M erapi a re a  v iew ed  th e  MMC as rem nan ts o f  th e  
M adiun r e b e l s  who h e ld  o u t f o r  a w h ile  u n t i l  t h e i r  
l e a d e r s  were k i l l e d  by  th e  arm y o r  p o l i c e .  And i t  
w ould be s u r p r i s i n g  i f  PKI c o u ld  have b ro u g h t  many y o u th s
two w orks w ere made a v a i l a b l e  in  In d o n e s ia n  a t  a tim e 
when v e ry  few f o r e ig n  com m unist m a te r i a l s  had  b e e n  
t r a n s l a t e d .  However, a s  th e  m i l i t a r y  p h ase  o f  th e  
r e v o l u t io n  had  j u s t  b e e n  c o m p le te d , th e r e  was s t i l l  
c o n s id e r a b le  i n t e r e s t  i n  m a t e r i a l s  on g u e r r i l l a  w a r f a r e .  
F u r th e rm o re , a s  th e  p r e f a c e  to  M ao's work in  b o o k le t  form  
i n d i c a t e s ,  th e  young PKI l e a d e r s  may have e x p e c te d  t h a t  
In d o n e s ia  w ould have to  ta k e  up  arms a g a in  in  o r d e r  to  
r i d  h e r s e l f  o f  th e  s e m i- c o lo n ia l  s t a t u s  im posed  by  th e  
Round T ab le  C o n fe ren ce  a g re e m e n t.
1
S e e , f o r  ex am p le , I c h t i s a r  G erakan T an i (S u rv e y  o f  th e  
P e a s a n t  M ovem ent), A p r i l  1951» p p » 2 -3 ; and  HR, November 
19, 1954.
2
PK I, " P ra k te k  G a n g s te r  A m erika” (A m erican  G a n g ste r  
P r a c t i c e s ) ,  BM, May 1 5 -Ju n e  1 , 1951, p p .2 7 6 -7 •
3
"M asaalah  T an i d i  I n d o n e s ia ” (The P e a sa n t Q u e s tio n  in  
I n d o n e s ia ) ,  BM, June  1 5 - J u ly  1 , 1951> p .3 0 4 .
i n t o  th e  MMC a r e a ,  t r a i n e d  them t h e r e ,  and  th e n  r e tu r n e d  
them  to  t h e i r  home a r e a s ,  w i th o u t  d e t e c t i o n  by  th e  
a u t h o r i t i e s  o r  a n t i - c o m m u n is ts .
From th e  l i m i t e d  in fo rm a tio n  a v a i l a b l e  to  me, i t  
w ould a p p e a r  t h a t  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  d id  n o t  en co u rag e  
th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  PKI arm ed b a n d s . Those t h a t  e x i s t e d  i n  
E a s t  J a v a  in  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1951 q u ic k ly  c e a se d  o p e r­
a t i o n s ,  though  i t  i s  n o t  known i f  t h i s  was on i n s t r u c t i o n  
from  th e  P a r ty  l e a d e r s  o r  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  m i l i t a r y  p r e s s u r e  
a g a i n s t  them . The MMC i s  a s e p a r a te  and so  f a r  u n so lv e d  
p ro b lem . I t s  l e a d e r s  w ere com m unists from  b e fo r e  th e  
Madiun r e b e l l i o n  who f l e d  t o  th e  m o u n ta in s when th e  
r e b e l l i o n  f a i l e d .  They a p p a r e n t ly  g a in e d  many a d h e re n ts  
from  p o o r p e a s a n ts  and d e m o b il iz e d  t r o o p s ,  and  o p e ra te d  
more a s  b a n d i t s  th a n  th e  c r e a t o r s  o f  a s m a ll  l i b e r a t i o n  
b a s e .  Due to  arm y and p o l i c e  a t t a c k s  th e  MMC m o s tly  
c e a se d  o p e r a t io n s  b y  th e  end  o f  1952, and  c o m p le te ly  by  
th e  end o f  1955 *  As y e t  I  have o b ta in e d  no c o n c re te  
e v id e n c e  o f  a command l i n k  b e tw een  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h ip  
and th e  MMC l e a d e r s ,  o r  o f  K ahin*s r e p o r t  t h a t  th e  MMC 
a re a  was u sed  to  t r a i n  num bers o f  com m unist y o u th s  from  
o th e r  a r e a s  in  p o l i t i c a l  and  m i l i t a r y  m a t t e r s .
When v iew ed  i n  th e  w id e r c o n te x t  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  
u n i te d  f r o n t  p o l ic y  w hich th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  p u rsu e d  
from  a b o u t th e  end  o f  1951, i t  seem s h ig h ly  u n l ik e l y  t h a t
t h e  PKI l e a d e r s  would have  e n co u rag e d  th e  MMC. The 
a d v a n t a g e s  were too  s m a l l ,  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  t o o  g r e a t *  
The MMC a r e a  was r e s t r i c t e d ,  and  c o u ld  have b e e n ,  and 
was,  e r a d i c a t e d  by r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  numbers o f  t ro o p s*  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  PKI l e a d e r s  c o u ld  n o t  r i s k  t h e  e x p o su re  
o f  t h e i r  p a r t  i n  th e  MMC t e r r o r i s m ,  f o r  t h i s  might  have 
n e g a t e d  t h e  p a i n s t a k i n g  work t o  c r e a t e  th e  image o f  PKI 
a s  r e s p e c t a b l e ,  d e m o c r a c y - lo v i n g ,  a n t i - t e r r o r i s t * * 1 2
The s e c o n d  k i n d  o f  ’i l l e g a l  PKI* t h a t  has been  
p e r s i s t e n t l y  rumoured  s i n c e  J a n u a r y  1951 i s  t h a t  o f  a 
n e tw o rk  o f  s e c r e t  g ro u p s  p r e p a r i n g  f o r  an e v e n t u a l  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s i t u a t i o n .  S e v e r a l  new sp ap er  r e p o r t s  seem 
t o  c o n f i r m  th e  rum ours .  I n  November 1954» s i x t e e n  PKI 
members from Temanggung, C e n t r a l  J a v a ,  were g a o le d  f o r  
r e c r u i t i n g  a s e c r e t  s e c t i o n  o f  th e  P a r t y  which was t o
o r g a n i z e  a ’l i b e r a t i o n  army* t o  be  u s e d  i f  PKI f a r e d
2
b a d l y  i n  th e  1955 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s *  The D j a k a r t a  
weekly  n e w sp a p e r  "Geledek"  r e p o r t e d  on May 3 1 , 1959 t h a t  
t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f  a ’PKI-Malam' (N igh t  PKI) had  b e e n  
r a i d e d  by  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  Rembang, C e n t r a l  J a v a ,  and a
1
For  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h i s  e f f o r t  a t  i m a g e - b u i l d i n g ,  
s e e  b e lo w ,  p p *240-56 .
2
Keng P o , J a n u a r y  1 3 , 1955 ; Pedoman, J a n u a r y  14# 1955 .
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A
num ber o f  weapons s e i z e d .  PKI-Malam was r e p o r t e d  to
h av e  b ra n c h e s  i n  C e n t r a l  and E a s t  J a v a  and to  be
p r e p a r i n g  f o r  a r e b e l l i o n  to  e s t a b l i s h  a p e o p l e ’s
dem ocracy . The J o g j a k a r t a  n ew sp ap er  " N a s io n a l"  c a r r i e d
a r e p o r t  on A p r i l  11 , 1960 o f  th e  a r r e s t  and im prisonm en t
i n  P a t i  ( i n c i d e n t a l l y  o n ly  some 25 m i le s  from Rembang) o f
s i x  p e r s o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  f i v e  members o f  th e  P a t i  r e p r e -
2s e n t a t i v e  c o u n c i l ,  f o r  h o ld in g  a s u b v e r s iv e  m e e t in g .  
M a t e r i a l s  c o n f i s c a t e d  a t  t h e  m e e tin g  in c lu d e d  n o te s  and 
l e t t e r s  on ,fHow PKI c an  c a r r y  o u t  an armed movement in  
196 0 ” , and a " 3 -d a y  p l a n  t o  r e p l a c e  th e  b u p a t i  and 
pamong p r a d j a " .^
Many f a c t o r s  m ust be  c o n s id e r e d  i n  a t t e m p t in g  to  
u n r a v e l  t h e  rum ours and  r e p o r t s  o f  an  i l l e g a l  PKI t h a t  i s  
p r e p a r i n g  f o r  e v e n t u a l  r e b e l l i o n .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  l o g i c a l  
t h a t  th e  PKI l e a d e r s  s h o u ld  have p r e p a r e d  p la n s  f o r  th e  
e v e n t u a l i t y  o f  b e i n g  f o r c e d  u n d e rg ro u n d  b y  governm ent 
r e p r e s s i o n ,  and t h a t  i t  h as  a t  l e a s t  a s k e l e t o n  u n d e r ­
g round  o r g a n i z a t i o n  even  i f  i t s  p r o j e c t e d  members a re  a t
1
G e le d e k ,  May 31* 1959*
2
N a s i o n a l , A p r i l  11, 1960.
3
B u p a t i  i s  th e  t i t l e  g iv e n  to  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v a n t  i n  c h a rg e  
o f  a kali) upa t e n ; pamong p r a d  j a  i s  th e  name g iv e n  to  th e  
members o f  th e  r u r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .
present working above ground* Second, the Sukiman 
government was unable to substantiate the charge of 
plotting to overthrow the government on which it arrested 
2,000 communists and communist-supporters in August 1951* 
Nor have later governments or even anti-communists 
revealed concrete evidence to support such a charge 
against PKI. Third, the creation of a PKI-Malam by PKI 
before legal political activity was repressed would 
destroy much of the image PKI has built itself as an 
essential part of the national united front policy* On 
the other hand, if the possibility of severe repression 
seemed great the PKI leaders might consider the risk of 
establishing an underground PKI worth taking* But such 
a possibility did not loom large from ASS'] until about 
the beginning of 1960, with the doubtful exception of a 
brief period after the installation of the Masjumi-led 
Burhanudin Harahap cabinet on August 12, 1955* Fourth, 
the PKI-Malam as reported in "Geledek" could be comprised 
of members of the small groups of extremist, self-styled 
communists such as belong to Ibnu Pama's Acoma. And, 
fifth, it is possible that PKI contains extremists, 
militant elements, who are dissatisfied with the national 
united front policy and have, without the sanction of the 
central leadership, established their own minor under­
ground organizations*
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In  s h o r t ,  t h e r e  i s  no c o n c re te  e v id e n c e  t h a t  th e  
A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  h as  o rg a n iz e d  an u n d e rg ro u n d  s e c t i o n  
o f  th e  P a r ty  w hich  i s  p r e p a r in g  f o r  th e  e v e n t u a l i t y  o f  
r e v o l u t io n .  R a th e r ,  th e  l e a d e r s h ip  w i l l  have  made 
p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  im p o r ta n t  c a d re s  and f o r  a s k e le to n  
f o r c e  o f  m id d le  and lo w er c a d re s  to  go u n d e rg ro u n d  i n  th e  
e v e n t  o f  s e v e r e  governm ent r e p r e s s io n .  R e p o r ts  o f  PKI- 
Malam and  s i m i l a r  o r g a n iz a t io n s  p ro b a b ly  s tem  from  th e  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  non-PK I ex trem e  l e f t i s t s  o r  o f  PKI members 
a c t i n g  w ith o u t  th e  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  P a r ty  
l e a d e r s h ip .
I I I .  COMMUNIST FUNDS IN INDONESIA
PKI i s  i n d i s p u te d l y  th e  w e a l t h i e s t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  
in  I n d o n e s ia .  I t  c an  a f f o r d  t o  m a in ta in  more f u l l - t i m e  
o r g a n i z e r s ,  p u b l i s h  more l i t e r a t u r e ,  and ru n  more c o s t l y  
e l e c t i o n  cam paigns th a n  any  o th e r  p a r t y .  The p u rp o se  o f  
t h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  to  exam ine th e  l i m i t e d  a v a i l a b l e  m a t e r i a l  
c o n c e rn in g  th e  P K I 's  incom e and e x p e n d i tu r e .  The incom e 
and e x p e n d i tu re  o f  PKI in  t h i s  a n a ly s i s  r e f e r s  n o t  o n ly  
to  th e  P a r ty  b u t  a l s o  to  th e  many c o m m u n is t- le d  mass 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  to g e th e r  th e y  c o n s t i t u t e  a 
f i n a n c i a l  a s  w e ll  a s  p o l i t i c a l  u n i t .
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PKI has  b e e n  u n a b le  t o  t a p  th o s e  governm ent s o u rc e s  
w hich  have p r o v id e d  m ost income f o r  a t  l e a s t  PNI and NU 
o f  th e  o t h e r  m a jo r  p a r t i e s #  The o p e n ly  acknow ledged  
s o u r c e s  o f  income f o r  th e  P a r t y  and i t s  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
f a l l  i n t o  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s :  P a r t y  m em bership f e e s ,  th e  
m em bership  f e e s  o f  th e  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s , d o n a t i o n s ,  
s p e c i a l  f u n d - r a i s i n g  cam p a ig n s ,  and th e  wages o f  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e s  i n  g o v e rn m e n ta l  b o d ie s#
Under th e  A p r i l  1951 PKI c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  m em bership 
f e e s  were f i x e d  a t  a b o u t  0#33 p e r  c e n t  o f  income f o r  th e  
lo w e r  income b r a c k e t s ,  a b o u t  0 .7 5  p e r  c e n t  f o r  medium- 
h ig h  o n e s ,  and a minimum o f  1^ p e r  c e n t  f o r  h ig h e r  
incomes# T h is  r a t e  was r e d u c e d  i n  th e  S ep tem ber 1959 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  to  0 .2  p e r  c e n t  f o r  members i n  th e  low er  
incom es , and a minimum o f  1 p e r  c e n t  f o r  th o s e  i n  th e
p
h i g h e r  incom es . The e n t r a n c e  f e e  has  rem a in e d  
unchanged  as  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  one m o n th !s m em bership 
f e e s .  I f  t h e  m em bership  f e e s  were c o l l e c t e d  r e g u l a r l y  
and f u l l y ,  th e y  would be an enormous s o u rc e  o f  incom e, 
e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  c la im e d  P a r t y  m em bership p a s s e d  th e  one 
m i l l i o n  mark b y  th e  b e g in n in g  o f  1956. V a r io u s  p i e c e s  
o f  e v id e n c e  w ould  i n d i c a t e ,  how ever, t h a t  th e  payment o f
1
PKI, K o n s t i t u s i  PKI, 1951, P P .53 -U .
2
Lukraan, T e n tan g  K o n s t i t u s i  PK I, p .9 0 .
fees is at a low rate and that the fees collected by the 
lower Party organizations are not forwarded in stipulated 
percentages to the higher committees.
An article by Anwar Sanusi in October 1956 shed 
light on the efficacy of the collection of membership
Afees in West Java. Sanusi stated that the work of the 
West Java provincial committee was not being performed 
as well as it should, because not enough money was coming 
in. Of the 22 section committees in West Java at that 
time:
only a few send money to the provincial committee 
every month or occasionally. The average amount 
that enters each month from the section committees 
does not reach 20 per cent of the amount that is 
really needed for the varied work of the provincial 
committee to be done well.
He added that:
Prom some kabupatens and large towns, subscription 
money does not reach the higher committees, 
especially the provincial committee and central 
committee or does so only in very small amounts, 
because ... it is used up by the lower committees.
An article the following month by Isk of the
Djakarta Raja committee reported that 'the Party in
1
Amir Anwar Sanusi, "Sedikit tentang Penarikan Iuran dan 
Penjetorannja” (A Little about the Collection and 
Forwarding of Membership Fees), KP, October 1956, pp.8-12. 
2
Isk, "Mendjadikan Soal Keuangan Masaalah bagi Seluruh 
Partai” (Make the Problem of Finances a Matter for the 
Whole Party), KP, November 1956, pp.24-7.
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Djakarta Raja experiences almost the same situation1 as 
that described by Sanusi. Isk complained of the belief, 
widely held within PKI, that members and candidate 
members need not pay membership and entrance fees because 
the Party could always receive money from people outside 
the Party. He also complained that some section 
committees and subsection committees considered it 
unimportant to forward membership fees to the higher 
committees.
In July 1957 and May 1958 Party leaders referred to 
continuing deficiencies in the collection of membership 
fees, and when I was in Java in 1959 and 1960 Party 
cadres indicated to me that the inflow of fees was still 
low.
The articles on West Java and Djakarta Raja touched 
upon a problem which has been serious in PKI: that the 
lower committees which collect the fees keep more than 
their share and pass on little or nothing to the higher 
committees. In order to eliminate this *wastage*, the 
central committee issued an order at about the end of 
July 1956 that the 10 per cent of membership fees
1
Aidit, "Ubah Imbangan Kekuatan", HR, July 5> 1957; 
"Untuk Melantjarkan Pemasukan Uang Iuran" (To Speed Up 
the Entry of Membership Pees), KP, May 1958, p.67*
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allotted for the central committee henceforth be 
forwarded directly by the subsection to the central 
committee instead of trickling upwards via the section 
committees and provincial committees as formerly. This 
order was not implemented fully. A central committee 
circular to all subsection committees in April 1958 
stated clearly that not all subsections were fulfilling
pthe earlier instruction.
The above information gives evidence of a certain 
weakness in Party discipline, but also suggests that the 
higher Party committees were not receiving from membership 
fees sufficient funds to operate properly.
The second source of funds for the communist movement 
in Indonesia is the membership fees of the communist-led 
mass organizations which claimed, in mid-1960, a combined 
membership of over 8 millions, I spoke with leaders of 
the trade union federation, SOBSI, the peasant organi­
zation, BTI, the youth organization, Pemuda Rakjat, the 
women’s organization, Gerwani, and the village officials1 
association, PPDI, and all complained of the impossibility 
of collecting more than a tiny percentage of membership
1
Anwar Sanusi, ’’Sedikit Tentang Penarikan Iuran”, KP, 
October 1956, pp.11-12.
2
Aidit, "Untuk Melantjarkan Pemasukan”, KP, May 1958,P.67.
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fees. There is also some published information on 
SOBSI, BTI and Gerwani as well as personal information 
from Pemuda Rakjat which supports the generalization of 
their national leaders.
In June 1956, SOBSI published a booklet which gave 
some statistics on the income of the communist-led trade 
unions. According to this booklet, in 1955 the SOBSI 
national council received only about 12.5 per cent of 
the subscriptions it should have according to the number 
of members. Pew of the national councils of the member 
unions received more than 30 per cent. The notable 
exception was the railway workers' union which achieved 
75 per cent because membership fees were deducted from 
the pay packet before it reached members. The booklet 
further commented that 'a deficit in the budget is still 
a common phenomenon’. Two basic causes of the lack of 
funds were listed: that fees were not collected on a 
large scale, and that those collected were not forwarded 
properly to the higher committees. These are the same 
complaints expressed by the PKI leadership, but within 
the mass organizations both problems seem to be more 
acute. SOBSI planned to raise the entry of membership
1 SOBSI, Mengatasi Keuangan dalam Serikat-Buruh 
(Overcoming the Problem of Finances in the Trade Unions), 
Djakarta, 1956, 29 p.
fees to 50 per cent during 1958» but the amount that did
reach the national council was only 10 per cent of what
it should have been based on membership figures*1 - a
decrease compared with 1955«
The BTI leaders have been less open in their
discussion of the organization’s finances. An article
in May 1957, however, mentioned that the entry of fees
was only 1-1i per cent of what it should have been, and
also that the lower committees were keeping an unfair
2share of those fees that were collected. The Gerwani 
national council in June 1956 complained that the entry 
of membership fees in the preceding year had been only 
about 11 per cent of which it should have been, and that 
the percentage was steadily declining,^ Prom April to 
June 1956 the total income for the national council was 
only 296 rupiahs - or about a month’s wage for a labourer. 
The national council revealed to the third Gerwani
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1
Moh. Munir, Pedoman Pen.jelesaian Plan Organisasi 1958 
(Survey of the Implementation of the 1958 Plan of 
Organization), Djakarta, 1959, p*29*2
Djadi, ’’Sekali Lagi tentang Keuangan” (Once Again about 
Finances), ST, May 1957, PP*6, 15*
3
Gerwani, Meluaskan Aksi-Aksi untuk Memperkuat Tuntutan 
Hak-Hak Wanita-Anak-Anak dan Perdamaian (Extending 
Actions to Strengthen the Demand for the Rights of Women 
and Children and for Peace), Djakarta, 1956, p*34*
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c o n g re s s  i n  December 1957 t h a t  in  th e  31 m onths from  
A p r i l  1955 to  O c to b er 1957 i t s  a v e ra g e  m on th ly  income 
from  e n tr a n c e  and m em bership  f e e s  was 702 r u p ia h s ,  w h ile  
th e  e x p en se s  o f  th e  c o u n c i l  were o v e r  8 ,0 0 0  ru p ia h s  p e r  
m onth . At th e  tim e o f  th e  c o n g re s s ,  th e  n a t i o n a l  
c o u n c i l  had  a d e b t o f  o v e r  6 0 , 0 0 0  r u p ia h s .  The c a u se s  
w ere a g a in  tw o: ’sh y n ess*  i n  c o l l e c t i n g  f e e s ,  and  th e  
r e f u s a l  o f  lo w e r co m m ittee s  to  fo rw a rd  c o l l e c t e d  f e e s  to  
th e  h ig h e r  com m ittees  i n  th e  p r e s c r ib e d  p e r c e n ta g e s .
One o f  th e  m ost i l l u m in a t in g  p ie c e s  o f  in fo rm a tio n  
on th e  in f lo w  o f  m em bership  f e e s  i n t o  th e  mass o r g a n i ­
z a t io n s  was g iv e n  in  A p r i l  1960 i n  an  in te r v ie w  w ith  a 
Pemuda R a k ja t  l e a d e r  i n  J o g j a k a r t a .  He s a i d  t h a t  
a l th o u g h  th e  m em bership f e e  o f  Pemuda R a k ja t  was o n ly  
i  r u p ia h  p e r  m onth, a t  th e  m ost o n ly  5 p e r  c e n t  was 
c o l l e c t e d .  Most o f  t h i s  5 p e r  c e n t  was used  b y  th e  
lo w er c o m m itte e s , none r e a c h in g  th e  f iv e  k a b u p a te n - l e v e l  
c o m m is s a r ia ts  in  th e  r e g io n .  He added  t h a t  none o f  th e  
a b o u t 20  Pemuda R a k ja t  f u l l - t i m e r s  in  th e  J o g ja k a r t a  
a r e a  w ere f in a n c e d  from  m em bership  f e e s .  I  d id  n o t  a sk  
him  to  e l a b o r a t e  on w hat o th e r  s o u rc e s  were ta p p e d .
1
G erw an i, L eb ih  G ia t  M eluaskan G erakan  u n tu k  
T e r la k s a n a n ja  Piagam  Hak-Hak W anita  In d o n e s ia  (More 
A c tiv e  in  E x te n d in g  th e  Movement f o r  th e  Im p le m e n ta tio n  
o f  th e  C h a r te r  o f  In d o n e s ia n  Women’s R i g h t s ) ,  D ja k a r ta ,  
1958, p p .7 8 -9 .
Prom the available evidence it would appear certain 
that none of the communist-led mass organizations receive 
even an important percentage of their operational costs 
from entrance and membership fees.
The third acknowledged source of funds for the 
communist movement is donations. The 1951 PKI consti­
tution lists among the sources of Party finances,
A'contributions from non-Party persons and groups’. This 
the September 1959 constitution re-worded as 'non-binding
pcontributions'. Similar clauses are contained in the 
constitutions of the mass organizations. . Leaders of 
Pemuda Rakjat in East Java said in interview on May 9,
1960 that their four province-level full-timers relied 
on money and other help from 'sympathizers' outside the 
organization. But although the constitutions and 
members of the PKI and its mass organizations acknowledge 
contributions from sources outside their organizations, 
these sources and the amounts received from them have not 
been disclosed. It is on these points that the 
interested non-communists do most speculation.
The fourth acknowledged source of funds, and an 
important one, is that of special fund-raising campaigns.
1
PKI, Konstitusi PKI, 1951, p.53.
2
Lukman, Tentang Konstitusi PKI, p.90.
Two kinds of fund-raising methods are used, although any­
one campaign may use both: the direct collection of money, 
and the collection of materials that can be converted 
into money.
Examples of the direct collection of money include 
the campaigns to finance the March 1954 Party congress, 
to build a permanent headquarters for the central 
committee, and to build PKI!s house of culture. In 
order to finance the 1954 congress, Aidit ordered every 
Party member and candidate member to contribute at least 
one rupiah. On December 11, 1953> the central com­
mittee secretariat issued a further order that each Party 
member and candidate member give three rupiahs during a 
3i month period in order to finance a central committee
pbuilding. The central committee decided in August 
1956 to collect funds for a PKI house of culture, and 
later claimed that four million rupiahs had been 
collected.-^ Prom the published information, however, it 
is not possible to ascertain how much of the funds raised 
in the campaigns were from Party members or should be
1 HR, November 17> 1953«2
HR, December 14, 1953* The new building was opened 
on August 19, 1954*
3 RI, September-October 1959» p.33*
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p l a c e d  i n  the  c a t e g o r y  o f  d o n a t io n s  from  n o n - P a r ty  
p e r s o n s .  But i f  th e  P a r t y  h as  found  g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  
i n  p e r s u a d in g  i t s  members t o  pay  m em bership f e e s  o r  i t s  
lo w e r  c o m m ittee s  to  fo rw a rd  th e  c o l l e c t e d  f e e s  to  h ig h e r  
c o m m it te e s ,  i t  seems f a i r  t o  assume t h a t  s i m i l a r  d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  a r e  f a c e d  in  the  s p e c i a l  f u n d - r a i s i n g  cam paigns , 
an d  t h a t  d o n a t io n s  from  o u t s i d e  th e  P a r t y  c o n s t i t u t e  a 
s i z e a b l e  e le m e n t .  As p a r t  o f  i t s  cam paign to  r a i s e  
fu n d s  f o r  th e  1957 l o c a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  a t  l e a s t  th e  E a s t  
J a v a  p r o v i n c i a l  com m ittee  o b l ig e d  e a c h  member and  
c a n d i d a t e  member t o  c o l l e c t  money o r  p ro d u c e ,  su ch  as 
r i c e ,  b a n a n a s ,  c o c o n u ts  and  c a s s a v a ,  from p e rs o n s  o u t s i d e  
th e  P a r t y .^
Most PKI members and s y m p a th iz e r s  a r e  p o o r  and 
u n a b le  o r  u n w i l l i n g  to  g iv e  money to  th e  P a r t y .  Fund­
r a i s i n g  h as  t h e r e f o r e  had  t o  ta k e  on s p e c i a l  fo rm s . In  
o r d e r  to  h e lp  f in a n c e  th e  1955 and 1957 e l e c t i o n  cam­
p a ig n s ,  members c o l l e c t e d  o ld  s a c k s ,  o i l  b o t t l e s ,  o ld  
n e w sp a p e rs ,  i n k  b o t t l e s ,  s ta m p s ,  o ld  c l o t h e s ,  o ld  t i n s  as  
w e l l  a s  p ro d u c e ;  and g ro u p s  were o rg a n iz e d  t o  c a t c h  f i s h  
and  g re e n  f r o g s ,  c o l l e c t  s a n d  and s to n e s  from  th e  r i v e r s ,
1
R u s la n ,  " P e ra n a n  A n g g o ta /T ja lo n -A n g g o ta  dalam  G-erakan 
Dana P e m il ih a n  DPRD" (The R ole  o f  Members and C a n d id a te  
Members i n  F in a n c in g  th e  L o c a l  E l e c t i o n s ) ,  KP, A p r i l  
1957, p p . 59-61.
and g a th er  banana le a v e s .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e ir  labour  
were s o ld  to  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  the P arty .^  The PKI a ls o  
i n s t i t u t e d  th e  ’P arty  t r e e ’ , ’P arty  h e n ’ , ’P arty  sh e e p ’ 
e t c .  system  under which P arty  members p la n t  a f r u i t  tr e e  
or cocon ut t r e e  or r a is e  a b ir d  or anim al fo r  th e  P a rty , 
and g iv e  the produce to  th e  P arty  fo r  sa le ^  -  a system  
a ls o  used  by BTI.^
The b e s t-d o c u m e n te d  PKI f u n d - r a i s i n g  cam paign was 
t h a t  f o r  th e  S ep tem ber 1959 n a t i o n a l  c o n g re s s ,^ - though  
a g a in  i t  i s  im p o s s ib le  t o  a s c e r t a i n  how much was r a i s e d  
from  th e  P a r ty  and how much from  o u t s i d e .  Not o n ly  were 
3 i  m i l l i o n  ru p ia h s  in  c a sh  c o l l e c t e d ,  b u t  th e  d e le g a te s  
w ere p r o v is io n e d ,  a t  l e a s t  in  p a r t ,  by  p ro d u ce  g a th e r e d
1
"Pengum pulkan Ponds P e m ilih a n  Umum" ( C o l le c t  G e n e ra l 
E le c t io n  F u n d s ) , KP, M arch 1955, p .3 8 ;  S . R idw an, "Pekan 
Sokongan S u k a re la "  (A Week o f  V o lu n ta ry  S u p p o r t ) ,  KP,
May 1, 1955) P*72; R u s la n , "P e ran a n  A n ggo ta” , KP, A p r i l  
1957, p .61 .2
A i d i t ,  "Ubah Im bangan K e k u a ta n ” , HR, J u l y  5 , 1957«
3
H a r to jo ,  "Luaskan A k s i-A k s i kaum T an i u n tu k  
Mengembangkan K ekuatan  P r o g r e s i f 1' (E x ten d  P e a s a n t A c tio n s  
i n  O rder to  D evelop  th e  P r o g r e s s iv e  F o r c e ) ,  ST, O c to b er 
1957, p .11 .
4
J u s u f  A d j i to r o p ,  "K ongres ja n g  d idukung  R a k ja t"  (A 
C ongress S u p p o r te d  by  th e  P e o p le ) ,  BM, S e p tem b er-O c to b e r 
1959, p p .3 7 0 -1 .
1 When theby the Party and its mass organizations, 
congress was concluded, over 2\ million rupiahs surplus 
remained, which was then used to extend the central 
committee building and help finance the Party house of
pculture.
Each of the communist-led mass organizations also 
holds special fund-raising campaigns for conferences and 
congresses, and, from their own evidence, find it far 
easier to obtain money for specific and only occasional 
purposes than for regular membership fees. These 
special campaigns, however, are not always successful. 
For example, the BTI leaders complained in March 1957 
that the debts incurred for its September 1953 congress 
were still not settled. And in August 1960, the PKI 
leadership sent out urgent instructions to all Party 
committees to assist Pemuda Rakjat in raising funds for 
its forthcoming congress.^
1
The produce collected consisted of over 5 tons of rice, 
10 quintals of sugar, 5 quintals of coffee, 30 kilograms 
of tea, 234 kilograms of salted fish, over 1,000 coconuts 
10 quintals of cassava, more than one ton of vegetables, 
and 20,000 cigarettes.
2
The surplus congress funds which went towards the 
construction of the house of culture may have been 
included in the four million rupiahs that was claimed to 
have been collected for the house.
3
Editorial, ST, March 1957» p«1*
4
Mimeographed circular, August 1960.
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A fifth source of funds for the communist movement 
in Indonesia is the wages of the PKI and mass organi­
zation representatives in parliament, in the Constituent 
Assembly, in local representative councils, and now in 
the Supreme Advisory Council, the National Planning 
Council, and the People’s Consultative Assembly.*1 All 
PKI members who hold positions in the name of the Party 
must hand their wages to the Party and receive in return 
an honorarium.2 Members of local representative 
councils are paid according to the number of meetings 
they attend, but average about 400 to 500 rupiahs per 
month. This amount is the bare minimum required 
outside Djakarta to maintain a full-time middle or lower 
cadre. Members of the councils’ executive committees 
earn much more. Because council work takes only a small 
amount of time, PKI full-time cadres who are also members 
of councils are in fact financed by the councils, and 
those council members with other jobs can hand over all 
their council wages to the Party.
1 See footnote 1 , on p.199> for the number of communist 
representatives in parliament, the Constituent Assembly, 
and the local representative councils. The number in 
the Supreme Advisory Council and the National Planning 
Council is low. The number in the People's Consultative 
Assembly is unknown, but includes all members of 
parliament plus others.
2 PKI, Konstitusi, 1954* (third edition), p.64; Lukman 
Tentang Konstitusi PKI, p.90.
The three main fields of expenditure for the commu­
nist movement in Indonesia are: the routine work of 
running the Party and the mass organizations, special 
activities such as congresses, conferences and the 
celebration of national and international anniversaries, 
and election campaigns.
One of the major items in the cost of the routine 
work of the Party and its mass organizations is the full­
time personnel. The size of this personnel is a closely 
guarded secret, and any estimates are necessarily tentative 
in the extreme. In September 1959» PKI claimed to have 
in Java alone an organization in 18,722 villages and 
1,430 ketjamatans. At higher levels, the Party 
constitution provides for section committees in each 
kabupaten and municipality, of which there are 99 in Java 
and 212 in all Indonesia, In Djakarta Raja in mid-1957
pthere were 19 section committees, and the larger towns 
of Java each have several. At the time of the sixth 
congress in September 1959» there were about 22 major 
district and island committees. The number of full- 
timers in the different committees varies widely from 
area to area. In some areas each village committee has
1 Anwar Sanusi, Results of the First Three-Year Plan, p.3»
2
a full-timer, but in others even the section committees 
are without one. It would probably be correct to say 
that there are several thousand full-time Party workers, 
including cadres and typists.
Parallel to the Party full-timers, and often inter­
woven with them because cadres are often full-timers for 
the Party and one or more mass organizations, are the 
full-time workers of the mass organizations, numbering 
probably several thousands in Java.
I was told by many non-communists wherever I travelled 
in Java that a PKI full-time worker at the village or 
urban neighbourhood level received between 500 and 1,000 
rupiahs per month. Observation of the clothes and 
homes of some of the medium-level full-timers of the 
Party and its mass organizations showed that they were 
far below middle class standards, and indicated a monthly 
income of perhaps 500 rupiahs. To the cost of the full- 
timers1 wages must also be added their travel expenses 
and also the cost of maintaining and equipping offices.
The total must be at least two million rupiahs per month,
230
1 Compton, writing from East Java in April 1956, repeated 
reports that branch chairmen of PKI were receiving 1,000 
rupiahs per month, activists in any field a basic salary 
of 500 rupiahs; Boyd R. Compton, Red Surabaja, Institute 
of Current World Affairs Report, New York, 1956, pp.6, 8. 
He commented that 'It appears that no other Indonesian 
party can afford to pay out so much to its important 
lower-level workers.*
Q  O  -*4 u 1
remembering that some full-time Party workers receive 
wages from the governmental bodies.
Within what might be termed routine expenditure is
ithe financing of national and local schools and courses.
Some indication of the cost incurred in the field of
education is given by examples from SOBSI. At the
beginning of January 1957» the SOBSI national council
announced that a campaign was to be completed by the end
of February to collect the 1 to 2 million rupiahs
2necessary to open SOBSI’s cadre schools. By September, 
however, the campaign had brought in only 308,722 
rupiahs.  ^ in 1958 and 1959 the SOBSI headquarters held 
twelve shifts of the national school, training in all 
about 300 cadres who stayed in Djakarta for the month’s 
duration of a shift.^ The cost of the national school 
was not disclosed, but the total cost of the education 
program for SOBSI alone is indicated by figures for
1
The extent of formal cadre training in PKI has been 
mentioned above; that in the communist-led mass organi­
zations is given below in the sections on the various 
organizations.
2
BB, January 9 , 1957> P*5*
SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen Konferensi Nasional SOBSI (1957) 
(Documents of the SOBSI National Conference, 1957)» 
Djakarta, 1958, p.97*
4
Information from conversation with a member of the SOBSI 
headquarters staff.
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East Java. From 1958 to May 1960, the East Java SOBSI 
provincial council organized 7 cadre courses of one 
month*s duration. The cost averaged 25,000 rupiahs for 
each course (or 833 rupiahs per course member), of which
pthe Ministry of Labour paid 10 per cent. These scraps 
of information give some indication of how great must be 
the total cost of the schools and courses organized by 
PKI and its mass organizations.
A second major item of expenditure is publishing.
PKI now publishes a vast array of periodicals, booklets 
and pamphlets besides the daily newspaper. Most of the 
mass organizations publish at least a periodical and 
occasional booklets and pamphlets. What evidence there 
is on the financing of the publications indicates that 
income trails far behind costs. The PKI monthly 
"Bintang Me rah” was forced to cease operations from 
December 1951 to August 1952 with a debt of 20,000 
rupiahs; and in January 1953 the central committee 
published a list of thirty Party committees with debts 
to "Bintang Merah" and thirty-six to "PKI-Buletin".^
1
Information from interviews with members of the East 
Java SOBSI headquarters.
2
The students taking part in schools are lodged together 
in hostels so that they can more easily participate in 
study and discussion groups and undertake self-study.
3 PKI-B, March 7, 1952, pp.6-7; February 10, 1953*p.19.
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The peace committee's periodical "Damai" (Peace) incurred 
a deficit of 8,077 rupiahs in the first five months of 
existence from November 1952 to March 1953» with total
Aincome only 650 rupiahs. The national council of 
SOBSI revealed that from January to October 1955 it had 
expended 100,603 rupiahs on publications but received 
only 60,731 rupiahs from them, while the national council 
of its estate workers' union had spent 105,772 rupiahs
pand received 29*381. It also revealed that during 1955 
the national council of its railway workers* union on 
average each month had spent 27»000 rupiahs and received 
17,000 rupiahs for publications. Before January 1955 the 
average income of the SOBSI national council for publi­
cations had been only 10 per cent of the expenditure.
In March 1957 the income for the SOBSI periodical 
"Bendera Buruh" was only lj.0 per cent of its cost.^ In 
December 1957 Gerwani declared that it had a debt of 
'tens of thousands of rupiahs' to the printers.^ Pemuda 
Rakjat was forced by financial difficulties to cease the 
publication of its chief periodical.
1 Damai, (April 1953), year 1, no.5-6, p.16.
2
SOBSI, Mengatasi Keuangan, p.18.
3 BB, March 13, 1957, p.4.
k G-erwani, Lebih Giat, p.77*
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Only two f i g u r e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  a s  t o  th e  c o s t  o f  t h e  
v a r i o u s  c o n g r e s s e s  o r  c o n f e r e n c e s :  BTI e s t i m a t e d  b e f o r e  
i t s  Sep tem ber  *1957 c o n g r e s s  t h a t  i t  would c o s t  2 0 0 , 0 0 0  
r u p i a h s ,  and t h e  Septem ber  1959 PKI c o n g r e s s  c o s t  5 0 0 , 0 0 0  
r u p i a h s .  The communist  movement i n  I n d o n e s i a  c e l e b r a t e s  
w i t h  much show s e v e r a l  n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n n i ­
v e r s a r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  May Day, May 2 0  ( t h e  Day o f  N a t i o n a l  
Awakening) ,  May 23 ( f o u n d a t i o n  o f  PK I) ,  August  17 
( n a t i o n a l  in d e p e n d e n c e  day)  and November 12 ( t h e  o u t b r e a k  
o f  t h e  1926 communist  r e b e l l i o n ) .  The c o s t  o f  the  
c e l e b r a t i o n s  h a s  n o t  b e e n  p u b l i s h e d ,  b u t  must be 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  f o r  t h e  o f t e n  l a v i s h  d e c o r a t i o n s  and 
r e c e p t i o n s .
No f i g u r e s  have  b e e n  p u b l i s h e d  on th e  c o s t  t o  PKI
o f  t h e  1955 and 1957 e l e c t i o n  c am p a ig n s .  I n  1955 PKI
s p e n t  f a r  more t h a n  an y  o t h e r  p a r t y  on su c h  a s  l a r g e
b i l l b o a r d s  and  s m a l l  c a r d s  showing t h e  P a r t y  symbol,  on
t r a v e l  ex p en se s  f o r  th e  P a r t y  l e a d e r s ,  on c a r n i v a l - l i k e
‘p e o p l e d  f e s t i v a l s ’ and  th e  c e l e b r a t i o n  o f  a n n i v e r s a r i e s ,
on th e  p r i n t i n g  o f  p a m p h le t s  and b r o c h u r e s ,  and on t h e
2l a r g e - s c a l e  u se  o f  f u l l - t i m e  p a i d  e l e c t i o n s  w o r k e r s .
1
E d i t o r i a l ,  ST, March 1957» p . 1 ;  A d j i t o r o p ,  ’’Kongres 
j a n g  d id u k u n g  R a k j a t ” , BM, S e p te m b e r - O c to b e r  1959» p«371*
2
P e i t h ,  The I n d o n e s i a n  E l e c t i o n s  o f  1955» p p . 2 7 - 8 .
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The Socialist Party leader, Sjahrir, estimated that PKI
«1probably spent 200 million rupiahs on the 1955 campaigns. 
PKI spent even more proportionately than the other parties 
in the 1957 local elections. One astute non-communist 
in Jogjakarta told me that he had heard that PKI spent 
five million rupiahs in the Jogjakarta Special District - 
an area with only 976,948 of the 27,130,661 voters in 
Java.
Although the evidence is sketchy, it seems that PKI 
must have spent at least 200 million rupiahs on the 1955 
and 1957 election campaigns. This figure might be 
reduced if one takes into account the large amount of 
voluntary and free labour that could be mobilized by the 
PKI and its mass organizations. But it remains a 
substantial figure and one which, in the opinion of non­
communist Indonesians and foreign observers, could not 
possibly be extracted from members of the Party and its 
mass organizations who are for the most part poor 
peasants and town dwellers for whom 6 to 12 rupiahs was 
a day’s wage.
After the above examination of the limited infor­
mation on the sources of income and items of expenditure
1
Robert S. Elegant, The Dragon’s Seed, New York, 1959» 
p.247.
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of PKI and its mass organizations, it would appear
correct to state that the Indonesian communists rely on
’contributions from non-Party persons and groups’, on
’non-binding contributions’, for a sizeable proportion
of their income. The other sources do not appear to
provide even half of what is expended. Who, then, are
these non-Party donors? Visible, but limited, assistance
is given by the Soviet Union, China and other Soviet bloc
countries whose books, periodicals and pamphlets, usually
in Indonesian, are sold in all communist bookshops.
Presumably the bookshops are given a good profit margin
on this literature. Another way the Soviet bloc
countries assist the Indonesian communists is by
financing delegations to visit the Soviet bloc* But
the main source of non-Party contributions is the more
than 3 million Chinese living in Indonesia.
Kahin states that PKI taps the Chinese business
community for ’substantial funds’.^  Some Chinese pay
willingly, he writes, but:
undoubtedly they usually do so because of 
persuasion or pressure from the Chinese embassy 
or pressure from the Communist-controlled labor 
unions and the threat of retaliatory action in 
case of noncompliance.
1
Kahin, ’’Indonesia” in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments 
of Asia, p.559*
237
Peith believes that the greater part of the PKIfs 1955
election campaign funds came:
from individual Chinese businessmen resident in 
Indonesia, and very possibly also from overseas 
Communist governments through their consular 
and business representatives in Djakarta.'
Doak Barnett reported in 1955 the generally-held belief
in Indonesia that the contributions from Chinese
businessmen 'make up a significant source of its /PKI’§7
ample political funds'.^ In Djakarta, Jogjakarta,
Surakarta, and Surabaja, the information I received from
non-communists confirmed what Kahin, Peith and Barnett
had written.
The Chinese business community in Indonesia is large, 
far wealthier than the native Indonesians, but it is 
treated as alien by Indonesians in general, discriminated 
against by the Indonesian government and4would be unable 
to obtain police protection against, say, extortionary 
threats by a trade union. At the same time Chinese 
youngsters are full of enthusiasm for the new China and 
communism. It would be most surprising if PKI did not 
exploit this source of funds. The non-communist parties
1 Peith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955> p.27.
2
A. Doak Barnett, A Choice of Nationality: Overseas 
Chinese in Indonesia, American Universities1 2Field Staff 
Reports, New York, 1955> p.26.
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have been financed, in general, from the proceeds of 
government corruption and from large individual donations, 
and are therefore in no position to criticize PKI for 
tapping the Chinese businessmen.
I know of no concrete evidence of PKI*s receiving 
funds from the communist embassies, legations and trade 
missions. Peith, however, did report that in 1952 the 
Chinese embassy gave both money and literature to the 
Party; and in i960 a Russian Intourist agent was 
arrested on the charge of smuggling several million 
rupiahs into Indonesia for purposes unknown.
To summarize, PKI and its mass organizations incur, 
for routine and occasional matters, an expenditure far 
exceeding the expenditure of any other political party in 
Indonesia. But although PKI and its mass organizations 
have succeeded in extracting from their members some 
membership fees and perhaps more funds for special 
purposes, the total income from these sources is far 
below total expenditures. The deficit is made up by 
donors, mostly non-Party persons as few communists are 
wealthy. PKI cannot tap government sources of wealth,
T “ ‘
Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953; a Turning 
Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, 
1958, pp.37-8.
and it seems reasonable to believe that a major part of
23^
Indonesian communist funds is derived from the large 
Chinese business community and also possibly from the 
foreign communist missions in Indonesia*
PART THREE: BUILDING MASS SUPPORT
PART THREE
BUILDING MASS SUPPORT 
I. THE CULTIVATION OF GENERAL APPEALS
As the Aidit leadership embarked on the implemen­
tation of the national united front policy, it hoped to 
win mass support primarily among the workers, the peasants 
and the petty bourgeoisie. Winning this support would 
depend ultimately on the Party’s ability to represent 
effectively the specific material interest of these 
groups, and much of the Party’s efforts, especially 
through its mass organizations, have been directed towards 
such representation. But the Aidit leadership had the 
immediate task of making the Party generally acceptable 
to its potential supporters. It had to create the 
favourable image of PKI as a nationalist, anti-colonial 
party, as a party sympathetic to religion, as a re­
sponsible party, opposed to the use of violence in the 
pursuit of political objectives, and as the resolute 
defender of democracy. That PKI lacked this image at 
the beginning of 1951 was partly a result of the Madiun 
rebellion, in which the communists had attacked the
2 4 0
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c e n t r a l  governm ent d u r in g  th e  w ar a g a i n s t  th e  D u tc h , and  
i n  w hich th e y  had  m urdered  many s a n t r i s .  Prom 1951 o n , 
much o f  PKI*s p ro p ag a n d a  and  a c t io n s  w ere d i r e c t e d  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  to  b u i ld i n g  a f a v o u ra b le  im age, w ith o u t  
w h ich  i t  w ould h ave  b e e n  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t ,  p ro b a b ly  
im p o s s ib le ,  to  w in  m ass s u p p o r t  a n d , from  t h i s  s u p p o r t ,  
to  b u i l d  a l a r g e  P a r t y .  W ith o u t su ch  an im age, i t  w ould 
a l s o  have  b een  im p o s s ib le  t o  a c c o m p lish  th e  o th e r  m ain 
t a s k  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t :  a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  non­
com m unist p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s .
The f i r s t  t a s k  o f  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  was to  
d is p ro v e  th e  a c c u s a t io n s  t h a t  th e  Madiun r e b e l l i o n  had  
b e e n  an  a n t i - n a t i o n a l  i n s u r r e c t i o n .  In  S ep tem ber 1950» 
s h o r t l y  a f t e r  th e  r e t u r n  o f  A id i t  and Lukraan to  th e  P a r ty
l e a d e r s h ip ,  PKI p u b l is h e d  an  a c c o u n t o f  Madiun w h ich  s e t
1
th e  l i n e s  f o r  a new , p a t r i o t i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  I t  
d e n ie d  t h a t  a r i v a l  R e p u b lic a n  governm ent had  b e en  form ed 
a t  M adiun, t h a t  th e  n a t i o n a l  f l a g  had  b e en  lo w ered  and 
th e  n a t i o n a l  anthem  b a n n e d . The 'a f f a i r *  had  become 
b lo o d y  o n ly  when P r e s id e n t  S ukarno  o rd e re d  th e  e l im in a t io n  
o f  th e  com m unists and  t h e i r  a l l i e s ,  who th e n  fo u g h t in  
s e l f  d e fe n c e . In  l a t e r  y e a r s ,  r e f in e m e n ts  w ere added  to
1
S in  P o , S ep tem b er 2 6 , 1950.
the new version of the 'affair'. At Madiun anti­
imperialists and true patriots were mercilessly butchered 
by those ready to treat with the imperialist enemy; 
American imperialists had planned the provocation which 
forced the heroes of Madiun to fight in self defence; and 
the real Indonesian instigators of the provocation turned 
out to be Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir, and not Sukarno, 
whose name was omitted from post-1951 versions of the 
'affair'.
The evidence suggests that the PKI leaders were 
pleading their case before a largely sympathetic public*
It was easy to establish the Party's anti-Dutch character, 
which had been demonstrated on many occasions since 1920. 
Many non-communist political leaders believed that there 
certainly had been provocation before the rebellion began. 
And most Indonesians, especially those in the groups PKI
1
1
For the major pronouncements of the Aldit leadership on 
the Madiun rebellion, see "Keterangan CC PKI tentang 
Peristiwa Madiun" (PKI Central Committee Statement on the 
Madiun Affair), Sin Po, February 10, 1951; Mirajadi, "Tiga 
Tahun Provokasi Madiun" (Three Years Since the Madiun 
Provocation), BM, August-September 1951> PP«39-52; PKI, 
Buku Putih ten tang Peristiwa Madiun (White Book on the 
Madiun Affair), Djakarta, 1953»' 32 p*; D.N. Aidit, Aidlt 
Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun (Aidit Accuses the Madiun 
Affair;, Djakarta, 1955» 64 p.; D.N. Aidit, Konfrontasi 
Peristiwa Madiun (1948); Peristiwa Sumatera (1956) 
(Confrontation with the Madiun Affair, 1948; the Sumatran 
Affair, 1956). Djakarta, 1957, 47 p.; PKI, PKI 40 Tahun 
(PKI 40 Years), Djakarta, 1960, pp.56-8.
has sought to attract, had little access to news at the
time of the rebellion, so that, except among the more
santri population, the anti-communist version of the
rebellion would not have been heard or, if heard, not
given much credence. It is important to note that the
Madiun area is still a communist stronghold, that is,
that the peasants and workers in the area of the rebellion
itself did not consider the ’affair* an anti-national
insurrection. But the communist leaders still felt the
need to present their version of Madiun in a manner that
would free them from any taint of anti-national activity.
The revamping of Madiun was the logical prelude to
the Aidit leadership’s attempt to portray PKI as the most
nationalist of parties. After the revolution against
the Dutch, which ended only in December 1949» the level
of Indonesian nationalism ran high. Most politically-
aware Indonesians still considered their country’s
sovereignty to be restricted or threatened by the remnants
of Dutch power, whether in the form of economic power or
in the form of the continued occupation of West Irian.
PKI was obliged to identify itself with the popular mood.
In a speech of May 23» 1952, Aidit declared:
For the communists, service to the Party, to 
the national interest, to the interests of 
the homeland and to its people is one and 
indivisible. If a communist does not serve 
the interests of the nation, of the homeland
o  * *
/ ; •  ' i
and  o f  t h e  p e o p le ,  i t  means t h a t  he d o es n o t  
s e rv e  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  P a r ty  and t h a t  he 
i s  n o t  a good com m unist . . .
E very  com m unist i s  a p a t r i o t ,  and  i f  th e r e  i s  
a p a t r i o t  who i s  n o t  a com m unist th e n  th e  
d o o r o f  PKI i s  a lw ays open to  r e c e iv e  him as  
a member.
As p o s i t i v e  p r o o f  o f  i t s  p a t r i o t i s m ,  PKI h a s  p a id  warm 
r e s p e c t  to  th e  sym bols o f  In d o n e s ia n  n a t io n a l i s m :  th e  
n a t i o n a l  a n th e m , th e  n a t i o n a l  f l a g ,  th e  n a t i o n a l  
la n g u a g e , n a t i o n a l i s t  a n n i v e r s a r i e s ,  th e  h o n o u rin g  o f
p
n a t i o n a l i s t  h e r o e s ,  P a n t j a s i l a ,  and  th e  P ro c la m a tio n
3
R e p u b lic  fo u n d ed  on A ugust 17> 1945« B e g in n in g  w ith  
th e  c e l e b r a t i o n  o f  N a t io n a l  Awakening Day on May 2 0 , 1952, 
PKI jo in e d  w ith  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  g ro u p s  in  o r g a n iz in g
1
D.N. A i d i t , Menempuh D ja la n  R a k ja t  (A long th e  P eo p le* s  
R o a d ), ( f o u r t h  e d i t i o n ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1954» p .3 2 .
2
P a n t j a s i l a  was r e v e a le d  b y  S ukarno  on Ju n e  1 , 1945 as  
th e  f i v e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  In d o n e s ia n  n a t io n a l i s m :  
n a t i o n a l i s m ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  g o v ernm en t, 
p r o s p e r i t y ,  and  b e l i e f  i n  God th e  A lm ig h ty .
3
S e e , f o r  e x a m p le , A id i t* s  c la im , made d u r in g  th e  cam­
p a ig n  f o r  th e  C o n s t i tu e n t  A ssem bly e l e c t i o n s  o f  December 
1955* t h a t :
PKI in  th e  C o n s t i tu e n t  A ssem bly w i l l  s ta u n c h ly  
d e fe n d  a l l  e le m e n ts  o f  th e  P ro c la m a tio n  
R e p u b lic  t h a t  b in d  th e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  th e  
p e o p le .  T hese e le m e n ts ,  among o t h e r s ,  a r e :  
th e  n a t i o n a l  f l a g  M e ra h -P u tih , th e  n a t i o n a l  
an them  In d o n e s ia  R a ja ,  th e  In d o n e s ia n  la n g u a g e  
a s  th e  la n g u a g e  o f  u n i ty  . . .  and th e  R e p u b lic * s  
m o tto  "U n ity  i n  D i v e r s i t y " .
D.N. A i d i t ,  P e r ta h a n k a n  R e p u b lik  P ro k la m a s i 1945.* (D efend  
th e  1945 P ro c la m a tio n  R e p u b lic .* ) , D ja k a r ta ,  1955> P»32.
nationalist celebrations.^ This cooperation has been 
maintained in succeeding years*
In keeping with their new-found nationalism, the 
PKI leaders during 1952 gradually reduced their attacks 
on President Sukarno* This change was inspired partly 
by the recognition that for the great majority of at 
least the Javanese, Sukarno enjoyed great personal 
popularity as a nationalist hero; and partly by the 
realization that, unlike Vice-President Hatta, he was not 
avowedly anti-communist but was, if anything, opposed to 
the extreme anti-communist forces. By the time of the 
1955 election campaigns, PKI was even attempting to link 
the name of the great nationalist leader with itself*
The need to effect the link increased after 1955 as 
Sukarno*s power increased and as he became the major 
barrier to an assumption of power by the largely anti­
communist army leaders.
The Aidit leadership, despite its preference for 
denunciation of American imperialism, publicly accepted 
the popular estimate of what was the major imperialist 
threat to the country. Although attacks on the American
1
Herbert Peith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: a Turning 
Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, 
1955, pp.86-7.
imperialists were not halted, Aidit conceded in March 
1954 that:
The first enemy of the Indonesian people, 
from the viewpoint of its great power in 
several spheres, particularly in the 
economic sphere, is Dutch imperialism.
Therefore the national united front must be 
aimed in the first place at the liquidation 
of Dutch imperialism, and not at the liqui­
dation of all foreign imperialism in 
Indonesia.^
Even as late as September 1959, after all Dutch enter­
prises had been seized by the Indonesian government, 
Aidit, while describing American imperialism as fthe most 
dangerous enemy of the Indonesian people1 2, nevertheless 
conceded to Indonesian nationalist feeling that 'Dutch 
imperialism still constitutes the first enemy of the
pIndonesian people’•
The communists 1 anti-Western position has stood them 
in good stead in their effort to demonstrate their 
nationalist fervour. For example, they attacked the 
Round Table Conference agreement from the first as a 
grave restriction of Indonesia's sovereignty, they 
accused the imperialists of aiding the anti-Republic
1 D.N. Aidit, Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia 
(The Indonesian Road to People’s Democracy)7 Djakarta, 
1955, p.38.2 D.N. Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi dan Kabinet Gotong Rojong 
(For Democracy and a Mutual Cooperation Cabinet), 
Djakarta, 1959, pp«13, 12.
Moslem rebels in West Java and Atjeh, and they heatedly 
denounced the alleged American, SEATO, and Kuomintang 
assistance to the PRRI-Permesta rebels as an attempt to 
overthrow the legitimate government and replace it by 
one subservient to the imperialists* interests.
To prove to Indonesians in general that PKI shared 
Indonesian nationalism was a relatively easy task, but 
the Aidit leadership was faced with the much more complex 
problem of proving to the religious that PKI was sympa­
thetic to religion. As early as May 1951, Aidit, 
speaking in Bogor, a heavily Moslem town, stressed that 
under communism religion would not be suppressed but 
would thrive, and that PKI certainly would not refuse to 
admit religious people into the Party.*1 Prom 1952 
onwards, PKI and its mass organizations have publicized 
annually their greetings for Idul Pitri, the Moslem feast 
marking the end of the Ramadan fast. At the same time,
1
Sin Po, May 12, 1951* PKI has received help from both 
the USSR and China in its efforts to dispel Moslem fears 
about persecution of religion under communism. Many 
delegations consisting of or including Indonesian Moslems 
have been invited to both countries. Their impressions 
have been almost always favourable and have been widely 
broadcast by PKI. For an example of how well the 
Indonesian Moslem delegations are treated, see V. 
Jefremov, Delegasi Ulama Indonesia dl Sovjet Uni (An 
Indonesian Ulama Delegation in the Soviet Union), 
Djakarta, 1957» 48 p* Both the Soviet Union and China publish periodicals in Indonesian which occasionally 
contain articles purporting to portray the free life of 
Islam under communism.
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the PKI leaders have had to make it clear that they
opposed Masjumi and the Darul Islam rebels not because
they were Moslem, but because they were anti-national and
serving the interests of Indonesia^ external enemies.
In August 1953, for example, after PKI had attacked
Masjumi and the Darul Islam rebels during the period of
discussions that preceded the formation of the first Ali
Sastroamidjojo cabinet, Aidit explained:
The accusation that PKIfs anti-DI ^Darul Islam7 
policy is the same as anti-Islam is a very 
dirty and a very stupid slander. In its 
statements PKI does not urge the disturbance 
of the Moslem religion, nor does it even oppose 
Masjumi people. PKI always urges its members 
to hold high freedom of religion, including the 
Moslem religion, and to cooperate with the 
members of all parties including Masjumi ...
Contrary to Masjumi, PKI clearly and resolutely 
defends freedom of religion, including the 
Moslem religion, because PKIfs anti-DI policy 
is a policy of fighting the groups that 
dishonour religion.^
During the 1955 general election campaign, in particular, 
Aidit urged Party members to explain that PKI attacked 
Masjumi because it was anti-communist, not because it was 
a Moslem party.“
1
PKI-B, August 25, 1953, p*138.2
D.N. Aidit, Untuk Kemenangan Front Nasional dalam 
Pemilihan Umum (For the Victory of the National Front in 
the^ ~Geriei^ l ElQctions), Djakarta, 1955, p.23.
Besides proclaiming that they were not hostile to
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religion, the communists actively sought to win the 
support of religious people* It was obvious that their 
efforts to do so would be hampered until they could win 
the neutrality, or sympathy, of the kiajis, the Islamic 
religious teachers who held great authority among the 
Moslem masses* There are some indications that PKI went 
out of its way to influence kiajis* For example, a 
member of the South Kalimantan provincial committee has 
described in an article how PKI in his region set about 
winning over the local kiajis* Party workers would 
send communist literature to those kiajis who liked to 
read, they would deferentially discuss political subjects 
with kiajis who liked to talk and discuss, they would 
join the kiajis’ religious instruction classes and there 
politely but skilfully propound the virtues of PKI, and 
they would participate in social work of a religious 
nature (such as cleaning graves and repairing mosques and 
prayer houses) in order to consolidate the kiajis * 
sympathy for PKI. In August 1957» it was claimed that 
such patient work was producing results among the kiajis. 
’They are beginning to say that PKI is good, and that this
1
Amar Hanafiah, ’’Pengalaman Tjara Menarik Simpati Kiaji- 
Kiaji” (Experience in Methods of Winning the Sympathy of 
Kiajis), KP, May-August 1957» pp.69-72.
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or that religious party is not good and only uses religion 
as a mask, and so on* * Some were already disposed to 
vote for PKI.1 2
The Christian minority, which remains small and 
tightly integrated, has not been an object of PKI 
recruitment to any extent, although occasional efforts 
have been made to prove that 'the aims and teachings of 
the communists are in accord with the Bible's 
directives’.^  But the Party leaders remain alert to the 
need to appear sympathetic to religion, especially Islam.
1 That the Aidit leadership is even willing to claim that 
work for the Party is the implementation of God’s law, is 
exemplified by the following quotation from a speech made 
by a communist kia jl in the Constituent Assembly. The 
speech was in reply to one made by a Masjumi member.
To the honourable Mr H. Moh. Thaha, from my own 
kampong in Solo, I express my thanks for his 
urging me to return to Islam. But Mr H. Moh.
Thaha himself knows that I have never left Islam.
And if the honourable gentleman urges me to 
return to Islam, in the meaning of to carry out 
God’s law in political practice, then according 
to my own experience of 33 years in the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), that is the 
only place to practice the law of God in its 
political meaning, and not anywhere else.
When the honourable gentleman truly wishes to 
carry out God's law and to devote himself 
wholeheartedly to good works, then let him do 
it with me within the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI).Prom the speech of K.H. Achmad Dasuki Siradj, in Tentang 
Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia (Concerning the Basis of 
the State of the Republic of Indonesia), vol.II,
Djakarta, no date, p.336.
2
HR, December 9, 1955
Lukman, s p e a k in g  a t  t h e  s i x t h  PKI c o n g re s s  in  S ep tem ber
1959» rem in d ed  d e l e g a t e s  t h a t  w i th o u t  a c o r r e c t  a t t i t u d e
on th e  r e l i g i o u s  q u e s t io n ,  ' t h e  P a r t y 's  u n i t e d  f r o n t
w ork would f a c e  more d i f f i c u l t i e s  and  o b s t a c l e s  and c o u ld
1
ev en  e x p e r ie n c e  d e f e a t s
The same s k i l l  w h ich  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  em ployed 
i n  p r e s e n t in g  PKI a s  a s t a u n c h ly  p a t r i o t i c  p a r t y  and  one 
s y m p a th e tic  to w a rd s  r e l i g i o n ,  was a l s o  em ployed to  convey 
th e  im p re s s io n  t h a t  PKI was a f u l l y  r e s p o n s ib le  p a r t y ,  
re a d y  to  ta k e  i t s  p la c e  in  th e  b u i ld i n g  o f  a  u n i t e d  and 
n a t i o n a l i s t  I n d o n e s ia .  The P a r ty  l e a d e r s  h ave  b e en  
c o n c e rn e d  to  s t r e s s  t h a t  PKI p la c e s  th e  n a t i o n a l  good 
b e fo r e  i t s  own i n t e r e s t s  a s  a p a r t y ,  and  t h a t  i t  t h e r e f o r e  
sh u n s  th e  v o lu n ta r y  u se  o f  f o r c e  a s  a p o l i t i c a l  in s t ru m e n t  
and welcom es th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  work w ith  th e  o th e r  
p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s ,  even w ith  th e  'r e a c t io n a r y *  p a r t i e s  i f  
to  do so  w ould  b e n e f i t  th e  n a t i o n .  T h is  p r o f e s s e d  
c o n c e rn  f o r  th e  good o f  th e  p e o p le  as a w hole h a s  b e e n  
th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  P a r t y 's  a p p e a ls  f o r  a l l - e m b r a c in g  
governm en ts o f  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y .  In  Ju n e  1955» f o r  
ex am p le , PKI a l t e r e d  i t s  e l e c t i o n  g o a l from  a p e o p le 's  
dem ocracy  to  a n a t i o n a l  c o a l i t i o n  governm ent w hich  would
1
M.H. Lukman, Ten ta n g  K onst i t u s i  PKI (C o n c e rn in g  P K I 's  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1959» p p .2 5 -6 .
be su p p orted  by * a ll  d em ocra tic  p a r t ie s  and grou p s, 
e s p e c i a l ly  n a t i o n a l i s t ,  Moslem and communist p a r t ie s *  and 
w hich would r e p r e se n t  *the i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  m a jo r ity  o f
-I
the p eo p le  and o f  a l l  the r e v o lu t io n a r y  c la s s e s * .
I t  has b een  e a s ie r  fo r  th e  PKI le a d e r s  to  c r e a te  the
p
image o f  PKI a s *the p a rty  o f  th e  peop le*  b ecau se  the  
P arty  has b een  e x c lu d ed  from c a b in e t  o f f i c e  s in c e  1948. 
They have been  a b le  to  take up pop ular demands w ith ou t  
th e  worry o f  h a v in g  to  im plem ent them. As the s e l f -  
a p p o in ted  spokesman o f  the p e o p le ,  PKI has advanced such  
demands as r e d u c tio n s  in  food  p r i c e s ,  g e n e ra l in c r e a s e s  
in  w ages, th e  adequate p r o v is io n  o f  b a s ic  consumer 
a r t i c l e s ,  in c r e a se d  e d u c a t io n a l and h e a lth  f a c i l i t i e s ,  
and a p r o g r e s s iv e  ta x a t io n  sy stem  d ir e c te d  a g a in s t  
fo r e ig n  com p an ies. I t  i s  im p ortan t to  n o te  th a t  each  
demand has b een  p r e se n te d  as r e a so n a b le , and o f te n  has 
been  accom panied by an o u t l in e  o f  how i t  may be m et. At 
an oth er l e v e l ,  PKI has p u t forw ard p r o p o sa ls  fo r  im proving  
In d o n es ia * s  econom ic p o l i c i e s .  In March 1957» to  take an 
exam ple, th e  econom ic departm ent o f  th e  PKI c e n tr a l  com­
m itte e  p u b lish e d  a stu d y  to  show how econom ic developm ent
1
T I, June 27, 1955.
2
H erbert P e i t h ,  The In d o n es ia n  E le c t io n s  o f  1955» I th a c a ,  
New York, 1957, P*15*
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could be undertaken without calling on private foreign 
-1capital. In November 1957» Runturambi of SOBSI and
Aidit took part in a national consultative conference on
2reconstruction, while since the creation in August 1959 
of the National Planning Council, to which communist 
representatives were appointed, PKI has taken an 
important part in the formulation of long-term national 
economic policies. The demands and proposals put 
forward by PKI are contrived proof that PKI has the 
interests of the whole people at heart, that it promotes 
these interests in a responsible manner, not seeking 
merely to embarrass governments and ministers, and that 
PKI is ready and able to accept responsibility in 
national administration. In short, PKI wants to be 
respected as a responsible and restrained party, imbued 
with a strong sense of the welfare of the people and of 
the nation as a whole.
The Aidit leadership has been at pains to explain 
that PKI, providing it was not attacked first, would
1
PKI, "Construct a National Economy Without New Foreign 
Investments", RI, March 1957, pp*28-33*2
Runturambifs speech in the conference has been published 
in booklet form as Runturambi, Politik Pembangunan 
Sekarang (Development Policy Now), Djakarta, 1957, 22 p, Aidit r8 speech has been published as D.N. Aidit, "Let Us 
Carry Out Planned Construction of Our Country", RI, 
December 1957, pp*27-30*
never resort to violence to realize its goals. As the 
leaders pledged in 1951» when several thousand communists 
and communist sympathizers had been arrested on an 
(unsubstantiated) charge of plotting to overthrow the 
government:
In the struggle to realize their political 
convictions, the communists will not use 
force while the ruling class still leaves the 
peaceful, the parliamentary way open. If 
there is the use of force, the spilling of 
blood, a civil war, it will not be the 
communists who start them but the ruling 
class itself.1 2
pThese sentiments have been repeated down to the present, 
and the PKI leaders have even eschewed the use of force
1
Sobromalisi, ’’Tentang Perebutan Kekuasaan" (Concerning 
Seizure of Power), BM, August-September 1951» pp.10-15.
2
For example, when, after the 1956 Soviet Communist 
Party congress, the PKI central committee considered the 
question of whether Indonesia could peacefully make the 
transition to a people’s democracy, the conclusion 
reached echoed the 1951 article:
it is a possibility, and one which we must 
strive with all our strength to make reality.
Thus, if it depends on the communists, the 
best way, the ideal way, for transition to 
the system of people’s democratic power •»• 
is the way of peace, the parliamentary way.
Thus, if it depends on the communists, the 
road of peace will be chosen because the 
communists certainly are not murderers.
Quoted in D.N. Aidit, ’’Revolusi Oktober dan Rakjat-Rakjat 
Timur” (The October Revolution and the Peoples of the 
East), BM, October-Noveraber 1957» p*381«
1
in disputes between labour and management, peasants and
landlords, and between itself and other political groups*
Indeed, the Aidit leadership has tried not only to
present PKI as a party willing to work within a
parliamentary regime, but also as a protagonist of that
regime, in fact, as a tireless defender of democracy.
In October 1951, for example, PKI claimed that it was
'the foremost defender of parliament's prestige, and
2always will be so', while in May 1953» Aidit declared 
that:
the communist parties and the democratic 
parties can gather the masses around them only 
if the Party honours the banner of bourgeois 
democratic freedom that has been discarded by 
the bourgeoisie.^
During 1951 PKI was one of the groups most vocal in 
calling for full democratic freedoms, and at the time of 
the October 17» 1952 'affair', it defended the parlia­
mentary system as being 'far better than the fascist 
military dictatorship system'.^ The defence of
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1 There are a few exceptions to this generalization, but 
very few.
2
Prom the speech of S. Utarjo on October 29» 1951» 
Risalah Perundingan 1951 (Indonesian Parliamentary 
Debates, 1951 )> vol.XV, p.7324«
3 D.N. Aidit, Menudju Indonesia Baru (Towards a New 
Indonesia), (second edition), Djakarta, 1955» P*44*
4 HR, October 18, 1952
democratic liberties was an important theme in PKI 
propaganda during the 1955 election campaigns. Since 
1956, with the rise of Sukarno and the army to a dominant 
political position, there has been a gradual constriction 
of democratic liberties and of the power of parliament.
But PKI could not spring militantly to the defence of 
democracy because the Party was dependent upon its 
alliance with Sukarno in order to prevent stem anti­
communist measures that the army was believed to advocate. 
PKI has protested, however, against the most flagrant 
infringements of democratic rights, and if its protests 
are more subdued than in previous years, they are still 
far more numerous and courageous than the protests
Aexpressed by PNI and NU leaders. As a result, many 
millions of Indonesians have come to regard PKI as the 
most sincere and courageous defender of democratic 
liberties in general, and of the parliamentary system in 
particular.
1 For a discussion of PKI*s struggle against the 
restrictions on democracy after April 1957» see below, 
p.568 et seq.
II. APPEALS TO SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF SOCIETY
o r n4 O i
The winning of mass support involved the Aidit 
leadership in two basic tasks. I have discussed in the 
preceding section how the Aidit leadership endeavoured to 
create among the social groups most likely to support the 
Party, an image of PKI as patriotic, as tolerant of and 
even sympathetic to religion, and as a responsible, 
peaceable party working within and defending parliamentary 
democracy. Such an image was designed to create a 
climate of opinion in which PKI could pursue with relative 
ease its second task, that of attracting and organizing 
mass support by representing the material interests of the 
different sections of 'the people'. The Party itself 
remained the focal organization, assimilating members and 
extending its organizational network as fast as possible. 
But because of the low level of political awareness of 
the Indonesian urban and rural poor in general, the Aidit 
leadership built nominally independent mass organizations 
as a means of mobilizing, if only for simple action, a 
vast body of sympathizers who would otherwise remain 
beyond the Party's influence. The mass organizations 
could also be relied upon to tap hitherto inaccessible 
resources of member and cadre talent for PKI itself, and
o roj
apparently they became the chief source of new recruits 
for the Party.
Lukman made clear his party's concept of mass
organizations in an article he wrote early in 195i*
By mass organization we mean a non-political 
organization of the masses, of the people*
A mass organization binds together several 
groups of the people according to their 
social position, for example: a workers' 
organization (trade union), peasants' 
organization, youth organization, women's 
organization, and so on* Also included 
in the mass organizations are various 
social and cultural organizations. The 
mass organizations arise on the basis and 
stimulus of the most simple and direct 
interests of the respective groups of the 
masses. Thus a trade union organization 
arises on the basis and stimulus of the 
simple and direct interests of the members 
•••, and so on.
Lukman went on to declare that a mass organization 
should not have the same basis as the Party, that is, 
Marxism-Leninism, but:
must be based on the ties of everyday social- 
economic needs and must be broad in nature.
In order to meet these conditions, the most 
simple consciousness of the masses of the 
need to organize is sufficient to be con­
dition of membership of the respective mass 
organizations.
If Marxism-Leninism was maintained as a basis, two dangers 
would arise: either membership would be restricted to
1
M.H. Lukman, "Partai dan Organisasi Massa" (The Party 
and Mass Organizations), BM, February 15, 1951 > pp.104-5> 
119.
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those who first agreed with and worked hard to understand 
Marxism, which would prevent mass membership; or Marxism- 
Leninism would not be maintained as a fighting faith, in 
which case its meaning ’would become merely an empty 
slogan* and the working class struggle led by PKI would 
be harmed. The purpose of the mass organizations,
Lukman declared, was to make the masses aware of the 
importance of organization, ’Even though it is the 
simplest awareness and based only on their own direct 
interests'•
Lukman also defined the role of the Party vis-a-vis
mass organizations. The Party must:
give leadership to the mass organizations in 
their actions, which means to train and raise 
the awareness of their members. This is the 
task, the duty of the Party fractions in the 
mass organizations. The broader the mass 
organization, the more the masses can be 
united, the broader the masses we can 
influence and give leadership to. That is 
why every communist must fight hard for the unity of each kind of mass organization.
Splitting a mass organization is not the work 
of communists but of Trotskyites and social 
democrats (socialists). Communists in mass 
organizations led by Trotskyites and social 
democrats ••. may not leave the mass organi­
zation because that would mean allowing the 
masses to continue under the leadership of 
persons who are truly the enemies of the 
people. We communists must have the slogan: 
where the masses are, that is our place.’
Therefore we communists cannot refuse to work in a mass organization, however 
reactionary it may be.
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Finally, Lukman emphasized that although mass
organizations should he non-political, in fascist or
colonial or semi-colonial countries their struggle to
achieve social-economic goals necessarily involved them
in politics. Therefore:
it is the communists* basic responsibility 
gradually to train and to give progressive 
political leadership to all mass organi­
zations. Therefore those persons are 
clearly wrong who believe that the mass 
organizations cannot give *satisfaction* to 
people who wish to participate in political 
action but are still unable to fulfil the 
conditions for entering PKI.
Analysis of the activities of the communist-led mass 
organizations during the decade of the Aidit leadership 
shows that their political role has been broadly fourfold: 
1. To gather the widest possible sections of society 
into organizations led by PKI, to arouse in them an 
awareness of the importance of organization, to give them 
basic political education, and gradually to discipline 
them.
2. To open up new social and geographic areas to PKI 
penetration. One or more mass organizations have been 
established where it would have been impossible to 
establish PKI directly because of political ignorance or 
opposition to communism. Their basic education in 
organizational and political matters has then created a 
favourable environment for the establishment of the Party
itself
3* To provide a source of Party members and cadres. 
The leaders and cadres of the mass organizations are open 
or covert Party members; they watch to see which of their 
activists are most susceptible to political education, 
and then gradually draw them into the Party.
U. To assist PKI in its political struggle. The 
mass organizations have been used, for example, to gather 
votes for PKI by assisting in the work of propaganda, 
organizing meetings, and mobilizing the people to go to 
the polls; to back PKI*s position on various matters or 
PKI demands by petitions, demonstrations, telegrams, 
letters, delegations, and the threat of strike action or 
general unrest; and to impress and woo Sukarno by 
gathering large crowds for his meetings, mobilizing large 
contingents for independence day parades, and so on. The 
mass organizations are also expected to provide a major 
source of strength for PKI in case the Party ever has to 
use force in order to resist repression or bid for power.
The Party and its mass organizations work closely 
together in mutual assistance. It is quite common for 
a cadre or activist to work for the Party and for one or 
more mass organizations. In some areas the Party 
organization has been established first, and has then 
used its cadres to create mass organizations that widen 
the PKI sphere of influence and control and that prepare
M01 ^
th e  way fo r  a fu r th e r  exp an sion  o f  th e  P arty  i t s e l f .
In  o th e r  a r e a s , i f  th e  tim e i s  n o t y e t  r ip e  fo r  the  
e s ta b lish m e n t  o f  the P a r ty , th e  cad res have f i r s t  s e t  up 
one or more mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  th a t  th en  prepare th e  
ground fo r  th e  P arty  o r g a n iz a t io n . Not enough in f o r ­
m ation  i s  a v a i la b le  to  e s t im a te  which i s  u s u a lly  
e s t a b l i s h e d  f i r s t ,  th e  P arty  or the mass o r g a n iz a t io n .
I t  would appear, how ever, th a t  in  th e  f i r s t  y e a rs  o f  th e  
A id it  le a d e r s h ip , when the P arty  fea r ed  government 
r e p r e s s io n  and had n o t a c h iev e d  th e  r e s p e c t a b i l i t y ,  
a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  Sukarno, and p h y s ic a l  s i z e  (w ith  a la r g e  
number o f  tr a in e d  P arty  cad res a v a i la b le )  which i t  had by  
1955» i t  was more u su a l fo r  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  to  be  
e s t a b l i s h e d  f i r s t .  T h is was more e s p e c i a l ly  so  in  the  
r u r a l a r e a s , where PKI had l i t t l e  o r g a n iz a t io n  b e fo r e  mid* 
1954* I r e c e iv e d  some in fo rm a tio n  to  in d ic a te  th a t  in  
more r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  in  some areas where PKI and th e  mass 
o r g a n iz a t io n s  have b een  e s t a b l i s h e d  fo r  some tim e , th e  
P a rty  has taken  over th e  work form erly  done by i t s  l e a s t  
e f f i c i e n t  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  such  as BTI, the p easan t  
o r g a n iz a t io n .
The o b l ig a t io n  o f  e v er y  P arty  member:
To se rv e  the p e o p le , to  c o n s o lid a te  th e  P a r ty 's
c o n n e c tio n s  w ith  them, to  stu d y  t h e ir  w ish es
9 f. 9
and correctly report these to the Party in time, 
and to explain Party policy to them,
has not been taken lightly. The Aidit leadership has
made great efforts to learn the desires and hopes of each
section of society, the pressing problems they face in
their daily lives. And it has created an extensive
network of Party and mass organizations which can present
organization, programme and course of action that seem
capable of fulfilling the desires and hopes, of tackling
the problems. The work of PKI and its mass organizations
does not, however, give a full explanation of the success
achieved in winning and organizing the support of many
millions of Indonesians. The expansion of the Party
organization has been facilitated by the apathy of the
other parties towards organizational work at the grass
roots. This apathy has been even more marked in their
work of building mass organizations.
The following sections deal with the activities of
the PKI and its mass organizations designed to attract and
organize support among the different sections of the
1
PKI, Konstitusi Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI’s Consti- 
tution), Dj akaria, 1951, p. 21. This obligation, worded
slightly differently, has been incorporated in succeeding 
Party constitutions. The constitutions of the mass 
organizations contain a similar obligation for their members, with, of course, ’the Party* being replaced by 
the name of the particular organization.
In d o n e s ia n s  p e o p l e 1: w o rk e rs , p e a s a n t s ,  th e  p e t t y  
b o u r g e o i s i e ,  y o u th , women, th e  e th n ic  g ro u p s and  e th n ic  
m i n o r i t i e s ,  and  th e  v e te r a n s  o f  th e  r e v o lu t io n .
1 • The W orkers
Communist l e a d e r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  w o rk e rs  c o n s t i t u t e  
th e  m ost r e v o l u t io n a r y ,  th e  m ost r e l i a b l e ,  and  th e  m ost 
e a s i l y  o rg a n iz e d  s o c i a l  b a s i s  o f  com m unist s u p p o r t .  In  
I n d o n e s ia  a f t e r  in d e p e n d e n c e , u n l ik e  i n  C h ina  a f t e r  1927» 
no  m a jo r  o b s t a c l e s  w ere p la c e d  b e tw een  th e  com m unist 
l e a d e r s  and th e  w o rk e rs . T h e re fo re  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  
h a s  g iv e n  f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  to  o r g a n iz in g  th e  w o rk e rs . As 
th e  PKI le a d e r s  acknow ledged  in  t h e i r  May Day m essage o f  
1958:
S in c e  th e  so u rc e  o f  th e  s t r e n g t h  and  o f  th e  
c a d re s  o f  th e  Communist P a r ty  l i e s  p r i m a r i l y  
in  th e  t r a d e  u n io n  m ovem ent, i t  goes w ith o u t  
s a y in g  t h a t  th e  fo re m o s t t a s k  o f  th e  commu­
n i s t s  i s  to  work in  th e  t r a d e  u n io n s .
The t r a d e  u n io n  f e d e r a t i o n ,  SOBSI, h a s  b e en  b u i l t  a s  th e
c h i e f  means o f  a t t r a c t i n g  and  o r g a n iz in g  th e  w o rk e rs , and
th e  fo l lo w in g  s e c t i o n  i s  c o n c e rn e d  l a r g e l y  w ith  SOBSI and
i t s  member u n io n s .  M ention  i s  a l s o  made o f  o t h e r  means
em ployed  b y  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  to  w in th e  a l l e g i a n c e  o f
th e  u rb a n  p o o r in  g e n e r a l .
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(a) SOBSI.
1• The Consolidation of PKI control over SOBSI,
SOBSI had been founded in November 1946 as an all- 
embracing trade union federation with the basic task of 
mobilizing the workers for the defence of the Republic* 
Before the Madiun rebellion it had a virtual monopoly in 
the field of organized labour within the Republic* 
Communists and non-communists had been about evenly 
divided in its leadership, but no disputes had arisen 
between the two groups who were united by a feeling of 
leftist solidarity in the struggle to defeat the Dutch 
and to create a socialist Indonesia* This solidarity 
was broken by the rebellion, but communists remained in 
control of the major part of the organization. Hence 
the problem for the PKI leaders after Madiun was not to 
establish a new trade union federation, but to consolidate 
their position in SOBSI, to shape SOBSI into an efficient 
organization under complete Party control, and to extend 
its membership and organization.
When the rebellion broke out in September 1948, many 
of the communist leaders in SOBSI either went into hiding 
or made their way to Madiun* Harjono, chairman of 
SOBSI, and Maruto Darusman, chairman of the largest member 
union, the estate workers' Sarbupri, were killed along
with many other communist trade union cadres. But 
because SOBSI as an organization did not participate in 
the rebellion it was not declared illegal. Nineteen of 
the 34 member unions withdrew from the federation in 
protest against the involvement of some of its communist 
leaders in the rebellion.
Discussions to re-unite the unions were in progress 
when the Dutch attack on the Republic in December 1940 
temporarily stopped all trade union activity. In May 
1949 efforts were resumed towards the creation of a single 
all-Indonesia trade union federation. By the end of 
October 1949 SOBSI was again functioning. The newly 
reorganized leadership was already clearly PKI-dominated 
and the non-communist acting chairman, Asrarudin, left 
the organization. In attempting to explain the commu­
nist domination of SOBSI so soon after Madiun, Asrarudin 
has suggested two reasons: that many of the non-communist 
individuals and trade unions had withdrawn from SOBSI at 
the time of the rebellion and thereby increased the 
already high proportion of communists in the SOBSI leader­
ship; and that PKI won the allegiance of many trade union 
cadres and activists by its ability to pay regular wages
Aand to provide trips abroad as rewards for good service.
1
Interview with Asrarudin
Other reasons must include the concentration of PKI 
efforts and personnel in SOBSI, in contrast with the 
other parties1 2 lack of interest in trade union work; and 
that PKI was the only party which appeared to be truly 
concerned with the interests of the workers and their 
activists.
On January 5> 1950 a nine-man SOBSI delegation, 
headed by Njono, left for China to study the workers* 
struggle there* It was not until November 19 that four 
of the delegates, including Njono, returned. The other 
five members remained longer. Presumably the members of 
the delegation underwent education in political and trade 
union matters while in China, and on their return provided 
PKI with a well-trained leadership for SOBSI. Njono, 
aged 28 when he returned, took over the leading position
pin SOBSI and has retained it until the present.-
According to Kahin*s analysis, by mid-1951 almost 
the entire membership of SOBSI looked to PKI for leader-
1
Sin Po, November 21, 1950.
2
Although Njono did not officially ask to join PKI until 
December 1954» he has been a close associate of the Aidit 
leadership and might even by considered a member of it.
He was elected to parliament as a communist representative 
in September 1955» and in September 1959 was elected to 
the PKI central committee and, more important, as one of 
the two candidate members of the politbureau.
?r.o4 <j j
ship, while most of the member unions were PKI-dominated,
1and the remainder PKI-influenced. A few leaders 
refused to recognize the leadership of PKI, but they were 
gradually ousted. Among the last non-communists to 
leave the SOBSI leadership was Ahem Emingpradja, the 
present Minister of Labour in the Sukarno cabinet. He 
had been left as acting chairman of Sarbupri when the 
chairman was killed in the Madiun rebellion. In the 
Sarbupri congress at the end of 1952 he was finally 
excluded from the leadership, but he did not leave 
Sarbupri finally until April 1954 and the SOBSI parlia­
mentary group until June 1954* His successor as Sarbupri 
chairman, Coerdian, who was at the same time a member of 
the finance section of the SOBSI central bureau, also
proved unwilling to accept PKI guidance. Coerdian was
2forced out of Sarbupri and SOBSI along with Ahem.
SOBSI claims that some 3,000 of its cadres and 
members were imprisoned during the August 1951 arrests of
1 Oeorge McTurnan Kahin, '‘Indonesian Politics and 
Nationalism", in William L. Holland (ed.), Asian 
Nationalism and the West, New York, 1953» p.13&.
2 For the resolutions adopted by the Sarbupri national 
council on the 'removal' of Ahem and Coerdian, see 
Sarbupri, Untuk Kebebasan Demokrasi dan Melawan Pemerasan 
jang Kedjam (For Democratic Freedom, and Opposing Cruel 
Repression), Djakarta, 1954» pp.16-17» 18.
governm en t o p p o n e n ts . B ut d e s p i t e  th e  a r r e s t  o f  PKI 
and  SOBSI l e a d e r s ,  few  B ran ch es  o f  SOBSI o r  i t s  member 
u n io n s  to o k  p r o t e s t  a c t i o n .  T h is  w arned th e  PKI l e a d e r s  
t h a t  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o v e r SOBSI was n o t  d e e p ly  r o o te d .  
C o n tro l  o f  th e  to p  l e a d e r s h ip  was a l r e a d y  f a i r l y  
e f f e c t i v e ,  b u t  n o t  y e t  o f  th e  m idd le  and  lo w e r c a d r e s .
As a r e s u l t ,  th e  PKI m em bership  d r iv e  w hich b eg an  in  
March 1952 had  a s  one o f  i t s  m ajo r a im s t o  b r in g  u n d e r 
P a r ty  d i s c i p l i n e  a g r e a t e r  num ber o f  th e  m id d le  and lo w e r 
l e v e l  c a d re s  and  a c t i v i s t s  o f  SOBSI and i t s  member 
u n io n s .1 2 By November 1954, i n  th e  judgm ent o f  Boyd 
Compton, S O B S I's:
to p  l e a d e r s h ip  i s  com m unist, i t s  s e c o n d -  
e c h e lo n  le a d e r s  a re  com m unist o r  com m unist- 
d o m in a te d , and i t s  ra n k  and f i l e  a re  
g e n e r a l l y  c o m m u n is t -d ir e c te d ,3
In  th e  m idd le  o f  1960, when I  was l a s t  i n  I n d o n e s ia ,  
i t  a p p e a re d  t h a t  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  c a d re s  o f  SOBSI and i t s  
u n io n s  w ere members o f  PK I, o r ,  i f  n o t  a c t u a l l y  P a r ty  
m em bers, h ad  b een  s u b je c t e d  to  s c h o o ls  and  c o u rs e s
i
1
Jo h n  W o lfa rd , '’S t r e n g th e n in g  th e  In d o n e s ia n  T rade U nion 
M ovem ent", W orld T rade  U nion Movement, May 1—15, 1953» 
P .1 7 .
2
Boyd R. Com pton, In d o n e s ia n  Communism: th e  Ranks S w e l l , 
A m erican  U n iv e r s i t i e s *  F i e ld  S t a f f  R e p o r t,  New Y ork,
1954, p*8 .
3
I b i d . ,  p .7
arranged, and taught by the communist leaders. Communist 
control of the leadership of SOBS I had ensured that only 
persons who were Party members or had proved themselves 
amenable to PKI control were chosen as cadres and received 
promotion within the unions. For all others the channels 
of promotion were closed.
At the same time as being completely controlled by 
PKI, SOBSI maintains the fiction of being tied to no 
political party. As 'proof of this political inde­
pendence, SOBSI points to K. Werdojo, member of the SOBSI 
national council and also a member of parliament for the 
small party Permai. However, of the 61 persons elected 
to the national council at the SOBSI congress of January 
1955> over half were known to be members of the Party.
In the September 1955 parliamentary elections eight 
members of the national council were elected on the 'PKI 
and non-party' list, six as PKI members and two as so- 
called non-party men. The nine-man SOBSI central bureau 
elected in 1956 consisted of these eight members of 
parliament in addition to Werdojo.
PKI has had to pay a price for the consolidation of 
its hold on SOBSI. As communist control became 
increasingly evident, many non-communists withdrew, 
others were forced out, and the non-communist parties 
began to establish their own trade union organizations.
The non-communist unions are still disunited and 
organizationally weak, but the system of labour dispute 
arbitration enforced by the government has permitted 
them to survive, and their effect of breaking the former 
SOBSI monopoly in the various labour fields seriously 
weakens the political usefulness of SOBSI - a question 
that will be discussed below.
2. The growth of SOBSI. The official SOBSI claim
is that as soon as the Round Table Conference agreement
was signed in December 1949, SOBSI began a rapid 
1expansion. With the slogan fcancel the Round Table
Conference agreement* and the basic demand for Lebaran 
2bonus, SOBSI won much support. Furthermore, many new 
unions sprang up in the former Dutch-occupied areas and 
then affiliated themselves with SOBSI. SOBSI branch 
offices were opened in virtually every kabupaten capital, 
and within a year of its re-establishment in September 
1949, SOBSI claimed to contain 25 vertical trade unions, 
many local unions, and 2 % million members. From 1950
_
SOBSI, Sedjarah Gerakan Buruh Indonesia (History of the 
Indonesian Labour Movement), Djakarta, 1958, pp.86-7*
2
Lebaran is the Moslem holiday and feast at the end of 
the Ramadan fast. In Indonesia the workers expect to 
receive a bonus for Lebaran equal to one month*s pay.
u n t i l  1955 SOBS I  c o n tin u e d  to  c la im  2 m i l l i o n  members,
b u t  th e  num ber o f  SOBSI b ra n c h  o f f i c e s  in c r e a s e d  from  11?
1
i n  November 1951 to  125 two y e a r s  l a t e r .  At th e  seco n d  
n a t i o n a l  c o n g re s s  in  J a n u a ry  1955 a m em bership o f
p
2 ,6 6 1 ,9 7 0  was c la im e d , and  128 b ra n c h  o f f i c e s .  In  
S ep tem ber 1957 th e  c e n t r a l  b u re a u  announced  t h a t  a f t e r  
th e  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  o f  t r a d e  u n io n s , SOBSI now in c lu d e d  
31 n a t i o n a l  u n io n s ;  th e r e  were e i g h t  SOBSI r e g io n a l  
o f f i c e s  and 150 b ranches.*^  As o f  November 1960, SOBSI 
c la im e d  2 , 7 3 2 ,9 0 9  m em bers, 165 b r a n c h e s ,  and  5 p r e p a r a to r y  
b ra n c h e s .^ 4-
The o f f i c i a l  SOBSI p i c t u r e  h a s  b e e n  a t o t a l  member­
s h ip  s in c e  1950 o f  b e tw e e n  2 .5  and  2 .73  m i l l i o n s ,  
v i r t u a l l y  s t a t i c ,  b u t  a s te a d y  in c r e a s e  in  th e  num ber o f  
SOBSI r e g io n a l  and b ra n c h  o f f i c e s .  The f i g u r e s  f o r  th e  
num ber o f  o f f i c e s  a re  p re su m ab ly  c o r r e c t  a s  th e y  can  be  
r e a d i l y  c h e c k e d , b u t  th e  m em bership c la im s  have b e e n  
w id e ly  c h a l le n g e d  b y  non-com m unist In d o n e s ia n  and f o r e ig n
1
HR, November 27> 1951; November 2 6 , 1953-
2
HR, J a n u a ry  11 , 1955; SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen K o n fe re n s1 
N a s io n a l  SOBSI (1957) (Docum ents o f  th e  SOBSI N a t io n a l  
C o n fe re n c e , 1 9 5 7 ) » D j a k a r t a ,  1958, p .93*
3
SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, l o c . c i t .
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SOBSI, F orw ard  f o r  th e  C o n s i s te n t  R e a l iz a t i o n  o f  th e  
P o l i t i c a l  M a n ife s to , m im eographed , D ja k a r ta ,  I9 6 0 , p .1»
O  o
4  t O
o b s e r v e r s .  I t  i s  e x tre m e ly  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  an o u t s i d e r  to  
ju d g e  w h e th e r o r  n o t  t o t a l  SOBSI m em bership has d e c l in e d  
s in c e  a b o u t 1951 due to  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  co m p e tin g  
non-SOBSI u n io n s  in  many f i e l d s ,  o r  i f  SOBSI m em bership  
h a s  rem ained  more o r  l e s s  s t a t i c ,  a d v an ces  among fo rm e r ly  
u n o rg a n iz e d  w o rk e rs  b a la n c in g  l o s s e s  to  th e  new n o n -
4
com m unist u n io n s .
In  th e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  1952 , G o ldberg  e s t im a te d  th e
t o t a l  number o f  o rg a n iz e d  w o rk e rs  in  In d o n e s ia  to  b e  f a r
l e s s  th a n  2 m i l l i o n s ,  w ith  SOBSI’s s h a re  8 0 0 ,0 0 0  to  
28 5 0 ,0 0 0 . T ed jasukm ana, a fo rm e r  M in is te r  o f  L ab o u r, 
e s t im a te d  in  1958 t h a t  some 3 to  4  m i l l io n  w o rk e rs  were 
o rg a n iz e d ,  o f  w hich  SOBSI a c c o u n te d  f o r  more th a n  60 p e r  
c e n t ,  o r  f o r  a t  l e a s t  1 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0  to  2 , 4 0 0 , 000 .
R ic h a rd so n , w r i t in g  i n  O c to b e r 1958, how ever, r e p o r t e d
1
I t  i s  even  d i f f i c u l t  i n  I n d o n e s ia  to  d e f in e  w hat i s  a 
t r a d e  u n io n  member. V ery few  ’members* pay  any  d u e s ,  and  
i t  h as b een  o f t e n  commented t h a t  SOBSI h a s  becom e so  
p o p u la r  among w o rk e rs  b e c a u se  i t  r e c e iv e s  fu n d s  from  
e ls e w h e re  and can  a f f o r d  n o t  t o  c o l l e c t  d u e s . F u r th e rm o re , 
many w orkers o b ta in  em ploym ent o n ly  s e a s o n a l ly .  A SOBSI 
member m ust th e r e f o r e  be d e f in e d  a s  someone who c o n s id e r s  
h im s e l f  a member; he may pay  d u es o r  n o t ,  b u t  he w ould 
ta k e  any  p ro b lem  to  th e  SOBSI a c t i v i s t  f o r  s o l u t i o n ,  
w ould a t t e n d  some m ee tin g s  o rg a n iz e d  b y  SOBSI, and  w ould 
i n  g e n e r a l  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  la b o u r  a c t io n  l e d  by  SOBSI.
2
H a rry  G o ld b e rg , G erakan B uruh d i  In d o n e s ia  (The L abour 
Movement in  I n d o n e s ia ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1952» p .1 9 .
3
I s k a n d a r  T ed jasukm ana, The P o l i t i c a l  C h a r a c te r  o f  th e  
In d o n e s ia n  T rade  U nion M ovem ent, I t h a c a ,  New Y o rk , 195S,
p p .2 5 , 2 8 .
the estimate of Experienced observers* that the total
number of organized workers may well have been below two 
1millions. Both Goldberg and Tedjasukraana had access 
to government and other materials, and their evidence 
would suggest a considerable increase in SOBSI membership 
between 1952 and 1958» and would indicate that SOBSI*s 
earlier claims to large membership were bluff to lend 
weight to SOBSI*s demands and PKI*s political bargaining 
position. But, as Richardson’s evidence indicates, much 
research is still required before any fairly accurate 
estimates can be made of trade union membership.
3« Strengthening SOBSI. Although SOBSI is a 
federation of national and local trade unions, it 
endeavours not only to coordinate the policies of its 
member unions but also, through the SOBSI regional and 
branch offices, to coordinate, control and assist trade 
union activities down to the local level.
All workers belonging to member unions are also 
considered as direct members of SOBSI. Ordinary members 
participate in the ’basic organizations’ of the trade 
unions, and wherever there is more than one basic organi-
1
J. Henry Richardson, "Indonesian Labor Relations in 
Their Political Setting", Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, October 1958» vol.XII, no.1, pp.6>5-6V
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zation in one field of work, a coordinating committee is 
established. The ordinary trade union members ’in the 
various fields of work are coordinated and led by the 
SOBSI branch whose area is determined by the SOBSI
Aregional council’. The regional councils have the dual 
task of coordinating and leading the member unions at the 
regional level, and of supervising the work of the SOBSI
pbranches. Among other duties, the national council 
assists in the simplification of member unions, assists 
and coordinates the central leadership bodies of the 
member unions, and gives leadership to the lower levels 
of the SOBSI organization in the implementation of the 
decisions of the national congress."^ Both the SOBSI 
regional councils and branches also coordinate and assist 
the lower levels of the member unions in implementing 
SOBSI decisions.
In short, SOBSI is more than an ordinary federation 
of trade unions, especially as the leadership of SOBSI and 
the member unions is unchallengeably in communist hands. 
Major policy decisions are taken by the central leader­
ship, which is closely coordinated with the PKI leader-
1
SOBSI, Konstitusi SOBSI (SOBSI’s Constitution),
Djakarta, 1955» pp.27-8.
2 3Ibid., pp.28-9 Ibid., p.35
ship, and the SOBSI machinery is used to ensure the 
correct implementation of policy right down to the places 
of work. What might be termed the leadership role of 
SOBSI is balanced by the assistance SOBSI gives to the 
member unions in their everyday work - in such matters as 
administration, the creation and training of cadres, the 
maintenance and expansion of membership, the methods of 
solving labour disputes - while SOBSI by its very size 
can add weight to their demands and can also, presumably, 
assist those in financial need. The following section 
deals with the effort made to strengthen the SOBSI 
organization, which is also the effort to strengthen 
PKI*s control over SOBSI and thereby over the SOBSI 
members.
A large number of cadres and activists of SOBSI and 
its member unions were brought into PKI during the first 
PKI membership drive which began in March 1952. Before 
1956 the only thorough political and organizational 
training they received was from PKI itself; SOBSI and its 
member unions did no more than give their cadres organi­
zational training in an incidental manner.
It was only in February 1956, when SOBSI was freed 
from the hectic work of the general elections campaigns, 
that the national council decided that SOBSI should
e s t a b l i s h  an  e d u c a t io n  sy s tem  r e a c h in g  from  th e  c e n t r e  to
i
th e  b r a n c h e s .  The i n t e n t i o n  was to  s e t  up a SOBSI 
c e n t r a l  s c h o o l  f o r  c a d re s  o f  th e  SOBSI r e g io n a l  c o u n c i ls  
and  th e  n a t i o n a l  c o u n c i ls  o f  member u n io n s ;  SOBSI r e g io n a l  
s c h o o ls  f o r  c a d r e s  o f  th e  SOBSI b ra n c h e s  and  th e  member 
u n i o n s 1 r e g io n a l  c o u n c i l s ;  SOBSI b ra n c h  c o u rs e s  f o r  c a d re s  
o f  th e  member u n io n s  * b ra n c h  c o u n c i l s  and f o r  l e a d e r s  o f  
th e  member u n io n s  1 b a s i c  o r g a n iz a t io n s ;  and  s c h o o ls  
o rg a n iz e d  by  th e  n a t i o n a l  c o u n c i ls  o f  th e  member u n io n s
p
f o r  t h e i r  own c a d r e s .  On O c to b e r  2 3 , 1956, th e  c e n t r a l  
b u re a u ,  a d a p t in g  f o r  SOBSI th e  e d u c a t io n a l  programme 
draw n up in  J u ly  f o r  PK I, d e c id e d  t h a t  th e  SOBSI s c h o o ls  
and c o u rs e s  would t e a c h  fo u r  m ain s u b j e c t s :  th e  h i s t o r y  
o f  th e  la b o u r  m ovem ent, SO B SI's s o c i a l  and econom ic 
program m e, th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t ,  and  p rob lem s o f  
o rg a n iz a t io n .-^
In  m id-November 1956 th e  SOBSI r e g io n a l  c o u n c i l  i n  
C e n t r a l  Ja v a  opened  i t s  f i r s t  c a d re  s c h o o l .  The c e n t r a l  
s c h o o l  w ent i n t o  o p e r a t io n  i n  th e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  1958.
By th e  end o f  1958, 133 s tu d e n t s  had  r e c e iv e d  t r a i n i n g  in
1
BB, December 5 , 1956, p .3«
2
SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p p .9 6 -7 *
3
BB, December 5 ,  1956, p .3 ;  in te r v ie w  w ith  a member o f  
th e  SOBSI n a t i o n a l  h e a d q u a r t e r s .
f> ^  o
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six Shifts' of the central school - each shift lasting
one month, the students living in a hostel together and
undertaking full-time study during their shift.*1 A
total of 21 school shifts had been held at the regional
level, branch courses had been begun in November and
December, a seminar on education had been arranged, and
Sarbupri and the railv/ay workers 1 union had each held
one shift of their central schools. During 1959 the
SOBSI central school held six more shifts, bringing the
2total number of graduates* to about 300. The regional
3and branch schools and courses were running smoothly.
Besides the four main subjects, cadres and activists were
also being taught Indonesian language and history, and
4general knowledge.
1
ITUN, December 1958, pp.8-9; Moh. Munir, Pedoman 
Penjelesaian Plan Organisasi 1958 (Survey of the 
Implementation of the 1956 Plan of Organization), Djakarta,
1959, pp.27-8.2
Interview with a member of the SOBSI national 
headquarters.
3 Leaders of SOBSI in East Java told me, for example, that 
the regional council in their province had organized seven 
shifts of its school between the beginning of 1959 and May
1960, each shift meeting every day for a month, and each 
attended by about thirty cadres. At the kabupaten level 
courses were held regularly, lasting for from 15 days, if 
full-time attendance could be achieved, to 1^ months.4
Njono, Untuk Mempertahankan dan Memperluas Hak-Hak kaum 
Buruh (To Defend and Extend the Workers* Rights),
Djakarta, 1959, p.69.
T h is  s c a l e  o f  c a d re  e d u c a t io n  m ust e n s u re  n o t  only-
c o n s id e r a b le  PKI c o n t r o l  o r  in f lu e n c e  o v e r  th e  c a d re s  o f
SOBSI and  i t s  member u n io n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when th e  SOBSI
e d u c a t io n  sy s te m  i s  b o l s t e r e d  b y  th e  PKI e d u c a t io n a l
programme f o r  P a r ty  m em bers, b u t  a ls o  a c o n s id e r a b le
in c r e a s e  in  th e  s k i l l  o f  th e  c a d re s  in  t h e i r  e v e ry d a y
w ork o f  a t t r a c t i n g  and o r g a n iz in g  th e  w o rk e rs . The
m ass iv e  SOBSI e d u c a t io n  programme a ls o  p ro v id e s  th e  means
o f  c r e a t i n g  new c a d re s  from  th e  ra n k  and  f i l e :
F o r th e  ra n k  and  f i l e  t h e r e  a r e  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  
to  be a c q u a in te d  w ith  th e  b a s ic  p ro b lem s o f  
th e  l a b o r  movement and  w ith  e le m e n ta ry  r u l e s  
o f  t r a d e  u n io n is m . The b e s t  among th e  
m em bership  a r e  th e n  g iv e n  th e  chance  to  
q u a l i f y  th e m s e lv e s  f o r  u n io n  p o s t s .  In  t h i s  
way t a l e n t s  a r e  d is c o v e re d  and p r o s p e c t iv e  
c a d re s  and  le a d e r s  a re  r e c r u i t e d  from  th e  
ra n k  and  f i l e . 1
I t  goes a lm o s t w ith o u t  s a y in g  t h a t  no o th e r  In d o n e s ia n  
t r a d e  u n io n  o r g a n iz a t io n  has an  e d u c a t io n a l  programme o f  
any  s c a l e .  Nor can  any  o th e r  t r a d e  u n io n  o r g a n iz a t io n  
o f f e r  th e  rew ard  and  p o l i t i c a l  i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  o f  th e  f r e e  
t r i p s  to  th e  S o v ie t  b lo c  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  have b e e n  e n jo y e d  
by  many te n s  o f  SOBSI c a d r e s .
As p a r t  o f  th e  e d u c a t io n  programme h a s  b e e n  th e  
a t te m p t  to  in c r e a s e  th e  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  th e  SOBSI
2 7 9
1
T ed jasukm ana , The P o l i t i c a l  C h a r a c te r ,  p .71
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periodical "Bendera Buruh" (Workers* Flag). In May- 
1957 circulation was only 5>500; this increased only 
slightly to 5,750 in April 1958, not a large number among 
a claimed membership of 2.6 millions. A plan to have 
"Bendera Buruh" received in every basic organization of
2the member unions by the end of 1958 was not fulfilled, 
but it was claimed that during 1959 circulation was raised 
to 15,000.3
The first comprehensive plan to improve the SOBSI 
organization was drawn up in September 1957 and implemen­
ted during 1958.^ By the end of 1958 it was clear that 
the SOBSI leaders had grossly overestimated the efficiency 
of their organization and its ability to make rapid
1
In 1954 a small, twice-monthly Buietin SOBSI had been issued, reaching a total circulation of 10,000 in May 
1955* In March 1956 it was replaced by the larger Bendera Buruh.
2
Njono, Untuk Mempertahankan, p.68.
3 ITUN, March 1960, p.7. According to information given 
by a member of the SOBSI national headquarters early in 1960, this figure is exaggerated and should have been 
7,000 to 8,000. The ITUN figure could be true and yet 
deliberately misleading: while Harian Rakjat was 
temporarily banned for two weeks in December 1959, the 
copies printed of Bendera Buruh probably were greatly 
increased.
4 The complete plan, including sections dealing with 
education and with women members, was published as SOBSI, 
Plan Organisasi 1958 (1958 Plan of Organization), 
Djakarta, 1957, 15 P*
improvements. Many basic organizations had still not
brought their members into groups, and, for various
reasons, the work of attracting 'the medium and high
workers * and government officials was proceeding slowly.
New SOBSI regional committees had been established in
East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, Atjeh and Bali while
one was in preparation in Central Kalimantan, but the
outbreak of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in February 1958
had prevented the establishment of new regional committees
in other areas. On the other hand five new SOBSI
branches had been opened, and seven were in preparation.
The part of the plan to increase the number of full-time
2workers in SOBSI branches had been achieved basically in
East and Central Java although, in general:
the work of improving the SOBSI branch leader­
ship bodies has not yet been successful, while 
the work of the SOBSI branches increasingly 
piles up.
Efforts to equip SOBSI branch offices with such as a 
typewriter, roneo machine and bicycle were still being
1
1
The results of the 1958 plan were given in Munir, 
Pedoraan, 34 p.
2
The plan had called for one full-time leader and one 
staff member in each SOBSI branch with up to 5>000 members 
two leaders and one staff member in each branch with up 
to 10,000, and so rising progressively to five full-time 




made. And SOBSI and its member unions fell far short of 
the goal of receiving 50 per cent of membership fees.
In 1958 the SOBSI national council received only 10 per 
cent of the fees it should have according to membership 
figures.
In the latter half of 1958, SOBSI, at the same time 
as PKI was doing the same in preparation for the first 
national conference of peasants and fishermen, undertook 
a 'go down* campaign:
in order to further strengthen the relations 
between the organization and the masses and 
between the higher and lower levels of the 
organization, as well as to avoid subjective 
methods of leadership not in accordance with 
the objective facts.*
The central secretariat set up a special committee to 
implement the campaign.
A plan of organization for 1959 was drawn up by the 
SOBSI national council with targets in a wide range of 
activities but concentrating on education, an increase in 
the number of full-timers, and increased collection of
1
As of January 1, 1958, however, the 0.20 rupiah paid 
by each member to SOBSI was increased by an extra 0.30 
rupiah ’permanent contribution *.
2
Editorial, "SOBSI 12 Tahun" (SOBSI 12 Years), BB, 




m em bership  fe e s*  The r e s u l t s  o f  th e  p la n  have n o t  b een  
p u b l i s h e d ,  b u t  in  th e  a b se n c e  o f  a s u c c e s s f u l  s o l u t io n  
to  th e  f i n a n c i a l  p ro b lem , and  su ch  a s o l u t i o n  was now here
p
i n  s i g h t  a t  th e  end o f  1958* a r a p id  i n c r e a s e  i n  th e  
num ber o f  f u l l - t i m e  c a d re s  c o u ld  n o t  be im plem ented*^
The fo rm a t io n  o f  g ro u p s  o f  o r d in a r y  mem bers, begun  
w ith  i n t e n s i t y  i n  1958, c o u ld  be  o f  g r e a t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
i n  b in d in g  th e  o r d in a r y  members t o  th e  u n io n  l e a d e r s h ip  
and  i n  i n c r e a s in g  th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  o r d in a r y  members 
in  u n io n  a c t i v i t i e s *  Group l e a d e r s  a r e  b ro u g h t  i n to  th e  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  b a s i c  o r g a n iz a t io n :  
th e y  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  d e le g a t io n s  to  m eet e m p lo y e rs , th e y  
g a th e r  members to  g iv e  e x p la n a t io n s  o f  u n io n  p o l i c y ,  to  
c o l l e c t  f e e s ,  and  to  re a d  SOBSI p u b l i c a t i o n s  and ’’H a r ia n  
R a k ja t"  t o g e t h e r ,  and th e y  o rg a n iz e  a s s i s t a n c e  to  work
1
M ard joko , "T riw u la n  T e r a c h i r  da lam  P e la k s a n a a n  P la n  
O rg a n is a s i  1959” (The L a s t  Q u a r te r  in  Im p lem en tin g  th e  
1959 P la n  o f  O r g a n iz a t io n ) , BB, O c to b e r 5 ,  1959* p*1*
2
N jo n o , U ntuk M em pertahankan, p*60 .
3
As h a s  b e en  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e , th e  com m unist movement in  
In d o n e s ia  r e c e iv e s  c o n s id e r a b le  sums from  o u ts id e  so u rc e s*  
I t  i s  presum ed t h a t  b y  1959 th e s e  s o u rc e s  w ere b e in g  
ta p p e d  e f f i c i e n t l y  and t h a t  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  was 
a l r e a d y  a p p o r t io n in g  th e  fu n d s  o b ta in e d  i n  f a i r l y  s t a t i c  
p r o p o r t io n s *  F u r th e rm o re , a s  th e  PKI c e n t r a l  com m ittee  
p lenum  i n  December 1960 made c l e a r ,  th e  P a r ty  was 
c o n t in u in g  t o  em p h asize  work among th e  p e a s a n t r y .
T h e re fo re  a n y  f u r t h e r  c o n s id e r a b le  i n c r e a s e  i n  S0BSI*s 
incom e, in  o r d e r  t o  p ay  f o r  many more f u l l - t i m e  c a d r e s ,  
c o u ld  o n ly  come from  w i th in  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  i t s e l f .
c\ o  *
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comrades in times of need, such as deaths, marriages and
Abirths. But to what extent the groups of ordinary- 
members have been formed and are active has not been 
revealed.
Finally, it is important to make some estimate of the 
full-timers working for SOBSI and its member unions 
because it is the existence of a large body of relatively 
well-paid full-timers enjoying adequate promotion 
possibilities that distinguishes SOBSI from the other 
trade union organizations and that greatly facilitates 
SOBSI's work of organizing the masses and attracting 
potential cadre material. The evidence is fragmentary, 
but less so than that for PKI or the other communist-led 
mass organizations.
In the SOBSI headquarters in Djakarta there were, in 
the early part of 1960, 50 full-timers including the 
chauffeurs for the two cars, the odd-job men, and the 
women cleaners and cooks.1 2 The number of full-timers at 
the regional and branch levels varied greatly because, in 
general, the SOBSI regions and branches parallel the 
government administrative divisions which embrace widely
1
Kastari, "Sekali Lagi Masalah Klompok” (Once More the 
Question of Groups), BB, February 25, 1960, p.2.
2
Interview with a member of the SOBSI national 
headquarters.
different total populations and numbers of workers. In
East Java, a relatively well-organized region with claimed
total of 5*10,000 SOBSI members, in mid-1960 there were
9 full-timers in the provincial office, and 15 in the
Surabaja city office; in each of the 29 branch offices
1there was an average of two full-timers. In the
Jogjakarta Special District, with a larger population
than Surabaja but far fewer trade union members, the
2SOBSI branch office had 9 full-timers, though a visual 
examination of the office showed that several of these 
were female clerical staff. Evidence supplied by SOBSI 
leader Munir suggests that the number of full-timers in
3the member unions is high. In December 1958 he reported 
that the basic organizations of government trade unions 
and small unions in private concerns had no full-timers, 
but that those in large private concerns, such as estates, 
and the sugar and oil industries, in general had them; the 
coordinating committees for the basic organizations in 
unions in private concerns generally had at least one
1
Interview with SOBSI leaders in East Java. The total 
of 5*10»000 members included 130,000 seasonal workers.
2
Interview with leaders of SOBSI in Jogjakarta.
3 Munir, Pedoman, pp.21-2.
f u l l - t i m e r In  November I960 th e r e  were 1 a b o u t 7 ,0 0 0
A
b a s i c  o r g a n i z a t i o n s . *
T hus, w i th in  J a v a  SOBSI i t s e l f  m a in ta in s  a la r g e  
s t a f f  a t  th e  c e n t r e  and  i n  th e  l a r g e  c i t i e s ,  and  an 
a v e ra g e  o f  p e rh a p s  two f u l l - t i m e r s  f o r  e a c h  o f  th e  
a p p ro x im a te ly  100 to  130 b ra n c h e s  in  th e  i s l a n d .  T h is  
w ould mean a b o u t 300 SOBSI f u l l - t i m e r s  in  J a v a  a lo n e ,  
added  to  w hich  i s  th e  num ber o f  f u l l - t i m e r s  o f  th e  member 
u n io n s  w h ich  m ust re a c h  to  w e ll  o v e r 1 ,0 0 0  and p ro b a b ly  
much h i g h e r .  W ith t h i s  now w e l l - t r a i n e d  and i n d o c t r i ­
n a te d  c a d re  f o r c e ,  SOBSI, and th e r e f o r e  PKI, i s  a b le  to  
o rg a n iz e  o v e r 50  p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  u n io n iz e d  In d o n e s ia n  
w o rk e rs  and  m o b il iz e  them f o r  PKI*s p o l i t i c a l  a d v a n ta g e . 
B ut b e fo r e  ex am in in g  th e  w ork SOBSI and i t s  member u n io n s  
have  done in  o r d e r  to  win t h e i r  m em bers, a b r i e f  s e c t i o n  
w i l l  i n d i c a t e  th e  m ajo r SOBSI u n io n s  so a s  to  show where 
SOBSI and  PKI h ave  t h e i r  g r e a t e s t  s t r e n g t h  among th e  
w o rk e rs .
4* The SOBSI member u n io n s . The SOBSI u n io n s  a re  
n o t  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  th e  to w n s . Some o f  th e  l a r g e s t  u n io n s  
*are com posed o f  p e o p le  who a r e  s t i l l  bound to  v i l l a g e  and
SOBSI, F orw ard  f o r  th e  C o n s is te n t  R e a l i z a t i o n ,  p .1 .
1
Acountry life with its traditional social ties1 23: Sarbupri,
the estate workers' union, SBG, the sugar workers' union, 
and Sarbuksi, the forestry workers* union. In the first 
years after 1950, when Sarbupri was still the only 
important estate workers' union, membership claims of
700.000 were made. More reasonable were those for
370.000 and 390,000 made in October 1956.^ The SBG, 
founded on March 3» 1946, claimed 305,000 members in 
1957» including seasonal and non-active workers;^ Sarbuksi 
in May 1960 claimed 250,000 members,^ but many of these 
too would be seasonal workers. Other S0BSI unions with 
large memberships that include a high number of seasonal 
and rural workers are: SEBDA, founded in June 1947 for 
workers and employees of local government at the kabupaten 
and autonomous town level, with a claimed membership of
82.000 in May 1960; and SBPU, for workers of the pro­
vincial-level autonomous regions, with 48,000 claimed
9P.7
1 Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, p.80.
2
BB, October 10, 1956, p.3; October 24» 1956, p.3* These 
figures correlate closely with Goldberg's estimate in 1952 
that Sarbupri membership was 350,000 or a little more; 
Goldberg, Gerakan Buruh, p.19*
3 BB, March 13, 1957» p*3; Tedjasukmana, The Political 
Character, p.31.
1o o o 
{*> o
members in May 1960. All of the above five unions have 
proved important channels by which communist cadres and 
sympathies as well as the rudimentary consciousness of 
class and of the importance of organization have entered 
rural areas.
Control of transportation would be a vital weapon 
in the event of a political crisis in Indonesia, and with 
the trend towards a possible showdown between PKI and the 
army, the PKI sixth national congress in September 1959
pcalled for improved work among the transport workers.
The largest of the SOBSI transport workers* unions is 
that for railwayman, SBKA, founded in March 1946, and 
claiming 68,000 members in May 1960.-^  The second 
largest, SBPP, was formed in 1950 as a merger of several 
seamen*s and harbour workers* unions, and in 1956 declared 
50,000 members.^4- SBKB, for chauffeurs, truck drivers and 
other workers in motor transport, claimed 50,000 members 
in 1956. In 1955 the SOBSI post, telegraph and telephone 
workers’ union claimed 50,000 members, but lost most of
1
HR, May 21, I960; May 7, I960.
2
PKI, Resolusi tentang Laporan Umum CC PKI Kepada Kongres 
Nasional ke-VI (Resolution on the PKI Central Committee’s 
General Report to the Sixth National Congress), Djakarta, 
1959, p.90.
3 HR, May 7, I960.
4 Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, pp.21, 31«
these when a rival non-communist union was established in 
1956. SERBAUD, for workers and employees in air 
transport, has less than 3,000 members*
In the industrial sphere, SOBSI unions are strong 
among textile workers, oil workers, miners, cigarette 
workers, and metal industry workers* The textile and 
clothing workers* union, including batik workers, claimed
A65*000 members in May 1960* The oilworkers' union 
claimed 60,000 members in July 1950 when it was formed as 
a merger of four vertical and two local unions; in 
November 1959 it claimed only 30,000.2 The miners* 
union claimed 19*570 members in 1956, the cigarette 
workers* union 51,000 in 1957, and the metal industry 
workers' union 8,685 in February 1957*^
Of the approximately 800,000 government officials 
and employees, not including 'workers', SOBSI claims that 
531*9U6 are members of 40 SOBSI unions.^ Among the more
1
HR, May 6, 1960*2
HR, July 20, 1951* and November 26, 1959; Thahib, "The 
Indonesian Oil Workers Form a Single Union", World Trade 
Union Movement, February 1-15, 1952, p*34.
3 Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, p*32*
k BB, July 15, 1959* p.2; SOBSI, Forward for the 
Consistent Realization, p*1* I am not sure if these 
figures include employees and officials of the autonomous 
districts and towns.
important SOBSI unions of government employees is the 
union for Ministry of Defence employees, with a claimed 
membership of 60,000, A small but perhaps in the long 
run politically important union is the SB Kependjaraan of 
prison workers and employees. This union has no 
competitor. In April 1958 it claimed 8,736 members in 
217 prisons, out of a total of 10,500 employees in 344 
prisons and prison offices, and reported that it was 
still growing rapidly.
Another SOBSI union worthy of note is Sarbufis, for 
film and stage workers, with a claimed membership of 
5,320 in 1956.2 34 Included in Sarbufis are actors of 
ketoprak,^  a popular traditional Javanese drama form which 
is often given contemporary political content,
5* The 'moderate1 SOBSI policy.^ During 1950» 1951 
and the early part of 1952 the SOBSI leaders were con­
cerned to use in militant action against the employers the 
genuine grievances of the workers at the miserably low
1
BB, April 30, 1958, p,6.
2
Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, p,32.
3 BB, September 30, 1957> p*1«
4 ~The term SOBSI here includes also its member unions 
because general policy comes from PKI and is implemented 
throughout the SOBSI organization and unions.
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wages and th e  g r o s s l y  d e f i c i e n t  work c o n d i t i o n s  and
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  A h a l t  t o  t h i s  ' s e c t a r i a n i s m 1 2 was
c a l l e d  i n  a PKI c e n t r a l  committee  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  March 1,
1952 which  e l a b o r a t e d  t h e  r o l e  SOBSI was to  p l a y  i n  t h e
1
n ew ly  e v o lv e d  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  p o l i c y .  SOBSI was 
t o  o r g a n i z e  t h e  b r o a d e s t  p o s s i b l e  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s ,  
c o o p e r a t e  w i th  t h e  non-SOBSI u n i o n s ,  and even  m a i n t a i n  
f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s .
A c co rd in g  t o  the  c e n t r a l  comm ittee  r e s o l u t i o n ,  'The 
w o r k e r s '  f r o n t  must  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  s t r o n g e s t ,  most u n i t e d ,  
most  p r o g r e s s i v e  and most  c o n s c io u s  f r o n t  in  t h e  b r o a d
p
n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t ' .  In  o r d e r  t o  a t t r a c t  t h e  mass
o f  w o rk e r s  and a l s o  e s t a b l i s h  good r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r
t r a d e  u n io n s  and t h e  e m p lo y e r s :
t h e  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  w o rk in g  c l a s s  t h a t  a r e  a l r e a d y  
m i l i t a n t  must p u rg e  th e m s e lv e s  o f  s e c t a r i a n  
d i s e a s e s  and o f  empty ' l e f t '  s l o g a n s  . . .
S e c t a r i a n i s m  i s  a d i s e a s e  t h a t  must  be  c e a s e l e s s l y  
and v i o l e n t l y  e r a d i c a t e d .  Only by  th e  rem oval  o f  
s e c t a r i a n i s m  can  th e  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  w ork in g  c l a s s  
who a r e  a l r e a d y  m i l i t a n t  a t t r a c t  t h e  mass o f  
w o rk e r s  who a r e  s t i l l  b ackw ard ,  and draw th e  
e n t i r e  p e o p le  i n t o  th e  s t r u g g l e  f o r  peace  and 
na  t i o n a 1 in d e  pendenc e •3
Even a s t r o n g  w o r k e r s '  u n i t e d  f r o n t ,  i n c l u d i n g  a 
l a r g e  number o f  m i l i t a n t  w o rk e r s  and c o o p e r a t i o n  tow ards
1
PKI, Kewadjiban F r o n t  P e r s a t u a n  Buruh (The Duty o f  t h e  
Workers* U n i t e d  F r o n t ) ,  D j a k a r t a ,  1952, 24 p .
2 3
I b i d . , p . 19. I b i d . , p .2 3
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common g o a l s  b e tw een  SOBSI and  non-SOBSI u n io n s ,  would 
n o t  be  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s t r o n g ,  so  th e  PKI c e n t r a l  com m ittee  
r e s o l u t i o n  c la im e d ,  to  w i t h s t a n d  th e  i m p e r i a l i s t s  and 
i n t e r n a l  r e a c t i o n a r i e s .  T h e re fo re  th e  w o r k e r s 1 f r o n t  
(w hich  i n  f a c t  meant SOBSI and  any  a l l i a n c e  be tw een  SOBSI 
and  o t h e r  u n io n s )  had  to  e s t a b l i s h  and  m a in ta in  good 
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  o t h e r  c l a s s e s .  T h is  c o u ld  o n ly  be done 
by  t o n in g  down th e  w orke rs*  a c t i o n s ,  by  u n io n  s u p p o r t  f o r  
th e  demands o f  o t h e r  c l a s s e s ,  and b y  w inn ing  th e  f r i e n d s h i p  
o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  e m p lo y e rs .
The c e n t r a l  com m ittee  c a l l e d  on th e  w o rk e rs  t o  e n s u re
t h a t  any  a c t i o n  th e y  to o k  f u l f i l l e d  t h r e e  c o n d i t i o n s :  t h a t
i t  was c o n s i d e r e d  c o r r e c t  and  j u s t  by  th e  m a j o r i t y  o f  th e
p e o p le  and s o  r e c e i v e d  t h e i r  sym pathy and s u p p o r t ;  t h a t
i t  was b eg u n  where t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e s s  was g r e a t ;
and t h a t  i t  was begun  and c o n c lu d e d  a t  th e  c o r r e c t  t im e .
But a t  th e  same tim e a s  l i m i t i n g  t h e i r  own demands and
th e  m i l i t a n c y  o f  t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  th e  w o rk e rs  had  to  l e n d
s u p p o r t  t o  th e  demands o f  o t h e r  c l a s s e s  who s h o u ld  be
in c lu d e d  i n  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t :
T hrough a c t i o n s  o f  s o l i d a r i t y ,  th ro u g h  sym pathy  
s t r i k e s  and  o t h e r  fo rm s o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  
t h a t  a r e  i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  t h a t  can  r e c e i v e  th e  
sym pathy  o f  and b e  s u p p o r te d  by  th e  b ro a d  
m a sse s ,  th e  I n d o n e s ia n  w o rk e rs  w i l l  s t e e l  th e  
f i g h t i n g  u n i t y  o f  th e  m asse s ,  and  w i l l  g r a d u a l l y  
emerge to  th e  f o r e  as  th e  d e fe n d e r  o f  d e m o c ra t ic
rights and freedom, the champion of peace, 
the leader, the uniter of all groups of the 
people and the builder of the national 
united front.*
The workers, as an instrument of the Party's national 
united front policy, were even instructed by the central 
committee resolution to strive to remove any hostility 
felt towards them by the national industrialists. The 
workers had to explain that sometimes they would demand 
improvements, but at the same time they would have to 
assist the national industrialists in their struggle 
against imperialist monopoly and explain that a people’s 
democracy, the workers’ political goal, would guarantee 
the existence of the national industrialists.
A SOBSI national conference from September 27 to 
October 12, 1952 accepted the role of SOBSI within the 
national united front policy. ’Sectarianism and the 
"closed-door” policy were thrown far away.'2 A new 
constitution was adopted, to be endorsed by the second 
national congress in January 1955» from which were 
deleted all terms that sounded communistic, such as 
’socialism,’ ’democratic centralism,’ ’people's democracy' 
and ’class struggle’, ’because they have created a
1
Ibid., PP.23-U.2
B.O. Hutapea, "Menjambut Tahun 1953M (Welcoming 1953)> 
BM, December 1952, p.163.
division between the SOBSI unions and those who belong to
Ano trade union federation*• The SOBSI central bureau
explained that the 1947 constitution had stated SOBSI’s
intention *to mobilize all workers to achieve a socialist
society*, but because the revolution had failed:
the duty of the Indonesian workers now is not 
to oppose capitalism and build a socialist 
society, but, together with the peasants, the 
petty bourgeois and the non-compradore 
national bourgeois, to oppose imperialism and 
build a people*s democratic society as the 
first step . •• towards a socialist society.
B.O. Hutapea, prominent in both PKI and SOBSI, wrote
an article in September 1952 which explained the new line
taken towards the national industrialists. He repeated
the PKI argument that small and medium capital, which is
usually Indonesian, developed an opposition to giant
capital and could therefore side with the anti-
imperialists.
The proletariat must be able to mobilize this 
strength /of the small and medium capitalist^7, 
not only by supporting the economic and social 
demands of the national industrialists ... but
1
A. M. Adinda, ’’Menjambut Lahirnja Konstitusi Baru SOBSI’* 
(Welcoming SOBSI*s New Constitution), Zaman Baru, October 
15, 1952, p.3.2
Zaman Baru, August 30, 1952, p.1.
3 B. O. Hutapea, "Sikap SOBSI Terhadap ’Modal Nasional*” 
(SOBSI*s Attitude towards ’National Capital’), Zaman Baru 
September 30, 1952, pp.11-13, 16.
a l s o  by  l i m i t i n g  th e  demands o f  th e  w o rk e rs  
who work in  t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  th ough  w ith o u t 
n e g le c t i n g  th e  w o rk e rs .
U nder th e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n  draw n up by  th e  1952
c o n fe r e n c e ,  m em bership  o f  SOBSI was opened  t o :
a l l  o rg a n iz e d  w o rk e rs , th ro u g h  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t iv e  t r a d e  u n io n s ,  . . .  i r r e s p e c t i v e  
o f  e th n ic  o r i g i n ,  d e s c e n t ,  s e x ,  r e l i g i o n  
and  p o l i t i c a l  c o n v i c t i o n . '
The f i c t i o n  o f  SOBSI’s p o l i t i c a l  ind ep en d en ce  h a s  b e e n
m e t ic u lo u s ly  m a in ta in e d  down to  th e  p r e s e n t .  In  November
1957» f o r  ex am p le , th e  SOBSI le a d e r s  c la im e d  t h a t :
In  SOBSI we s e e  e ac h  p e rs o n  i s  f r e e  to  choose 
th e  p a r t y  he l i k e s .  We have p e rs o n s  from  
M asjum i, PK I, PNI and so  o n , and  a l a r g e  p a r t  
a r e  n o n - p a r ty  p e r s o n s .2
At th e  same tim e  th e  l e a d e r s  f u r t h e r  c la im e d  t h a t :
The a t t i t u d e  o f  SOBSI to w ard s  th e  p a r t i e s  i s  
d e te rm in e d  b y  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  
th e  p a r t i e s  f o r  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  w o rk e rs  
i n  g e n e r a l  . . . .  The sym pathy o f  SOBSI and  
th e  w o rk e rs  f o r  PKI i s  b e c a u se  PKI i n  words 
and  d eed s  i s  a lw ay s  a c t iv e  in  f i g h t i n g  f o r  
th e  w o rk e r s 1 2 i n t e r e s t s .  T h is  a t t i t u d e  o f  
SOBSI i s  a l s o  h e ld  to w ard s  o th e r  p a r t i e s  t h a t  
c a r r y  o u t  a programme t h a t  b e n e f i t s  th e
w o rk e r s .3
P resu m ab ly  t h i s  f i c t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  in d ep en d en ce  
m ust be  aim ed to  d e c e iv e  th e  ra n k  and f i l e  members and
1
SOBSI, K o n s t i t u s i  SOBSI, p .2 0 .
2
BB, November 29 > 1957» p *1 .
I b i d . , p .U .
3
p o te n t i a l  members who a re  non-communist b u t n o t
9 or
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p o l i t i c a l l y  co n sc io u s . I t  cou ld  h a rd ly  be expected  to
dece iv e  non-communist p o l i t i c i a n s  and tra d e  u n io n is ts .
P robab ly  an o th e r  purpose o f  t h i s  f i c t i o n  i s  to  o f f i c i a l l y
d is s o c ia te  SOBSI from PKI so th a t  i f  th e  l a t t e r  were to
be su b je c te d  to  r e p re s s io n , SOBSI could  c laim  immunity as
a p o l i t i c a l l y  independent o rg a n iz a tio n .
S ince 1952 the SOBSI le a d e r s ,  im plem enting the
n a t io n a l  u n ite d  f ro n t  p o lic y , have been u n w illin g  to
an tag o n ize  e i th e r  th e  government o r th e  n a t io n a l  em ployers.
In  the  words o f  th e  c e n t r a l  bureau  re p o r t  to  th e  September
1957 n a t io n a l  co n fe ren ce :
A ll p ersons and g roups, i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n ,  r e l ig io u s  c o n v ic tio n , 
e th n ic  group, and p a r ty ,  who a re  n o t proved 
to  be agen ts  o f  Dutch monopoly and who a re  
n o t proved to  be ag en ts  o f  th e  warmongers, 
a re  the  f r ie n d s  o f  the  w o rk e rs .1 2
Only those who had proved them selves to  be 'v e ry  r e a c t io n ­
a r y ' were to  be com batted, w hile towards o th e rs  'we must 
av o id  ex cess iv e  dem ands' in  th e  in t e r e s t s  o f  the  b ro a d e s t 
p o s s ib le  u n i ty .  N jono, speak ing  to  the  n a t io n a l  co u n c il 
a t  th e  end o f December 1958, e la b o ra te d  on the  theme o f
1
SOBSI in e f f e c tu a l ly  claim ed such immunity a t  th e  end o f 
August 1960 when th re e  re g io n a l army commanders p laced  
tem porary bans on the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  PKI and a s s o c ia te d  
o rg a n iz a tio n s .
2
SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p.25*
different categories of antagonism within society and the 
different methods to he employed for their solution: 
contradictions that arose between the workers and the 
armed forces, the current cabinet, and the national
Abusinessmen, were not major ones. They should be solved 
by democratic means1 in order to strengthen the national 
unity required to solve the most fundamental contra­
diction, that between the Indonesian people and 
imperialism.
Prom the formation of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo 
cabinet on August 1, 1953» until the end of 1959» with 
the exception of the brief period of the Masjumi-led 
Burhanudin Harahap cabinet, SOBSI carefully avoided 
blaming the government for the deteriorating economic 
situation, instead blaming the imperialists and their 
agents. What is more, the SOBSI leaders frequently 
stated their desire to assist in the economic development 
of the country. In November 1937 the SOBSI national 
conference declared of the government’s five-year plan 
that ’the trade unions must assist in its accomplishment*, 
and stated SOBSI ’s policy to be that of ’struggle within 
_
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th e  framework o f  th e  coun try*s economic developm ent*;
in  th e  same month a SOBSI re p re s e n ta t iv e  p a r t ic ip a te d  in
th e  governm ent-sponsored n a t io n a l  c o n s u lta t iv e  conference
2on r e c o n s tru c t io n ;  and in  August 1959 a SOBSI re p re ­
s e n ta t iv e  to o k  h is  p la ce  on the  S ukarno-appoin ted  
N a tio n a l P lan n in g  C ouncil e n tru s te d  w ith  th e  ta s k  o f  
fo rm u la tin g  a com prehensive p la n  fo r  n a t io n a l  developm ent. 
A fte r  th e  government ta k e -o v e r o f  Dutch e n te rp r is e s  in  
December 1957» b o th  SOBSI and PKI pledged th e i r  support 
to  the e f f o r t s  to  keep them ru n n in g .
C oncerning th e  non-governm ent Indonesian  em ployers, 
SOBSI has n o t o n ly  l im i te d  i t s  demands upon them, b u t has 
co n tin u ed  to  d e c la re  th a t  i t s  unions ’always a s s i s t  the  
n a t io n a l  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  to  overcome th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
fa c in g  thern*.-^ SOBSI even has s ta te d  i t s  d e s ire  to  
r a i s e  p ro d u c tiv i ty  and e f f ic ie n c y  in  t h e i r  e n te r p r is e s  on
A
1
S u g ir i ,  ’’The G reat H orizons Open to  Indonesian  Trade 
U nions”, World Trade Union Movement, August-Septem ber 
1958, p.U2.
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The speech o f  th e  SOBSI r e p re s e n ta t iv e  in  the conference 
has been p u b lish ed  in  b o o k le t form as Runturam bi, P o l i t i k  
Pembangunan S ekarang , 22 p .
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Njono, Tegakkan P an d ji-P an d .ii P ersa tu an  (Uphold th e  
Banners o f  U n ity )’/" D ja k a r ta , 1958, p .§ .
Athe basis of mutual profit# Such magnanimity could be
carried too far, however, and the PKI leaders rejected
the idea of an increase-production movement to welcome
the sixth Party congress on the grounds that such a
movement ’could even be a good deed for the bourgeoisie
or for the enemies of the people, so that it could harm 
2the people ’.
At the PKI congress in September 1959 Aidit once 
again expressed concern at the danger of radical labour 
action.^ He said that economic instability, a decline 
in the people’s standard of living, the threat of mass 
dismissals and efforts to reduce trade union rights had 
caused:
unrest among the working masses and may 
result in desperate or extremely radical 
measures if they are not given correct 
leadership. That is why greater attention 
must be given to improving work in the basic 
o rganizations•
In other words, PKI, and therefore SOBSI, was not only not 
inciting the workers to militant action, but, for the sake
1
SOBSI, Program SOBSI Mengenal Perbaikan Ekonomi guna 
Perbaikan t?pan dan Djaminan Sosial kaum Buruh (SOBSI’s 
Programme for Improving the Economy in order to Improve 
the Workers’ Wages and Social Security), Djakarta, 1955»
pp.12-13.
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of the national united front policy, was preparing to 
restrain them from radical measures provoked by the 
worsening economic situation.
Since the beginning of 1952, then, SOBSI and its 
unions have moderated their demands and actions for the 
sake of PKI's national united front. The emphasis has 
been on Reasonable and just1 demands, on the solution 
of disputes between the workers and national employers, 
governmental and private, by friendly means. This has 
not decreased SOBSI*s attractiveness for the Indonesian 
workers for four reasons. First, SOBSI has far greater 
finances, personnel and zeal with which to make its 
presence felt among the workers. Second, almost all 
other trade union organizations are either tied to 
political parties associated with one or more cabinet - 
and therefore strictly limited in the militancy they could 
show and associated with the cabinets f failure to improve 
the condition of the workers or they are specifically 
religious groupings with a severely limited potential 
membership among the largely abangan workers. Third, the 
great majority of Indonesian workers, as the PKI central
1
SOBSI, Masaalah Front Persatuan Buruh (The Question of 
the Workers1 United ^ront), Djakarta, 1959> p«32.
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committee resolution of March 1, 1952 indicated, are 
loath to take radical action. And, fourth, SOBSI has 
been, despite its moderation and reasonableness, the most 
effective defender of the workers* interests, the most 
courageous in pressing for improvements in wages and 
working conditions.
The following section deals with SOBSI*s work in 
defence of the workers* interests, that is, SOBSI*s basic 
trade union work by which it has won the allegiance of 
over 50 per cent or organized workers in Indonesia.
6. SOBSI*s defence of the workers* interests. It is 
outside the scope of this thesis to make a detailed 
analysis of all the work undertaken by SOBSI and its 
member unions in the promotion of the workers* interests, 
but this section discusses some aspects of this work, 
namely, the struggle for trade union freedoms, the formu­
lation of comprehensive and popular programmes of demands, 
and some examples of large and small successes achieved 
by SOBSI unions for their members.
SOBSI protests were in part instrumental in ending 
the prohibition of strikes in *vital* industries issued 
first by some regional army commanders in the latter half 
of 1950 and then by the Natsir government at the beginning
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Aof 195*1* The emergency law which replaced it in
September 1951 removed the prohibition but established
a compulsory labour disputes arbitration system and laid
down rules which in effect greatly restricted the
2opportunity for strikes or lock-outs. This also drew 
SOBSI criticism, but it became less raucous when the 
national united front policy was put into practice.
Partly as a result of SOBSI and PKI demands, the September 
195*1 regulation was replaced by a new law in June 1958 
which laid down a slightly altered arbitration system, but 
which brought trade union representatives into the arbi­
tration committees.^ Meanwhile, however, the state of 
emergency decreed in March 1957 had placed far greater 
restrictions on trade union freedom. Because the PKI 
wished to antagonize neither Sukarno, who had issued the 
decree, nor the army, which played a major administrative
1
The Natsir governments regulation is given in 
Kernenterian Perburuhan (Ministry of Labour), Peraturan 
Perburuhan dan Per a tu ran Administrasi PerburuEarPlLa^bour 
Regulations and Labour Administration Regulations), 
Djakarta, 1953» PP.435-40.2
The September 1951 emergency law is given in Kementerian 
Perburuhan, Himpunan Peraturan-Peraturan Perburuhan (19U5- 
1955) (Collection of Labour Regulations, 1945-1955)/ 
Djakarta, 1955> pp.41-9.
3 Interview with Surjanatakusuma, secretary of the central 
labour disputes arbitration and conciliation committee 
since its founding in 1951*
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role under the decree, SOBSI made few open protests at 
the infringement of trade union freedom - nor did it 
protest when, on August 14, 1957» strikes were prohibited 
in ’vital* enterprises, which meant that virtually all 
strikes would be illegal*
With the general economic deterioration, in which 
continuous and sometimes rapid inflation has constantly 
reduced the already low real value of wages, SOBSI has 
found no difficulty in discovering grievances to represent. 
More or less comprehensive lists of demands have been 
presented to the government on each May Day and New Year, 
by each SOBSI congress, conference and national council 
meeting, and during periods of cabinet formation* SOBSI 
has gained popularity by its repeated demands for wages 
to be adjusted in line with price increases, for the 
provision of essential commodities at low prices, for a 
Lebaran bonus equal to one month’s pay, for the provision of 
increased job opportunities, and for the prohibition of 
mass dismissals.
The scope of the SOBSI programmes of demands is
illustrated by those drawn up by the SOBSI leadership for
■]endorsement by the August 1960 national congress. Within 
1
The programmes of demands endorsed by the January 1955 
congress were not quite so full* They are given in 
SOBSI, Program SOBSI, pp.13-27«
the draft "Programme of Demands for National Economic 
Development", designed to appeal to all sections of 
workers, were 80 points grouped under the headings ’lower 
prices and speed up production1 2, ’nationalize Dutch 
enterprises and strengthen the state’s sector of the 
economy*, ’increase internal production and implement 
foreign economic relations of benefit to Indonesia’, 
measures for increasing the production of rice, textiles, 
oil, sugar and fish, and measures for improving communi- 
cations. The draft programme of social and economic 
demands was divided into six categories: a general 
category dealing with trade union rights and democracy;
44 demands for government employees; four demands for 
workers in the former Dutch enterprises; 37 demands for 
workers in private enterprises, with special sub-headings 
for workers in large foreign enterprises, in national 
enterprises, and in small enterprises; two demands for 
young workers; and six ’for the rights and interests of
pwomen workers’. Thus the SOBSI leaders try to appeal 
to the working class as a whole and to each worker in his 
particular employment.
1
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Obviously lists of demands without concrete results 
would hardly serve to maintain SOBSI membership. Examples 
of some of the major successes achieved by SOBSI since 
1949 are given.
The first major SOBSI success was the Sarbupri strike
of August and September 1950 when work in virtually all
private estates was brought to a halt. The government
finally intervened and established a minimum wage for
estate workers that was far higher than the previous
2average wage rate. Also in 1950 the oil workers 
successfully struck against dismissals and for workers*
3compensation and a non-contributory pension. In 
September 1953 Sarbupri strike action forced the govern­
ment to alter a decision of the arbitration committee and
grant a 30 per cent wage increase at a time of stable 
4prices. SOBSI successes during 1955 included general
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Movement", World Trade Union Movement, May 1-15» 1953» p.20.
4 Hutomo, "Indonesian Plantation Vforkers Want Higher 
Wages", World Trade Union Movement, October 16-31> 1953» 
p.30; Bank Indonesia, Report for the Year 1953-1954» 
Djakarta, 1954, p.143*
victory of the demand for Lebaran "bonuses, wage increases
of 10 to 20 per cent for workers in private industry, the
free or cheap distribution of essential commodities in
some enterprises, a new wage scale for government
employees and workers, and considerable increases in
wages and benefits for workers in the Shell and Standard
Vacuum oil companies. In 1956 strong SOBSI and PKI
opposition was in part responsible for the failure of the
plan of the Minister of Finance to cut drastically the
number of government employees.
During 1957 SOBSI claimed as successful its efforts
to obtain a provisional wage increase for government 
2workers. In the latter half of 1958 all trade unions 
of government workers jointly raised the demand for a 
minimum wage of 135 rupiahs per month, a demand previously 
raised only by SOBSI; in December a resolution incorpo­
rating this demand was tabled by PKI and SOBSI members of 
parliament, and was carried unanimously, accepted by the
3government, and put into effect as of January 1, 1959*
1
Njono, Tegakkan, pp,8-9; RI, April 1957» pp.29-30,2
Njono, "Some Problems of the Indonesian Workers”, ITUN, 
May 1957, p.U.
3 Ngadiman Suseno, "Successes in the Beginning of the 
Year", ITUN, February-April 1959, p.9; HR, December 18 
and 19, 1958.
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When the government took over the Dutch enterprises in 
December 1957» a grave dislocation of inter-island 
shipping occurred and at the end of 1958 several tens of 
thousands of harbour workers and seamen were still fully 
unemployed. SOBSI then proposed that seamen of the 
former Dutch shipping company who were still unemployed 
should receive full pay until they found work; the 
government agreed to give full pay until the middle of 
1959.1 2
Most of SOBSI*s social-economic successes have not, 
however, been in the spectacular category. They have been 
won under the slogan formulated at the end of 1951» 'small
pbut successful*, as opposed to 'large but failed*.
Within the scope of such 'small but successful* actions 
are demands for small wage increases, the issue of work 
clothes, the provision of a trade union room, sports 
facilities, meal breaks, and increased distributions of 
essential commodities free or at low prices.
The above scattered examples of successful SOBSI 
action in the promotion of the workers * interests indicate 
that SOBSI has effectively proved its worth as an
1
ITUN, January 1959» PP*7-8.2
Ngadiman, "Apa 'Ketjil Hasil' Itu?" (What is 'Small but 
Successful'?), BB, December 20, 1957» p.3«
efficient industrial organization. A comparison of the
socio-economic gains won by SOBSI through the use of all
means at its disposal with those won by other trade
union organizations, suggests that SOBSI has been far
more active and successful in the basic trade union work
«1which attracts members and binds them to a trade union.
7. SOBSI*s relations with other trade unions. A PKI
central committee resolution of March 1, 1952 viciously
attacked the non-SOBSI unions but expressed nonetheless
pthe need to cooperate with them. SOBSI was slow to 
seek unity with the competing unions it had been 
denouncing as imperialist agents, but gradually developed 
an increasing enthusiasm for this work. The main fields 
of cooperation have been three: joint committees of trade 
unions in particular fields of work, joint committees for 
national celebrations, particularly for May Day, and joint 
trade union delegations to fill invitations to the Soviet 
bloc countries.
What is called the cooperation meeting of government 
employees* trade unions was established in 1953 with
1
This general conclusion was reached largely through 
interviews with officials of the Ministry of Labour, and 
especially with officials of the labour disputes 
arbitration and conciliation service.
2
PKI, Kewadjiban, pp.17-18.
originally 32 members, and grew to include 71 unions and
«190 per cent of all government workers by July 1959*
The cooperation meeting of trade unions in foreign 
enterprises was established in 1955» and by January 1960 
was reported to include 40 unions with 1^ million
pmembers. The cooperation body of estate workers'
organizations was formed in 1957 and included Sarbupri
plus seven major non-SOBSI unions.^ By September 1957,
a cooperation meeting of oil workers' unions had also
h.begun to function.
The first joint May Day committee was formed in 1953 
when SOBSI and five other trade union federations, 
including PNI's KBKI, established a central committee.^ 
Joint May Day celebrations have been held in succeeding 
years. The countries of the Soviet bloc early invited 
the Indonesian trade unions to send joint delegations on 
free visits. One of the earliest reported joint
1
SOBS1 2345, Sedjarah, p.95; BB> July 15, 1959, p.2. SOBSI claimed that of the workers represented in the 'meeting' 
in July 1959 sixty per cent belonged to SOBSI unions.
2
SOBSI, Sedjarah, p.95; HR, January 7, I960.
3 HR, December 3, 1959; interview with Iskander Wahono, 
secretary-general of KBKI, the PNI trade union federation.
4 SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p.18.
5 HR, March 30 and 31, 1953.
delegations attended the 1953 May Day celebrations in 
Peking and the seventh all-China congress of trade unions, 
and then went on a tour from Mukden to Canton. Since 
1953 the flow of joint trade union delegations to the
pSoviet bloc has been considerable.
The question arises, have the joint actions 
benefitted SOBSI? And the answer would appear to be 
negative. Joint meetings have provided SOBSI leaders 
with broader audiences, but they have also presented the 
SOBSI rank and file as an audience for the non-SOBSI 
leaders. Joint actions, especially through the various 
cooperation meetings and bodies, have apparently brought 
the unions greater success than individual action would
1
World Trade Union Movement, July 16-31> 1953» pp.9-10.On their return, the SOBSI and non-communist GSBI 
delegates issued a joint statement full of praise for the 
Chinese government, and concluding with the call to all 
Indonesian trade unionists:
to take more positive action to form a workers* 
united front. With their united strength the 
Indonesian workers can certainly take the road 
of China, free themselves from the shackles of 
imperialism and build up their homeland.
2 44 Indonesian trade unionists were invited, for example, 
to attend May Day celebrations in 1957• 20 to China, 11 to 
the Soviet Union, 8 to North Korea, 3 to North Viet Nam, 
and 2 to East Germany. Of the 44» only 16 were from 
SOBSI, while 18 were from other trade union federations,
3 from non-federated unions, 1 from the communist-led 
village officials* association, and 6 from unidentified 
unions. BB, April 24> 1957> p«6.
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have achieved, hut all unions benefit from them and 
especially the smaller unions, usually non-SOBSI, whose 
bargaining position would otherwise be much weaker. It 
is also possible that SOBSI's efforts towards trade union 
unity have in fact brought the non-SOBSI unions closer 
together. In the period from 1950 to 1960 trade union 
organization was characterized by the fragmentation of 
existing non-SOBSI federations and the creation of a 
large number of new federations and new unfederated 
unions - in other words, the opposite of a trend towards 
unity. On SOBSI initiative, however, the non-SOBSI 
federations and unions were brought together on various 
joint committees and for joint actions. Recently they 
have begun to hold informal talks among themselves in 
order to prevent SOBSI control of the joint committees 
and actions, and a trend towards non-SOBSI trade union 
unity has been observable.
In other words, S0BSI*s friendship towards and 
cooperation with the non-SOBSI trade union federations and 
non-federated unions have not been of direct benefit to 
SOBSI itself.2 The policy has been dictated by PKIfs
1
Interview with Iskander Wahono.
2
The only post-1950 example of militant action by SOBSI 
against another trade union perhaps gives some evidence 
that SOBSI would have benefitted from more aggressive
overriding concern to pursue the national united front 
policy at the level of national politics.
8. SOBSI*s political usefulness to PKI. Efficient 
trade union work in the defence of the workers* interests 
is not the primary purpose of SOBSI under the guidance of 
the Aidit leadership. That work is necessary in order to 
attract the broad mass of the workers, but the primary 
goal of the PKI leaders is to create in SOBSI, as in every 
mass organization, an organization that can lend support 
to the Party’s political struggle. Until the present, 
SOBSI has proved politically useful in a number of related 
ways: it has provided a source of Party cadres and 
members, it has provided a platform for pro-communist 
propaganda, and it has been a valuable assistant in 
supporting and strengthening the Party in its relations 
with the other political forces. The Aidit leadership 
also has endeavoured to create in SOBSI a major source of 
strength that could prove decisive in the event of a 
political showdown.
The communist leaders of SOBSI and its member unions 
are constantly searching for potential Party cadres and
action. In May 1955» SOBSI used its members to break a 
strike by the PSI-led KBSI, and SOBSI leaders claimed 
later that the collapse of the strike and the ’unmasking* 
of the KBSI leaders caused many members of KBSI unions to 
leave them and join SOBSI.
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activists among their members, and use the SOBSI 
educational machinery, both formal and informal, to raise 
and guide the political consciousness of their own cadres 
and activists to the point where they voluntarily enter 
PKI. Through their publications, bulletin boards and 
cadres, SOBSI and its unions have faithfully publicized 
the current PKI line and PKI*s defence of the workers* 
interests. And SOBSI, like the other communist-led mass 
organizations, has been an important vehicle for preparing 
the way for the geographical spread of the Party.
The assistance SOBSI has given PKI in the latter*s 
political struggle is far more complex, and can be 
considered under four headings: the mobilization of 
electoral support, assistance in creating a favourable 
atmosphere for the development of the national united 
front policy, direct pressure to assist PKI on particular 
issues, and additional support for PKI in conferences and 
governmental bodies.
In the two national elections of 1955 and the local 
elections of 1957/1958, SOBSI played a significant part 
in mobilizing votes for PKI. Before the 1955 elections, 
SOBSI appointed, at all levels down to the basic organi­
zation, general election action committees or special 
cadres with the task of assisting in the election
Acampaigns; and on July 15, 1955 the SOBSI secretariat
issued a call to all member unions and all SOBSI regional
committees and branches to prepare the workers for voting
by showing them how to punch the hole through the
2appropriate symbol on the voting paper, SOBSI was also 
used to distribute PKI literature and mobilize crowds for 
Party meetings.
We have seen how SOBSI has adopted a moderate pose 
in its dealings with the government and Indonesian 
employers, and how it has sought cooperation with non- 
SOBSI unions, - all in order to create the impression 
that communists are reasonable, responsible persons, and 
worthwhile allies, SOBSI*s moderation and even friendli­
ness were perhaps calculated to allay any fears and 
suspicions which the non-communists may have harboured 
regarding the disruptive and aggressive nature of the 
Indonesian communists. The ability of SOBSI to work 
amicably with the non-SOBSI unions for their mutual 
benefit, and perhaps even for the greater benefit of the 
non-SOBSI unions, should be a lesson to the non-communist 
politicians that cooperation with PKI at the political 
level could be beneficial. And if the PKI and its mass
1
Buietin SOBSI, June 20, 1955» pp.1-2,
2
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o r g a n iz a t io n s  a r e  in  f a c t  r e a s o n a b le  and w e ll  m ean ing , 
how th e n  can  th e y  b e  re g a rd e d  as  d a n g e ro u s?  Why sh o u ld  
t h e i r  r e p r e s s io n  b e  c o n s id e re d  n e c e s s a ry ?
The p o s i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  t h a t  SOBSI, l i k e  th e  o th e r  
c o m m u n is t- le d  m ass o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  h a s  a p p l ie d  i n  s u p p o r t  
o f  PKI h as b e en  in  th e  form  o f  s ta te m e n ts  and r e s o l u t i o n s  
m ass m e e tin g s  and d e m o n s tr a t io n s ,  p o s t e r s  and  b a n n e r s ,  
l e t t e r s ,  c a b l e s ,  p e t i t i o n s  and  d e le g a t io n s  to  th e  
p r e s i d e n t ,  t o  c a b in e t  m i n i s t e r s ,  s p e a k e rs  o f  p a r l i a m e n t ,  
th e  p r e s i d e n t  o f  th e  suprem e c o u r t ,  th e  a t t o r n e y - g e n e r a l ,  
th e  army c h i e f  an d  an y  o th e r  c o n c e iv a b le  governm ent 
a u t h o r i t y ,  and th e  u se  o r  t h r e a t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s .
Two m ajo r exam ples o f  SOBSI *s u se  o f  o r  t h r e a t  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e  a c t i o n  o c c u r re d  in  March 1957» On March 
1 8 , SOBSI in  S ou th  S um atra  h e ld  a 2 4 -h o u r  g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  
to  p r o t e s t  th e  s e i z u r e  o f  power b y  th e  r e g io n a l  army 
commander and  to  dem and th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  c i v i l  g o v e rn ­
m en t; and  on March 19 a SOBSI d e le g a t io n  w arned S u w ir jo , 
th e  c a b in e t  f o rm a te u r ,  t h a t  i f  a c a b in e t  was form ed w ith  
M asjum i b u t  w ith o u t  PKI, 'SOBSI w i l l  n o t  h e s i t a t e  and i s  
a lw ay s in  r e a d in e s s  to  le a d  a t o t a l  s t r i k e  a c t io n  a l l  
o v e r  I n d o n e s ia ' • ^
1
ITUN, March 1957» p .6 .
On July 12, 1957 a 45-member National Council was 
installed by Sukarno to assist the cabinet, and for the 
first time the president included ‘functional groups* in 
governmental bodies* SOBS I received one seat on the
National Council, one on the 45-member National Advisory 
Council appointed on August 15 > 1959» one on the 
77-member National Planning Council appointed on the same 
day, and about eight in the appointed parliament installed 
on June 25, 1960. The SOBSI seats by themselves are not 
significant, but when added to those of the other commu­
nist-led mass organizations they do give important 
additional representation to PKI.
If the national united front policy fails to enable 
PKI to take power by peaceful means, then SOBSI might be 
of crucial importance in any possible show of strength 
between the political forces* In SOBSI, PKI has an 
organization that reaches into government ministries, 
that might be able to bring the economy to a standstill, 
and that might be able to mobilize large numbers of 
workers to the side of PKI. Perhaps the threat, spoken 
or implied, of the use of the massive PKI network given 
at a time of major political crisis might be able to bring 
PKI to power. The fundamental question, the real strength 
of PKI vis-a-vis the other political forces, will be dealt 
with in the concluding chapter. But some examination
1 >') 
u  jL »
n e e d s  t o  be  made h e re  o f  SOBSI*s r e a l  s t r e n g t h  in  th e  
la b o u r  f i e l d  b e c a u s e  SOBSI i s  P K I 's  m ost im p o r ta n t  mass 
o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  w e ll  s u p p l ie d  w ith  fu n d s  and  c a d r e s ,  and 
o rg a n iz e d  i n  v i t a l  s e c t o r s  o f  th e  economy among th o se  
who sh o u ld  b e ,  a c c o rd in g  to  P K I 's  M a rx is t  a n a l y s i s ,  th e  
m ost m i l i t a n t  and  p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n s c io u s  o f  th e  P a r t y 's  
s u p p o r t e r s .
The s t r e n g t h  SOBSI c o u ld  e x e r t  in  th e  e v e n t  o f  a 
p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  dep en d s n o t  o n ly  on th e  s i z e  o f  i t s  own 
m em bership  and  body  o f  w e l l - t r a i n e d  c a d re s  b u t  a l s o  on 
o t h e r  f a c t o r s :  th e  s i z e ,  and  o c c u p a t io n a l  and r e g io n a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  th e  non-SOBSI u n io n s  and o f  th e  
u n o rg a n iz e d  w o rk e rs ,  and  w hat m igh t be  term ed  th e  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  th e  SOBSI m em bersh ip .
U n t i l  th e  Madiun r e b e l l i o n ,  SOBSI and i t s  member 
u n io n s  h ad  a v i r t u a l  m onopoly o f  t r a d e  u n io n  a c t i v i t i e s  
w i th in  th e  R e p u b lic .  B u t, as h a s  b e e n  s e e n , th e  
r e b e l l i o n  and  th e  l a t e r  t i g h t e n in g  o f  PKI c o n t r o l  o v e r 
SOBSI l e d  many t r a d e  u n io n s  and u n i o n i s t s  to  l e a v e .  The 
h i s t o r y  o f  th e  a p p e a ra n c e , d is a p p e a r a n c e ,  f r a g m e n ta t io n  
and  g ro w th  o f  th e  non-SOBSI u n io n s  s in c e  M adiun i s  m ost 
c o m p lic a te d ,  b u t  th e  g e n e r a l  o u t l i n e  i n d i c a t e s  a  s te a d y  
in c r e a s e  in  th e  com bined s i z e  o f  th e  non-SOBSI u n io n s .
1
The s t o r y  o f  t r a d e  u n io n  d ev e lo p m en ts  i n  t h i s  p e r io d  i s  
g iv e n  in  o u t l i n e  i n  S an d ra  N i t i d i h a r d j o ,  G erakan  Buruh
The following paragraphs are concerned only with 
indicating the relative sizes of the non-SOBSI unions 
in I960.
Several trade union federations exist that are tied
to particular political parties* The largest, PNI*s
KBKI, was founded in December 1952 and by 1958 claimed
over one million members; at the beginning of 1960 it
claimed 143 branches with at least one full-timer in each
branch.^ The Socialist Party*s KBSI in March 1958
2claimed 376,000 members, and contained three important 
unions: the railway workers* PBKA with a claimed member­
ship of 32,000 at the end of 1959* the estate workers* 
Perbupri with 120,000, and a union of civil aviation 
workers which claimed 60 per cent of all workers in that 
field.^ The Labour Party runs a small federation with 
perhaps 30,000 members. Among the trade union feder­
ations based on religion, the largest is the Masjumi-
Indonesia (The Indonesian Labour Movement), mimeographed, 
Djakarta, 1956, PP»79-97; Tedjasukmana, The Political 
Character, pp.25-130; also in the Ministry of Labour's 
periodical Tindlauan Masa *alah Perburuhan (Survey of the 
Labour Question). I also received much assistance from 
officials of the Ministry of Labour, and especially from 
cadres of the various trade union federations.
1
Interview with Iskander Wahono.
2
Tindjauan Masa *alah Perburuhan, May 1958, p.8.
Interview with A.Z. Abidin, secretary-general of KBSI.3
inclined SBII, founded at the end of 1947 and hopefully
Aclaiming 850,000 members at the end of 1959* Three 
other Islamic trade union federations exist, but their 
combined size cannot be above 100,000 members. Both 
Christian Protestants and Roman Catholics also have their 
own small federations.
In 1954 there were about 980 trade union organi­
zations, with a total claimed membership of 711,000, 
unaffiliated to any central federation. They included 
many of the trade unions for white collar workers in
banks, air transport, the police, government ministries
2and public services. Among the more important non- 
federated unions is the teachers’ union, with 128,000 
members, and a North Sumatra estate workers* union with 
up to 100,000 members.
The rise of the non-SOBSI unions has broken the 
monopoly of almost every SOBSI union in its particular 
sphere.^ SOBSI leaders, non-SOBSI unionists and Ministry
1 Interview with Agus Sudono, first secretary of SBII.
2 Richardson, ’’Indonesian Labor Relations”, Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, October 1958, vol.XII, no.1, p.Ö5* 
3 ITUN, February 1960, p.2; Tedjasukmana, The Political 
Character, p.39*I _ _ _
For example, the monopoly of Sarbupri has been broken 
by the rise of the KBSI affiliate Perbupri, Sarbupri- 
S0BRI, Sarbupri-Coerdian, the KBKI’s estate workers’
of Labour officials alike estimate that SOBSI now includes 
perhaps 50 to 60 per cent of all organized labour. But 
the collapse of the SOBSI monopoly means that there is now 
virtually no labour area in which SOBSI could cause a 
complete stoppage without the support of the non-SOBSI 
unions. Furthermore, the reservoir of unemployed and 
non-unionized workers faces any go-it-alone strike by 
SOBSI with the possibility of defeat - unless it were in 
a highly skilled field.
The second major factor involved in any estimate of 
SOBSI’s real strength in the labour field is the character 
of the SOBSI membership. In other words, how militant 
are the SOBSI members? How far would they follow the
union, SBII, Sarbumusi of the NU, and regional unions; 
the monopoly of SBKA among railway workers has been broken 
by the KBSI affiliate PBKA, which is now dominant in West 
Java and is increasing in East Java with the help of the 
Moslem parties, and by the small, FNI-led KBKA; Perbum 
now has perhaps only 50 or 60 per cent of all oil workers; 
and the SOBSI post, telegraph and telephone union now 
contains only a minority of workers in that field.
1
See above, p.37 , footnote 2 , for estimates of thenumber of unemployed and underemployed. The number of 
non-organized workers has been estimated by Njono at three 
millions, by Tedjasukmana at about two millions; Njono, 
"Beberapa Peladjaran dari Kongres Nasional ke-II SOBSI” 
(Some Lessons from SOBSI’s Second National Congress), BM, 
January 1955> p.8; Tedjasukmana, The Political Character, 
p.25. Tedjasukmana*s estimate specifically excluded 
workers in ’very small undertakings * who ’usually do not 
form associations’.
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SOBSI leaders in the event of a political crisis in
militant action that would be clearly pro-PKI? The
answers given by non-communist trade union leaders,
security police officers and Ministry of Labour officials
are fairly uniform: 'I do not believe that PKI could lead
the workers in political strikes1, 'SOBSI no longer dare
start a strike alone; it could not, alone, lead strikes,
especially of a political nature',
The SOBSI members have a strong attachment 
to their trade union leaders, but I am not 
at all convinced that in a political crisis 
many would follow PKI against the government 
for clearly political purposes,
'If there was a grave political crisis, the SOBSI workers
Awould say "go fight for yourself" and then go home'*1
The extent to which the SOBSI members would follow 
their leaders in clearly political action would depend, 
of course, on where the lines of political division were 
drawn. But if PKI were opposed to the government and 
without a powerful ally such as the president, it is very 
doubtful indeed whether the SOBSI members, with some few 
exceptions, would militantly support PKI. This relative 
passivity requires some explanation.
1 These are representative quotations from conversations 
with me.
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Four factors mentioned in the Introduction help
Aexplain the passivity of the Indonesian workers. First,
the majority of workers are in small enterprises, which
in any country are the most difficult for trade unions to
organize for militant action. Second, the small
employers still accept, in general, a certain fatherly
responsibility towards their workers, which helps prevent
the growth of antagonistic labour relations. Third,
about 35 per cent of the workers are women, and more in
2some of the largescale industries, who also constitute 
an obstacle to the development of militant trade unionism, 
the moreso in a country where women are traditionally 
‘malu1, shy. Fourth, and most important, the Indonesian 
workers are usually not far removed in time or family 
connections from the peasantry, and retain a strong sense 
of acceptance of authority or the tradition of open 
obedience. Certainly the ingrained behavioural patterns 
of the village have undergone change with the migration 
to the cities, especially among the literate and skilled 
workers and among those who have lived in the towns for a 
long time; but the patterns do not appear to have changed 
so much among most workers.
1





Throughout their history, moreover, Indonesian trade
unions have been sternly discouraged from militant action.
The workers have received neither the leadership nor the
experience in industrial action necessary to rid them of
their obedience to established authority and to develop
the traits of solidarity in action and aggressiveness in
politics. During the Dutch and Japanese rule the growth
1of trade unions was severely curtailed, and the few
2strikes were quickly suppressed. When trade unions 
were formed after the proclamation of independence, they 
were not the spontaneous creation of the workers but the 
fabrication of literate middle class persons. Even 
today, the national and regional leadership of SOBSI and 
its member unions contains hardly a single cadre of other 
than white-collar origin, and the SOBSI leaders complain 
in private of the great difficulty of finding workers who 
can be trained as trade union cadres. During the 
revolution strikes were anti-patriotic and reduced to a 
minimum, and from the end of 1950 military and government 
regulations as well as PKI's national united front policy
1
In 1935 there were 111 trade unions with 72,675 members, 
and in 1939 75 unions with 109,547 members; Peter H.W. 
Sitsen, Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies, 
New York, 1942, pp.46-7- 
2
In 1939 there were only 18 strikes, of from 1 to 18 days, 
involving a total of 1,628 workers; ibid., p.47»
0 0,1
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have also reduced the number of strikes. There have 
been very few strikes since 1956.
When an ordinary worker enters a trade union, what 
does he expect to put into it, and to receive from it?
He joins because the union offers to help him face 
problems raised by his employment, and more often than 
not he joins a SOBSI union because it is the largest, the 
best organized and most successful. His membership is, 
however, largely passive. Under the labour disputes 
arbitration and conciliation system established in 1951» 
when the worker has a complaint or a problem he takes it 
to the trade union cadre, usually a person of higher, 
’superior* social status, who then takes it to the 
employer or a government committee for solution. The 
worker himself rarely participates in direct action. 
Whereas in the village the peasant traditionally has 
taken problems to the *bapak* (father) lurah or government 
official, the urban worker takes his problems to a new 
*bapak* who then negotiates with *the authorities* on his 
behalf.
If the above general picture is correct, the workers 
have no or very little experience in methods of direct 
action (and SOBSI is still striving to prevent ’radical* 
actions), they are not conscious of the power they could 
exert by such action, and they look upon the union as a
o r 
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sort of *bapak* who mediates between themselves and the
more or less incomprehensible forces that weigh upon
them. Such a picture is over-simplified and certainly
would not apply to some of the SOBSI unionists, perhaps,
for example, the more skilled railway workers. But it
does seem to have wide validity. And if it does, then
it means that SOBSI could not be of the importance its
numbers indicate were PKI to face a show of strength with
its political enemies. The workers do not have the
militancy, the unity, the training in direct action, or
even the belief in their own strength, to follow SOBSI
and PKI against *the authorities* if *the authorities*
1were to demonstrate their determined opposition.
(b) Direct Party Work.
Although the Aidit leadership has used the mass 
organizations to gather support and potential members, it 
has been careful not to obscure PKI*s primary position as 
the militant defender of the working class. The mass
1
As an illustration of this point, in March 1960 the 
SOBSI seamen*s and harbour workers* union, which has a 
virtual monopoly in the ports of Java, tried to stage 
strikes in Tandjung Priok, Semarang and Surabaja. A 
display of force by the army caused the strikes to 
collapse immediately and the workers to submit without 
protest to the arrest of the union cadres. And in this 
example the union was pressing justifiable social- 
economic demands, not political ones.
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organizations swell the vociferous campaigns for popular 
demands, such as the provision of essential commodities 
at low prices, but PKI is pointed to as the clear leader 
of the campaigns. At one level, PKI is presented to 
the workers as the party most able in representing their 
material demands, but at another level PKI is presented 
as the champion of a political system which will ensure 
social and economic justice for the masses.
At the present stage of the Indonesian revolution,
PKI offers a people’s democracy. The PKI programme 
endorsed in March 1954 promised that for the workers 
people’s democracy would mean industrial expansion, a 
minimum wage, an annual holiday of at least two weeks with 
full pay, a social security system paid for by the state 
and the capitalists, price controls, a six-hour work day 
in mines and other unhealthy employment, the abolition of 
’semi-feudal exploitation of work’, such as contract 
labour, the prohibition of female, child and youth labour 
in unhealthy work, the free development of trade unions,
Aand the right of labour to make collective agreements.
In the election manifesto endorsed at the same time, the
1
PKI, Program PKI (PKI’s Programme), Djakarta, 1954» 
pp.16-17*
PKI promise was contained in a single sentence: 'For the 
workers, to vote PKI means rice, fair wages and just
Asocial security'.
For the 1957/1958 regional and local elections, PKI 
issued election programmes for each province and for each 
kabupaten and autonomous city. The PKI election 
programme for Surabaja illustrates the promises PKI has
pmade to the workers. Apart from promises of a general 
appeal, such as improved educational and medical 
facilities, those designed particularly for the urban 
worker included:
1. to fight for a minimum daily wage of seven rupiahs 
for municipal workers;
2. to increase the supply of water;
3. to endeavour to increase the supply of electricity 
to the kampongs;
4. to build and repair alleys, roads and bridges;
5. to fight for the immediate legalization of houses 
built by squatters on disputed land;
1 PKI, Manifes Pemilihan Umum PKI (PKI's General Election 
Manifesto), Djakarta, 1954» p*19* It should be noted 
that the verb 'memilih* means both 'to vote' and 'to 
elect'.
2 Program Secom PKI Kotapradja Surabaja untuk Pemilihan 
DPRD Kotapradja Surabaja (The Programme of the Surabaja 
City PKI Section Committee for the Elections for the 
Surabaja City Representative Council), Surabaja, 1957»
pp.9-10.
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6 . t o  make more la n d  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  kampongs and 
i n d u s t r y ;
7* to  f i g h t  f o r  th e  rem oval o f  d i s c r im in a t io n  a g a in s t  
women in  th e  s p h e re s  o f  wages and jo b s ;  and
8 . to  in c r e a s e  th e  num ber o f  c o u rs e s  f o r  t e a c h in g  th e  
v a r io u s  t r a d e s .
The PKI s lo g a n  to  a t t r a c t  th e  S u ra b a ja  w o rk e rs  w as: ’F o r 
th e  w o rk e rs  and  governm en t em p lo y ee s , to  v o te  PKI means 
p ro p e r  w ag es , h o u s in g ,  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  and w ork c o n d i t i o n s ’.
B e s id e s  p ro m is e s  o f  a b e t t e r  l i f e ,  and i t s  work in  
th e  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  PKI h a s  a l s o  u n d e r ta k e n  a v a r i e t y  
o f  t a s k s  aim ed a t  w in n in g  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  u rb a n  popu­
l a t i o n .  The P a r ty  and i t s  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  have 
c o l l e c t e d  r e l i e f  f o r  v ic t im s  o f  f lo o d s  and kampong f i r e s ,
and some P a r ty  co m m ittees  have  form ed l o c a l  f i r e  b r ig a d e s
2to  a s s i s t  th e  m u n ic ip a l  b r ig a d e s .  PKI work b r ig a d e s  
have  a l s o  h e lp e d  to  c le a n  kampong g u t t e r s ,  and to  b u i ld  
and  r e p a i r  kampong h o u s e s ,  p u b l ic  l a v a t o r i e s  and b a th in g
1
The d a n g e r  o f  f i r e  in  th e  d e n s e ly  packed  and in flam m ab le  
kampongs i s  v e ry  g r e a t  d u r in g  th e  d ry  s e a s o n , and  e ac h  
y e a r  th o u sa n d s  o f  homes a re  d e s t r o y e d .
2
In  November 1959 » f o r  ex am p le , th e  PKI D ja k a r ta  R aja  
com m ittee  i n s t r u c t e d  a l l  c o m m itte e s , c a d re s  and members 
i n  i t s  a re a  to  fo rm  f i r e  b r ig a d e s  in  e a c h  kam pong; HR, 
November 5, 1959 *
o n n
places, and gutters.-' So far, however, PKI and its mass 
organizations have been unable to inspire any large 
number of their members to join such brigades.
An important function filled by PKI and its mass 
organizations among the poor sections of society, both 
urban and rural, is the provision of mutual assistance in 
times of need, such as deaths, marriages, births, and 
illness, a valuable service to people near or at 
subsistence level and with no or few social security 
services. Since 1958 PKI has written and talked much 
on the need to establish cooperatives, including consumer 
cooperatives which would free especially the workers from 
the speculative practices of the shopkeepers. As yet, 
however, concrete results have not been announced, and 
as the emphasis of the cooperative campaign has been in 
the rural areas, the campaign will be dealt with more 
fully in the section on the peasantry.
In many cities of Java a system of kampong government 
has been established distinct from the municipal and 
national government structure. Rukun-rukun tetangga 
(associations of neighbours) are united in rukun-rukun 
kampong (kampong associations) which in turn are united
-
For the results achieved by Party work brigades in 
preparation for the September 1959 congress, see above, 
p.187*
i n  an  a l l - c i t y  f e d e r a t io n *  The s t r e n g t h ,  and  sp h e re  o f
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  kampong governm ent sy s te m s v a ry  from
c i t y  to  c i t y  and  th e y  h ave  d is a p p e a re d  a l t o g e t h e r  in
1
som e, su c h  a s  M alang , b u t  i n  S u ra b a ja ,  th e  seco n d  
l a r g e s t  tow n i n  In d o n e s ia  and  th e  m ost im p o r ta n t  
i n d u s t r i a l l y ,  PKI b u i l t  th e  RKKS (Rukun Kampong K ota 
S u r a b a ja ,  S u ra b a ja  C i ty  Kampong A s s o c ia t io n )  i n t o  *a 
sy s te m  o f  com m unity o r g a n iz a t io n s  • • •  s t r o n g  enough to
p
com pete w i th  t h e  o f f i c i a l  l o c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t iv e  s y s te m 1• 
The J a p a n e s e  had  o r i g i n a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  rukun  
kampong sy s te m  in  S u ra b a ja  d u r in g  t h e i r  o c c u p a tio n  a s  a 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  n e tw o rk  f o r  s c a r c e  co m m o d itie s , a s  a m u tua l 
s u r v e i l l a n c e  s y s te m , and  a s  a means o f  m o b i l iz in g  fo rc e d  
la b o u r  an d  s e m i - m i l i t a r y  g u a rd  u n i t s .  In  J a n u a ry  1950 
th e  RKKS was e s t a b l i s h e d  u n d e r PKI d i r e c t io n *  In  th e  
a b se n c e  o f  a g o vernm en t s t r u c t u r e  b e lo w  th e  l e v e l  o f  th e  
f l in g k u n g a n ?, o f  w hich  t h e r e  a re  37 i n  S u r a b a ja ,  th e  RKKS 
becam e th e  e f f e c t i v e  governm ent i n  th e  kam pongs* When, 
i n  th e  seco n d  h a l f  o f  1950, th e  governm ent a p p o in te d
1
L e t t e r  from  I r e n e  T in k e r  W alker to  th e  a u th o r ,  O c to b er 
2 5 , I9 6 0 .
2
Jo h n  D* L egge , P rob lem s o f  R e g io n a l Autonomy in  
C on tem porary  I n d o n e s i a , I t h a c a ,  New Y ork , 1957, P«23«
3
The b e s t  a c c o u n t  o f  th e  RKKS i s  g iv e n  i n  Boyd R. 
Com pton, Red S u r a b a j a , I n s t i t u t e  o f  C u r re n t  W orld A f f a i r s  
R e p o r t ,  New Y ork , 1956, p p .8 -1 5 .
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o f f i c i a l s  fo r  th e  lin g k u n g a n s , th e y  were m o stly  the
c a n d id a te s  p rop osed  by th e  RKKS b ra n ch es.
D uring the su cc ee d in g  y e a r s ,  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  
to  d i s t in g u i s h  betw een  the fu n c t io n in g  o f  the  
R .K .K .S. branch a t  th e  ward l e v e l  and the ward 
governm ent i t s e l f . 1
The RKKS c o l l e c t s  f e e s  from each  h o u seh o ld , b u ild s  s c h o o ls ,  
o r g a n iz e s  community work to  c le a n  g u t te r s  and r e p a ir  
a l l e y s ,  s u b s id iz e s  b u r ia l s ,  and arran ges fo r  th e  n ig h t  
guards th a t are u s u a l ly  le d  by a member o f  Pemuda R ak ja t.
The p o l i t i c a l  u s e fu ln e s s  o f  th e  RKKS to  PKI has been  
c o n s id e r a b le :  i t  has m o b iliz e d  p eo p le  fo r  r a l l i e s  and 
d e m o n str a tio n s , m o b iliz e d  v o te r s  in  e l e c t i o n s ,  and has 
se r v e d  to  b r in g  th o se  kampong d w e lle r s  w ith  g r e a te r  
i n i t i a t i v e  in t o  the PKI o r b i t  and then  in to  th e  P arty  
i t s e l f .  A lthough th e  l o c a l  army commander in  A p r il 1958 
i s s u e d  a r e g u la t io n  fo r b id d in g  the RKKS to  engage op en ly
p
in  p o l i t i c s ,  th e  RKKS c o u ld  n ot be banned b e c a u se , in  
the ab sen ce o f  a government s tr u c tu r e  b e low  the lingkungan  
l e v e l ,  i t  was needed to  perform  the government d u t ie s  o f  
cen su s ta k in g , kampong c le a n in g  and s e c u r i t y ,  and the  
d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  coupons fo r  e s s e n t i a l  com m od ities. As o f
-
I b id . , p.9 .
2
T his r e g u la t io n  i s  g iv e n  in  K otapradja Surabaja  
(S u rab aja  C i t y ) ,  Madja1ah Penerangan (In fo rm a tio n  
M agazin e), n o .6 , 1959» p p .1 7 -2 0 .
May I9 6 0 , PKI members o r  s y m p a th iz e rs  s t i l l  c o n t r o l l e d  
26 o f  th e  27 lin g k u n g a n  o f f i c e s .
The im p o rta n c e  o f  th e  rukun  kampong sy s tem  in  o th e r  
J a v a n e s e  towns i s  n o t  com parab le  to  t h a t  o f  th e  RKKS, b u t  
th e  PKI e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  th e  sy s tem  o u ts id e  S u ra b a ja  s t i l l  
a w a i ts  r e s e a r c h .
2 .  The P e a s a n ts
(a )  The PKI A t t i tu d e  to  th e  P e a s a n t s .
D u rin g  th e  r e v o l u t io n  PKI h ad  l a r g e l y  ig n o re d  th e  
p e a s a n t r y .  T hen, in  A ugust 1948, th e  p o l i t b u r e a u  
a d m it te d  p a s t  e r r o r s  and d e c la r e d  t h a t  'W ith o u t th e  a c t i v e  
s u p p o r t  o f  th e  p e a s a n t s ,  th e  n a t i o n a l  r e v o lu t io n  w i l l
A
c e r t a i n l y  be d e f e a t e d ' .  One o f  th e  m ain ta s k s  o f  th e  
f i f t h  n a t i o n a l  c o n g re s s  s c h e d u le d  f o r  O c to b e r 1948 was to  
fo rm u la te  an a g r a r i a n  programme t h a t  c o u ld  u n i te  th e  p o o r ,  
s m a ll  and  medium p e a s a n ts  w ith  th e  w o rk e rs , t h a t  i s ,  w ith
p
th e  P a r ty .  The c o n g re s s  was n o t  h e ld  n o r  th e  programme 
fo rm u la te d  b e c a u se  i n  S ep tem ber th e  M adiun r e b e l l i o n  
b ro k e  o u t  and  i n  December th e  D utch  la u n c h e d  t h e i r  se co n d
1
PK I, D ja la n  B aru  u n tu k  R e p u b lik  In d o n e s ia  (New Road f o r  
th e  In d o n e s ia n  R e p u b lic ) ,  ( s e v e n th  e d i t i o n ) ,  D ja k a r ta ,  
1953 , P .1 0 .
2
PK I, L a h im ja  P a r t a i  Komunis In d o n e s ia  dan  
P erkem bangann ja  (The B i r th  and  Growth o f  P K I), D ja k a r ta ,  
1951, P .2 2 .
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attack on the Republic* For almost five years after 
Madiun the PKI leaders devoted their resources to 
reconstructing and expanding support in the towns and 
in the trade unions. Some work was done in analyzing
Arural conditions,1 but it was not translated into
practical action. This phase came to an end in July
1953 when Aidit published an article which turned the
2major focus of Party activity onto the rural areas.
Aidit stated that ’The agrarian revolution is the
essence of the people’s democratic revolution in
Indonesia’. Therefore it was vital for the Party to win
the allegiance of the peasants. He admitted that the
peasant mass was indifferent to and not rarely suspicious
of the Party, and blamed this on several factors: first:
there is not yet a single Party member who 
thoroughly understands, and very few who know about, agrarian relations and the life 
and demands of the peasants ;
second, the communist-led peasant organizations had raised 
the slogans ’the right of the state over all land’ and 
’nationalization of all land’, which made the peasants
1
See, for example ’’Masaalah Tani di Indonesia” (The 
Peasant Question in Indonesia), BM, June 15-July 1, 1951» PP*303-6; PKI, ’’Program Perubahan Tanah dan Tuntutan kaum 
Tani” (The Programme of Land Change and Peasant Demands), 
BM, December 1951, pp.7-22, 32-6.2
D.N. Aidit, ’’Haridepan Gerakan Tani Indonesia” (The 
Future of the Indonesian Peasant Movement), BM, July 
1953, PP.332-40.
suspicious because they did not understand them; and 
third, the Party did not yet have a *correct and 
revolutionary* agrarian programme to attract the peasants. 
He called for an end to the 'serious deficiency* in Party 
work among the peasants, and for an expansion of Party 
membership in the villages, especially among the labourers 
and poor peasants.
Aidit scornfully rejected the statements of some
cadres in the rural areas that the peasants in their areas
had no problems which could be exploited in order to bind
them to the forces of the revolution. All cadres must
realize that the peasants had many demands, and that:
For each demand a movement can be made based 
on a slogan, for example: 'lower land rents',
'lower the interest rate on loans', 'lower 
state taxes', 'cancel arrears in land tax',
'abolish setoran paksa', 'abolish pologoro',
'abolish rodi ', Tdon’t touch the land that is 
worked by the peasants', 'give unworked land 
to the peasants', 'the peasants' right to 
determine the rent of the land leased to 
foreign estates', 'arm the peasants in order 
to crush the DI, Til and other terrorist 
gangs', 'assistance in seeds and tools for 
the peasants', 'one agricultural school for 
each ketjamatan', 'abolish the fee for 
permission to kill and sell livestock',
'abolish the fee for identification papers',
'improve the old irrigation and make new',
'form a village government that defends the 
people', etc., etc. / e i q j These are not all 
the slogans of the peasants' everyday demands.
There are too many to be included here.
1
Ibid., p.339* Pologoro is unpaid labour and services 
performed by the villagers for the village officials; rodi
It was the duty of Party cadres and members, Aidit wrote, 
to decide,through discussion with the peasants, which was 
the most urgent demand in any place at a given time*
As the basic slogans with which the Party could 
attract the peasant masses, Aidit laid down 'land for the 
peasants*, 'distribution of land to the peasants', and 
'peasant private ownership of land'.
With these slogans the peasants will certainly 
have no doubts about our programme, and they 
will even support it with all their strength. 
This is the guarantee for firm alliance between 
the workers and peasants, the guarantee for a 
strong national united front, the guarantee for 
our victory.* 1
Aidit was aware, however, of the danger of 'adventurism*,
of trying to bring the peasants* struggle to a higher 
level without preparatory organizational and educational
work, and he carefully laid down techniques by which the 
peasants could be brought by stages towards the point of 
implementing the 'land for the peasants' slogan.
is compulsory, unpaid labour for the government. Setoran 
paksa, in this context, is probably the compulsory sale 
of a certain proportion of the rice harvest to the govern­
ment, at prices fixed by the government and below the 
market price.
1
Ibid., p.335* Aidit made clear to the Party cadres 
who would be reading his article, however, that peasant 
private ownership of land would not be the final stage of 
the agrarian revolution. The peasants' own experience 
plus 'the leadership and education of the Party* would 
lead to the voluntary abandonment of private for 
collective agriculture.
The March 1954 Party congress endorsed the new
emphasis on the importance of peasant participation in
the revolution, and clarified:
the basic and most immediate tasks of the 
Communist Party, that is, to mobilize the 
peasants and draw them into the struggle 
to eliminate the remnants of feudalism, 
and to develop the anti-feudal agrarian 
revolution« *
Since the fifth congress the Aidit leadership has con­
tinued to acknowledge the agrarian revolution as the 
essential element of the Indonesian revolution« In 
December i960, for example, Aidit referred to ’the 
emphasis on activities among the peasants within the
pframework of strengthening the national front.*
The Aidit leadership has classified the peasantry 
into several broad social divisions based on land owner­
ship,^ It has been aware that in order to mobilize the 
support of the non-landlord elements, then it must first 
understand the specific interests and demands of the 
different social divisions. Because the conditions of 
the peasants vary widely from region to region, and even
1 D.N. Aidit, "Indonesian People in Struggle for Complete 
Abolition of Colonial Regime", PALP, August 27> 1955>
2
D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisms dan 
Peodalisme.’" (Continue to Advance to Destroy Imperialism 
and Feudalism.*), HR, January 2, 1961.
3 See above, pp.71-3
from village to village, and because so little information
is available concerning agrarian relations in Indonesia,
the Party leaders have endeavoured to collect their own
information. This task was begun systematically early
in 1958. At the end of that year Party cadres were
instructed to *go down to the villages*, to live, eat and
work with the peasants, in order to gather first-hand
information in preparation for the PKI national peasants*
1conference in April 1959. Since the conference, both
PKI and BTI have continued to compile information from
villages (especially in Java) on such matters a3 land
tenure, interest rates charged by moneylenders, and the
2survival of feudal customs. It is hoped that this 
information will enable PKI and BTI to make their appeals 
to the different sections of the peasantry more concrete 
and therefore more effective.
(b) Building an Organization among the Peasants.
1. PKI. Prior to the March 1954 congress, PKI had 
made few direct inroads into the villages. At the
1
"Laporan Mengenai Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan kaum Tani" 
(Report on Party Work among the Peasants), BM, April-May
1959, p.138.2
For some of the results of the information-collecting 
campaign, see ST, January 1959, p.10; and Asmu, "Masaalah 
Landreform" (TKe Question of Land Reform), BM, January
1960, pp.21-5.
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c o n g re s s  i t  was announced  t h a t  l e s s  th a n  h a l f  o f  th e  
1 6 5 »206 P a r ty  members were o f  p e a s a n t  o r i g i n .  I t  i s  
r e a s o n a b le  to  assum e t h a t  a good p r o p o r t io n  o f  th o s e  o f  
p e a s a n t  o r i g i n  w ere in  th e  e s t a t e ,  f o r e s t r y  and  s u g a r - m i l l  
a r e a s  w here SOBSI u n io n s  had  a l r e a d y  b e e n  a c t iv e  f o r  some 
y e a r s .  The m em bership  d r iv e  w hich  fo l lo w e d  th e  c o n g re s s  
was aim ed p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  th e  p e a s a n t s .  B e fo re  th e  end 
o f  1955 c la im e d  P a r ty  m em bership had p a s s e d  one m i l l i o n ,  
and  was g iv e n  a s  one and a h a l f  m i l l io n s  a t  th e  b e g in n in g  
o f  1958» a t  w hich  f i g u r e  i t  s ta y e d  u n t i l  th e  s i x t h  
c o n g re s s  i n  S ep tem ber 1959« In  December 1958 i t  was 
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  p e a s a n ts  c o n s t i t u t e d  o v e r  h a l f  th e  P a r ty  
m em bersh ip , w h i le  th e  s i x t h  c o n g re s s  was in fo rm e d  t h a t  
th e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  p e a s a n t  members was s t i l l  i n c r e a s in g .  
T hese o f f i c i a l  P a r ty  f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  b e tw ee n  March 
1954 and December 1958 th e  num ber o f  p e a s a n t  members 
in c r e a s e d  from  l e s s  th a n  8 0 ,0 0 0  to  w e l l  o v e r  t h r e e -  
q u a r t e r s  o f  a m i l l i o n .
In  h i s  r e p o r t  to  th e  s i x t h  c o n g re s s  i n  S ep tem ber 
1959» Anwar S a n u s i  p r e s e n te d  s t a t i s t i c s  on th e  d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  o f  th e  P a r ty  o r g a n iz a t io n  i n  J a v a  a t  t h a t  t im e
1
PK I, B ahan-B ahan u n tu k  K ongres N a s io n a l  ke-VT P a r t a i  
Komunis I n d o n e s ia  ( M a te r ia l s  f o r  th e  S ix th  PKI N a t io n a l  
C o n g re s s ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1958, p .5 3 ;  PKI, R e s o lu s i  t e n ta n g  
L ap o ran  Umum, p .6 6 .
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which also can be used to visualize the situation in July
1956. According to his figures, in July 1956 PKI had a
branch in about 34 per cent of the 21,047 villages in
Java, and increased this to 84.2 per cent in the next
three years; in July 1956 PKI had a subsection in about
70 per cent of the 1,449 ketjamatans, and increased this
to 98«7 per cent. Prom an analysis of the 1957 local
election results, the ’vacant* villages and ketjamatans
would be in the strongly Moslem areas of West Java and
East Java, including Madura.
Vital to strengthening the Party organization in the
rural areas has been the creation of good cadres for work
among the peasants. This has been difficult in the
2Javanese villages for a number of reasons. First, the 
more literate and politically conscious peasants who tend 
to become cadres in both the Party and the mass organi­
zations are often middle and rich peasants or even 
landlords, and retain the attitudes of their social 
position towards the poorer peasants. Second, in the 
relative social peace of the village, many cadres,
1
Amir Anwar Sanusi, The Results of the First Three-Year 
Plan, mimeographed, Djakarta, 1959» p.3*
2
The following information was gathered largely from 
conversations with cadres of PKI and its mass organi­
zations; see also, "Laporan”, BM, April-May 1959> PP*135> 
144-5.
themselves of peasant origin, are loath to create social 
disunity in the village or have failed to recognize the 
existence of landlord exploitation. Third, some PKI 
cadres have tended to become landlords once they become 
village officials, and to ignore the sufferings of the 
poorer peasants. Fourth, the educational level of 
peasant members is generally so low that they must be 
taught literacy and basic general knowledge before they 
can receive political training. And, fifth, cadres from 
urban areas often do not know the regional language 
required, or are simply unwilling to engage in rural work.
The low level of the quality of peasant cadres was 
admitted in ’'The Report on Party Work among the Peasants’* 
submitted to the PKI national peasants * conference in 
mid-April 1959:
The majority of Party cadres at the subsection 
and branch levels in the villages have not yet 
deeply studied the class divisions, the 
characteristics of each class and the class 
relations in the village. In general they are 
still unable to distinguish the landlord from 
the rich peasant, and still do not know the 
difference between the rich peasant and the 
medium peasant. This means that they do not 
yet thoroughly know who are the friends and 
who are the enemies of the revolution.1
Worse still, the cadres even up to the section level did
not, in general, know:
240
1
"Laporan", BM, April-May 1959* p*131
n  A -f
who constitute the landlord group and what is 
the history of their land ownership, the 
means by which the landlord steals the 
peasants* land, the forms of exploitation and 
the evil nature of the exploitation of the 
landlord and moneylender, the way the landlord 
and moneylender squeeze and deceive the 
peasants, the way the landlord uses government 
officials and thugs to oppress the peasants*1 2
The work of the Party in educating a body of cadres
has been detailed in the section an building the Party.
But special attention has had to be given to peasant
cadres because of their generally lower quality. A report
presented to the central committee in July 1957 proposed
conferences between peasant activists as a means of
improving their quality. Before the national peasants 1
conference the Party launched a *go down to the villages*
and *three-togethers* movement, as has been described
above, partly as a way to increase the middle and upper
cadres* understanding of village life. In the conference
itself, the Party leaders called for special schools for
peasant cadres, and for the replacement of Party rural
1
Ibid., p.132.
2 "Laporan Tambahan Mengenai Masaalah Mengembangkan 
Pekerdjaan Massa kaum Tani" (Additional Report on the 
Question of Developing Mass Work among the Peasants), 
HR, July 10, 1957.
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w o rk e rs  whose i n d iv i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  c o n f l i c t e d  w ith  th o se  
o f  th e  p e a s a n ts .
In  s h o r t ,  by S ep tem ber 1959 th e  PKI o r g a n iz a t io n  had  
b e e n  e x te n d e d  i n t o  th e  g r e a t  m a jo r i ty  o f  Ja v a n e se  v i l l a g e s  
and  i n t o  v i r t u a l l y  e v e ry  v i l l a g e  i n  th e  s t r o n g l y  PKI a r e a  
o f  C e n t r a l  and  E a s t  J a v a .  An in te n s i v e  e f f o r t  i n  c a d re  
e d u c a t io n  had g r e a t l y  in c r e a s e d  b o th  th e  num ber and  
q u a l i t y  o f  r u r a l  c a d r e s .  T h e ir  q u a l i t y  s t i l l  l e f t  much 
to  b e  d e s i r e d ,  b u t  th e  P a r ty  l e a d e r s  w ere aw are o f  th e  
d e f i c i e n c i e s  and were t a k in g  m easu res t o  e r a d i c a t e  them .
I t  sh o u ld  b e  n o te d  h e re  t h a t  th e  A ld i t  l e a d e r s h ip  i n  
i t s  work o f  a t t r a c t i n g  and m o b il iz in g  th e  p e a s a n ts  had  
u se d  n o t  o n ly  PKI and th e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p e a s a n t  mass 
o r g a n iz a t io n s  b u t  a l s o  th e  y o u th  o r g a n iz a t io n  and  th e  
women’s o r g a n iz a t io n ,  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  whose members a re  
v i l l a g e r s .
2 .  BTI. When the A id it  le a d e r s h ip  won c o n tr o l  o f  
PKI in  January 1951» the P arty  had com p lete  c o n tr o l  o f  one 
n a t io n a l  p easan t o r g a n iz a t io n , RTI (Rukun Tani In d o n e s ia ,  
In d o n esia n  P easan ts*  U n io n ), d is g u is e d  c o n tr o l  o f  BTI, 
and in f lu e n c e  in  a t h ir d ,  SAKTI (S arek at Tani In d o n e s ia ,
1
"L a p o ra n " , BM, A pril-M ay  1959> p . l 4 6 ;  B.O . H u ta p e a , 
"Some L essons from  th e  F i r s t  N a t io n a l  P e a s a n ts  C o n fe re n ce  
o f  th e  C . P . I . " ,  R I, A ugust 1959» pp .32-3*
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Indonesian Peasants1 23Association). On July 2, 1951 these
three organizations established the FPT (Front Persatuan
Tani, Peasants* United Front) with a joint programme of 
1demands. For over two years the FPT operated as a 
fairly closely-knit body, issuing statements and demands 
concerning the major peasant problems and political 
events. In December 1952 the FPT even organized a joint 
cadre course, using as study material what had been used 
in an RTI cadre course in June 1951» the first reported
ppeasants' cadre course in Indonesia. In December 1951» 
the FPT claimed half a million members, the great 
majority of whom must have been in Java.
At the beginning of 1953 the communist leaders of 
RTI proposed the fusion of BTI, SAKTI and itself. The 
communists in BTI had finally removed the remaining non­
communists from the leadership of the organization and 
readily agreed to the proposal. But although the SAKTI 
executive committee also agreed, an internal struggle 
with members of the small Trotskyite party, Acoma,
1
Ichtlsar G-erakan Tani (Survey of the Peasant Movement), 
July-August 1951» p.15*
2
BTI, Tentang Agitasi dan Propaganda (Concerning 
Agitation and Propaganda), Djakarta, 1954* p.3»
3 Sin Po, December 27, 1951*
Aprevented the fusion for over two more years. Prom 
September 14 to 20, 1953 BTI and RTI held a fusion
congress, the joint organization retaining the name BTI.
At the time of the fusion, BTI claimed 240,000 members,
•5RTI 120,000. Once the communist wing in SAKTI was 
confident of its own control of the organization, a SAKTI 
congress was held in June 1955 which accepted fusion with 
BTI.
By the time of the fusion between BTI and RTI, PKI 
was concentrating its efforts in the rural areas, and BTI 
began to grow rapidly. In March 1954 it claimed 800,000 
members.^ One year later it claimed 170 branches in 136 
of the 162 kabupatens in Indonesia, sub-branches in 7*638 
of the 43,249 villages, and a total membership of 
2,027,500.6 When SAKTI fused with BTI it claimed to
2
1 The difficulties faced by the communist leaders of SAKTI 
in bringing about fusion with BTI are given in Sidik 
Kertapati, Untuk Persatuan dan Memperluas Perdjuangan Tani 
(For Unity and Extending the Peasants1 Struggle),
Djakarta, 1955, pp.24-37*2
HR, September 21 and 22, 1953*
D.N. Aidit, "Mengatasi Kelemahan Kita" (Overcoming Our 
Weaknesses), in his Pilihan Tulisan, vol.I, p.502, note 14*4
Sidik Kertapati, Untuk Persatuan, p.44*
5 "Laporan", BM, Apri1-May 1959, p*129*6
HR, April 5, 1955.
Ahave 42 branches, 378 sub-branches, and 200,000 members.
At the end of 1955» after what must have been a massive
membership drive parallel to the drives by PKI and its
other mass organizations in preparation for the general
2elections, BTI claimed 3,315>820 members. Thus, 
according to the figures issued by the peasant organi­
zations, the number of peasants in the PKI-controlled 
organizations had risen from 360,000 in September 1953 
when RTI fused with BTI, to over 3.3 millions at the end 
of 1955.
The BTI national council meeting from March 26 to 28
31955 reviewed the work of the organization. Until that 
time, BTI had been active principally in the areas of 
estate and forestry lands where BTI could easily exploit 
the problems of the peasant squatters who had occupied 
large tracts of land during the Japanese occupation and 
the revolution. The council decided that while consoli­
dation was required in such areas, BTI had to extend its 
activities into the ordinary villages. This required 
cadre courses to explain the BTI constitution and the
1
Sidik Kertapati, Untuk Persatuan, p.23.
2
HR, July 23, 1956.
3 The report of the executive committee of the national 
council to the council meeting is given in full in ST, 
March 1955, PP.1, 6-7.
class divisions and forms of exploitation in the villages; 
the increased distribution of the periodical "Suara Tani" 
(Voice of the Peasants); and improved methods of work, the 
implementation of collective leadership, and the acti­
vation of members* meetings. The question was also 
raised of purging those landlord elements in the organi­
zation, especially those in positions of leadership, who 
had entered in order to intimidate or persuade the 
peasants against resorting to * radical* action.
By July 1956 BTI claimed to have 188 branches in 148
kabupatens and cities, and an organization in 1,290 of
2the 3 »139 ketjamatans. The membership was still that 
quoted in December 1955*
In the fifth BTI congress, from September 3 to 12,
1957» Sardjono, who is reportedly a close associate of 
Alimin, was removed from the position of chairman and 
given the honorary post of third vice-chairman. The new 
leadership consisted entirely of persons of proved loyalty
1
Asmu, "Beladjar dari Sidang Pleno DPP-BTI ke-III untuk 
Mengatasi Kelemahan Pekerdjaan Partai dilapangan 
Perdjuangan Tani" (Learning from the Third Plenum of the 
BTI National Council in order to Overcome Weaknesses 
in the Party*s Work in the Sphere of the Peasants' Struggle), 
BM, February-March 1955» p.61.
2
HR, July 23, 1956
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Ato the Aidit leadership. It was claimed that BTI now
had 201 branches, 1,323 ketjamatan-level organizations,
13>787 village-level sub-branches, and 3,390,286 
2members. The heavy concentration in Java is revealed







Djakarta Raja 3 9 76 20,358
West Java 19 257 1,744 657,134
Central Java 38 416 4,533 1,160,6543
East Java 29 422 4,906 1.163,894
Total: 89 1,101+ 11,259 3,002,040
Total outside 
Java: 112 219 2,528 388,246
1 The list of leaders elected in the 
ST, October 1957, p.3»o




BTI’s membership claims have not been consistent. In 
April 1958, for example, BTI in Central Java claimed to 
have 37 branches and 600,000 members; TI, April 10, 1958. 
Sudisman, a member of the PKI politbureau, stated in 
December 1957 that:BTI ••• has 1.6 million members and is able 
to mobilize more than three million peasants 
in actions to demand that empty lands of the 
Dutch estates be distributed to the landless 
peasants;
Sudisman, "Semangat Bukit 1211 Merabadjakan Rakjat Korea 
dalam Mengalahkan Agresi dan Membangun Sosialisme" (The 
Spirit of Hill 1211 Steels the Korean People in Defeating 
Aggression and Developing Socialism), BM, December 1957, 
p.511.
The only significant membership claims outside Java were 
for North Sumatra, 152,094» and South Sumatra, 108,210, 
but there were already two province-level organizations 
in Kalimantan, 'several' kabupaten-level branches in 
Sulawesi, and BTI organizations in many of the smaller 
islands of East Indonesia and Nusatenggara, from Bali 
to Halmahera and the Aru archipelago.
Among the proposals contained in the executive 
council's report to the congress were: the further 
expansion of membership and easier conditions for 
acceptance of members; an extensive anti-illiteracy drive 
among BTI activists and the peasant masses; increased 
distribution of "Suara Tani" as a propaganda tool and a 
means of raising the cadres* political awareness; and 
regional conferences to discuss common experiences and 
problems.2
In April 1959 BTI claimed million members, or 14 
per cent of all adult peasants, branches in almost every 
kabupaten, organizations in 45 per cent of all ket.jamatans,
1
Hartojo, "Luaskan Aksi-Aksi kaum Tani untuk 
Mengembangkan Kekuatan Progresif" (Extend Peasant Actions 
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and sub-b ranches in 35 per cent of all villages. Growth 
since the fifth congress had been largely effected outside 
Java, especially in Atjeh, Bali, Sumba, Flores and Timor. 
The national council which met in that month emphasized 
the need to adapt the form of organization at the village 
level to the local everyday needs of the peasants.
Members should be organized not only in groups based on 
place of residence, but also in groups based on units of 
work, for example groups of renters of landlords' land.
But, 'besides BTI and cooperatives are also needed arisan 
and sports groups and various mutual assistance groups ...,
pdeath associations, etc.'.
Of the greatest long-term importance for BTI are its 
efforts to produce a large and capable cadre force. The 
generally poor quality of PKI's peasant cadres has already 
been referred to, but the cadre situation within BTI is 
far worse in terms of both numbers and quality. As late
1
"Laporan Umum Sidang DPP Pleno II BTI" (General Report 
to the BTI Second National Council Plenum), supplement 
to ST, May-June 1959» pp.29-30.2
Among the ethnic Javanese, a family in which a death 
has occurred is obliged to provide certain ritual feasts 
for kin and neighbours, and the proper fulfilment of this 
obligation is considered necessary for the welfare of the 
entire neighbourhood. Neighbourhood death associations 
are organized to assist poor families who could not 
otherwise fulfill this obligation. In an arisan group, 
all members contribute a certain sum each week, and each 
member in turn receives the whole sum.
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a s  A p r i l  1959» many BTI "branches and even  some r e g io n a l
A
c o m m itte e s  w ere w i th o u t  f u l l - t i m e  o f f i c i a l s ,  and  a l th o u g h
many c a d re s  o f  PKI and  th e  o th e r  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  d o u b le
a s  BTI c a d re s  t h i s  means t h a t  BTI work d o es n o t  r e c e iv e
th e  a t t e n t i o n  i t  s h o u ld .  In  May 1957» "S uara  T an i"
commented t h a t  t h e r e  w ere s t i l l  many i l l i t e r a t e  a c t i v i s t s
i n  th e  s u b -b ra n c h e s  and k e t;jam atan  c o m m itte e s , w ith  some
ev en  h o ld in g  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  a t  th e  
2l a t t e r  l e v e l .  Work had  a l r e a d y  begun  on th e  e r a d i ­
c a t i o n  o f  i l l i t e r a c y  among a c t i v i s t s  b u t  had  n o t  a d v an ced  
f a r .  What PKI and  BTI c a l l  th e  i d e o l o g i c a l  sh o r tc o m in g s  
among t h e i r  p e a s a n t  c a d re s  s tem  from  th e  s o c i a l  o r i g i n  o f  
many o f  th e  c a d re s  among th e  r i c h  p e a s a n ts  and l a n d lo r d s .  
A lth o u g h  e f f o r t s  had  b e e n  made s in c e  1955 to  remove th e s e  
sh o r tc o m in g s  by  p u rg e s  o r  e d u c a t io n ,  th e y  w ere s t i l l  b e in g  
r e f e r r e d  to  a s  an  o b s ta c le  to  c o r r e c t  w ork in  1 9 5 9 *^
W ith th e  g ra v e  s h o r ta g e  o f  l i t e r a t e  and c a p a b le  c a d re s  o f
1
"Laporan", BM, Apri1-M ay 1959» p . 144*
2
ST, May 1957, p .1 1 .
3
Asmu, "Belad b ar" , BM, February-M arch 1955, P*61; P a rto , 
"Memperbaiki P ekerdjaan P a r ta i d ik a lan gan  kaum Tani" 
(Im proving P arty  Work among th e  P e a s a n ts ) , KP, O ctober
1958, p .2 0 5 ; B.O. H utapea, "Some L esson s" , RI, August
1959, p .3 2 .
k
B.O. H utapea, l o c . c i t . ; "Laporan", BM, A pril-M ay 1959,
P .1 3 5 .
reliable social origins, it has proved difficult to 
remove those with suspect backgrounds•
Before 1959 cadre education in BTI was unsystematic 
and on a small scale. Then the national council meeting 
of April 22 to 26, 1959» which met a few days after the 
PKI national peasants* conference, drew up a three-year 
plan of organization and education. The general outline 
of the plan was as follows:
Organization:
1. To increase membership by 50 per cent in the first 
year, 75 per cent in the first two years, and 100 per cent 
in the three years, that is, to 7 millions.
2. To provide each branch with a typewriter, each 
sub-branch with a name-board.
Education:
1. To extend the circulation of ”Suara Tani”. All 
BTI committees down to the ket;jamatan level were required 
to subscribe to ”Suara Tani”, and activists were obliged 
to write up their experiences for it.
1
The plan was never published in full, but its general 
outline was obtained from several references in ST: 
"Laporan Umum”, supplement to ST, May-June 19599 PP*31-3; 
July 1959, pp.1-2; November 1959, p.U; A. Rachman, "Arti 
Plan 3 Tahun BTI” (The Meaning of BTI*s Three-Year Plan), 
June 1960, p.3; June 1960, p.7*
2 . To en co u rag e  th e  lo w er BTI co m m ittees  to  i s s u e  
t h e i r  own p e r i o d i c a l s ,  how ever s im p le  and in  lo n g -h a n d  i f  
n e c e s s a r y ,  i n  th e  l o c a l  la n g u a g e s ,
3 .  To s p e e d i ly  e r a d i c a t e  i l l i t e r a c y  among a c t i v i s t s  
a t  th e  k e t;jam a tan  l e v e l ,  and  i n t e n s i f y  a n t i - i l l i t e r a c y  
c o u rs e s  f o r  th e  p e a s a n t  m asses in  s e a s o n s  o f  l e a s t  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  w ork .
4 . To i n t e n s i f y  c a d re  c o u rs e s  a t  th e  c e n t r e  and in  
th e  r e g io n s ,  and u n i f y  t h e i r  e d u c a t io n  u n d e r  f o u r  b a s ic  
h e a d in g s :  th e  p e a s a n ts *  s o c i a l  an d  econom ic p ro b le m s ,
BTI and o th e r  p e o p le * s  o r g a n iz a t io n s  i n  th e  v i l l a g e s ,  th e  
b i r t h  and  g ro w th  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  p e a s a n t  movement and 
th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  p e a s a n t  movements a b ro a d ,  and  th e  
dev e lo p m en t o f  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement. E d u c a tio n  in  
a g r i c u l t u r e  was a l s o  to  be  g iv e n .
Each co m m ittee  was s e t  a t a r g e t  a f t e r  d i s c u s s io n s  
from  th e  l e v e l  o f  members* m e e tin g s  u p w ard s . Some a r e a s  
b eg an  work un d er th e  p la n  on November 23» "1959» th e  r e s t  
on May 1, I9 6 0 . In  Ju n e  1960 th e  BTI l e a d e r s h ip  
announced  t h a t  in  g e n e r a l  th e  q u o ta s  had  p ro v e d  to  b e  to o  
low , and  t h a t  some a r e a s , s u c h  a s  C e n t r a l  J a v a ,  had  a l r e a d y  
r a i s e d  them . An im p re s s io n  o f  w hat th e  p la n  m eant f o r
ST, June  1960, p .7*
1
A
e a c h  r e g i o n  i s  g iv e n  b y  t h e  exam ple o f  E a s t  J a v a .  T here  
th e  g o a l s  o f  th e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  th e  p l a n  in c lu d e d :  t o  buy 
a m im eograph m ach ine , a new t y p e w r i t e r  and  b i c y c l e  f o r  
th e  p r o v i n c i a l  o f f i c e ;  to  i n c r e a s e  th e  num ber o f  f u l l ­
t im e  o f f i c i a l s  i n  th e  p r o v i n c i a l  o f f i c e ,  and t o  p r e p a r e  
two c a d r e s  o f  th e  b ra n c h  l e v e l  and  f o u r  o f  a lo w e r  l e v e l  
f o r  s e n d in g  o u t s i d e  J a v a ;  to  e s t a b l i s h  a sy s te m  o f  c a d r e  
c o u r s e s ,  and t o  h o ld  two c o u r s e s  a t  t h e  p ro v in c e  l e v e l ;  
t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  "Suara  Tani'* and to  h o ld  
m on th ly  d i s c u s s i o n s  on i t s  c o n t e n t s ;  to  p u b l i s h  a news 
l e t t e r ;  t o  h o ld  a s e m in a r  on a g r i c u l t u r e ;  to  e f f e c t  
s y s t e m a t i c  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  b r a n c h  c o m m it te e s ;  t o  e x te n d  
th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n t o  V a c a n t*  a r e a s ;  and to  l e a d  
s p e c i f i e d  cam paigns in  th e  p e a s a n ts *  i n t e r e s t s *
On November 12, 1959, a p e a s a n ts *  e d u c a t i o n  b u i l d i n g  
a s s o c i a t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d  w ith  BTI*s cha irm an  a s  i t s  
c h a irm a n ,  and  i n c l u d i n g  l e a d e r s  from Femuda R a k ja t ,  
Gerwani and SOBSI u n i o n s . 1 2 The d e c l a r e d  aim  o f  th e  
a s s o c i a t i o n  was t o  p rom ote  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge among th e  
p e a s a n t s  a n d  to  r a i s e  t h e i r  s p i r i t  o f  p a t r i o t i s m  *in th e  
w id e s t  m eaning* . By J u l y  1960 each  BTI member was
1
Mimeographed docum ent se e n  a t  t h e  BTI E a s t  J a v a  o f f i c e ,  
S u ra b a ja *
2
HR, November 16 , 1959
obliged to pay half a rupiah, part of the money for the
new association (which was intended at least for the
training of cooperative cadres), and part for BTIfs own
1central office. At that time BTI was claiming 4 million 
members.
In short, BTI has built a mass membership and an 
extensive organizational network, especially in Java - 
and with even less competition from non-communist organi­
zations than either PKI or SOBSI has faced in its own 
work. For the non-communist politicians, organizational 
work among the peasants is even less attractive than 
among the workers. But both BTI and PKI still experience 
a grave shortage of good peasant cadres. The great 
majority of peasants are poor, illiterate, parochial, 
unaware that their conditions could be changed by their 
own efforts, and they therefore constitute poor cadre 
material. The efforts of BTI itself and of PKI under 
their respective three-year plans have increased the 
number and quality of their peasant cadres, but both are
still markedly deficient. BTI especially is faced with
2such grave and as yet unsolved financial difficulties, 
that it is unable to appoint sufficient full-time cadres, 
whatever their quality.
1 2
ST, July 1960, p.5* See above, pp.221, 227*
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3. PPPI. The Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia
(Indonesian Village Officials* Association) was founded 
on September 26, 1946 by the fusion of seven village 
officials* associations. After the transfer of 
sovereignty to Indonesia in December 1949* PPDI spread 
rapidly from the former areas of the Republic in Java, 
and by the time of its third congress in May 1951 had 
extended throughout Java and even into Sumatra. PKI 
control of the PPDI leadership by 1951 at the latest is 
indicated by the phraseology used in the statement made
pat that time of the basis and goals of PPDI*s struggle. 
The present leaders, all of whom are PKI members or 
sympathizers, were elected at the last congress in July 
1955* Actual leadership is in the hands of Usman 
Muftiwidjaja who was elected on the PKI list to the 
Constituent Assembly and is now a member of the appointed 
parliament.
As of May 1960 the PPDI leaders claimed that there 
were 108 branches at the kabupaten level, and 350>000
1
Much of the following information on PPDI was obtained 
from an interview with three of PPDI*s central leaders.
2
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m em bers, o f  whom tw o - th i r d s  w ere  in  Ja v a  and  M adura.
I n  S o u th  S u m atra  PPDI was a l s o  e v e n ly  s p r e a d ,  b u t  
e ls e w h e re  i t  h ad  few m em bers. T h ere  i s  no com peting  
v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s ’ a s s o c i a t i o n .
PPD I’s s t r u g g l e  f o r  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  v i l l a g e
p
o f f i c i a l s  h a s  b een  c e n t r e d  a ro u n d  th r e e  m ain m a t t e r s .
The f i r s t  i s  th e  s t a t u s  o f  v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s .  PPDI 
dem ands t h a t  v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s  b e  g iv e n  th e  s t a t u s  o f  
e i t h e r  l o c a l  o r  c e n t r a l  g o v ern m en t o f f i c i a l s ,  w hich  w ould 
mean t h a t  th e y  w ould  b e  f r e e  fro m  a r b i t r a r y  d i s m is s a l  and  
w ould r e c e iv e  r e g u l a r  w ages and  p e n s io n  r i g h t s .  T h is  i s  
th e  c h i e f  lo n g - te rm  dem and. The se co n d  c o n c e rn s  th e  
o f f i c i a l s *  in co m e. S in c e  1951 th e  c e n t r a l  governm ent 
h a s  s u b s id iz e d  th e  p o o re r  v i l l a g e s  t o  e n a b le  them  to  pay 
t h e i r  o f f i c i a l s  s t i p u l a t e d  minimum w ages. B ut th e s e  
minimums a re  f a r  be low  minimum l i v i n g  re q u ire m e n ts  and 
PPDI u rg e s  th e  governm ent to  p ro v id e  l a r g e r  s u b s i d i e s .
1
In  F e b ru a ry  1960 , SOBSI r e p o r t e d  PPDI*s m em bership to  
be  2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; ITUN, F e b ru a ry  1960, p .2 .
2
The lo n g  l i s t  o f  g e n e r a l  and  s p e c i f i c  demands a d o p te d  
b y  th e  May 1951 c o n g re s s  i s  g iv e n  in  Djaman B a ru , March 
3 0 , 1953» p p .2 3 -4 ;  and I c h t i s a r  O erakan  T a n i , J u l y -  
A ugust 1951» PP*13-14* An a c c o u n t  o f  PPDI work 
c o n c e rn in g  t h e  more im p o r ta n t  p ro b lem s f a c in g  v i l l a g e  
o f f i c i a l s  i s  g iv e n  in  S u g ijo n o , ’’Dengan ta n p a  pandang  
b u lu  P .P .D ,I .  s e l a l u  ta m p il  k ed ep an  u n tu k  B ela  N asib  p a ra  
Pamong D esa” (W ith o u t any  D is c r im in a t io n  W h atso ev er, PPDI 
i s  a lw ays to  th e  f o r e  in  D e fen d in g  th e  W elfare  o f  th e  
V i l la g e  O f f i c i a l s ) ,  S u a ra  Pamong D e sa , November 1958- 
J a n u a ry  1959, p p .8 9 -W I
The third concerns the situation of village officials in 
the disturbed areas* Partly because of PPDI demands, the 
government pays compensation to the families of village 
officials killed at their posts, and allowances to 
officials forced from their villages by terrorist or rebel 
activities* PPDI demands that the allowances be 
considerably increased*
PPDI is clearly the poorest of PKI’s mass organi­
zations. The head office is a one-room affair up some 
very steep ladders in a small, run-down shop in Surakarta. 
At the centre, there are two full-timers, both members of 
PKI, plus part-time help from those with other employment, 
for example from Usman and from the secretary-general who 
is a village head, Almost all PPDI functionaries in the 
regions are part-timers* In Surabaja I visited the home 
of the full-time secretary for East Java and found it to 
be a pantry-size, dilapidated addition to the side of a 
kampong house* But it is doubtful if even the low 
expenses of PPDI are met by subscriptions, for when I 
asked the three members of the central secretariat about 
membership fees, they all agreed that it was more or less 
impossible to collect them, but disagreed on what the fee 
was and had to settle the resultant argument by reading
the constitution
A p a rt  from  b e in g  th e  p o o r e s t  o f  th e  PKI mass o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n s ,  PPDI i s  a l s o  th e  l e a s t  e f f e c t i v e  p o l i t i c a l l y  and 
h a s  f a i l e d  t o  d e v e lo p  among more th a n  a v e ry  sm a l l  s e c t i o n  
o f  i t s  m em bership  a s y m p a th e t ic  a t t i t u d e  tow ards  PKI and 
i t s  p o l i c i e s ,  A w e l l - p r o d u c e d  m on th ly  p e r i o d i c a l  
a p p e a re d  a t  t h e  b e g in n i n g  o f  1957» b u t  w i t h i n  two y e a r s  
h ad  d i s a p p e a r e d  b e c a u s e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  As 
y e t  no c a d re  s c h o o ls  o r  c l a s s e s  have  b e e n  h e l d ,  b u t  
w r i t t e n  c o u r s e s  on a s m a l l  s c a l e  a r e  o r g a n iz e d  *to g iv e  
th e  c a d r e s  an u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  th e  r e v o l u t i o n * •
Communists c o n t r o l  PPDI a t  th e  c e n t r e  b e c a u se  no one 
e l s e  h a s  c a r e d  to  c h a l l e n g e  them . But from  i n f o r m a t io n  
r e c e i v e d  from  members o f  th e  c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n ts  r u r a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s e r v i c e  i t  would  a p p e a r  t h a t  PKI has  
l i t t l e  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  th e  g r e a t  m a jo r i t y  o f  PPDI members. 
The members a r e ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  more l i t e r a t e ,  w e a l th y  and 
p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n s c io u s  th a n  th e  o r d i n a r y  v i l l a g e r s ,  th ey  
t e n d  to  be  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  PNI o r  o f  one o f  t h e  Moslem 
p a r t i e s ,  and th e y  a re  members o f  PPDI f o r  th e  s o l e  p u rp o se  
o f  p ro m o tin g  t h e i r  own s p e c i f i c  i n t e r e s t s .
As in  th e  c a s e  o f  th e  o t h e r  P K I- le d  mass o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n s ,  th e  PPDI c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h i p  f r e q u e n t l y  i s s u e s  
s t a t e m e n t s ,  i n  th e  name o f  th e  whole o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  in  
s u p p o r t  o f  PKI p o l i c i e s  and demands, t h u s  a d d in g  n u m e r ic a l  
w e ig h t ,  o r  a p p a r e n t  w e ig h t ,  t o  PKI*s p o s i t i o n .
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(c) Work among the Peasants.
The following section contains three main divisions: 
communist work in the areas of easier access, namely, the 
estate, forestry, insecure, and transmigrant areas; work 
in the ordinary villages; and work designed to assist 
and appeal to the peasantry in general,
1 • Work in the areas of easier access. PKI first 
entered the villages in the estate and forestry areas. 
During the Japanese occupation and the revolution, tens 
of thousands of land-hungry peasants moved into estate and 
forestry lands. Under the terms of the Round Table 
Conference agreement, the Indonesian government was 
obliged to restore estate lands to their former owners.
At the same time the government's forestry service began 
evicting the squatters from its land. The result was a 
series of bitter clashes between the authorities and the 
peasants. In some areas peasants were shot, and in many 
more the squatters' homes were destroyed, their crops 
ploughed up.
PKI, the peasant organizations BTI, RTI and SAKTI, 
SOBSI unions such as the estate workers' and the forestry 
workers' union, and other mass organizations, including 
Pemuda Rakjat, fought alongside the peasants, often
successfully, to prevent eviction or to obtain compen­
sation in the event of eviction. The climax to the 
attempts to dislodge the squatters from estate lands was 
reached on March 16, 1953 when five squatters were shot 
by police at Tandjung Morawa in North Sumatra. The FPT 
strongly denounced the shooting, and on May 2 a SAKTI 
member of parliament introduced a motion demanding an 
immediate halt to anti-squatter action in the area, and 
the creation of a committee, including peasant repre­
sentatives, to settle the land problem there. This 
motion led to a division between FNI and Masjumi, and to 
the downfall of the Wilopo cabinet.
Sadjarwo, of BTI, sat as Minister of Agriculture in
the next cabinet and was partly responsible for the
emergency law of June 8, 1954 concerning the settlement
1of the question of the people’s use of estate lands.
While PKI and its peasant organizations objected to some 
of the provisions of the new law, they welcomed its 
recognition of the squatters* right to appoint their 
representatives to negotiate with the estate owners, and 
its stipulation that any decision must consider the 
peasants* interests. In October 1956, the 1954 law was
T ~  ~  “Kementerian Agraria (Ministry of Agrarian Affairs), 
Undang-Undang Darurat no.8 tahun 1954 (Emergency Law No.8 1954)7 mimeographed, Djakarta, 195^ 7 8 P*
1extended to include squatters on state forestry lands. 
Despite the 1954 and 1956 laws, occasional violent 
disputes have continued between the squatters and the 
authorities, but BTI has usually succeeded in winning 
ultimate recognition of the peasants* interests in any 
land settlement.
The regions of sugar-cane have also provided a more 
easy point of entry into the rural areas for PKI and its 
peasant organizations. Since the transfer of sovereignty 
in December 19499 the government has fixed, at a level it 
feels reasonable, the rent of the land leased by the 
peasants to the sugar-mills for cane growing. This 
system has been strongly opposed by the peasants and BTI 
who demand that leasing of land be completely voluntary, 
and that the rent be fixed in discussions between the
2peasants or their representatives and the factories.
PKI and its peasant organizations have also found a 
ready problem to exploit in the areas threatened by 
bandits and rebels. Such areas where they have made 
progress are parts of West Java, and, since February 1958, 
the rebel areas of Sumatra and North Sulawesi. Since its
1
Kementerian Agraria, Undang-Undang Darurat no.1 tahun 
1956 (Emergency Law No.1, 1956), mimeographed, T>Jakarta, 
T 95S, 4 p.2
See, for example, HR, June 16, 1954; ST, February 1960,
p. 2.
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November 195*1 a g r a r i a n  program m e, PKI h a s  c a l l e d  f o r  th e
c o n f i s c a t i o n  o f  th e  la n d  o f  p r o - r e b e l  and  p r o - b a n d i t
l a n d l o r d s ,  and i t s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  to  th e  p o o r  and  la n d le s s  
1
p e a s a n t s ,  a demand s t r o n g l y  em phasized  b y  PKI and BTI in  
W est J a v a ,  PKI and i t s  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  have  a l s o  b een  
lo u d  and p e r s i s t e n t  in  t h e i r  demand f o r  governm ent 
p r o v i s io n  o f  weapons to  e n a b le  th e  p e a s a n ts  to  p r o t e c t  
th e m s e lv e s .  The com m unist s o l i c i t u d e  f o r  th e  v ic t im s  o f  
arm ed b a n d s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by  a mass m ee tin g  in  Bogor in  
1954 w here PKI d i s t r i b u t e d  c lo th e s  and  r i c e  to  p e a s a n ts
2
who h ad  b e e n  ro b b ed  o r  b u rn e d  o u t b y  D aru l Is la m  g a n g s .
O nly a b o u t 2 5 ,0 0 0  p e rs o n s  p e r  y e a r  have  l e f t  Ja v a  
f o r  th e  o u t e r  i s l a n d s  s in c e  1949 , b u t  th e y  co m p rise  a 
c o n s id e r a b le  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  in  S o u th  Sum atra 
w here th e y  a l s o  p ro b a b ly  c o n s t i t u t e  a l a r g e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  
B T I’s S ep tem ber 1958 c la im  o f  108,210  members i n  t h a t  
r e g io n .  U n h a p p ily  f o r  th e  t r a n s m i g r a n t s , t r a n s p o r t  
s h o r ta g e s  c au se  b o t t l e n e c k s  a t  p o r t s ,  th ie v e s  i n  th e  shape  
o f  s h o p -k e e p e r s ,  t i c k e t  s e l l e r s  and  ro b b e rs  s t r i p  them  o f
1
S e e , fo r  exam p le, "Program Perubahan Tanah", BM,
Decem ber 1951> p .1 9 ;  " R e s o lu s i  t e n ta n g  M e n g ik u ts e r ta k a n  
R a k ja t  dalam  Membasmi S i s a - S i s a  G erom bolan 'P R R I-P e rm e s ta * 
’D I - T I I ” * (R e s o lu t io n  c o n c e rn in g  th e  P e o p le ’s P a r t i c i ­
p a t io n  in  E r a d ic a t in g  th e  Remnants o f  th e  ’PR R I-Perm esta*  
’D I -T I I ’ G an g s), BM, A p ril-M ay  1959, p*206 .
2
Compton, In d o n e s ia n  Communism, p .9*
their little wealth, and the areas they go to are often 
ill-prepared. These conditions provide a source of 
discontent that PKI and BTI can exploit. Both PKI and 
BTI recognize the need for transmigration, but declare 
that it ’must not be of the nature of moving poverty
Afrom Java to the other islands’. They demand adequate 
transportation, work tools, housing, medical facilities, 
and living expenses while the new land is being opened up.
2. Work in the ordinary villages. In the second
half of 1953, PKI and its mass organizations began the
immense task of organizing the great majority of Java’s
peasants who live in ordinary villages, villages where
even PKI and BTI cadres often claimed that no peasant
problems existed, that no landlords were to be found.
The PKI leaders readily admit that:
The task of cultivating the peasants’ trust 
in the Party and of convincing the peasants 
of their own strength is a difficult one, 
especially if we bear in mind their 
backwardness.1 2
Aidit recognized in July 1953, as the campaign to attract 
the peasant masses was begun :
1
BTI, Konstitusi BTI (BTI's Constitution), Djakarta,
1954, pp.9-10.2
"Laporan", BM, April-May 1959, p.139.
Only by practical work among the peasants, 
only by leading the peasants in the struggle 
for their everyday demands, demands that 
seem small, insignificant, unimportant, only 
in this way can Party cadres and members have 
close relations with the peasants and receive 
their trust. Only by actions to demand things 
that seem small, insignificant, unimportant, 
can the peasants* organization grow stronger, 
wider and more solid.
Only through the work of organizing and 
educating the peasants can the peasants * 
struggle be raised to a higher level. Only 
through this work can the peasants be educated 
and mobilized so that the time will be ripe to 
carry out the slogans *land for the peasants*, 
*distribution of land to the peasants*, and 
*peasant private ownership of land*.
In order to strengthen the peasants* confidence in
themselves and in PKI and BTI, the Aidit leadership has
concentrated on *small but successful* actions.
Passionate and *leftist* measures, not based 
on the true consciousness of the peasants, 
must not be taken. Measures of that kind 
confuse the peasants and retard their 
consciousness.1 2 3
In each action, the peasants must be Convinced of its 
justice, correctness and benefit*, and *the Party must 
always strive to be able to draw in and mobilize 90 per 
cent of the village inhabitants*.^
1
Aidit, "Haridepan", BM, July 1953» PP*339-U0.2
PKI, Tuntunan untuk Bekerdja dikalangan kaum Tani (Guide 
for Working among the Peasants)V Djakarta, 1955* P*U7*
3 "Laporan**, BM, April-May 1959» p.141; D.N. Aidit, 
Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution,
Djakarta, 1958, p.61.
The l i s t  o f  *sm all b u t  s u c c e s s f u l*  a c t i o n s  l e d  b y
PKI and  BTI among th e  p e a s a n ts  ra n g e s  from  th e  m ost
t r i f l i n g  to  dem ands f o r  r e n t  r e d u c t io n *  In  th e  words
o f  a PKI g u id e  f o r  i t s  p e a s a n t  c a d r e s :
A f t e r  th e  p e a s a n t  o r g a n iz a t io n  i s  fo rm ed , 
q u ic k ly  u n d e r ta k e  c o n c re te  a c t i v i t i e s  in  
d e fe n c e  o f  th e  p e a s a n ts *  i n t e r e s t s ,  su ch  as  
th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f e r t i l i z e r ,  s e e d l in g s  
and  t o o l s  a t  a ch eap  p r i c e ,  r e p a i r i n g  th e  
w a te r  c h a n n e ls ,  r e p a i r i n g  th e  f i s h -p o n d s  
and  d i s t r i b u t i n g  f i s h  e g g s , e s t a b l i s h i n g  
c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  s in k in g  w e l ls  t o g e t h e r ,  
r e p a i r i n g  th e  v i l l a g e  b r id g e s  and  ro a d s ,  
o r g a n iz in g  a d e a th  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  g e n e r a l  
e d u c a t io n  and  e d u c a t io n  o f  a g r a r i a n  
l e a d e r s ,  d e fe n c e  o f  p e o p le  b ro u g h t  to  c o u r t ,  
e r a d i c a t i o n  o f  i l l i t e r a c y j  o r g a n iz in g  s p o r t s  
and  c u l t u r a l  b o d ie s ,  e t c . '
And e a c h  a c t i v i t y  i s  u se d  to  r a i s e  th e  p e a s a n ts *  c l a s s
c o n s c io u s n e s s  and  m i l i t a n c y .  As a l e a d e r  o f  PKI and
BTI rem in d ed  th e  p e a s a n t  c a d r e s :
In  o r g a n iz in g  m u tu a l a s s i s t a n c e  when members 
s u f f e r  i l l n e s s  o r  d e a th ,  do n o t  f o r g e t  to  
c o n n e c t  t h i s  a c t i v i t y  w ith  p ro p ag an d a  to  th e  
e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  la n d lo r d * s  e x p l o i t a t i o n  and  
o p p r e s s io n  have c a u se d  th e  h e a l t h  o f  th e  
p e a s a n t  la b o u r e r s  and p o o r p e a s a n ts  to  be  
v e ry  b a d ,  t h e i r  l i f e  i n  g e n e r a l  to  be  
s h o r t e r ,  many o f  t h e i r  c h i ld r e n  to  d ie  in  
th e  womb o r  b e f o r e  r e a c h in g  th e  age o f  s i x ,  
many o f  t h e i r  w ives to  d ie  in  c h i l d b i r t h  . . .  
e t c .  In  t h i s  way th e  p e a s a n ts  u n d e rs ta n d  
t h a t  th e  e n t i r e  b a d  s i t u a t i o n  w hich b e f a l l s  
them  i s  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  l a n d lo r d * s  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  and o p p r e s s io n .  In  t h i s  way 
th e  p e a s a n ts  w i l l  g r a d u a l ly  r e a c h  th e  
c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  th e  l a n d lo r d  c l a s s  i s  t h e i r
1
PKI, T u n tu n a n , p.UU
first enemy, and "by knowing the methods of 
exploitation used by the landlord the 
peasants will understand that the landlord*s 
ownership of land is unjust and that the 
landlord must be opposed.1 2
Actions that directly affect the interests of the
landlords, such as demands for joint land rent agreements,
and demands for lowered interest rates on loans, higher
wages for labourers, and lowered land rents, were not
undertaken on any scale until after 1955» They are still
limited in scope for three main reasons: first, in the
present stage of the revolution the Aidit leadership seeks
the broadest alliance in order to combat imperialism, and
therefore does not want to alienate political forces
2containing landlord elements; second, in the relative 
social peace of the Javanese village, the peasants need 
much preparatory work before they will take direct action 
against the local landlords; and, third, PKI and BTI are 
only now producing sufficient well-trained cadres willing 
and capable of directing anti-landlord actions.
1
Asmu, "Beladjar", BM, February-March 1955 > pp.59-60.
2 For the Aidit leadership’s tactical separation of the 
struggle against imperialism and that against feudalism, 
see above, pp.65-6. Aidit explained on July 8, 1956 that 
in the anti-imperialist struggle:
We also agree to cooperate with the anti­
imperialist landlords, but at the same time 
we fight to reduce rents for rice lands, and 
to ensure that the landlords do not exploit 
the peasants too much.
HR, July 10, 1956.
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The A p ril 1959 PKI n a t io n a l  peasan ts*  conference 
fo rm u la te d  a new campaign s lo g an  which cou ld  be th e  b a s is  
f o r  a ro u s in g  th e  p o o re r p ea san ts  a g a in s t  the  la n d lo rd s , 
and y e t  be s u f f i c i e n t ly  j u s t  to  make o p p o s itio n  appear 
g ro s s ly  u n ju s t :  the 6 :4  s lo g an . That i s ,  fo r  the  
d iv is io n  o f  crops in  th e  p ro p o rtio n  o f  s ix  p a r ts  fo r  th e  
sh a re -c ro p p e r  and fo u r  fo r  the la n d lo rd , w ith  the  s t i p u ­
l a t i o n  th a t  i f  any la n d lo rd s  were a lre a d y  re c e iv in g  le s s  
than  fo u r  sh a re s  th ey  shou ld  con tinue  to  do so , w ith  a
A
minimum o f  2^ sh a re s . Communist and a f f i l i a t e d  members
o f  p a r lia m e n t pu t forw ard a m otion in  p a rliam en t f o r  the
26 :4  d iv is io n  o f c ro p s . The government stepped  in  q u ick ly  
w ith  i t s  own b i l l  w hich, a f t e r  some amendments, was 
adopted  unanim ously on November 20, 1959» and p ro v id ed  fo r  
a 5 :5  d iv is io n ,  though r e ta in in g  agreem ents a lre a d y  more 
fav o u rab le  to  th e  te n a n ts .^
1
B.O. H utapea, "Some L essons” , August 1959» p p .3 0 -1 .
2
A le a d in g  FNI member o f p a rliam en t to ld  me in  in te rv ie w  
th a t  th i s  communist m otion was d esig n ed  to  c re a te  u n re s t  
i f  passed  and a t t r a c t i v e  propaganda i f  passed  o r n o t .  He 
claim ed t h a t  i f  the 6 :4  m otion had become law , the lan d ­
lo rd s  and w ealthy  p ea san ts  who had fo rm erly  le a se d  lan d  
would have then  worked i t  them selves w ith  la b o u re rs  in  
o rd e r  to  re c e iv e  a h ig h e r  income th an  th e  40 p e r  cen t o f  
y ie ld s  allow ed in  the  b i l l  proposed by PKI. This would 
have fo rced  a la rg e  number o f  te n a n t farm ers and s h a re ­
c ro p p ers  to  become a g r i c u l tu r a l  la b o u re rs .
3
PKI dan P erw ak ilan , fo u r th  q u a r te r  1 9 5 9 - f i r s t  q u a r te r  
I960, p p .137-46.
Having won this parliamentary victory, PKI and BTI 
launched a campaign to acquaint the peasants with their 
rights under the new law. At the same time, the 6:4 
demand has been extended gradually, but its implementation
is slow and requires careful preparation because:
The 6:4 action and other actions against the 
landlords* exploitation are entirely new for 
the peasants and even for most BTI cadres. 
The existence of examples of successful 
action will facilitate our work to convince 
the peasants of the justice of the 6:4 
demand and of the power of the peasants * 
unity. It also constitutes an important 
education for the local BTI cadres
3. Work in all villages. In categorizing PKI and 
BTI work among the peasants, there is a broad category 
which concerns all types of villages, which has the 
purpose of attracting the peasant labourers, poor peasants 
and medium peasants in general. This work ranges widely 
from concrete actions to the easier task of drawing up 
written demands.
PKI and BTI cultural and sports activities in the
rural areas are difficult to assess because little infor-
2mation has been issued. Perhaps, in general, the 
1
ST, January I960, p.3. The underlining is mine.
2
The only public mention by BTI of cultural activities 
was in April 1959 when it was announced that some groups 
were being organized to play traditional musical instru-
peasants are too old or too tired to participate in such 
activities which are a feature of Pemuda Rakjat’s work*
On the other hand, there are indications that PKI’s anti­
illiteracy work has been considerable among its members, 
and BTI too has at least announced the importance of 
eradicating illiteracy*
PKI long scorned the efforts of Vice-President Hatta
to create a cooperative movement in Indonesia, and it was
not until the Party’s national peasants* conference in
mid-April 1959 that a major revision was made in the
attitude towards cooperatives* The conference decided
to launch attempts to create three types of cooperatives:
credit, production, and purchase and sale* The PKI
sixth congress in September 1959 repeated the call to
establish cooperatives, and demanded government assistance 
2for them* As yet neither PKI nor BTI have published 
information on the implementation of the cooperative
369
ments, and others practising traditional forms of 
fighting and wrestling; "Laporan Umum”, supplement to ST, 
May-June 1959» p*33.
1
D.N. Aidit, "Ply High the Banners of *Land to the 
Peasants’ and Fight for One Victory after Another”, in 
supplement to RI, June-July 1959» pp*13-14.2
Njoto, Tentang Program PKI (Concerning PKI’s Programme), 
Djakarta, 1959» P.58; PKI, Resolusi tentang Laporan Umum 
CC PKI, p.89.
campaign, although in mid-1960 BTI was collecting funds
in order to train cadres for work in cooperatives.^
Since the April 1959 conference, PKI and BTI also
have begun to help the peasants to raise production. A
campaign has been launched to popularize what are called
the five principles of rice production: *Plough deeply,
plant closely, give more fertilizer, improve seedlings,
2and improve irrigation'. Fantastic production claims 
have been made for the five principles, but however 
exaggerated the claims may be, the five principles do 
lead to some increase in production. Three persons 
associated with BTI claim to have developed strains of 
rice with high yields. In June i960 it was reported 
that BTI in Central Java had established a committee to 
ensure the equitable distribution of one of the strains
xproduced, and that peasant demand for the seed was high. 
If the seed is superior, then its distribution must also 
be an effective means of winning broad peasant support.
The written appeals to and defence of the peasants' 
interests also range widely in scope. Both PKI and BTI
1
ST, July 1960, p.fj.
2
Aidit, ''Fly High the Banners", in supplement to RI, 
June-July 1959, p.14*
3 ST, June 1960, p.U
*Cl t _L
is s u e  le n g th y  l i s t s  o f  demands a t  tim es o f  con ferences 
and co n g re sse s , lo c a l  and n a t io n a l  e l e c t io n s ,  and c a b in e t 
changes. The l i s t s  inc lude  a v a r ie ty  o f  demands from 
a g r i c u l tu r a l  to o l s ,  te c h n ic a l  gu idance, cheap c r e d i t ,  and 
th e  d e m o c ra tiz a tio n  o f v i l la g e  governm ent, to  g r e a t ly  
in c re a se d  h e a l th  and ed u c a tio n a l f a c i l i t i e s  and reduced 
p r ic e s  o f  e s s e n t i a l  com m odities. But th e  im pact o f  
th e se  demands on the i l l i t e r a t e ,  t r a d it io n -b o u n d  peasan t 
can be ex ag g e ra ted . S im ila r ly  th e  s lo g an  ‘la n d  fo r  the  
peasan ts*  must have some e f f e c t ,  b u t i f ,  as th e  BTI 
le a d e rs  d e c la re d , th e  p easan ts  have s t i l l  to  be convinced 
o f  the ju s t i c e  o f  the  6 :4  demand, i t s  e f f e c t  o u ts id e  the  
e s t a t e ,  f o r e s t r y  and tran sm ig ra n t a re a s  may a ls o  be 
exaggera ted  by d e t r a d i t io n a l iz e d  Indonesians and fo re ig n  
o b se rv e rs . I t  appears th a t ,  in  g e n e ra l ,  th e  su p p o rt o f  
the p ea san ts  can be won on ly  by co n c re te  and b e n e f ic ia l  
a c tio n s  which a re  s u f f i c i e n t ly  sim ple so as n o t to go too 
f a r  ahead o f t h e i r  ‘co n sc io u sn ess* .
4 . PKI e x p lo i ta t io n  o f  the s a n tr i-a b a n g a n  schism  in  
J a v a . Whereas th e  s a n t r i  p o p u la tio n  o f  Jav a  has been  
h ig h ly  r e s i s t a n t  to  communist o rg a n iz a t io n a l  e f f o r t s ,  PKI 
has been ab le  to  win th e  su p p o rt o f  a b ro ad  c ro s s - s e c t io n  
o f  th e  abangan community by e x p lo it in g  th e  abangans * 
conscious h o s t i l i t y  towards th e  devout Moslems. D uring
O ^ o
xj t , j
the revolution, Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia), 
through which the communists did most of their work in 
the villages, sought the support of the ab an ga ns on the 
basis of a vigorous anti-santri position, Pesindo paved 
the way for later PKI work by successfully identifying 
itself with the ’original*, that is abangan, people as 
against the alien-oriented, Arab-oriented santris, with 
the poorer abangans as against the generally wealthier
Asantri3.
Under the Aidit leadership, the communists:
In many villages ... have taken advantage of 
the traditional feud between the strongly- 
Muslim group and the nominal Muslims, 
offering to the latter an identity and an 
organization. In such villages the organi­
zational line between Green (Muslim) and Red 
may have nothing at all to do with the 2
economic position of the antagonistic groups.
Special efforts have been made to win the support of
persons of traditional status within the abangan community
and the communists have proclaimed themselves to be the
true lovers and promoters of traditional elements in
abangan culture, from mutual aid in road repair to music
and dance-drama. Masjumi, which included the most
1
Robert Ravenelle Jay, "Santri and Abangan: Religious 
Schism in Rural Central Java’* (Harvard University, Ph.D. 
thesis, 1957)> pp.238-40.2
Compton, Indonesian Communism, p.9*
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fanatical of the Moslem reformist opponents of syncretic 
beliefs and ritual, was attacked not only for its 
policies, but also for its foreignness, its fanaticism, 
and its alleged desire to force others into a pattern of 
life based on Islam. In many areas PKI has been 
successful in creating the image of itself as both the 
defender of traditional values and culture and, at the 
same time, the harbinger of progress - progress, of 
course, by traditional ways of doing things.
(d) The Political Usefulness of Communist Support 
in the Villages^
Massive peasant support was essential to the Aidit 
leadership in order to bring about a communist victory by 
either peaceful or forceful means.
With largescale peasant electoral support, PKI could 
increase its parliamentary representation. This in turn 
could increase the Party!s bargaining position in national 
politics, and bring about if not a communist government 
or communist participation in a coalition government, at 
least the alliance of important political forces among the 
divided revolutionary political elite. It was also 
possible, though this advantage was realized probably in 
retrospect, that massive popular support would reduce the 
possibility of governmental repression of the Party for
two reasons. First, the government would be hesitant to 
repress a party with obvious popularity - especially PKI 
which, under the national united front policy, was 
careful to appear friendly to the nationalists and 
responsible in the exercise of its role as a non-government 
party. Second, the government might hesitate to attempt 
to repress a party with broad, organized support out of 
fear of the calamitous results such an attempt might bring.
The Aidit leadership may have hoped to win power by 
peaceful means, but it cannot have expected to. It needed 
to build organized mass support capable of neutralizing 
or defeating the forces which would be expected to oppose 
a communist bid for power. With the effort to organize 
mass support in the countryside, the Aidit leadership 
must have aimed to develop a force which, in the event of 
a political crisis, could be a major weapon for one of 
two purposes: to be displayed so as to intimidate 
opponents and convince wavering allies, that is, to win 
power by the mere display of apparent strength; or, if 
the opposition could not be intimidated, to be used along 
with the other communist organizations in order to destroy 
the Party’s opponents*
Results have certainly been achieved towards what 
might be termed the peaceful purposes of peasant support. 
PKI’s numerical size and apparent organizational ability
ö  *
helped encourage first PNI and then Sukarno to seek the 
alliance of the communists - of course on mutually 
beneficial terms. It is also possible that the size of 
PKI’s rural votes and therefore presumed rural strength 
and popularity has been a factor in deterring repressive 
measures against the communists.
Now that it appears highly unlikely that the other 
political forces will permit PKI to win governmental 
power by peaceful means, the question looms large as to 
whether the communists * rural organization could be used 
to achieve power by other means. The real power that 
the Aidit leadership wields through its support among the 
peasants is determined largely by three factors: the 
authority and influence exercised by other forces in the 
villages, the number of unorganized peasants, and the 
nature of the support given by the peasants to the 
communists.
The unanimous opinion of those non-communist 
politicians and government officials with whom I talked 
and who were concerned with the peasants was that as yet 
PKI had achieved little in building support that could 
openly oppose, let alone attack and destroy, *the 
authorities* in the countryside. The authority of the 
central government’s rural civil service and of the 
village officials has certainly declined, but it is still
sufficiently impressive to deter the great majority of 
peasants from open acts of defiance. Furthermore, while 
communist organization has grown, so too has the strength 
and authority of the army and the police in the rural 
areas. Only in the rarest cases would the peasants, 
conditioned to obey, stand against a combination of 
Authorities’. PKI and BTI have admitted publicly the 
great difficulty in making the peasants aware of their 
exploited position, and in arousing them to even mild 
actions against Indonesian landlords. The present 
slogan is ’all roads lead to 6:4*> but even these roads 
are long and difficult, and if successfully traversed 
lead only to the start of the fundamental task of building 
peasant support that can act in a disciplined and militant 
manner when called upon to do so.
As in their trade union work, the Indonesian commu­
nists have faced competition in their effort to win mass 
rural support. At the end of 1954? for example, there 
were 35 peasant organizations in Indonesia, 7 centralized 
and more or less nation-wide, and 28 locally based.
Within Java, it would seem that BTI membership is larger 
than that of all other peasant organizations combined.
1
Susilo Prawiroatmodjo, Tindjauan Slngkat Organisasi 
Tani di Indonesia (Brief Survey of Peasant Organizations 
in Indonesia), DJakarta, 1955> PP*50-4*
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Despite this, the Moslem STII and PNI*s Petani have 
greater influence than their membership would suggest 
mainly because they contain persons who retain influence 
and authority in the villages. The former includes many 
wealthier santris, and the latter many government and 
village officials.
The Indonesian peasants constitute some 55 to 65 
million persons, in some 12 to 15 million families. As 
BTI and PKI include perhaps 2 million family heads, and 
other peasant organizations and political parties account 
for about 1 million family heads, then between 9 and 12 
million peasant families are as yet unorganized.
Finally, but perhaps of most importance in con­
sidering communist strength in the villages, is the 
nature of communist support among the peasants. What 
might be termed the intellectual appeal of communism has 
had little if any effect among the Indonesian peasants.
The communists have had to win sympathy by concrete work 
for the peasants* interests, and this has been done to a 
large extent in the non-santri areas of Java through PKI 
and a wide range of organizations from the mass organi­
zations to cooperatives, savings associations and cultural 
and sports groups which may or may not be openly linked 
with the communist organizations. Some areas where
traditional social patterns have been weakened have
O '-■I o (j 4 .;
proved more ready to accept the support of PKI and its 
organizations. In the majority of villages, however, 
the communists have had to tread warily, to conform to 
village modes of behaviour, to work wherever possible 
through traditionally influential persons. Step by step 
PKI has sou$it to give the peasants an awareness of their 
exploited position, to lead them to actions of an 
increasing scope to the point where they will oppose the 
local landowners. But the peasants and even many cadres 
are still unwilling to oppose the local persons of status, 
let alone the government authorities.
The Javanese peasantry is not militant or revo­
lutionary; it is passive and basically conservative. It 
accepts help from PKI and the mass organizations, but it 
gives them little in return other than votes. The Aidit 
leadership is aware of this situation and expects to take 
years to create a militant and revolutionary force from 
the peasantry. This force has not yet been created, and 
it appears doubtful if it will appear in the foreseeable 
future. In short, the estimate of most non-communist 
political, governmental, police and army leaders that the 
peasants are really of minor importance in the extra- 
parliamentary struggle would appear to be valid as of the 
present and will probably remain so for the next few
years
O  SN
3« The P e t ty  B o u rg e o is ie
D oubts e x p re s s e d  above a s  t o  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  
A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p ’s c o n c e p t o f  th e  p e t t y  b o u r g e o is ie  a s  a 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  c a te g o r y  i n  I n d o n e s ia ,  a r e  s t r e n g th e n e d  
b y  an a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  e f f o r t s  made b y  PKI to  a t t r a c t  and  
o rg a n iz e  th e  g ro u p s  l i s t e d  a s  c o m p r is in g  th e  p e t t y  
b o u rg e o is ie *  The g ro u p s  a re  o f  su c h  d iv e r s e  i n t e r e s t s ,  
s o c i a l  s t a t u s  and  p o l i t i c a l  a w aren ess  t h a t  th e  PKI 
l e a d e r s  have  b e e n  f o r c e d  to  u se  a  w ide v a r i e t y  o f  m ethods 
i n  o rd e r  to  s e e k  t h e i r  s u p p o r t  -  w ith  a m arked la c k  o f  
s u c c e s s  among s e v e r a l  o f  th e  g roups*
The In d o n e s ia n  p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s ie ,  as d e f in e d  b y  th e  
A id i t  l e a d e r s h i p ,  i s ,  in  g e n e r a l  (w ith  th e  o b v io u s  
e x c e p tio n s  o f  t h e  u rb a n  p o o r  and  th e  f i s h e rm e n ) ,  b e t t e r  
e d u c a te d  th a n  th e  w o rk e rs  and  p e a s a n t s ,  and  b e t t e r  
in fo rm e d  on th e  p r o g r e s s  o f  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s  and t h e r e f o r e  
on th e  e x te n t  o f  th e  i n c a p a c i ty  and c o r r u p t io n  o f  th e  
su c c e e d in g  In d o n e s ia n  g overnm en ts*  I t  a l s o  s u f f e r s ,  w i th  
th e  o b v io u s  e x c e p t io n  o f  th e  d o c to r s ,  th e  econom ic c h a o s , 
th e  i n f l a t i o n ,  and  th e  s h o r ta g e  o f  consum er goods an d  raw  
m a t e r i a l s .  As a  r e s u l t ,  th e  p e t t y  b o u r g e o is ie  o u g h t to  
be more s y m p a th e tic  th a n  m ost n o t  o n ly  to  P K I 's  v o c a l
-
See a b o v e , p p .7 4 -6 *
struggle to alleviate the misery of the people, hut also 
to PKI’s promise of a people’s democracy*
The short-term, frequently repeated demands of PKI 
that should appeal to the petty bourgeoisie in general 
include: reduced prices and increased distribution of 
essential commodities, increased educational and health 
facilities, eradication of corruption, better balance of 
Indonesia’s foreign trade between capitalist and socialist 
countries so as to ensure high prices for Indonesia’s 
exports and the import of adequate industrial raw 
materials and consumer goods, resistance to fascism and 
the guarantee of democratic rights, the rapid development 
of the national economy, and the eradication of imperial­
ist power and influence. PKI’s opposition to the 
•fanatical* Moslems in Masjumi has also appealed to the 
largely unreligious or abangan petty bourgeoisie. 
Furthermore, the literate petty bourgeoisie should be 
able to grasp the significance of PKI’s long-term goal, 
a people’s democracy, which is promised to bring full 
national independence, full democratic rights for the 
people, the eradication of feudalism, and rapid economic 
development*
From the limited evidence I obtained, however, it 
appears that the political or intellectual appeal of PKI 
has met with little response, even among the intellectuals.
r* O f
The members o f  th e  p e t ty  b o u rg e o is ie  have been a t t r a c te d  
to  th e  P a r ty  o r  one o f  i t s  mass o rg a n iz a tio n s  by what 
th e  communists do o r prom ise to  do to  promote the  s p e c if ic  
s e c t io n a l  i n t e r e s t s  of the p o p u la tio n . The P a rty  has 
sough t to  a t t r a c t  the  u rban  poor by i t s  work in  the 
kampongs, as has been seen a b o v e t h e  women*s o rg an i­
z a t io n ,  Gerwani, has sought p r im a r ily  to  a t t r a c t  the  
p o o re r  women, in c lu d in g  those  who c o n s t i tu te  a h igh
pp ro p o rtio n  o f the  p e t ty  t r a d e r s ;  com m unist-led s tu d en t
o rg a n iz a tio n s  have sought to  a t t r a c t  s tu d e n ts  in  h igh
3
sch o o l and u n iv e r s i ty ;  and th e  youth o rg a n iz a tio n ,
Pemuda R a k ja t, has a t t r a c t e d  youths from the p o o rer 
s e c t io n s  o f the  p e t ty  b o u rg eo isie* ^ -
The A id it le a d e rs h ip  has made s p e c ia l  e f f o r t s  to  
a t t r a c t  and o rg an ize  two o f  the  groups inc luded  in  the 
p e t ty  b o u rg e o is ie : the  fish erm en , and the  in te l le c tu a ls *
(a ) The F isherm en.
In  1959 the  A id it  le a d e rsh ip  was in c re a s in g ly  aware 
th a t  due to  the a tro p h y  o f  democracy and the  in c reased  
power o f th e  army, th e  P a r ty  would p ro b ab ly  face  an 
u lt im a te  choice betw een s u f f e r in g  re p re s s iv e  measures
1 2
3
See above, p p .325-32
See below , p p .411-20.
4
See below , p p .428-41. 
See below , pp.393-UH
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and making a bid for power. If faced with this choice,
the support of Indonesia’s fishermen would be a valuable
asset: in the absence of more than a token navy, they
could run personnel and equipment into or out of
Indonesia in general and each island in particular.
Mention of the need to organize the ’millions* of
fishermen was made by the BTI and PKI leaders in 1957 and
1958, but it was not until the PKI national peasants’
conference of April 1959 that a detailed examination was
1made of the question of organizing fishermen. An
analysis was made of the social division among fishermen
which closely paralleled the analysis of the peasantry,
and which concluded that:
The fishermen-labourers and the poor fishermen 
together with the middle fishermen are moving 
forces of the revolution and must therefore 
be aroused, organized and mobilized in actions 
for improved conditions and democratic 
liberties, and in the struggle for complete 
national independence.
The conference called for the creation of fishermen’s 
unions for the labourers, of cooperatives ’serving, in the 
first place, the interests of the poor and middle fisher­
men*, and of ’other organizations serving general 
interests, such as cultural and sports clubs’. On August
i
’’Conclusions on the Question of Fishermen in Indonesia”, 
in supplement to RI, June-July 1959» pp.9-10.
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3t I960, the PKI central committee issued a circular which 
admitted that * until now the work of the Party among 
fishermen has not been developed and in some places has 
not begun at all'« Section committees were ordered to 
appoint cadres to supervize the work among fishermen, and 
instructions were given for the creation of a multiplicity 
of organizations in the fishing villages,
(b) The Intellectuals,
The Aidit leadership has been perplexed by the
intellectuals. In April 1951 the intellectuals were
confidently classified among the driving forces of the
revolution, and in 1957 Aidit included them within the
2supposedly revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. But when 
they continued to withstand the attractions of the Party, 
the leadership was forced into qualifications. In 
November 1952, the Party leaders drew a distinction 
between 'the old-generation intellectuals, who in general 
can be at the most neutralized, especially in revo­
lutionary times', and the younger intellectuals who could
1 PKI, Development of Work among Fishermen, mimeographed 
document, Djakarta, 19&0, p,1,
2




b e  made a r e a l  and  a c t i v e  f o r c e  in  th e  r e v o lu t io n *  T h is  
d i s t i n c t i o n  a c c o rd in g  t o  age was r e p la c e d  i n  1957 when 
A i d i t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t :
The i n t e l l e c t u a l s  and th e  s tu d e n t  y o u th  a re  
n o t  a c l a s s  i n  s o c i e t y  b u t  t h e i r  c l a s s  
p o s i t i o n  i s  d e te rm in e d  b y  f a m ily  o r i g i n ,  by 
t h e i r  c o n d i t io n s  o f  l i v i n g  and  b y  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  o u t lo o k .
The s i x t h  P a r ty  c o n g re s s  in  S ep tem b er 1959 acknow ledged  
th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  to  b e  ‘g e n e r a l l y  p a t r i o t i c  and  s t r o n g l y  
a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t ‘ , b u t  e x p l i c i t l y  d iv id e d  them  in to  two 
c a t e g o r i e s :  th o s e  ‘b o rn  and c r e a t e d  o f  In d o n e s ia n  la b o u r  
who a r e  s t r i v i n g  f o r  th e  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  o u r  p e o p le  and o f  
o u r  i n t e l l e c t u a l s * ,  and  th o s e  w i th  an  i n c o n s i s t e n t  
a t t i t u d e  t o  th e  r e v o l u t i o n ,  th e  i d e o l o g i c a l  r e p r e s e n ta ­
t i v e s  o f  th e  e c o n o m ic a lly  and  p o l i t i c a l l y  in s e c u re  
b o u rg eo is ie* * ^
What a c c o u n ts  f o r  PK I‘s c o n tin u e d  f a i l u r e  to  a t t r a c t  
more th a n  a  h a n d fu l  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ? ^  A p a r t i a l  b u t
1
"Bekerdja dalam kalangan I n t e l e k t u i l"  (Work Among th e  
I n t e l l e c t u a l s ) ,  BM, October-Novem ber 1952, p p * 120-3«
2
A i d i t ,  In d o n e s ia n  S o c i e t y , p«59«
3
PKI, R e s o lu s i  t e n ta n g  L ap p ran  Umum CC PK I, pp*92-3«
4
I t  i s  n o te w o rth y  t h a t  o f  th e  46 f u l l  and  c a n d id a te  
members o f  th e  PKI c e n t r a l  co m m ittee  e l e c t e d  i n  S ep tem ber 
1959, I  know o f  o n ly  two who have  u n i v e r s i t y  d e g re es*
com plex answer r e v o lv e s  around the s o c i a l  o r ig i n s ,  s o c i a l  
s t a t u s ,  and o c c u p a tio n s  o f  th e  in t e l l e c t u a l s *  The o ld e r  
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  ten d  to  come from a r i s t o c r a t i c  or  w ea lth y  
f a m i l i e s  b e c a u se  su ch  fa m il ie s  were the o n ly  ones w h ich , 
under Dutch r u l e ,  were a b le  to  g iv e  th e ir  c h ild r e n  h ig h er  
e d u c a t io n , and even  tod ay  very  few  u n iv e r s i t y  s tu d e n ts
A
have t h e ir  o r ig in s  in  th e  poor s e c t io n s  o f  s o c ie ty *
At th e  same t im e , ach ievem ent in  form al e d u c a tio n  i s  an 
im portant d eterm in an t o f  s o c i a l  s t a t u s  so  t h a t ,  by and 
la r g e ,  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  form al e d u c a tio n  b r in g s  w ith  i t  
a h ig h  s o c i a l  s ta tu s *  And h ig h - s ta tu s  In d on esian s have 
shown, in  g e n e r a l ,  l i t t l e  concern  fo r  the p l ig h t  o f  t h e ir  
p oorer  countrymen*
I t  has a l s o  been  th e  c a se  s in c e  independence th a t  
In d o n e s ia , u n lik e  some c o u n tr ie s ,  has had no group o f  
unem ployed i n t e l l e c t u a l s  to  form a r e s e r v o ir  o f  revo­
lu t io n a r ie s *  Anyone w ith  a f a i r l y  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  form al 
e d u c a tio n  has found ready and p r e s t ig e f u l  employm ent, 
e s p e c i a l ly  in  th e  grow ing b u reaucracy  and a l s o  in  th e  
expanding u n iv e r s i t y  sy stem  and th e  la r g e ,  m o stly  fo r e ig n  
p r iv a te  concerns* In order to  o b ta in , r e ta in  or advance  
t h e ir  p o s i t i o n s ,  th e  ed u cated  In d on esian s have ten ded
1
For a d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  r e a so n s , in c lu d in g  s o c i a l  
o r ig in ,  th a t  e x p la in  why th e  u n iv e r s i t y  s tu d e n t s ,  th e  
fu tu re  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  are  n o t a t t r a c t e d  to  PKI, se e  
b elo w , p p .4 1 8 -2 0 .
either to remain aloof from politics or to support the 
political parties of the persons in control of employment* 
And in no case, in government, university or private 
employment, have those in control been communists.
Although PKI has failed to attract many intellectuals 
it has built LEKRA, the only large, nation-wide mass 
organization of cultural workers, including a few 
intellectuals.
LEKRA. LEKRA was founded on August 17, 1950 with 
Njoto as the Party's guiding hand in the central 
secretariat. Special sections were set up for litera­
ture, the plastic arts, voice, drama and film, philosophy, 
and sports. Within a year, 21 branches had been
established, sixteen in Java, three in Sumatra, one in
1Kalimantan, and one in Sulawesi.
Major structural changes were made by the first
2LEKRA congress held in January 1959. Before the 
congress the structure had been a simple one: at the
1 LEKRA, Menjambut Kongres Kebudajaan (Welcoming the 
Cultural Congress), ?, 1951> p.1.
2
LEKRA, Laporan Umum Pengurus Pusat LEKRA kepada Kongres 
Nasional ke-I LEKRA (Ihe General Report of the National 
Council to the First LEKRA Congress), mimeographed, ?, 
1959f p.27; Keputusan-Keputusan Kongres Nasional ke-I 
LEKRA (Decisions of the First LEKRA Congress), 
mimeographed, ?, 1959, p.1.
centre, the national council and the secretariat with the 
six special sections; a LEKRA organization at the 
regional level; and the local branches. The congress 
created a system of institutes which runs parallel to the 
old structure: institutes of literature, plastic arts, 
music, dance, drama, film, and science, with their own 
organizations reaching down to the branch level, and 
actually embracing ordinary members in their own cultural 
field. The ordinary branches now look after ’general 
cultural matters’. Under the new system, individual 
members receive better guidance and assistance in their 
own field.
LEKRA has always kept the size of its membership a 
secret. The general report to the 1959 congress stated 
evasively that:
We do not know definitely how many members 
we have, but clearly the number now is not 
as in the saying ’it can be counted on the fingers of one hand ’ •1 2
In an interview, the LEKRA secretary-general claimed that 
as of May 1960 there were about 200 branches, each with
ptwo or three institute sections.Ä The most important 
and largest branches were in Jogjakarta, Surakarta and
1
LEKRA, Laporan Umum, p.2.
2
Interview with Joebaar Ajoeb, LEKRA secretary-general, 
and Basuki Resobowo, a member of the LEKRA secretariat.
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D j a k a r t a ,  w h ile  i n  J o g j a k a r t a  LEKRA was c o n s id e r a b ly
s t r e n g th e n e d  b y  th e  de  f a c t o  a f f i l i a t i o n  o f  a  l a r g e  g roup
o f  young  p a i n t e r s  i n  th e  n o m in a l ly  in d e p e n d e n t P e o p le ’s 
1
A r t i s t s *  N on-com m unist e s t im a te s  o f  LEKRA m em bership
so m etim es ru n  i n t o  t e n s  o f  th o u s a n d s ,  b u t  a f i g u r e  f a r  
b e lo w  1 0 ,0 0 0  w ould  p ro b a b ly  in c lu d e  a l l  who ta k e  p a r t  
more o r  l e s s  r e g u l a r l y  i n  LEKRA a c t i v i t i e s *
LEKRA, a s  th e  o th e r  m ass o r g a n i z a t i o n s , h a s  
e n d e a v o u re d  t o  a t t r a c t  m em bersh ip  by a p p e a l in g  to  th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  a s p e c i f i c  s e c t i o n  o f  s o c i e t y .  As th e  
o n ly  n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l  o r g a n iz a t io n  to  have s u rv iv e d  th e  
l a s t  t e n  y e a r s ,  LEKRA h a s  p ro v id e d  n o t  o n ly  a  p la c e  f o r  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  common i n t e r e s t s ,  b u t  a l s o  some t r a i n i n g  
i n  th e  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r a l  f i e l d s .  In  a c o u n try  a lm o s t 
d e v o id  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  th e  e x h ib i t i o n  o f  w orks o f  a r t ,  
LEKRA h a s  p ro v id e d  them  f o r  any  a r t i s t ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  
s t y l e .  As a n  o u t l e t  f o r  th e  work o f  b o th  a r t i s t s  and
p
w r i t e r s ,  LEKRA p u b l i s h e s  a  p e r i o d i c a l ,  "Zaman Barm", 
and  s in c e  1959 h a s  b eg u n  t o  p u b l i s h  books and  b o o k le t s .
1
The c h a irm a n  o f  th e  P e o p le ’s A r t i s t s  ( P e lu k is - P e lu k i s  
R a k ja t)  ra n  as a  ’n o n -p a r ty *  c a n d id a te  on P K I’s l i s t  in  
th e  1955 e l e c t i o n s .
2
Zaman Baru i s  th e  c o n t in u a t io n  o f  th e  com m unist- 
c o n t r o l l e d  S u ra b a ja  p o l i t i c a l  p e r i o d i c a l  o f  th e  same 
name w hich v i r t u a l l y  d is a p p e a re d  in  1953> to  b e  r e v iv e d  
a s  a r e g u l a r l y - i s s u e d ,  w e l l-p ro d u c e d  LEKRA p e r i o d i c a l  i n  
m id -1956 .
oonOöJ
LEKRA artists are employed to create the decorations and
posters for PKI and its mass organizations at times of
1celebrations, congresses, conferences and elections, and 
LEKRA. members also provide the talent for the cultural 
performances that are a feature of the communist meetings 
and election campaigns.
LEKRA claims to have had success in bringing together
and organizing the da längs in West and Central Java, the
ludruk groups of East Java, and gamelan players, and to
have been instrumental in the formation of BAKOKSI, a
2separate organization of ketoprak artists. That is, it 
has acted as a sort of trade union for the players in the 
traditional forms of Javanese entertainment.
LEKRA has been able to provide, thanks to its commu­
nist connections, the reward of trips to Soviet bloc 
countries for its most active members. The first LEKRA 
group to go abroad consisted of six persons who attended 
the 1951 Berlin youth festival. LEKRA members have 
attended all subsequent communist international youth
1
This is not to imply that LEKRA members are paid for 
their work in aid of PKI and its mass organizations. I 
do not know if their labour is given free.
2
LEKRA, Lappran Umum, pp.15, 26. Dalängs are the story­
tellers in the wajang dramas; ludruk and ketoprak are 
traditional forms of music-drama; gamelan is the name of 
the Javanese orchestra that accompanies the wajang and 
music dramas.
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festivals, and have also participated in cultural dele­
gations to Czechoslovakia, Korea and Tashkent.
Finally, in order to attract cultural workers by an 
appeal to their specific interests, LEKRA has formulated 
demands in their interest. For example, the second 
national conference, held from October 28 to 30, 1957» 
demanded tax relief for artists, bigger subsidies for 
cultural organizations, lighter entertainment tax, 
protection and assistance for the national film industry,
-iand the creation of a Ministry of Culture. The national
congress in January I960 demanded reduced prices for
cultural tools such as books, paints, canvas, and musical 
2instruments.
The political usefulness of LEKRA for PKI has been 
varied. Apart from adding its voice to those of the 
other mass organizations in support of PKI*s position on 
particular issues, LEKRA has enhanced the attractiveness 
of PKI and the other mass organizations by making them 
more colourful with posters, banners and cultural enter­
tainment* By organizing the artists in the traditional 
forms of entertainment, it has succeeded in infusing a 
pro-PKI political content into these tremendously popular
1




art forms. And LEKRA has been the spearhead for the 
attack on Western Rock'n’roll culture*, with its 
'immoral', 'sadistic', 'war-thirsty' books, films and 
music. This attack may have played a part in persuading 
the government to ban the 'immorality* of Western music, 
Western dancing, and the hula-hoop.
LEKRA has tried to teach its members to portray the
sufferings of the people in a realistic manner. But
LEKRA is in no position to exact artistic discipline from
its members who are in the organization for what it gives
them and who still largely follow their own individual-
1istic progress. What LEKRA has done, as the only 
significant nation-wide cultural organization in Indonesia, 
is to bring a wide range of cultural workers, from film 
actors and peasant entertainers to sophisticated poets and 
artists, into contact with PKI and into work of benefit of 
the Party.
1 LEKRA's failure to persuade its members to adopt 
socialist realism is illustrated by Sukarno's reaction to 
the LEKRA art exhibition held at the time of the 1959 
congress:My friends, I have seen an exhibition of 
paintings by members of LEKRA; I must say that 
you are very liberal minded. I found so many 
styles and schools of painting - naturalism, 
realism, surrealism, impressionism, cubism, 
futurism, etc. When I asked the artists why 
there are so many styles, their answers 
revolved around the individuality of the 
artist, freedom of the artist, etc.




The adult workers and peasants in Indonesia have 
"been slow to discard the tradition of open obedience and 
to regard inequality as an injustice which they themselves 
can remove. As a result, they have not provided a 
satisfactory source of cadre material for PKI and its mass 
organizations. The Aidit leadership has spent, therefore, 
much effort in order to attract and organize the youth, to 
mould them politically before the dead weight of tra­
ditional values and behaviour is placed upon them.
As youth is differentiated according to age and 
education, several mass organizations have been 
established for it. The largest and most important is 
Pemuda Rakjat, the continuation under a new name of Pemuda 
Sosialis Indonesia of the revolution. Pemuda Rakjat is 
the only mass organization which has formal ties with the 
Party, and which receives open assistance from the Party. 
It is aimed primarily at the urban and rural poor with 
little or no education. For high school students there 
is IPPI, and for students of institutes of higher edu­
cation, including universities, there is CGMI. Youngsters 
below high school age have been provided with a communist- 
led scout association and, the most recent addition to 
PKI*s mass organizations, a young pioneer movement.
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( a )  Pemuda R a k ja t .
1 • The g row th  o f  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n # D u rin g  th e
r e v o l u t i o n  th e  S o c i a l i s t  P a r ty  in c lu d e d  many sh a d e s  o f
l e f t i s t s  from  th e  S j a h r i r  s o c i a l i s t s  to  c o v e r t  com m unists.
I t s  y o u th  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  Pemuda S o s i a l i s  I n d o n e s ia ,  p la y e d
an  im p o r ta n t  r o l e  i n  m o b il iz in g  y o u th  to  th e  d e fe n c e  o f
th e  R e p u b lic ,  and o rg a n iz e d  i t s  own arm ed g ro u p s . The
1
h i g h e s t  m em bership  re a c h e d  was a b o u t 5 0 , to  1 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
At th e  b e g in n in g  o f  1948 th e  S j a h r i r  s o c i a l i s t s  b ro k e
away from  th e  S o c i a l i s t  P a r ty  to  form  th e  PSI ,  b u t  th e y
d id  n o t  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  own y o u th  o r g a n iz a t io n  u n t i l  th e
end  o f  1954* Many o f  th e  l e a d e r s  and  members o f  Pemuda
S o s i a l i s  In d o n e s ia  were in v o lv e d  in  th e  M adiun r e b e l l i o n ,
and  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  l a t e r  c la im e d  t h a t  one th o u sa n d  o f
2i t s  l e a d e r s  were k i l l e d .
The r e b e l l i o n  d id  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  th e  p r o s c r i p t i o n  o f  
th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  an d  i t s  t h i r d  c o n g re s s  was h e ld  in  
D ja k a r ta  from  November 4 to  12, 1950» T o ta l  m em bership
3
h ad  f a l l e n  t o  3 0 , 0 0 0 , and th e  num ber o f  b r a n c h e s  to  149*
_
In te rv ie w  w ith  Moh. P a tc h a n  an d  Anwar N a s u t io n ,  th e n  
r e s p e c t i v e l y  f i r s t  an d  se c o n d  d e p u ty  s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  o f  
Pemuda R a k ja t ,  and  w ith  Q odar, a member o f  th e  Pemuda 
R a k ja t  e x e c u tiv e  c o u n c i l .
2
S in  P o . March 2 2 , 1951.
3
S in  Po, November 8 , 1950; in te r v ie w  w ith  P a tc h a n , 
N a s u tio n  and Q odar.
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Perhaps ind ica tive  of an attempt to re -e s ta b lish  the 
o rg an iza tio n 's  good character was the large photograph 
o f President Sukarno which, side-by-side with one of Mao 
Tse-tung, watched over the congress. The congress was 
a v ic to ry  for the A idit group which was then strugg ling  
to capture complete control of PKI. In line  with the 
th inking of the A idit group, the old name of the organi­
zation  was discarded as one which would turn away 
prospective members. I t  was replaced by Pemuda Rakjat. 
The declared objective of the organization was a lte red  
from a s o c ia l is t  s ta te  to a people 's democracy. Wikana, 
an opponent o f the A idit group, was removed from the 
leadersh ip . And a t a time when the A idit group was 
strugg ling  against Tan Ling D jie 's  concept of more than 
one M arxist-Leninist party , the congress promised to 
a s s is t  in  the c reation  of a single M arxist-Leninist 
party , PKI, as the leader of the revolution. During 1950 
Pemuda Rakjat joined the World Federation of Democratic 
Youth, and since then one or o ther leader of Pemuda Rakjat 
has been a v ice-president of the WFDY.
During the f i r s t  two years or so a f te r  the December 
1950 congress, Pemuda Rakjat, lik e  the other PKI-led mass 
organizations, continued to show a 's e c ta r ia n ' character 
despite i t s  verbal re jec tio n  of sectarianism . From the 
l i t t l e  information th a t remains of i t s  a c t iv i t ie s  p rio r
to about 1954» it would appear that they were mainly
complementary to PKI*s political agitation for a people*s
democracy, against colonialism, against the Round Table
Conference agreement, against the August 1951 mass
arrests, against the state of war and siege regulations,
and against PKI*s political opponents. The first signs
that sectarianism was being abandoned appeared only when
the Aidit leadership was formulating its concept of a
broad national united front.
The fourth Pemuda Rakjat congress was held in
November 1952, attended by about 300 delegates repre-
2senting the 118 branches and 46,596 members. The 
general report to the congress noted that 129 leaders had 
been imprisoned during the August 1951 arrests,"^ and 
contained a further strong attack on sectarianism. The 
constitution adopted by the congress opened Pemuda Rakjat
1
In October 1951, for example, the Pemuda Rakjat leader­
ship ordered all branches to cooperate with other youth 
organizations in establishing joint committees to 
celebrate Heroes* Day; HR, October 15, 1951* In February 
1952, Pemuda Rakjat joined with several other youth 
organizations, including PNI*s Pemuda Demokrat, in the 
celebration held in Bandung of the International Day of 
Youth Solidarity against Colonialism; HR, February 22, 
1952.2
HR, November 13, 15 and 17, 1952; also interview with 
Fatchan, Nasution and Qodar,
3 A report in HR, January 2, 1952, stated that 150 Pemuda 
Rakjat members arrested in August 1951 were still in 
prison.
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to  a l l  boys an d  g i r l s ,  aged  14 to  3 0 , who were In d o n e s ia n  
c i t i z e n s  a n d  who a g re e d  to  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n 's  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  
B oth  e n t r a n c e  and  m em bership  f e e s  w ere s e t  so  low t h a t  
ev en  i f  c o l l e c t e d  th e y  w ould n o t  e x c lu d e  any  p o t e n t i a l  
me mbe r , howe v e r  po o r • ^
F o llo w in g  th e  c o n g re s s ,  m em bership b e g a n  to  r i s e
s lo w ly ,  a n d  i n  Ju n e  1953 th e  n a t i o n a l  c o u n c i l  i s s u e d  th e
2
f i r s t  p la n  f o r  e x p a n s io n  o f  m em bersh ip . The g o a l  was 
an  i n c r e a s e  from  7 0 ,3 1 9  to  1 5 0 ,0 0 0  b y  th e  end o f  1953*
By th e  tim e  o f  th e  f i r s t  n a t i o n a l  c o n fe re n c e  i n  J u ly  
1954* Pemuda R a k ja t  c la im e d  281 b ra n c h e s  and 202 ,605  
m em bers, o f  w h ich  180 b ra n c h e s  and 166,631  members were
3
i n  J a v a ,  and  81 b ra n c h e s  and  29>974 members i n  S u m a tra .
The c o n fe re n c e  la u n c h e d  an  a m b itio u s  p la n  to  r a i s e  member­
s h ip  to  5 0 0 ,0 0 0  b y  th e  end  o f  th e  y e a r ,  w ith  th e  em phasis  
on m oving o u t o f  t h e  tow ns i n t o  th e  r u r a l  a r e a s .  T h is 
g o a l  was n o t  r e a c h e d , b u t  i n  Ju n e  1955 Pemuda R a k ja t
1
Pemuda R a k ja t ,  P e r a tu r a n  D a sa r  Pemuda R a k ja t  (Pemuda 
R a k ja t 's  C o n s t i t u t i o n ) ,  ( t h i r d  e d i t i o n ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1954* 
p p .1 4 , 41 .
2
Pemuda R a k ja t ,  Rol Pemuda dalam  P e rd ju a n g a n  u n tu k  
Kernerdekaan N a s io n a l  dan  P e rd am a ian  D unia (The R ole o f  
Y outh i n  th e  S t r u g g le  f o r  N a t io n a l  In d ep en d en ce  and  W orld 
P e a c e ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1955» p .3 7 .
3
I b i d . . p p .3 7 - 8 .  The f i g u r e  f o r  Ja v a  in c lu d e d  th e  i n s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  m em bersh ip  i n  N u sa te n g g a ra  b e c a u se  a t  t h a t  tim e 
N u sa te n g g a ra  was in c lu d e d  in  th e  a re a  o f  th e  E a s t  Ja v a  
r e g io n a l  c o m m itte e .
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c la im e d  458  b ra n c h e s  and 4 5 0 ,0 0 0  m em bers, and 601 b ra n c h e s
an d  6 1 6 ,6 0 5  members a t  th e  end  o f  1955* A p p a re n tly  th e
movement i n t o  th e  v i l l a g e s  was s u c c e s s f u l ,  f o r  i t  was
c la im e d  t h a t  a b o u t 75 p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  members in  Ju n e  1955
2
w ere p o o r  p e a s a n t s .  By th e  end  o f  1955» 80 p e r  c e n t  o f  
members w ere p e a s a n t s ,  15 p e r  c e n t  w o rk e rs  and  o f f i c e  
w o rk e rs , 5 p e r  c e n t  s tu d e n t s  o f  h ig h  s c h o o l  and  u n i v e r s i t y  
and 1 p e r  c e n t  'o t h e r s * ,  in c lu d in g  sm a ll  tra d e sm e n  and  
f ish e rm en .-^  The s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  even  c o m p la in ed  t h a t  
th e  num ber o f  young w o rk e rs  was now to o  low . O nly a b o u t 
5 p e r  c e n t  o f  members w ere g i r l s .
The p rob lem  o f  c a d re  e d u c a t io n  was r a i s e d  in  th e  
f i f t h  Pemuda R a k ja t  c o n g re s s  h e ld  in  J u ly  1956. Some 
a t te m p t  a t  p u b l i c a t i o n  in  o r d e r  to  p ro v id e  m a te r i a l  o f  u se  
f o r  c a d re s  h ad  a l r e a d y  b e e n  made, b u t  w ith  i n d i f f e r e n t  
s u c c e s s .^  D u rin g  th e  e l e c t i o n  cam paign f o r  th e
1
A sm udji, "M eluaskan  P e n e rb i ta n  O rg a n is a s i"  (To E x ten d  
P u b l is h in g  by  th e  O r g a n iz a t io n ) ,  B u ie t in  Pemuda R a k ja t , 
n o . 1, 1955, P .5 ;  HR, J u l y  2 6 , 1 9 5 ^
2
A sm udji, "M elu ask an " , B u ie t in  Pemuda R a k ja t , n o .1 ,  1955»
p . 6 .
3
Pemuda R a k ja t ,  Menudju P e r s a tu a n  Pemuda In d o n e s ia  ja n g  
Luas (Towards B road U n ity  o f  In d o n e s ia n  Y o u th ) , D ja k a r ta ,  
195Ü, p .4 5 .
4
In  J a n u a ry  1954 a tw ic e -m o n th ly  Pemuda B am  (New Y outh) 
was to  b e g in ,  b u t  was n o t  h e a rd  o f  s u b s e q u e n t ly ;  to w ard s 
th e  end o f  1955 a m o n th ly  G e n e ra s i  Baru (New G e n e ra tio n )  
was a p p e a r in g ,  a l th o u g h  th e  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  i t  and  a l l
Constituent Assembly, the Pemuda Rakjat executive com­
mittee had instructed members to study Aidit*s "For the 
Victory of the National United Front in the General
Elections" as well as the committee^ report to the fourth
1national council plenum* The congress was told that in
future education would be concentrated at the centre and
provincial and kabupaten levels for cadres, with
collective discussions in all leadership bodies and
2members* 1 groups. In order to implement Marxist-Leninist 
education proper relations had to be organized with PKI 
and the Party's directives carried out. Visits to the 
Soviet bloc have been of importance as political education 
as well as rewards. It was not divulged what percentage 
of youth delegations abroad have been Pemuda Rakjat 
members, but large delegations have attended, for example, 
the communist international youth festivals; 63 Indo­
nesians went to Berlin in 1951> about 100 went to 
Bucharest in 1953 (61 spending an extra three months in 
Eastern Europe, the USSR, and China), 37 to Warsaw in
Pemuda Rakjat brochures and pamphlets was less than 2,250; 
and from the end of 1955 the monthly Buietin Pemuda Rakjat 
appeared, though by July 1956 it had been combined with 
Generasi Baru. HR, December 30, 1953; Asmudji,
^Meluaskan", Buletin Pemuda Rakjat, no.1, 1955» P»5;
Pemuda Rakjat, Menudju, p.53*
1
Pemuda Rakjat, Menudju, pp.51-2.
2
1955» and about 200 to Moscow in 1957 (of whom some also
1visited China and North Korea)*
During 1958 Pemuda Rakjat formulated a plan of 
organization and education to be completed before the
psixth congress scheduled for the beginning of 1960. The 
important goals for the plan were four:
1* To increase membership to one million.
2. To extend organization into new areas, especially 
outside Java.
3* With regard to cadres: (a) to arrange the movement 
of cadres from the better-established to the newer areas; 
(b) to arrange for every province or province-level 
region in Java and Sumatra (except Djambi and Riau) to 
have two full-timers, and each similar area outside Java 
and Sumatra one each; (c) to arrange for every commis­
sariat in Java and Sumatra (except Djambi and Riau) to
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1
HR, July 10 and October 23, 1953; July 28, 1955; July 3* 
and September 10, 1957«
2
Pemuda Rakjat, Diktat (Outline for Cadre Courses), 
mimeographed, Djakarta, no date, pp.33-7*
3 Under the Pemuda Rakjat constitution, there is a 
committee for each province or province-level area, a 
commissariat to coordinate the branches in each kabupaten 
and large town, then a branch which coordinates the work 
of several sub-branches in which ordinary members partici­
pate. Groups further divide ordinary members as a means 
of implementing the work of the sub-branch; Pemuda Rakjat, 
Peraturan Dasar Pemuda Rakjat (Pemuda Rakjat's Consti- 
tution), (fifth edition), Djakarta, 1958, pp.31-43*
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have at least one full-timer, and outside Java and Sumatra 
one half-timer; and (d) to arrange for every branch to 
have at least one mobile activist readily available for 
work,
4» To implement the following education programme:
(a) at the centre, ’shifts* of one month each in a central 
school to teach the history of social development, the 
basic problems of the revolution, the Indonesian youth 
movement, and problems of Pemuda Rakjat organization;
(b) at the province level, ‘shifts’ of half a month to 
teach "How Society Develops’1, the "ABC of the Indonesian 
Revolution" (both of which are study guides issued by PKI 
for use in its section and subsection schools), the 
Indonesian and international youth movements, and problems 
of Pemuda Rakjat organization; (c) at the commissariat 
level, schools and courses to study the Indonesian and 
international youth movements, to give an understanding 
of the role of Pemuda Rakjat, and to give general 
knowledge; (d) in the branches, discussions on theory, 
using material from "Harian Rakjat" as well as the Pemuda 
Rakjat constitution; and (e) in the sub-branches, 
political lectures given by leaders of the branch and by 
members of the local PKI subsection. Students in the 
schools were to live in hostels, and to work similarly to 
students in PKI schools. The general plan was that the
schools at each level would educate cadres and activists 
from the immediately lower level, while the political 
lectures in the sub-branches would be for both members and 
non-members.
At the end of 1957 there had been 802 branches and a
1claimed membership of 800,000. In July 1958, the
national council raised the membership goal to 1,200,000,
and asked the urban sections of the organization to give
attention not only to workers and girls, but also to high
2school and university students. The executive com­
mittee’s report to the council indicated, however, that 
in fields other than membership expansion difficulties 
were being faced.^ The periodical "Generasi Baru" could
not be published due to a shortage of funds; the education 
system was not yet in operation;*4 and the losses suffered 
by Pemuda Rakjat at the hands of PRRI-Permesta rebels
1 Pemuda Rakjat, Pemuda Pengawal Kemerdekaan Nasional 
Indonesia (Youth, the Guardian of Indonesian National 
Independence), Djakarta, 1957* p.6.
2
Pemuda Rakjat, Laooran Umum oada Sidang De wan Nasional ke-III (General Report to the Third Meeting of the National 
Council), mimeographed, Djakarta, 1958, p.13.
3 Ibid., pp.13-19.
k The report did comment that the national council was 
still running a school for preparing cadres from Java for 
work in the outer islands, and that some commissariats and 
branches had, on their own initiative, organized schools 
and courses on politics and theory.
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forced the organization to give the areas outside Java a 
prior claim on cadres.
By the end of 1959 claimed membership had reached 
2about one million. The social composition had remained
fairly stable since 1955» and in April 1960 the Pemuda
Rakjat leaders estimated that about 70 per cent of members
were peasants, 25 per cent workers of all descriptions
from labourers to office workers, and 4 per cent high
3school and university students. Girls still comprised 
about 5 per cent. The geographical spread of Pemuda 
Rakjat was indicated by the endorsement in July 1958 of 
province-level committees for Atjeh, West Kalimantan, 
Central Kalimantan, and Nusatenggara.^- Despite this, 
membership remained concentrated in Java (about 70 per 
cent) and Sumatra (about 30 per cent), with little outside
5these two islands. In April 1958, for example, the
1
There were two reasons for this priority: first, many 
cadres of PKI and its mass organizations were killed by 
the rebels; and, second, the central government placed a 
ban on all political activity in the war zones, so that 
PKI used its mass organizations to fill the political 
gap left by the withdrawal of the rebels and the ban on 
party activities.
2
Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, p.171.
3 Interview with Patchan, Nasution and Qodar.4 Pemuda Rakjat, Lappran Umum, p.14*
5 Interview with Patchan, Nasution and Qodar.
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membership in Nusatenggara, including Bali, was only 
6,296^ in a population of about 5>800,000.
In 1959 *cadre education was begun on a nation-wide
pscale and in a carefully organized fashion’. The 
central school began its first ’shift* in January 1959» 
and was soon followed by schools and courses at the lower 
levels as laid down in the 1958 plan. The central school 
held two shifts each year, each shift lasting one and a 
half months and taking 30 to 40 cadres. In the pro­
vincial and commissariat schools the courses lasted from
one to three weeks depending partly on how often the
4students could meet. Subjects taught were in line with 
the plan. Publishing efforts were not so successful, 
but in 1960 the small news-sheet ’’Buletin Pemuda Rakjat" 
was still being published, at a rate of 10,000 copies per 
month, and was being distributed to each sub-branch where 
it served as material for discussions, lectures and for 
improving the organization.
1
HR, April 28, 1958.2
Interview with Patchan, Nasution and Qodar.
3
HR, January 12, 1959.
4
Interview with Pemuda Rakjat leaders in East Java and 
Jogjakarta.
I t  i s  im p o s s ib le  f o r  an o u t s i d e r  t o  e s t i m a t e  w h e th e r  
t h e  1958 p la n  has b e en  f u l f i l l e d  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  
number o f  f u l l - t i m e  c a d r e s .  The number o f  c a d r e s  i s  
k e p t  s e c r e t ,  and th e  p rob lem  o f  e s t i m a t i n g  i t  i s  made 
more d i f f i c u l t  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  c a d r e s  o f t e n  d o u b le  a s  
c a d r e s  f o r  PKI and f o r  one o r  more o f  th e  o t h e r  mass 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  and p a r t l y  b e c a u se  th e  number v a r i e s  w id e ly  
from  a r e a  to  a r e a .  A ccord ing  to  i n f o r m a t io n  I  r e c e i v e d  
from  Pemuda R a k ja t  c a d r e s  in  t h e  f i r s t  months o f  1960, 
t h e r e  were f i v e  f u l l - t i m e r s  i n  th e  c e n t r a l  h e a d q u a r t e r s ,  
and  s i x  c a d re s  who a l s o  had  o t h e r  j o b s ;  i n  E a s t  J a v a  t h e r e  
were f o u r  f u l l - t i m e r s  a t  t h e  p r o v in c e  l e v e l ,  w h i le  an  
e s t i m a t e d  5  p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  com m ittee  members a t  th e  
c o m m is s a r ia t  l e v e l  were f u l l - t i m e r s ;  and i n  th e  J o g j a k a r t a  
S p e c i a l  D i s t r i c t  t h e r e  were f i v e  f u l l - t i m e r s  i n  th e  
J o g j a k a r t a  c i t y  c o m m is s a r ia t ,  and  be tw een  t h r e e  and  f i v e  
i n  e a c h  o f  th e  f o u r  k a b u p a te n  c o m m itte e s .  Prom th e s e  
f i g u r e s  i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  Pemuda R a k ja t  p r o b a b ly  has  
a t  i t s  d i s p o s a l  a few h u n d red  f u l l - t i m e r s  o r  p a r t - t i m e r s ,  
w hich  i s  in c o m p a ra b ly  more th a n  any  o t h e r  y o u th  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  Pemuda R a k ja t  r e c e i v e s  c o n s t a n t  
a s s i s t a n c e  from PKI and th e  o t h e r  c o m m u n is t- le d  mass 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
2• The activities of Pemuda Rakjat. As has been
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seen, Pemuda Rakjat in the first two years or so after 
the December 1950 congress concentrated largely on 
political action. Since 1952 or 1953 political action 
has not been abandoned, but it has been concerned largely 
with building the image of the communist group as the 
militant defender of Indonesian sovereignty, the patriotic 
bearer of the sacred flame of the 1945 revolution. 
Vociferous denunciation has been made of colonialism and 
imperialism, of any real or imaginary interference in 
Indonesia’s internal affairs, of ’Western culture’ 
(including the ’immoral’ films and dances which offend a 
large number of Indonesians, especially the less educated 
and the more tradition-bound), and of ’subversion*, 
ranging from Dutch assistance to the Darul Islam rebels 
to Kuomintang and Western assistance to the PRRI-Permesta
Arebels. The demand for the return of West Irian has 
been brought up regularly, and when PKI after 1955 began 
to move closer to Sukarno, Pemuda Rakjat organized 
campaigns in support of his concept of guided democracy. 
More recently, it drew attention to those contents of his
1 Pemuda Rakjat leaders claim that when the PRRI-Permesta 
rebellion broke out in 1958, Pemuda Rakjat cadres and 
activists played an active and at times heroic part in 
opposing and even openly fighting the rebels.
406
political manifesto of August 17> 1959 which were of 
benefit to PKI. In a different vein, Pemuda Rakjat 
instructed its members to vote communist in the 1955 and 
1957 elections, and also organized brigades to campaign 
for PKI.
Pemuda Rakjat*s political activities have been of
considerable assistance to PKI. They also have attracted
a few members and they have served to raise the political
consciousness of cadres and activists. They have not
been, however, a chief means by which Pemuda Rakjat has
attracted over one million members. Sukatno, the
secretary-general, wrote in 1955 that the way to attract
mass membership was for Pemuda Rakjat to truly know the
hopes of youth, for Pemuda Rakjat as a whole to fight for
youth*s *everyday interests*, and for the sub-branches to
answer *the everyday needs of every section of youth, in
workshops, factories, offices, harbours, urban kampongs,
«1villages, estates, schools, etc. * Work towards this end 
has been twofold: the formulation of programmes of demands 
aimed at each major section of youth, and the social and 
economic activities of the sub-branches and groups.
1
Sukatno, "Untuk Memperluas Diskusi-Diskusi dikalangan 
Anggota.'” (To Extend Discussions Among Members.*), Buie tin 
Pemuda Rakjat, no.1, 1955> p.3*
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An example of the comprehensive programmes of demands
drawi up by Pemuda Rakjat is that put forward by the fifth
congress in July 1956. It contained twenty general
demands, seven demands specifically for young workers,
eleven for young peasants, and fifteen for high school
and university students. The scope of the demands
ranged widely: in the case of young workers, for example,
from improved wages, social security, and work conditions,
to the abolition of wage differences because of sex or
age, the distribution of essential commodities at low
prices, and technical education with scholarships from
the employers and the government.
Political action and published programmes of demands
have meant little to the ordinary young worker or peasant.
The great appeal of Pemuda Rakjat lies in its social and
economic activities, and Pemuda Rakjat did not achieve
mass membership until these were given priority.
The organization secretary told the first national
conference in July 1954:
In seeking for the object of activity of the 
organization to defend the rights of the 
various groups of youth in the various fields, 
urgent demands should be chosen which can be 
felt every day and can be carried out 
successfully, for example: abolition of 
pologoro, reduction of land rent, village 
democratization, higher wages, lower book
Pemuda Rakjat, Menudju, pp.63-7-
1
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prices, and so on ... In order to carry out 
demands as well as possible, we must 
cooperate with youth organizations, other 
mass organizations concerned, and with the 
mass of youth that is not yet organized ••• 
what is especially important is to carry out 
concrete and continuous activity until the 
demands are successful. Once a demand is 
successful, then another object of activity 
must be sought with the goal of further 
raising the political and organizational 
consciousness as well as the militancy of the 
mas3 of youth, of the members and function­
aries of Pemuda Rakjat.
Urgent economic demands have sometimes been pressed by
2Pemuda Rakjat alone, but usually Pemuda Rakjat has 
worked in conjunction with PKI and/or one or more of the 
other communist-led mass organizations.
Like PKI and the other mass organizations, Pemuda 
Rakjat has also organized mutual aid activities. They 
are of two kinds. The first is the organization of 
teams to build and repair roads and paths, bridges, 
houses, irrigation ditches, and gutters. The second is 
giving assistance to members in times of need or illness, 
which, among youth who are poor and without social 
services, is a valuable way of winning support. A member
1
Pemuda Rakjat, Rol Pemuda, pp.50-1.
2
Sukatno told the fifth congress in July 1956, for 
example, that in the Tjirebon area of West Java Pemuda 
Rakjat had taken the initiative in demanding that the 
division of the rice harvest between the landowner and 
sharecropper be made in the fields, and in refusing to 
carry the landlords* share free of charge to the rice 
bams; Pemuda Rakjat, Menudju, p.21.
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would be reluctant to leave Pemuda Rakjat and thereby
1forfeit the minimum security it affords him, Pemuda 
Rakjat also helps its members by the provision of anti­
illiteracy and general knowledge courses.
Professor A.G. Pringgodigdo, president of Airlangga 
University in Surabaja, told me that when he returned to 
Java after a visit to the United States he was greatly 
impressed by the silence and darkness of the villages and 
urban kampongs once the sun had set, which at that latitude 
is always about 6 p,m. Pew villagers or kampong dwellers 
can afford any but the weakest kerosene or candle light, 
and the atmosphere, in the absence of organized enter­
tainment at a low price, is usually one of deep boredom. 
This is a clue to the main reason for Pemuda Rakjat*s 
success in attracting over one million members,
Pemuda Rakjat provides the young members and peasants 
with something to do, something to relieve the darkness 
and boredom. The value of sports and cultural activities 
was recognized by Sukatno in November 1959 when he called 
for Pemuda Rakjat cadres to attract even greater numbers
of workers and peasants by organizing all kinds of sports
2and cultural groups. Volley-ball, badminton, football,
1
Interview with Patchan, Nasution and Qodar,
HR, November 6, 1959*
2
table-tennis and even chess clubs are organized under the
1leadership of the commissariats• Physical training
groups have been established. The extent of the work in
the sports field was indicated by its organization in
November 1958 of a national sports festival, the first to
2be held by a youth organization in Indonesia* Cultural 
activities vary widely, often in accord with the 
traditional forms of entertainment in the different 
regions, and include mixed choirs, many types of musical 
groups, and drama and music-drama groups.
An obvious failure in Pemuda Rakjat*s work has been 
its attempt to attract girls into the organization. The 
leaders feel that the causes of this failure cannot be 
easily overcome: first, girls usually marry between the 
ages of 15 and 16 in the villages and by 20 at the latest 
in the towns, and once they are married they should enter 
the women*s mass organization, not Pemuda Rakjat; and 
second, there is a strongly ingrained tradition that 
girls should not mix in public with young men. An effort 
has been made to overcome this second difficulty by 
creating special all-girl groups and by experimenting with
1
The 1958 plan of organization and education called on 
each commissariat to provide uniforms for at least one 
hundred team members.
2
HR, November 12 and 13, 1958.
a l l - g i r l  s u b -b ra n c h e s .  A c t i v i t i e s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r
g i r l s  in c lu d e  c l a s s e s  in  h a n d i c r a f t s ,  su c h  as r a f f i a  w ork , 
i n  how to  r a i s e  f i s h ,  and  in  h o u se h o ld  s k i l l s  su ch  as  
se w in g  and c o o k in g , b u t  th e y  a r e  n o t  y e t  w id e ly  d e v e lo p e d .
S in c e  th e  December 1950 c o n g re s s ,  Pemuda R a k ja t  h as  
p ro v e d  a v a lu a b le  a s s i s t a n t  to  PKI. I t  h a s  a t t r a c t e d  
o v e r  one m i l l i o n  young w o rk e rs ,  p e a s a n ts  and s tu d e n ts  
i n t o  an o r g a n iz a t io n  c o n t r o l l e d  by  PKI; i t  h as u se d  them  
to  add w e ig h t to  th e  s t r u g g l e  o f  PKI and th e  o th e r  mass 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ;  i t  h as  d raw n from  them c a d re s  and a c t i v i s t s  
who p a s s  on to  become c a d re s  and a c t i v i s t s  o f  PKI and th e  
o t h e r  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s ;  and  i t  h a s  e n d e a v o u re d  to  a ro u s e  
i n  i t s  o r d in a r y  members a sym pathy  f o r  PKI and i t s  g e n e r a l  
o b j e c t i v e s .  Through Pemuda R a k ja t  young p e o p le  may 
a c q u i r e  s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e d u c a t io n a l  v a lu e s  w hich  
w i l l  p r e d is p o s e  them a s  a d u l t s  to  v o te  f o r  PKI and to  
e n t e r  PKI a n d /o r  one o f  th e  o t h e r  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s .
(b ) S tu d e n t  O r g a n iz a t io n s : IP P I and CGMI.
A
1. IP P I. The Ik atan  P e la d ja r  In d o n esia  (League o f  
In d on esian  High S ch oo l S tu d e n ts )  was formed in  J o g ja k a r ta  
in  September 1945 and in c lu d e d  h ig h  sc h o o l s tu d e n ts  and a
1
Much o f  th e  in f o r m a t io n  on  IP P I  was r e c e iv e d  in  
c o n v e r s a t io n s  w ith  M a ru li S i l i t o n g a ,  a non-com m unist 
l e a d e r  o f  IP P I f o r  many y e a r s .
few university students* In February 1948 it merged 
with the Sarekat Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian 
University Student Association) to form IPPI. During 
the revolution IPPI and its predecessors were active 
chiefly in mobilizing students for the struggle against 
the Dutch* The leadership consisted of socialists and 
communists, with no friction between the two* At the 
time of the Madiun rebellion many of the communist- 
inclined leaders in Java went into hiding, but those in 
Sumatra remained in their posts* After the second Dutch 
attack in December 1948 IPPI activists passed into Dutch- 
occupied areas and helped establish a high school student 
association which joined IPPI in 1950*
A covert communist, Sujono Atmo, was elected to the 
IPPI leadership at the 1950 and 195*1 congresses, and in 
the early 1950's the communists won control of most 
branches in Central and East Java. The non-communists 
became aware of the attempt to capture IPPI and united in 
1954 to elect a central board free from communists. Boon 
afterwards a split occurred in the Djakarta IPPI, rival 
communist and non-communist sections competing. In 1957» 
because the central board would not call a new congress, 
presumably because it was afraid of losing control to the 
communists, the communist-led Bandung regional committee 
took the initiative of inviting the other communist-led
s e c t i o n s  to  h o ld  a c o n g re s s .  The c o n g re s s  was h e ld ,  a 
new c e n t r a l  b o a rd  e l e c t e d ,  and  two I P P I 's  e x i s t e d ,  each  
c la im in g  to  be  th e  o n ly  l e g i t im a t e  o n e .
S in c e  1950 IP P I h a s  d e c l in e d  i n  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g t h .
I t s  m em bership  th e n  was a b o u t 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 . In  1960  i t  was 
s t i l l  3 0 0 ,0 0 0 , d e s p i t e  a trem endous in c r e a s e  i n  th e  num ber 
o f  h ig h  s c h o o l s t u d e n t s ,  and i t s  o r g a n iz a t io n  was s p l i t  i n  
tw o . At th e  tim e o f  th e  s p l i t  i n  1957» th e  com m unists 
c o n t r o l l e d  b r a n c h e s ,  m a in ly  in  J a v a ,  c o n ta in in g  a m a jo r i ty  
o f  th e  m em bersh ip . The d e c l in e  i n  r e l a t i v e  s t r e n g t h  h as 
b e e n  due to  th e  s t r u g g l e  b e tw een  th e  com m unists and non­
co m m u n ists , to  th e  d e c r e a s in g  a t t r a c t i o n  f o r  u n i v e r s i t y  
s tu d e n t s  who form ed t h e i r  own o r g a n iz a t io n s  and so  rem oved 
w hat had  b een  I P P I fs  so u rc e  o f  l e a d e r s ,  to  th e  age (m o s tly  
o v e r  3 0 ) o f  th e  p r e s e n t  IP P I l e a d e r s ,  w hich i n c r e a s e s  th e  
h ig h  s c h o o l  s tu d e n ts  a p a th y  to w a rd s  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  and 
to  th e  r e f u s a l  o f  many p r i v a t e  s c h o o ls ,  r e l i g i o u s  and 
s e c u l a r ,  to  p e rm it  t h e i r  s t u d e n ts  to  j o in  IP P I b e c a u se  th e  
o r g a n iz a t io n  in c lu d e s  many com m unists.
The c o m m u n is t- le d  IP P I c o n c e n t r a te s  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  
m a in ly  on s p o r t s ,  s o c i a l  and c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  w hich  
i t  r e c e iv e s  s u p p o r t  from  Pemuda R a k ja t .  U nder i t s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  IP P I i s  n o n - p o l i t i c a l ,  and th e  com m unists do 
n o t  o p e n ly  a t te m p t t o  i n d o c t r i n a t e  i t s  m em bers. IP P I i s  
u se d  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  i n  th e  s h o r t - r u n ,  to  m o b il iz e  s tu d e n ts
to support PKI-led rallies, demonstrations and protests, 
and in the long-run to plant the seeds of pro-PKI 
sympathies and to find a few promising students who can 
he trained to become communist cadres and activists.
12. CGMI. PKI has had indifferent success among
the intellectuals as a whole, and very few university
students have been won over. As an article in "Bintang
2Merah" of February 1958 declared:
up till now, bourgeois ideology and ways, that 
is, idealism and individualism, are still 
dominant in our universities. We see that 
the youths who graduate from high school with 
pure spirits and who form progressive elements, 
fall prey to bourgeois ideology and ways after 
entering university.
The article said that a Party seminar on work among
students, had just concluded that the Party must give:
leadership and assistance to the students, 
both in fighting for economic and cultural 
improvements, especially improvements in 
their studies, and in raising their still far 
from adequate political consciousness;
1
Much of the information on CGMI was obtained from inter 
views with national leaders of CGMI, the PNI student 
organization GMNI, the Moslem student organization HMI, 
and the socialist student organization GMS; also from 
local leaders of these organizations in Jogjakarta and, 
to a lesser extent, in Surabaja.
2
Banggas, "Memperbaiki Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan 
Mahasiswa" (To Improve Party Work among the Students),
BM, February 1958, pp.57-85*
and that the communist-led student organizations must be 
broadly based on patriotism and unity.
Communist-led local university student associations 
were established in about 1950 in Bandung, Bogor and 
Jogjakarta. They fused in November 1956 to form CGMI 
which initially claimed about 1,180 members. By early 
1960 CGMI claimed 7>000 members in sixteen towns with 
institutions of higher learning, the largest branches 
being Bandung and Jogjakarta with 1,750 members each, 
Surabaja with 500 members, Malang with 400, and the 
University of Indonesia in Djakarta with 300. These 
figures were hotly denied by the leaders of the other 
student organizations who estimated that CGMI had perhaps 
4,000 members - compared with over 10,000 in the Masjumi- 
oriented HMI, about 10,000 in the PNI-oriented GMNI, and 
about 6,000 evenly divided between the Protestant and 
Roman Catholic student associations.
CGMI claims to be non-political and non-religious, 
and seeks to attract new members by a variety of 
activities such as:
1. strong opposition to the often sadistic initiation 
rites inflicted on new students;
1
The term 'mahasiswa* as used in the titles of the student 
organizations is roughly translated as university student, 
but it also applies to students in post-high school 
academies and teachers* colleges.
2. waging a struggle for students’ interests, for 
example organizing a delegation to the Minister of 
Education in January 1960 to demand reduced prices for 
books, increased budgets for the Ministry of Education, 
and increased students’ allowances;
3* social events, such as excursions, badminton and 
table-tennis;
4* active propaganda in support of President 
Sukarno’s political lines, and opposition to the PRRI- 
Permesta rebellion, and to all imperialist (Dutch,
American and SEATO) real and imaginary infringements of 
Indonesian sovereignty; and
5 * opposition to 'rock’n ’roll culture’, and appeals 
for a culture based on 'the Indonesian personality’,
CGMI had in early i960 recently begun to organize study 
groups for its own members, with the more advanced 
students helping the newer ones.
Apart from its own activities, CGMI attracts many new 
students because of its unique character. All other 
national student organizations are either openly tied to 
a political party or to a religion. For young students 
without political affiliation or strong religious feelings 
but who wish to join a national student organization, CGMI 
is the only one open to them.
As one CGMI le a d e r  com plained  to  me, In d on esian  
s tu d e n ts  are  n o t p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n s c io u s ,  and CGMI must 
work to  arou se  p o l i t i c a l  c o n sc io u sn e s s  *not op en ly  or  
d i r e c t l y  bu t b y  s t e a l t h * .  Members are brough t in to  such  
a c t i v i t i e s  as p r o t e s t s  a g a in s t  th e  v i s i t  o f  a Dutch  
a i r c r a f t  c a r r ie r  to  West Ir ia n  in  May 1960, peace weeks 
and peace campaigns made more a t t r a c t iv e  b y  le c t u r e s  and 
f i lm s ,  and demands fo r  th e  e x p u ls io n  o f  Dutch u n iv e r s i t y  
l e c t u r e r s  who oppose the In d o n esia n  c la im  to  West Ir ian *  
Some few  s tu d e n ts  have been won to  communist sym path ies  
through CGMI, b u t the sp a r se n e ss  o f  t h e ir  ranks i s  shown 
by the d i f f i c u l t i e s  e x p e r ie n c e d , fo r  example in  Gadjah 
Mada U n iv e r s ity  in  J o g ja k a r ta , in  f in d in g  younger s tu d e n ts  
to  take over the le a d e r s h ip  from th o se  who sh ou ld  have 
l e f t  u n iv e r s i t y  y e a rs  ago* In g e n e r a l ,  whenever members 
f in d  th a t  CGMI i s  com m u n ist-led , most o f  them le a v e .  
Non-communist s tu d e n t le a d e r s  g e n e r a l ly  e s t im a te d  th a t  
no more than 5 or 10 per c e n t o f  CGMI members r e a l iz e d  
th a t  i t  was c o n tr o l le d  by  PKI*
Over the p a s t  few  y ea rs  th e  im portance o f  a l l  s tu d e n t  
o r g a n iz a t io n s  has d e c lin e d  due to  a d ec re a se  in  stu d e n t  
i n t e r e s t  in  p o l i t i c s ,  the growth in  im portance and s o c i a l
A
a c t i v i t y  o f  e le c t e d  s tu d e n t c o u n c i ls  in  each u n iv e r s i t y ,
1
E a rly  in  1960, th e  o n ly  u n i v e r s i t i e s  or c o l l e g e s  where 
a CGMI member was p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  s tu d e n t  c o u n c il  were
and an increasing concern with study. As study groups 
gained in importance for the student organizations, CGMI 
suffered a decrease in its attractiveness partly because 
it did not realize until after the other organizations 
the keen interest in such groups, and partly because 
there were very few communist university teachers, and so 
few who could assist the students in CGMI's groups.
The question still remains: why have PKI and CGMI 
failed to attract more than a handful of Indonesian 
students to the communist cause? A partial answer might 
be found in the social origins of the students, and in 
the general political situation since especially 1956.
The great majority of Indonesian university students still 
come from the social levels above the workers and poor and
Amedium peasants. They come from families which normally 
would support PNI, Masjumi or the Socialist Party. Many 
came from families of government officials with a 
tradition of non-participation in political affairs as a
Padang and Malang. CGMI members had held that position 
in the large Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta from 
1956 to 1958, but in the latter year the non-communists 
had exposed CGMI!s communist orientation, with the result 
that by the academic year 1959/1960 CGMI held only one of 
the 27 occupied seats on the student council.
1
For some statistical evidence to support this statement, 
see Leslie H. Palmier, "Occupational Distribution of 
Parents of Pupils in Certain Indonesian Educational 
Institutions", Indonesie, 1957> vol.X, pp.320-76, 
especially p.369.
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safeguard for future positions and promotion. That some 
of the children of the middle class and aristocracy have 
not become communists is surprising, but the Indonesian 
middle class and aristocracy have been remarkably free 
from the occasional reformist or radical devoted to the 
welfare of the * lower orders* and willing to risk their 
own future welfare and status for that cause.
The second factor, the general political situation 
since about 1956, was commented upon by all leaders of 
student organizations who were interviewed in 1959 and 
1960, All claimed that during the past four years or 
so a decline had occurred in the originally low political 
interest of students. This can partly be explained by 
the fact that the generation which fought in the revo­
lution, and which would be expected to show a greater 
interest in politics, had largely passed through the 
universities by 1956 and had been replaced by young 
students concerned primarily with their studies - and 
with the jobs and status those studies would provide.
The general discrediting of political parties by 1957 has 
also tended to reduce the students* interest in party 
politics. Furthermore, very few job opportunities for 
graduates are to be found outside the government - 
ministries, services, armed forces, nationalized enter­
prises, and so on. Because Sukarno and the army, which
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have become the dominant political forces since 1956, 
look with a jaundiced eye on the political parties, and 
because the political future of Indonesia is so uncertain, 
students have been discouraged from openly engaging in 
political activity because it could jeopardize their 
future careers.
(c) Communist Scouts and Young Pioneers.
For the age group below high school age, PKI has 
established both scout and young pioneer organizations.
A communist-led scout association was already active in 
1954« It remained small, its membership was not 
published, and early in 1961 it was absorbed, by presi­
dential order, in a single, nation-wide scout association 
under Sukarno as chief scout. Perhaps because of the 
lack of success of the scout association, Aidit in 1959 
suggested the formation of a young pioneer organization 
which took the name Fadjar Harapan (Dawn of Hope).
Despite its clear PKI origin, the Fadjar Harapan 
constitution declared that the organization was open to 
all children aged six to thirteen, and was 'not associated
1 "Experimen jang Berhasil" (Successful Experiment), BM, 
September-October 1959, pp.409-10.
1 Activities were to includewith any political party*.
sports and play, training in farming and handicrafts,
study groups to assist with homework, visits to museums
and historical sites, and encouragement to read *about
the people's heroes and about the creative mind of the
people*. Party and Pemuda Rakjat cadres were instructed
to study the experiences of pioneer organizations abroad
and to adapt them to local conditions.
In the initial stages Pad jar Harapan was to be
organized on a local basis with no central leadership.
By May 1960 there were 1,000 members in Djakarta and
groups were already being formed in the other large 
2towns. Through Padjar Harapan the Aidit leadership 
presumably hoped to build a mass organization that would 
not only attract parents whose children could use the 
organization's facilities, but also prepare children for 
entry into first Pemuda Rakjat and IPPI, and then into 
PKI and its adult mass organizations. It is still too 
early to ascertain the success of this new PKI venture, 
but as there is a great need in both towns and villages 
for an organization to provide something to do for the
1 Padjar Harapan, Constitution of Padjar Harapan. 
mimeographed translation, Djakarta, I960, pp.2-3.
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teeming millions of Indonesian children, there is every
*1likelihood that, barring external factors, it will 
achieve mass membership.
5» Women
The attempt to organize women and to produce women 
cadres and activists has required patience and special 
methods. The poorer Indonesian women have even less 
experience than their menfolk in organizations, they are 
generally illiterate, and they are traditionally meek, 
especially in mixed company. But the Aidit leadership 
has considered the work of attracting and organizing 
women to be important because not only do women comprise 
half the electorate, they also play an important role in 
the economy. A high percentage of workers in industry 
are women, and women participate in agricultural work as 
peasants and as labourers on estates. In order to 
attract and organize women, especially those of the poorer 
classes, the Indonesian communists have used the Party 
itself, the women’s mass organization, G-erwani, the SOBSI 
unions, and BTI. Considerable success has been achieved
1
These external factors could include a total ban on the 
activities of PKI and its mass organizations, or, as 
happened to the scout movement on March 9, 1961, the 
enforced consolidation of all children’s organizations 
into one government-led body.
in drawing women into the Party and the mass organi­
zations, and in the last few years women have begun to 
occupy cadre and activist positions.
(a) The Work of the Party.
Mention has already been made of the instruction 
issued by the central leadership in January 1955 to 
increase the number of women members and to organize 
their activities in special womens groups, of the 
attention paid to the creation of women cadres, and of 
the increase in female membership of PKI to 100,000 in 
September 1957 and 258,000 in September 1959. But what 
has PKI offered women? What has it done to attract them 
directly?
The PKI election manifesto, endorsed in March 1954» 
claimed that ’for women, to vote PKI means emancipation
Aand the guarantee of equal rights’. An article in
’’Harian Rakjat” just before the Constituent Assembly
elections of December 1955» explained at some length what
2was meant by equal rights. PKI would guarantee equal 
rights in four fields: in marriage there would be equal 
freedom for both sexes in choosing a partner, equal rights
1 PKI, Manifes Pemilihan Umum PKI, p.19.
2
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i n  d iv o rc e  and  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  j o i n t  d i s c u s s io n  b y  m other 
and  f a t h e r  a b o u t  m a t te r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  and 
j o i n t  o w n e rsh ip  o f  th e  c h i l d r e n ;  i n  th e  econom ic s p h e re ,  
women w ould p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  th e  p ro d u c t iv e  p ro c e s s  as 
e q u a ls  o f  men; i n  la b o u r  t h e r e  would b e  no  d i s c r im in a t io n  
a g a i n s t  women, and e q u a l  pay  f o r  e q u a l  work w ould be 
e n fo r c e d ;  and  in  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  women w ould have th e  same 
s h a r e  a s  men when th e  la n d  was d iv id e d *  A lso  a p p e a l in g  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  women have b e e n  th e  
f r e q u e n t ly  r e p e a te d  com m unist demands f o r  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  fo o d  and t e x t i l e s  a t  low p r i c e s ,  th e  p r o v i s io n  o f  
a d e q u a te  e d u c a t io n a l  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  a l l  c h i l d r e n ,  and so  
on .
The m ethods u se d  b y  PKI a c t u a l l y  to  a t t r a c t  women 
d i f f e r  a c c o rd in g  t o  th e  s o c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  women. An 
a r t i c l e  by  one o f  th e  le a d in g  women com m un ists , S e t i a t i  
S u r a s to ,  d e s c r ib e d  th e  m ethods u sed  among th e  t h r e e  b ro a d  
s o c i a l  g ro u p s : th e  w o rk in g  c l a s s  and p e a s a n t  women, th e
A
m id d le  g ro u p , and th e  h ig h e r  g ro u p . P a r ty  m em bership 
can  m ost e a s i l y  b e  e x te n d e d , sh e  w ro te , among w ork ing  
c l a s s  and  p e a s a n t  women. They f a c e  many d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  
t h e i r  l i f e  and c a n  f e e l  p e r s o n a l ly  th e  l e a d e r s h ip  and
1
S e t i a t i  S u r a s to ,  "M em perluas K eanggo taan  P a r t a i  
d ik a la n g a n  W an ita ” (E x te n d in g  P a r ty  M em bership among 
Women), KP, F e b ru a ry  1957» p p . 19- 2 1 .
support of the Party in overcoming therm But because in 
general they are illiterate, have many children, and face 
an insecure life in terms of both income and marriage, it 
is difficult to get the poorer women together for 
meetings, especially meetings that are not very close to 
their homes. Therefore they are approached by assistance 
in times of need, and by small meetings of women who live 
close together. Later, this can be followed by efforts 
to press their everyday demands and to draw political 
conclusions from them. And so, gradually, they are 
prepared for participation in ordinary Party meetings and 
courses.
The middle group includes traders, middle peasants, 
middle government employees, students, and their wives - 
*longer time will be needed in order to attract them’.
They fear to be connected with the Party, Setiati wrote, 
because they might thereby lose their social position, or 
because they have been subjected to reactionary propaganda. 
PKI assists them in facing their everyday problems, for 
example by giving explanations of their rights and of 
such as tax and pension regulations.
Few women in Indonesia are prominent intellectuals 
or high government officials, but in its dealings with the 
higher groups of women, PKI attempts to win indirect 
influence over their husbands. Women in this group,
42G
Setiati warned, 'require special attention'. She
recognized that they cannot easily he drawn into the
Party, and that to try to do so openly would produce the
reverse result. 'They are afraid of the word communist'
and afraid to lose their own and their husband's positions.
The most the Party can do is to invite them at every
opportunity to functions as honoured guests, and to
explain the Party's position scientifically and openly.
In this way PKI hopes to win their sympathy.
If they are already_convinced /that the PKI 
position is correct/ they will assist and 
support us. And if they are already 
convinced, then they can give moral and 
material support to our struggle, although 
in general they will not wish to give it 
openly. We must understand this and not 
hope for more than they can give.
Setiati emphasized that the middle and higher groups could
give financial assistance to the Party, and she called for
the regular collection of subscriptions and 'support*
which would cement their relations with the Party as well
as give them a feeling of participation in the Party's
struggle.
PKI held its first national women's conference from 
May 26 to 30, 1938* The problems of increasing the 
number of women members were discussed. Aidit pointed
1
The major documents of the conference are given in BM, 
June 1958, pp.241-85.
o u t  t h a t :
The g r e a t e s t  h in d e ra n c e  to  P a r ty  work among 
th e  w o rk in g  women i s  th e  s t i l l  dom inant b e l i e f  
t h a t  th e  p r e s e n t  b a d  c o n d i t io n s  a r e  p r e d e s t in e d  
and c a n n o t b e  c h a n g e d .1
T h e r e f o r e ,  he s a i d ,  th e  P a r ty  m ust work c e a s e l e s s l y  to
c o n v in c e  them  t h a t  th e  b ad  s i t u a t i o n  i s  m an-m ade, and t h a t
th ro u g h  o r g a n iz a t io n  a b e t t e r  s i t u a t i o n  can  be c r e a t e d .
Sudism an c a l l e d  on  th e  P a r ty  to  g iv e  g r e a t e r  a t t e n t i o n
2t o  th e  b a s i c  econom ic p ro b lem s fa c e d  b y  women. And
S u h a r t i  l i s t e d  some o f  th e  m ethods t h a t  had  p ro v ed
s u c c e s s f u l  in  a t t r a c t i n g  new women m em bers: t a l k s ,
p r e f e r a b l y  g iv e n  b y  women c a d r e s ,  on th e  r i g h t s  o f  women
and c h i l d r e n  and on th e  P a r t y 's  s ta n d  f o r  e q u a l i t y  in
3m a r r ia g e ;  a n d ja n g so n o  g ro u p s ; a s s i s t a n c e  to  h o u se h o ld s  
i n  tim e s  o f  m is fo r tu n e  (d e a th  o r  s i c k n e s s )  o r  when b u sy  
( b i r t h s ,  e t c . ) ;  e x p la in in g  th e  P a r t y 1s s t e m  a t t i t u d e  
to w ard s  members who b r e a k  th e  com m unist m o ra l c o d e ; and 
a c t io n s  to  d e fe n d  th e  ev e ry d ay  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  women
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1
D.N. A i d i t ,  "W anita  Komunis P ed ju an g  u n tu k  M a s ja ra k a t 
B aru "  (Communist Women, F ig h te r s  f o r  a New S o c i e t y ) ,  BM, 
Ju n e  1958, p .247*
2
S udism an , ,rDengan K etabahan  ja n g  B esa r M endid ik  dan  
Mempromosi K ader-K ader W an ita"  (W ith G re a t R e s o lu t io n  
E d u ca te  and P rom ote Women C a d re s ) ,  BM, Ju n e  1958, p .2 5 0 .
3
And.jangsono g ro u p s  a r e  s m a ll  g ro u p s  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n  
members t h a t  c a l l  on n e ig h b o u rs  f o r  f r i e n d l y  v i s i t s  and 
c h a t s .  They w ere u se d  by PKI and i t s  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  
e s p e c i a l l y  a ro u n d  th e  t im e s  o f  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .
Amasses. An obvious way of increasing women membership 
has been to persuade male members to bring their wives 
to meetings, and so gradually raise their political 
consciousness to the level at which they ask to join the 
Party.
By its own direct efforts PKI has brought many women 
into its ranks - but it is impossible to estimate what 
proportion has been attracted directly, and what through 
the activities of the mass organizations.
(b) Gerwani.
The communist-led mass organization for women made
its humble entry on June U f 1950 when Gerwis (Gerakan
Wanita Indonesia Sedar, Movement of Enlightened Indonesian
Women) was founded as the merger of six local women’s
organizations scattered across Java. Total membership 
2was only 500.
In the first eighteen months of its existence Gerwis 
made little progress because membership was restricted to
1
Suharti, "Menghidupkan Grup Wanita dan Meluaskan 
Keanggotaan Partai dikalangan Wanita” (Activating Women’s 
Groups and Extending Party Membership among Women), BM, 
June 1958, p.256.2
Gerwani, Peraturan Dasar Gerwani (Gerwani*s Consti­
tution), Djakarta, 195^ +> p.7; Suharti Suwarto, "Indonesian 




’ f u l l y  p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n s c io u s  women’ • The l e a d e r s h i p ,
2w h ic h  was d e r i v e d  99 p e r  c e n t  from th e  b o u r g e o i s i e ,  
i s s u e d  p io u s  demands f o r  im proved  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  p o o r  
women,^ b u t  d e s p i t e  p l a n s  f o r  work among t h e  m asses^  made 
no r e a l  e f f o r t s  t o  go down and  o r g a n iz e  th e  m asse s .  
A c t i v i t i e s  were c o n c e n t r a t e d  on s u p p o r t i n g  P K I’s p o l i t i c a l  
s t r u g g l e .  The r e s u l t  was t h a t  s e v e r a l  Gerwis l e a d e r s  
were among th o s e  im p r is o n e d  i n  t h e  A ugust 1951 mass
1
I n t e r v i e w  w i th  Mrs Umi S a r d jo n o ,  c h a irm a n  o f  Gerwani 
s i n c e  March 1954«
2
Umi S a r d jo n o ,  ’’P r a e a d v ie s  t e n t a n g  O r g a n i s a s i ” (R e p o r t  
on O r g a n i z a t i o n ) , W anita  S e d a r  ( E n l ig h te n e d  Woman), 
F e b r u a r y  1 5 , 1951, p#33* I n  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  Umi S a rd jo n o  
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  th e  w ork e rs  and p e a s a n t s ,  th e  
o p p r e s s e d ,  s h o u ld  l e a d  th e  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,
f a c t s  as  t h e y  a r e  i n  I n d o n e s i a  show t h a t  
t h e i r  a w are n ess  i s  s t i l l  v e ry  low . The 
o p p r e s s e d  w ork e rs  and  p e a s a n t s  a r e  n o t  y e t  
aware t h a t  t h e y  s h o u ld  ta k e  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  
o f  th e  r e v o l u t i o n .
In  su c h  a s i t u a t i o n ,  99 p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  Gerwis l e a d e r s h i p  
were b o u r g e o i s ,  ’b e c a u s e  t h e y  can  m ost q u i c k l y  a c c e p t  
o u r  t h e o r i e s  and  t e a c h i n g s  f o r  l e a d i n g  th e  s t r u g g l e  to  
v i c t o r y ’ •
3
S e e ,  f o r  exam ple , th e  demands f o r  w ork ing  women drawn 
up by  th e  f i r s t  G erw is c o n fe r e n c e  i n  F e b ru a ry  1951» W anita  
S e d a r , March 15» 1951, p .1 5 .  The f i r s t  Gerwis c o n g re s s  
i n  December 1951 f o r m u la te d  a p l a n  f o r  a d e m o c ra t ic  
m a r r ia g e  law  which w ould  e n s u re  e q u a l  r i g h t s  and o b l i ­
g a t i o n s  f o r  b o t h  s e x e s ,  p r o t e c t  w ives and c h i l d r e n  i n  
c a s e s  o f  d iv o r c e  o r  s e p a r a t i o n ,  e s t a b l i s h  a minimum age 
f o r  m a r r ia g e  o f  17 f o r  women and 20 f o r  men, and  ’i n  
p r i n c i p l e *  g u a r a n te e  monogamy; W anita  S e d a r , J a n u a r y  
1952, p . 6 .
4
The f i r s t  Gerwis c o n fe r e n c e  i n  F e b ru a ry  1951, f o r  
e x am p le , drew up a d e t a i l e d  programme f o r  work in  th e  
v i l l a g e s ;  W anita  S e d a r , March 15, 1951, P«16.
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arrests, and that by December 195*1» when the first
national congress was held, membership had risen only to„ 16,000.
The first congress concluded, 'after criticism and 
self-criticism', that in the past too much attention had 
been given to outside actions and not enough to 
strengthening Gerwis, to internal actions 'that directly
oconcern the interests of women in their everyday life*. 
Some leaders and cadres were criticized for their 
'sectarian manner' or work, others for creating hostility 
to Gerwis by their unsubtie methods of work, especially 
in facing non-Gerwis people. The congress also, however, 
still concerned itself with political matters of little 
interest to the mass of women, such as West Irian, the 
cancellation of the Round Table Conference agreement, and 
a free foreign policy. It was decided, too, to join the 
International Federation of Democratic Women.
Despite the criticism and self-criticism indulged in 
at the December 1951 congress, the Gerwis leaders were 
slow to direct their attention to winning mass support by 
the study and exploitation of the everyday problems and 
interests of the women masses. The root of their
1
HR, June 5» 1957.
Wanita Sedar, January 1952, p*3.
2
unwillingness is probably found in their social origins.
The Gerwis leaders were almost entirely middle class, and
the Indonesian middle class in general has shown itself
loath to go among the flower orders1 2 and organize them.
1In June 1953 claimed membership was only 40,000, but the 
beginnings of work among the masses were indicated by a 
report in February 1953 on the work of Gerwis in East 
Java. Among the 7>016 members in East Java at that 
time, Gerwis was running 8 kindergartens, 52 anti­
illiteracy courses, 29 courses in handicrafts, mutual 
assistance in 5U places, and cadre courses in 17«
The second Gerwis congress was held in March 1954. 
Membership had reached 80,000, the number of branches 
2 0 3 . 3 Three foreign delegates attended, including Monica 
Felton from the International Federation of Democratic 
Women, and they sat as honorary members of the congress 
presidium. Umi Sardjono, the new chairman, announced at 
the close of the congress that Gerwis had thrown away its 
Sectarian characteristics’, and to symbolize the end of 
sectarianism the name Gerwis was replaced by Gerwani. 
Consequently a new constitution was drawn up which opened
1
HR, June 9, 1953.2
Djaman Baru, February 28, 1953> p.29.
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HR, March 26, 1954
G erw ani to  a l l  In d o n e s ia n  women, aged  16 and o v e r ,  
‘ i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  p o l i t i c a l ,  r e l i g i o u s  and e th n ic  a f f i l i ­
a t i o n ’ , who a c c e p te d  th e  G-erwani c o n s t i t u t i o n  and  
1program m e.
The se co n d  c o n g re s s  d e c id e d  to  in c r e a s e  m em bership
to  two and o n e - h a l f  m i l l io n s  b y  th e  tim e  o f  th e  n e x t
c o n g re s s ,  b u t  a l th o u g h  t h i s  t a r g e t  was l a t e r  c r i t i c i z e d
a s  ’n o t  o b j e c t i v e ' ,  a r a p id  i n c r e a s e  i n  m em bership  was
a c h ie v e d .  M em bership was c la im e d  to  be  4 0 0 ,0 0 0  j u s t
b e f o r e  th e  S ep tem ber 1955 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s ,  and  5 0 0 ,0 0 0
a t  th e  tim e  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu e n t  A ssem bly e l e c t i o n s  in  
• 7
Decem ber 1955* In  Ju n e  1956, when m em bership was 
r e p o r t e d  to  be  5 6 5 *147> G erw ani h a d , in  J a v a ,  b ra n c h e s  
i n  a l l  k a b u p a te n s  and  l a r g e  to w n s, an  o r g a n iz a t io n  a t  th e  
k e t ja m a ta n  l e v e l  i n  40 p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  k e t ja m a ta n s » and
1
G erw an i, P e r a tu r a n  D a s a r , p .1 1 .
2
The G erw ani l e a d e r s  c la im e d  i n  December 1957 t h a t  th e  
t a r g e t  was u n r e a l i s t i c  b e c a u se  f o r  o v e r  a y e a r  a f t e r  th e  
se co n d  c o n g re s s  th e  w hole o r g a n iz a t io n  was b u sy  c h an g in g  
i t s  s t r u c t u r e  in  l in e  w ith  th e  new c o n s t i t u t i o n ;  b e c a u se  
G erw ani d id  n o t  have th e  num ber o f  c a d re s  r e q u i r e d  to  
a c h ie v e  th e  t a r g e t  in  a s o c i e t y  where women a r e  u n ac ­
custom ed  to  ta k in g  p a r t  i n  o r g a n iz a t io n ;  and  b e c a u se  in  
d e c id in g  on th e  t a r g e t  f i g u r e  no a t t e n t i o n  h ad  b e en  g iv e n  
to  th e  p ro b lem s posed  by  ’d i f f i c u l t  r e g i o n s ' ,  su ch  as  
i n s e c u r e ,  m o u n ta in o u s an d  i s o l a t e d  a r e a s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
o u t s id e  J a v a .  G erw an i, L eb ih  G ia t  M eluaskan G erakan u n tu k  
T e r la k s a n a n j a  Plagam  Hak-Hak W anita  In d o n e s ia  (More A c tiv e  
i n  E x te n d in g  th e  Movement f o r  th e  Im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  th e  
C h a r te r  o f  In d o n e s ia n  Women's R i g h t s ; ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1958» p .6 9 -  
3
HR, June  13> 1955; J a n u a ry  2 1 , 1956.
a b o u t 5 ,0 0 0  s u b -b ra n c h e s  a t  th e  u rb a n  n e ig h b o u rh o o d  and
v i l l a g e  l e v e l ;  o u t s id e  Ja v a  th e r e  were b ra n c h e s  o r
p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  them i n  a l l  o f  S u m a tra , i n  W est and
S o u th  K a lim a n ta n , and  in  N o rth  and S o u th  S u la w e s i , w h ile
lo w e r l e v e l s  o f  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  were a l r e a d y  e s t a b l i s h e d
1
i n  W est N u sa te n g g a ra  and M aluku. At th e  tim e  o f  th e  
t h i r d  G erw ani c o n g re s s  i n  Decem ber 1957> th e r e  were
p
6 7 1 ,3 4 2  m em bers.
In  th e  p e r io d  b e tw een  th e  seco n d  and t h i r d  c o n g re s s e s ,
G erw ani engaged  in  p o l i t i c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  s o c i a l  and
econom ic a c t i v i t i e s .  D uring  th e  1955 g e n e ra l  e l e c t i o n s ,
2 3 ,0 0 0  G erw ani members in  Ja v a  a lo n e  w orked i n  th e
e l e c t i o n  co m m ittee s  form ed by th e  governm ent t o  e n su re
th e  sm ooth e x e c u t io n  o f  th e  e l e c t i o n s ;  and 23 members r a n
on th e  PKI l i s t ,  and  1 f o r  th e  sm a ll  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r ty
PR I. F iv e  members w ere e l e c t e d  to  p a r l ia m e n t  on th e  PKI
t i c k e t ,  f o u r  as P a r ty  m em bers, and  o n e , ch a irm an  Umi
S a rd jo n o , a s  'n o n - p a r ty * .  S ix  were e l e c t e d  on th e  PKI
t i c k e t  to  th e  C o n s t i tu e n t  A ssem bly . In  th e  1957 l o c a l
3e l e c t i o n s ,  59 members were e l e c t e d  to  l o c a l  c o u n c i l s ,
1
G erw an i, M eluaskan A k s i-A k si u n tu k  M emperkuat T u n tu ta n  
Hak-Hak W anita-A nak-A nak dan  P erdam aian  (E x te n d in g  A c tio n s  
to  S t r e n g th e n  th e  Demand f o r  th e  R ig h ts  o f  Women and 
C h i ld re n  and f o r  P e a c e ) ,  D ja k a r t a ,  1956, p p .2 6 -7 *
2
G erw an i, L eb ih  G ia t ,  p .6 8 .
3
R I , J a n u a ry  1958, p p .2 7 - 8 .
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almost all from the PKI lists. Strong support was given 
to the peace movement, especially in collecting signatures 
for the Vienna Peace Appeal, and Gerwani's support was 
given to whatever PKI*s political stand happened to he at 
the moment•^
Education on an appreciable scale was begun within
Gerwani after the second congress. For ordinary members,
an anti-illiteracy campaign was started in 1955 and within
a year it was claimed that 30 per cent of members could
2read, though not all of them could yet write. Courses 
for cadres concentrated on problems of organization and 
administration, but towards the end of 1957 an attempt 
was made to systematize cadre education with schools and 
courses at all levels of the organization and with uniform 
mimeographed guides for four basic subjects: the history 
of the national movement, the history of the national and 
international women's movement, problems of Gerwani 
organization and development, and instruction on the 
International Federation of Democratic Women, on the
1 For example, Gerwani expressed support for the first Ali 
Sastroamidjojo government, opposition to the Burhanudin 
Harahap government, support for Sukarno's concept of an 
all-party government, and support for the president in his 
efforts as cabinet formateur in April 1957«
2
Gerwani, Lebih Giat, p.73*
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1
r i g h t s  o f  women and  c h i l d r e n ,  and on p e a c e .  Prom O c to b e r  
1950 u n t i l  l a t e  1952 G erw is had  p u b l i s h e d  i t s  own p e r i o d i ­
c a l .  At th e  b e g in n in g  o f  1955» Gerwani s t a r t e d  a new 
p e r i o d i c a l  "W anita  I n d o n e s i a "  ( I n d o n e s ia n  Woman), b u t  
a f t e r  i r r e g u l a r  a p p e a ra n c e s  i t  c e a se d  p u b l i c a t i o n  in  th e  
m id d le  o f  1956. To r e p l a c e  i t ,  " B e r i t a  G erw ani" (Gerwani 
News) was p u b l i s h e d ,  a s i n g l e  s h e e t  d e v o te d  e x c l u s i v e l y  
t o  news o f  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and d e s ig n e d  to  a s s i s t  c a d r e s
i n  t h e i r  work. E a r l y  i n  1960 i t  had a c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  
2o n ly  2 ,0 0 0 .
Between th e  s e c o n d  and t h i r d  c o n g r e s s e s :
G erw ani, from  th e  c e n t r e  to  th e  r e g i o n s ,  has  
t a k e n  an a c t i v e  p a r t  i n  a c t i o n s  to  d e fe n d  th e  
r i g h t s  o f  women and c h i l d r e n ,  which i s  th e  .. 
fu n d a m e n ta l  t a s k  o f  a women*s o r g a n iz a t io n . -^
I n  t h i s  f i e l d  Gerwani la u n c h e d  a cam paign  d u r in g  th e  1955 
e l e c t i o n s  t o  p r e s s  i t s  demand f o r  a d e m o c ra t ic  m a r r ia g e  
la? ;,  u rg e d  th ro u g h  members o f  p a r l i a m e n t  t h a t  th e  l e g a l  
c o s t  o f  r e - u n i o n  o f  s e p a r a t e d  p a r t n e r s  s h o u ld  be  removed 
w h i le  t h a t  o f  s e p a r a t i o n  s h o u ld  b e  made g r e a t e r ,  p a r t i c i ­
p a te d  i n  c o m m ittee s  s e t  up e x p e r i m e n t a l ly  i n  some a r e a s  
b y  th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  R e l ig io u s  A f f a i r s  to  s o lv e  m a r r ia g e  
d i s p u t e s ,  demanded h eavy  p e n a l t i e s  i n  c a s e s  o f  rap e  and
1 2
I b i d . ,  p p .7 4 - 6 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i th  Umi S a r d jo n o .
3
G erw an i, L eb lh  G i a t , p .51*
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abduction, and, in the sub-branches, carried out many
-1small actions of benefit to its members. In defence of 
the interests of peasant and working class women, Gerwani 
assisted BTI and the SOBSI trade unions. Other social- 
economic activities included the creation of some training 
courses for midwives, and the establishment of 179 kinder­
gartens and 3 elementary schools.
By the time of the third congress, held from December 
22 to 27? 1957? Gerwani claimed 671>342 members, dis­
tributed geographically as follows: 613>262 in Java, of 
whom 253>750 were in East Java, 219>414 in Central Java, 
132,220 in West Java, and 7>878 in Djakarta; 59>740 in
Sumatra; 2,680 in Sulawesi; 2,260 in Nusatenggara; 1,900
2in Maluku; and 1,500 in Kalimantan. Within Java there 
were branches in every kabupaten and city, an organization 
at the ketjamatan level in 75 per cent of all ket;lamatans, 
and sub-branches in approximately 40 per cent of all
1
In general the Indonesian woman is very insecure in her 
marriage because her husband may easily repudiate the 
marriage. According to the statistics of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, in the years 1954 through 1958 the number of marriage repudiations within the Moslem com­
munity was from 50 to 52 per cent of the total number of 
new marriages plus reconciliations between separated 
partners; Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical 
Pocketbook of Indonesia 1960, Djakarta, 1960, p.l8. This 
insecurity greatly enhances the appeal of an organization 
that demands a democratic marriage law, and that aids the 
wife in her efforts to prevent repudiation by the husband. 
2
Gerwani, Lebih Giat, pp.68, 71*
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v i l l a g e s .  Some s u b -b ra n c h e s  h ad  b e en  o rg a n iz e d  in  p la c e s
o f  w ork , b u t  th e y  were d is b a n d e d  when th e  SOBSI u n io n s
e s t a b l i s h e d  s p e c i a l  womenfs d e p a r tm e n ts .
Prom December 1957 to  December 1960 G erw ani p u t  i n to
o p e r a t io n  a t h r e e - y e a r  p la n  by  w hich i t  was hoped f i n a l l y
to  c r e a t e  a sy s te m  o f  c a d re  e d u c a t io n .  Many c a d re
c o u rs e s  w ere h e ld  a t  th e  v a r io u s  l e v e l s ,  b u t  t h e i r  num ber
and  e x te n t  have  n o t  b e e n  d iv u lg e d .  At th e  b e g in n in g  o f
1960 th e  num ber o f  f u l l - t i m e  c a d re s  w ere s t i l l  v e ry  low :
t h r e e  a t  th e  c e n t r e ,  and an  a v e ra g e  o f  be low  one f o r  each
o f  th e  b ra n c h e s  ( i n  December 1957 th e r e  w ere 183 b r a n c h e s ) .
A c o n s id e r a b le  amount o f  p a r t - t i m e  la b o u r  was a v a i l a b l e ,
h o w ev er, from  th e  women c a d re s  i n  PKI and o th e r  com m unist-
l e d  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  and  from  Gerwani members o f
p a r l ia m e n t  and  th e  l o c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  c o u n c i l s .
The n a t i o n a l  c o u n c i l 's  r e p o r t  to  th e  t h i r d  c o n g re ss
i n  Decem ber 1957 c r i t i c i z e d  w hat i t  c o n s id e re d  to  be  a
c o n tin u e d  o v e r-e m p h a s is  on p o l i t i c a l  m a t te r s  w hich were
o f  l i t t l e  o r  no i n t e r e s t  to  th e  mass o f  In d o n e s ia n  women:
E x p e r ie n c e  u n t i l  now p ro v e s  t h a t  a c t io n s  
c o n c e rn in g  p o l i t i c a l  q u e s t io n s  a re  n o t  b a la n c e d  
by  s o c ia l - e c o n o m ic  a c t i o n s ,  so  t h a t  t h e i r  im­
p o r ta n c e  i s  l e s s  d i r e c t l y  f e l t  by  th e  wornen 
m a sse s .
. . .  t h i s  means n o t  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  i s  
u n im p o r ta n t ,  b u t  t h a t  we m ust f u r t h e r  in c r e a s e  
th e  num ber o f  a c t io n s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  r i g h t s  
o f  women an d  c h i ld r e n  a s  w e l l  a s  s o c i a l -  
econom ic a c t i o n s ,  a c t io n s  t h a t  d i r e c t l y
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concern the life of the women masses, for 
example the question of kampong improvements,  ^
the problem of water, the problem of rice, etc.
The national council's report to the congress declared
that:
in order to extend membership, every action 
must be based on the direct interests of the 
mass of women, discussed with the women 
themselves, and carried out as well as 
supported by them.
A double guiding principle was laid down for any action:
that its purpose should be reasonable so that it received
wide sympathy and support from the community, and that it
should be made at the right time and with realized limits.
The third congress endorsed a comprehensive 27-point
programme of demands which embraced problems ranging from
marriage laws, work laws, and equal rights, to compulsory
education, adequate medical provisions, and price controls
2on essential commodities. With this programme Gerwani 
hoped to appeal to all sections of Indonesian women from 
working class and peasant women to the literate middle 
classes.
At the beginning of 1960, when Gerwani membership was 




The programme of demands is given in full, ibid., 
pp.125-7.
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slowing d o m  in the rate of growth after December 1957> 
Gerwani was engaged in the following practical work 
designed to attract and hold its mass membership:
1. A popular activity was the arisan whereby all 
members of a group contributed a certain sum each week and 
each member in turn received the whole sum.
2. Mutual assistance was organized at times of need, 
such as death, birth, marriage, illness and pregnancy.
3. Small-scale credit groups were organized.
4. There were 326 kindergartens and 3 elementary 
schools. Training courses were being held for kinder­
garten teachers. A few of the kindergartens were well- 
equipped and had trained teachers, but the majority were 
still make-shift.
5. In the middle of 1959 the national council decided 
that each branch should have at least five or six persons 
competent to manage a cooperative. Courses for cooper­
ative cadres were begun in which officials of the govern­
ments Cooperative Service were asked to teach. By early 
1960 a few consumer cooperatives had already been created.
6. Anti-illiteracy courses were still the main 
activity in Central and East Java. Some branches held
1
The following information was obtained in conversations 
with Umi Sardjono and with Gerwani leaders in East Java 
and Jogjakarta.
courses for the general public, sometimes alone and 
sometimes in cooperation with government agencies*
7. Women were assisted in their marriage problems. 
G-erwani cadres participated in the semi-official bodies 
for the solution of marital disputes, and even occasionally 
defended members in court in divorce cases.
8. Handicrafts were taught: in the villages, the 
making of baskets and mats, in the towns, cushions and 
clothes, and everywhere cooking.
9. G-erwani led popular campaigns to demand such as a 
decrease in the price of essential commodities, rice, 
textiles, sugar and cooking oil.
10. Some cultural activities were organized, includ­
ing choirs and drama groups, but these were not yet 
widespread.
11. Gerwani gave assistance to the other communist- 
led mass organizations and to PKI in their efforts to 
obtain improvements for the different sections of society.
12. Gerwani joined with other women*s organizations 
in celebrating Kartini Day (April 21) and Motherfs Day 
(December 22), and in the larger cities held its own 
celebrations for International Women*s Day.
1
Kartini is a national heroine; she was one of the first 
to attempt to give education to girls.
The basic members* groups met at least once a month and 
sometimes as often as once a week*
It seems that the main attraction of Gerwani for the 
mass of urban and rural members is Gerwani*s social work, 
the organization of arisan groups, small credit groups, 
mutual assistance, literacy courses, kindergartens, and 
assistance in the solution of marriage problems. Little 
direct political education is given to the ordinary 
members, but Gerwani endeavours to teach them that bad 
conditions can be changed by organization, and that PKI 
is the only political party which truly defends their 
interests. Gerwani*s political importance to PKI lies 
in its ability to awaken the mass of women to political 
problems, to mobilize voters, to add support to PKI*s 
political line, to aid the other mass organizations, and 
to provide a source and training ground for female Party 
members and cadres.
(c) The Work of SOBSI and its Trade Unions.
The following section deals not with the work of the 
communist-led trade unions for their members in general, 
but with the special attention given to women members.
Although the number of women workers is high in 
1Indonesia, SOBSI and its member unions did not give 
special attention to them until the beginning of 1956, 
just one year after PKI began to examine the means of 
attracting and organizing a far greater number of women. 
On February 25, 1956 the national council of SOBSI passed 
a resolution concerning women workers and including the 
following decisions:
1. to demand equal rights for men and women in the 
same work, including payment of allowances and of the 
minimum wage;
2. to demand the intensive implementation of work 
law number 1, 1951» with special attention to the rights 
of women workers;
1
A survey of medium and large manufacturing enterprises 
in 1955 found that about 35 per cent of the 450>000 
workers reported were women; International Labour Office, 
Report to the Government of Indonesia on Social Security, 
Geneva, 1958, pp.17-18. Of 1,452,000 workers employed 
by over 25,000 officially registered enterprises in 1956, 
416,784 were women workers; Njono, "Women Workers of 
Indonesia", World Trade Union Movement, March 1956, p.9* 
According to a PKI estimate given in May 1958, women 
comprised 45 per cent of workers in estates, 65 per cent 
in textile enterprises, 60 per cent in light industry, sind 
65 per cent in cigarette enterprises, with a large number 
also in the government ministries and services; Sundari, 
"Memperbesar Aktivitet Gerakan Wanita untuk Memenangkan 
Partai dalam Pemilihan Umum Parlemen ke-II" (Increasing 
the Activity of the Women's Movement in order to Bring 
Victory to the Party in the Second Parliamentary General 
Elections), BM, June 1958, p.263«
3* to oppose discrimination against women effected 
"by some reactionary officials in government offices, 
enterprises and services;
4. to fight for special rights for women with regard
1to pregnancy, confinement and work conditions.
The resolution also decided on the formation within the 
trade unions of special women*s groups which could discuss 
the special demands of women workers and organize an 
effective fight for their implementation under the leader­
ship of the respective trade unions.
To indicate its willingness to have women share in 
the work of the organization, the national council in 
February 1956 increased the number of its women members 
from one to five. By September 1957, there v/ere 49 
women cadres in the central and regional leadership com­
mittees of SOBSI and its member unions, and ’The number 
of women cadres who lead or participate in leading the 
basic organizations has greatly increased’. In that 
month the SOBSI national conference decided that trade 
unions with many women members should form women’s 
departments, that the work of forming special women’s 
groups in work places should be completed by the end of
1
BB, March 17, 1956, p.3.2
SOBSI, Dokumen-Dokumen, p.94*
1958, t h a t  c a d re s  sh o u ld  be  a p p o in te d  w i th in  SOBSI
r e g i o n a l  and  b ra n c h  co m m ittee s  to  ta k e  c a r e  o f  wom en's
a f f a i r s ,  and t h a t  women w ork ers  sh o u ld  be  p rom oted  w i th in
1
th e  l e a d e r s h ip  b o d ie s .
D u rin g  1956 and  1957 some o f  th e  member u n io n s  h e ld  
s p e c i a l  c o n fe re n c e s  d e v o te d  to  th e  p ro b lem s o f  women 
w o rk e rs ;  i n  1957 some SOBSI b ra n c h e s  were a l r e a d y  
o r g a n iz in g  s p e c i a l  c a d re  c o u rs e s  f o r  women; and i n  
F e b ru a ry  1958 SOBSI h e ld  a n a t i o n a l  s e m in a r  on women 
w o rk e rs , th e  ag en d a  d e a l in g  w i th  m ethods o f  o r g a n iz in g  
women w o rk e rs , th e  s p e c i a l  so c io -e c o n o m ic  p rob lem s f a c in g
p
women w o rk e rs , and  w om en's r i g h t s .  The n a t i o n a l  c o u n c i l  
s e c r e t a r i a t  i n  March 1958 r e v e r s e d  i t s  d e c i s io n  to  o rg a n iz e  
s p e c i a l  women's g ro u p s , b u t  th e  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
women w o rk e rs  w ere p rom oted  b y  th e  t r a d e  u n i o n s ' s p e c i a l  
d e p a r tm e n ts  and c a d re s  f o r  wom en's a f f a i r s ,  and by 
o c c a s io n a l  a l l - f e m a l e  m e e tin g s
By th e  end o f  1958 few women had  y e t  e n te r e d  th e  
c e n t r a l  l e a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  SOBSI u n io n s :  th e r e  w ere fo u r  
women o u t o f  39 members o f  th e  c e n t r a l  c o u n c i l  o f  th e  
e s t a t e  w o rk e r s ' u n io n  whose m em bership  was 45 p e r  c e n t
1
SOBSI, P la n  O r g a n is a s i  1 958 , p p .5 - 6 .
2
BB, O c to b e r 15, 1957» p .6 ;  J a n u a ry  3 0 , 1958, p p .1,3*
3
M unir, Pedom an, p p .1 5 -1 6 .
female, 9 out of 29 in the cigarette workers* union whose 
membership was 65 per cent female and 3 out of 21 in the 
textile workers * union whose membership was also 65 per
Acent female* But women were *rapidly* occupying places
in the leadership of the basic organizations* Pew
statistics have been made available since then of the
increase in women cadres within SOBSI and its member 
2unions; but although they and the figures for the end 
of 1958 show a low proportion of women cadres compared 
with women members, they also indicate considerable 
success for SOBSI and its unions in developing organi­
zational interest and ability among the women members in 
a country where, at least among the poorer classes, 
women have no experience of how to run organizations, 
especially mixed organizations*
In short, because women workers constitute a 
considerable percentage of workers in certain fields of 
labour, large numbers have been attracted into the SOBSI
1 Ibid., p*17*
2
In August 1959, the estate workers' union, Sarbupri, 
claimed that it had 681 women activists in a membership 
of perhaps 350»000 to 400,000; BB, August 25» 1959» p*3« In May 1960 the East Java SOBSI leaders told me that 
women constituted about five per cent of the cadres, but 30 per cent of total membership, in the province.
unions on the basis of their general interests as workers. 
Prom February 1956, however, the SOBSI leaders made 
efforts specifically to attract women workers and to 
strengthen their ties with the unions through appeals to 
their specific interests as women workers and through the 
creation of women activists and cadres. The slow but 
noteworthy increase in women trade union cadres gives 
some indication of the success of these efforts.
(d) The Work of BTI.
An article entitled ’'Extending Membership Among 
Peasant Women", published in "Harian Rakjat" on June 15# 
1955> showed how the PKI-led peasant organization BTI has 
worked to make the peasant women politically aware and 
then to recruit them as members of BTI or Gerwani. The 
author, Kartinah, acknowledged that peasant women were 
backward, shy and humble, and that they could not be 
attracted into an organization by merely inviting them to 
join. Patience was required if they were to be attracted 
and, wherever possible, the help of a husband, father or 
neighbour was enlisted. The men were expected to explain 
the purpose of BTI, to take their womenfolk to meetings,
i Kartinah, "Memperluas Keanggotaan dikalangan Wanita 
Tani" (Extending Membership among Peasant Women), HR,
June 15, 1955.
and to ensure that they were present at discussions of 
the situation in their own village*
In this way, Kartinah claimed, the women learned that 
other women faced the same problems, 'and that their 
suffering is not different*. Soon they reached the point 
of wanting to join with their menfolk in the peasants* 
struggle, and they learned the importance of organization 
in solving their problems. Then 3TI or G-erwani drew them 
into its organization. Special care was taken to give 
them a sense of responsibility and participation by at 
first asking them to perform easy tasks, such as preparing 
food for meetings, rendering assistance to others in times 
of need, and other social work. Lessons were also given 
to eradicate illiteracy and to teach health matters, 
sewing, and so on. In short, Kartinah wrote, the peasant 
women:
must be given a little responsibility in the 
organization because by being given responsi­
bility, even though a little, they feel proud 
that they can assist the work of the organi­
zation and they feel that their energy is not 
wasted.
Kartinah*s article illustrates three characteristics 
of PKI*s work to organize the masses: first, the care and 
patience employed in raising the consciousness of the 
masses and in bringing them into an organization; second, 
the way in which one communist organization assists the
work o f  th e  o t h e r s  -  i n  t h i s  c a s e  BTI h e lp s  in  th e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o r  g ro w th  o f  G erw ani, and  Gerwani th e n  
a s s i s t s  BTI i n  th e  s t r u g g l e  to  im prove th e  p e a s a n t s * con­
d i t i o n s  a n d ,  t h i r d ,  th e  a r t i c l e ,  a p p e a r in g  a s  i t  d id  
i n  th e  PKI n e w sp a p e r ,  c l e a r l y  e n v is a g e s  th e  work o f  th e  
mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a s  l e a d i n g  e v e n t u a l l y  t o  m em bership i n  
th e  P a r t y .
6 .  E th n ic  Groups and  M i n o r i t i e s
The I n d o n e s ia n  p e o p le  i s  composed o f  many e th n i c
g r o u p s .  More th a n  35 d i s c r e t e  g ro u p s  e a c h  c o n ta in  more
th a n  1 0 0 ,0 0 0  members, and  t h e r e  a r e  l a r g e  numbers o f
1
s m a l l e r  g r o u p s .  So f a r  th e  s m a l l e r  e t h n i c  g ro u p s  have 
n o t  r e a c t e d  t o  any  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x t e n t  a g a i n s t  th e  r e a l  o r  
su p p o se d  d o m in a t io n  o f  t h e  J a v a n e s e ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  g ro u p . 
The n a t i o n a l  la n g u a g e ,  I n d o n e s ia n ,  i s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
Malay b u t  n o t  to  th e  la n g u a g e s  o f  J a v a .  Nor can  th e  n o n -  
J a v a n e s e  p o i n t  t o  J a v a n e s e  monopoly o f  pow er: th e  
P r e s i d e n t - P r im e  M in is te r -S u p re m e  Commander, S u k a rn o , i s  
p a r t  B a l i n e s e  as  w e l l  a s  p a r t  J a v a n e s e ;  th e  F i r s t  D eputy  
Prim e M i n i s t e r ,  D juanda , i s  S un d an ese ;  t h e  army c h i e f ,  
N a s u t io n ,  i s  a Moslem B a ta k ;  th e  a i r  f o r c e  c h i e f  i s
1
G. W il l ia m  S k in n e r ,  "The N a tu re  o f  L o y a l t i e s  i n  R u ra l  
I n d o n e s i a " i n  S k in n e r  ( e d . ) ,  L o c a l ,  E t h n i c ,  and N a t io n a l  
L o y a l t i e s  i n  V i l l a g e  I n d o n e s i a :  a Symposium, New Haven, 
C o n n e c t i c u t ,  1959> P*5*
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reportedly a Eurasian raised "by a Sundanese family; and 
the navy chief is Sundanese. The leaders of the main 
political parties are also drawn from a wide range of 
ethnic groups.
The non-Javanese do complain, however, about 
'Djakarta', meaning the central government. They com­
plain of the waste and corruption, the endless red tape, 
the lack of interest in the affairs of the regions, and 
the appropriation of funds obtained from their exports in 
order to subsidize Java. This discontent with Djakarta1 
has been a prime cause of the acts of insubordination that 
have occurred in the outer islands, from merely ignoring 
central government instructions, to smuggling, to setting 
up local councils in defiance of the central governments 
apparatus, to open rebellion and the formation of separate 
but not separatist states. A solution to the anti- 
Djakarta grievances has been looked for in a considerable 
increase of regional autonomy - to which the central 
government has paid lip service.
The ethnic minorities, or, in Indonesian official 
terminology 'the non-native Indonesian citizens1, consist 
of Chinese, Arabs, and Eurasians. Arabs and Eurasians 
are relatively few in number, but the racial Chinese of 
Indonesian citizenship amount to about 1 or million.
The ethnic minorities, and especially the Chinese, have
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suffered considerable discrimination, particularly in the 
economic sphere where the government has legislated and
iofficials have acted against them.
(a) PKI and the Ethnic Groups.
None of the ethnic groups in Indonesia has developed 
a militant ethnic consciousness. The communist leaders 
dared not try to develop and exploit such a consciousness 
because in Indonesia, unlike in India, the growth and 
existence of the Party has been at least partly dependent 
upon an alliance with political forces within the central 
government. Among some of the non-Javanese ethnic groups 
there has arisen, however, a demand for greater regional 
autonomy, for a 'fairer share for the provinces' in the 
distribution of the government's income. During the 
first years after January 1951» the Aidit leadership was 
too engrossed in re-establishing and strengthening the 
Party and its mass organizations in Java to devote more 
than passing attention to the non-Javanese areas. Interest 
in the outer regions was first aroused by the 1955 
elections, in which PKI sought to gather the highest
1 For a description of discrimination against the 
Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, see Donald E. 
Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 
Ithaca, New York, 195&> especially pp.51-7> 60-2.
possible number of votes, and was then increased after 
1956 when the Party leaders were forced to consider 
seriously the non-parliamentary means that would be 
necessary in order to win power, A communist victory 
even in Java would be difficult without broad support 
among the Sundanese in West Java, while a victory in Java 
might be reversed if the outer islands remained in the 
hands of non-communists,
In their efforts to attract and organize the members 
of the various ethnic groups, the PKI leaders have not 
created specific ethnic group organizations, but have used 
the ordinary machinery of the Party and its mass organi­
zations, At the same time, the leaders have taken pains 
to declare their support for the interests of the regions, 
for the broadest autonomy for the ethnic groups. The PKI 
central committee admitted in October 1953 that the Party 
'has not yet given much attention to the problem of the 
ethnic groups in our country'. The remedy for this 
deficiency was begun in March 195U when the fifth national 
congress endorsed a programme calling for the election of 
democratic regional governments with wide autonomy, and
1
PKI, Putusan-Putusan Sidang Pleno Central Comite Partai 
Komunis Indonesia (Decisions of the PKI Central Committee 
Plenum Meeting), Djakarta, 1953> p.57*
for the right of each ethnic group to use its own language
in schools and in court. During the 1955 election
campaign, PKI declared:
The Indonesian Republic is a unitary state 
with many ethnic groups. This means that 
Indonesia must have a central government that 
is obeyed by all regions and ethnic groups, 
but at the same time there must be the 
broadest autonomy for every ethnic group 
(provisionally this is possible along the 
ordinary administrative divisions) for 
organizing finances, economy, communications, 
culture and policy special to its area. All 
ethnic groups, whether large or small, are 
equal, fraternal, and of mutual assistance, and 
therefore they may not oppress one another and 
none may receive special treatment.
It is noteworthy that of the 39 persons elected to 
parliament on the PKI ticket in September 1955» at least 
15 were not ethnic Javanese despite the heavy concen­
tration of PKI votes in the Javanese areas.
In 1956, 1957 and 1958 the problem of the ethnic 
groups was thrown into prominence by the formation of 
regional councils in protest against the central govern­
ment in North, Central and South Sumatra, and in East 
Indonesia, and by the formation of the PRRI-Permesta rebel 
government in February 1958. Both the councils and the 
rebel government appealed to regional and ethnic loyalties
1
PKI, Program PKI, pp.13-14»
2
HR, November 18, 1955
s t r e s s i n g  th e  a l l e g e d  un co n ce rn  o f  th e  governm ent i n  
D j a k a r t a  f o r  th e  p rob lem s o f  t h e  r e g io n s  and p e o p le s  
o u t s i d e  J a v a .
The PKI l e a d e r s  were s t r o n g l y  opposed  to  th e  a n t i ­
communist d i s s i d e n t  l e a d e r s  b u t  were c o n ce rn e d  n o t  to  
a p p e a r  opposed  to  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  r e g i o n s .  They 
were q u ic k  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  d e s p i t e  th e  s lo g a n s  o f  ’b ro a d  
autonom y f o r  t h e  r e g i o n s ’ and ’d ev e lo p m en t o f  th e  r e g i o n s ’ 
th e  c o u n c i l s  by t h e i r  i l l e g a l  s e i z u r e  o f  power h in d e r e d  
th e  developm en t o f  d e m o c ra t ic  r e g i o n a l  go v e rn m en t,  and by  
t h e i r  c o r r u p t i o n  and sm ugg ling  a c c e l e r a t e d  th e  b a n k ru p tc y  
o f  th e  s t a t e  and  ham pered e f f o r t s  to  improve th e  economy
A
o f  th e  r e g i o n s .  In  o r d e r  to  r e - s t a t e  i t s  own c o n ce rn  
f o r  b r o a d ,  d e m o c ra t ic  r e g i o n a l  autonom y, PKI i s s u e d  t h r e e  
b o o k l e t s  i n  A p r i l  1958» two m onths a f t e r  th e  o u tb r e a k  o f  
th e  r e b e l l i o n ,  w hich  d e c l a r e d  th e  P a r t y ’s s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  
f o r m a t io n  o f  s e v e n te e n  f i r s t - l e v e l  autonom ous r e g io n s  
o u t s i d e  J a v a ,  and  e l a b o r a t e d  on i t s  1955 s t a t e m e n t  o f
p
P K I’s g o a l  o f  r e g i o n a l  and e t h n i c  g roup  autonom y.
1
S e e ,  f o r  exam ple , M.H. Lukman, " K e s e t ia a n  PKI pada 
P o l i t i k  F r o n t  P e r s a t u a n  dan Pem belaan K e p en tin g an  R a k j a t ” 
(P K I’s L o y a l ty  to  t h e  U n i te d  F r o n t  P o l i c y  and to  th e  
D efence  o f  t h e  P e o p l e ’s I n t e r e s t s ) ,  i n  A i d i t ,  Lukman and 
N jo to ,  57 Tahun P a r t a i  Komunis I n d o n e s ia  (PKI 37 Y e a r s ) ,  
D j a k a r t a ,  1957, p p . 1 4 -1 7»
2
The t h r e e  b o o k l e t s  were i s s u e d  u n d e r  t h e  t i t l e  Menudju 
Otonomi D aerah  S e l u a s - l u a s n j a  (Towards th e  B ro a d e s t
That PKI successfully avoided being characterized as
’Djakartan' or Javanese or opposed to regional interests,
was indicated by the communist and other reports of rapid
1Party expansion in the outer islands since 1956, Both
Lukrnan and Aidit told the delegates to the PKI sixth
congress in September 1959 of the great importance of
work among the ethnic groups. Aidit called on the Party
to improve this work by promoting the culture of the
different groups by promoting and defending broad,
democratic regional autonomy as a step toward ethnic group
autonomy, and especially by developing work among the
peasants who constituted a majority within the ethnic 
2groups.
(b) PKI and the Ethnic Minorities.
The PKI programme for the ethnic minorities has been 
simple: equal rights for all citizens, and the prevention 
of narrow nationalism among the ‘native’ Indonesians at
Regional Autonomy), I-III; Djakarta, 1958. A.R. Nungtjik 
was the author of the first on "Autonomy and its Sphere of 
Authority”; Peris Pardede wrote the second on "Abolition 
of the Pamong Pradja System"; and Hutomo Supardan,
Harjowisastro and J. Piry wrote the third, which consisted 
of essays on "The Budget", "Determining the Boundaries of 
Autonomous Regions", and "Level-Ill Autonomy".
1
See above, pp.161-2.
2 Aidit, Untuk Demokrasi, pp.175-6; Lukrnan, Tentang 
Konstitusi PKI, pp.25-6.
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the same time as preventing a feeling of superiority
1among the minorities.
PKI’s earnestness in defence of the ethnic minorities 
was shown by the Party’s campaign in late 1959 and early 
I960 against the government’s action to evict aliens 
trading in the rural areas. Because of the muddle of 
Indonesia’s citizenship regulations, many Chinese and some 
of the few Arabs are no longer sure which nationality they 
hold. Therefore the eviction of alien rural traders 
affected many of confused nationality as well as some of 
clearly Indonesian nationality, and profoundly distrubed 
all members of the ethnic minorities as a possible step 
towards further discrimination against themselves.
Whatever PKI's motives in opposing the eviction measure 
and thereby arousing the wrath of many political and army 
leaders, its opposition appeared laudable in the eyes of 
the minorities, especially the Chinese.
Because the Chinese are viewed with envy and 
suspicion by many Indonesians, it would be undiplomatic 
for PKI itself to organize them. Therefore, although a
1
See, for example, D.N. Aidit, "Bersatu untuk 
Menjelesaikan Tuntutan Revolusi Agustus 1945" (Unite to 
Complete the Demands of the August 1945 Revolution),
HR, August 1, 1956.
few Chinese are in PKI, a separate and officially
1sovereign party has been formed for them: Baperki.
Baperki (Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan
Indonesia, Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Council)
was founded on March 13 > 1954 by Siauw Giok Tjhan, a close
2associate of PKI, purportedly to unify the different 
peoples of Indonesia into one people, and to undertake 
social and educational work especially among the 
minorities. In fact, Baperki has been an organization 
of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, with a small 
number of native Indonesians, mostly communists, also as 
members.
Baperki’s activities have included the building and 
maintenance of schools, but they have been concerned 
primarily with assisting the Chinese minority to circum­
vent and combat all official and unofficial discrimination. 
Membership is not large, perhaps forty or sixty thousand 
in the whole country. In the September 1955 parlia­
mentary elections, Baperki won 178,887 votes.
1
Much of the information on Baperki was obtained in 
interview from a Baperki leader in Surabaja.
2
Siauw Giok Tjhan in January 1951 had founded the twice- 
weekly newspaper Suara Rakjat which in July 1951 became 
the daily Harlan Rakjat, the official mouthpiece of PKI.
He was director and then co-director of Harian Rakjat 
until October 31, 1953*
If rumour has any basis in truth, Baperki is most 
useful to PKI as an agent for collecting from the wealthy 
Chinese businessmen large sums that are channelled into 
PKI's needy coffers. There would be infinitely greater 
risk of public detection of this source of communist funds 
if it was tapped directly by PKI, rather than by a Chinese 
organization for ostensibly social purposes.
7. Veterans of the Revolution
Although relatively little actual fighting took place 
during the revolution against the Dutch, there are 
approximately 800,000 Indonesian 'veterans’, that is, 
persons who in the period from August 17> 1945 to December 
27y 1949 joined an official army unit or a recognized 
armed group in defence of the Republic. The veterans 
were a major target for PKI organization because they had 
a higher level of political consciousness than most of the 
population, because they were, in general, dissatisfied 
with the fruits of victory, and because they knew how to 
use weapons. After the transfer of sovereignty in 
December 1949» hundreds of national and local veterans' 
organizations were formed, of which the communist-led 
Perbepsi became the largest.
1 Moh. Munasir, "Veterans' Problem", Veteran, August 1959» 
p.16; also pp.41-2.
Perbepsi was formed on December 30, 1951 by the
1fusion of 149 national and local groups. In October 1954
2it claimed 194 branches and 205,740 members, and in
December 1957 300,000 members (at which time PKI claimed
3it had 265>000), The chairman, Supardi, was elected to 
parliament in 1955 as a 'non-party' member of the PKI 
ticket.
Perbepsi's three chief social and economic demands
were:
1. government acceptance of the principle of 
preference for veterans;
2. a government policy of settling veterans on land 
made available by the redistribution of foreign estate 
holdings and the non-extension of large land leases;
3. provision of training courses for veterans, and 
the rehabilitation and employment of those disabled.
The greatest value of Perbepsi for PKI was that it 
constituted a para-military organization that would be 
available in the event of a major political crisis.
1 D.N. Aidit, "Ubah Imbangan Kekuatan untuk Melaksanakan 
Konsepsi Presiden 100$" (Change the Balance of Power in 
order to Carry Out the President's Concept 100$), HR,
July 5, 1957.2
TI, October 21, 1954.
3 HR, December 20, 1957; Sudisman, "Semangat Bukit 1211”, 
BM, December 1957> p*512.
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Training courses in military matters were given to
members, and Perbepsi formations could be seen 'marching
1and drilling to the beat of drums'* During the second 
half of 1953 and during 1954, Perbepsi attempted to 
persuade and manoeuvre the government into arming its 
members as part of its proposed people's militia to fight 
the Darul Islam rebels, and, when this was rejected, to 
maintain security during the elections. The government 
was unmoved*
At the beginning of July 1957 the PKI central com-
pmittee heard a report on Party work among veterans which
stated that if the veterans 'are well organized and well
led this will greatly assist in changing the balance of
power so that the situation moves to the left'* But the
end of Perbepsi was already at hand. Prom December 26,
1956 to January 2, 1957 an all-Indonesia veterans*
congress had been held on the initiative of Nasution, the
army chief of staff. The 2,300 delegates had agreed 'by
acclamation' to form the Indonesian Veterans' Legion which
3would absorb all existing veterans’ organizations. The 
1
Compton, Indonesian Communism, p.11.
2
"Laporan Tambahan Mengenai Pengalaman Bekerdja dikalangan 
Bekas Pedjuang (Veteran)” (Additional Report on Experience 
in Working among the Veterans), BM, May-July 1957» pp.264-7* 
3
Munasir, "Veterans' Problem", Veteran, August 1959, p.l6*
individual organizations successfully dug their heels in 
for a while, but by August 1959 army pressure had forced 
their dissolution and the merger of their membership into 
the army-controlled Veterans * Legion.
That PKI considers the fusion of all veterans* 
organizations to be harmful was indicated by the ardent 
opposition of the Party, Pemuda Rakjat and SOBSI to later 
attempts by the army and certain government ministers to 
form all-embracing youth and trade union organizations.
III. MOBILIZING ELECTORAL SUPPORT
1• PKI*s Election Campaigns
Once they had decided, within the framework of the 
national united front policy, to exploit the possibilities 
for political action offered by the parliamentary regime, 
the PKI leaders were committed to take part in elections. 
All-Indonesia elections were held in September 1955 for 
parliament, and in December 1955 for the Constituent 
Assembly. Local elections for the-provincial, kabupaten, 
and city councils were held throughout Java from June to 
November 1957» and later in South Sumatra, Riau, and 
Kalimantan. In both the national and the local elections
PKI applied its organizational and propaganda resources
with great effect, especially in Java but also in the 
outer islands.
It is possible to envisage PKI’s tremendous activity 
in the election campaigns as having reference to three 
interdependent factors: the general power situation, the 
extension of communist support and organization, and the 
improvement of the Party organization*
The more votes PKI obtained in 1955 > the more seats 
it would procure in parliament and the Constituent 
Assembly. Politics were still revolving largely around 
parliament, and an increase in Party representation there 
could be expected to increase the Party’s bargaining 
position in national politics. Increased parliamentary 
strength also could be expected to increase the Party’s 
chance of gaining entry into a coalition cabinet. Because 
the Constituent Assembly was to draw up the future consti­
tution of the country, it was also important for the Party 
to have major representation there as well. By 1957 the 
power and authority of the parties in general had declined 
but it was possibly even more important for PKI to demon­
strate its own broad support. The two major power 
centres in the country were now Sukarno and the army. 
Sukarno needed PKI in order to help maintain his primary 
political position, just as PKI needed him in order to 
keep the army leaders, who included many anti-communists,
from th a t  p o s it io n *  The s tr o n g e r  th e  su p p ort PKI co u ld  
d em o n stra te , th e  su r e r  the P arty  was o f  m a in ta in in g  the  
a l l i a n c e  w ith  Sukarno and o f  s tr e n g th e n in g  h i s  hand 
v i s - a - v i s  th e  army. And i f  Sukarno had d e c la r e d  a f t e r  
th e  1955 e l e c t i o n s  th a t  a p a r ty  w ith  s i x  m i l l io n  v o te r s  
( t h a t  i s ,  PKI) sh o u ld  n o t  be ex c lu d ed  from th e  governm ent, 
w ould n o t  h i s  c a se  be str en g th e n e d  by a la r g e  in c r e a se  in  
communist v o te s  in  1957?
The e l e c t i o n  cam paigns p rov id ed  th e  P arty  w ith  a 
g o v ern m en t-sa n ctio n ed  o p p o r tu n ity  to  i n t e n s i f y  and ex ten d  
propaganda and o r g a n iz a t io n a l  a c t i v i t y ,  e s p e c i a l ly  in  new 
a r e a s . D uring th e  p e r io d  o f  the cam paigns, lo c a l  
t r a d i t io n a l  and c o n s e r v a t iv e  a u t h o r i t i e s  cou ld  n o t  
c r i t i c i z e  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  as d i v i s i v e ,  and P arty  work 
was ex ten d ed  in to  a rea s  h i th e r to  c lo s e d  to  i t .  Furtherm ore 
p op u lar  i n t e r e s t  in  p o l i t i c s  was h e ig h ten ed  during th e  
cam paigns -  n o t o n ly  b eca u se  o f  the work o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s ,  b u t a l s o  b ecau se  th e  M in is tr y  o f  In form ation  made 
a g r e a t  e f f o r t  to  inform  th e e le c t o r a t e  o f  the rea so n s fo r  
and th e  methods o f  v o t in g .  The PKI le a d e r s  took  advantage  
o f  t h i s  in c r e a se d  i n t e r e s t  to  p r e se n t  a b a s ic  o u t l in e  o f  
th e  commendable g o a ls  o f  th e  P a r ty . Once i n t e r e s t  in  and 
sympathy fo r  PKI had b een  a ro u sed , the communists moved 
q u ic k ly  to  r e c r u it  th e  new sym p ath izers fo r  e i t h e r  the  
P a rty  o r  th e  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s . That i s ,  th e  e l e c t o r a l
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su p p ort g a in ed  d u rin g  the e l e c t i o n  campaigns was en v isa g e d  
a s  th e  b a s i s  fo r  a ra p id  ex p a n sio n  o f  the communist 
o r g a n iz a t io n s .
The e l e c t i o n s  were used  t o  s tr e n g th e n  the Party- 
o r g a n iz a t io n  in  th r e e  w ays. F i r s t ,  the campaigns were 
u sed  to  t r a in  P arty  c a d r e s , a c t i v i s t s  and members. The 
P a rty * s e l e c t i o n  m a te r ia ls  were s tu d ie d  i n t e n s i v e ly  a t  a l l  
l e v e l s  o f  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n , and th e  e n t ir e  membership 
r e c e iv e d  t r a in in g  in  th e  d is se m in a tio n  o f  P arty  propaganda 
and the m o b il iz a t io n  o f  p eop le  o u t s id e  the P a r ty . Second, 
i t  i s  p o s s ib le  th a t  th e  A id it  le a d e r s h ip , a n t ic ip a t in g  
communist c o n tr o l  o f  th e  government in  the fo r e s e e a b le  
fu tu r e ,  was ea g er  to  have the la r g e s t  p o s s ib le  number o f  
ran k in g  cad res e n te r  p ar liam en t and the l o c a l  c o u n c i ls  in  
o rd er  to  overcome th e  P a r ty 's  d e f ic ie n c y  in  e x p er ien ced  
a d m in is tr a to r s , in  p erson s fa m il ia r  w ith  m atters o f  
governm ent. T h ird , th e  e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  p ro v id ed  the  
P a rty  le a d e r s  w ith  an o b je c t iv e  b a s i s  on w hich to  a s s e s s  
th e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  th e  P arty  o r g a n iz a t io n , th e  s o c i a l  and 
geograp h ic  areas o f  P arty  su p p o r t, and, from t h e s e ,  the  
e s s e n t i a l  f i e l d s  o f  fu tu r e  P arty  work. P r e v io u s ly , th e  
le a d e r s  had to  r e ly  fo r  such a ssessm e n ts  on th e  s u b je c t iv e  
r e p o r ts  o f  l o c a l  c a d r e s .
Both in  1955 and 1957 PKI was competing mainly for
1
th e  v o te s  o f th e  n o n - s a n tr is .  W ithin the  n o n -s an t Pi 
e l e c t o r a t e ,  PKI began the  e le c t io n  campaigns w ith  a la rg e  
n u c leu s  o f  p o te n t i a l  v o te rs  formed by th e  membership o f  
th e  mass o rg a n iz a t io n s , w hile i t s  e f f o r t s  to  r a l l y  
e l e c t o r a l  su p p o r t beyond th e  f r o n t i e r s  o f  th e  P a rty  and 
mass o rg a n iz a tio n s  were f a c i l i t a t e d  by the  p o p u la r image 
o f  the  P a r ty  th a t  had been b u i l t  so c a r e fu l ly  s in c e  1951» 
by  th e  p o l i t i c a l l y  u n s o p h is tic a te d  and uncommitted n a tu re  
o f  most o f  the  abangan e l e c t o r a te ,  and by th e  c u r re n t 
p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n .
I f  PKI had been heard  o f  p re v io u s ly  by th e  mass o f  
th e  abangans» i t  was most p ro b ab ly  as a re sp o n s ib le  p a r ty  
opposed to  te r ro r is m , and eager to  defend and promote the  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  p eo p le . In t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  a t t r a c t  
v o te r s ,  th e  P a r ty  le a d e rs  u s u a l ly  d id  n o t have to  f i r s t  
b reak  down e x i s t in g  p o l i t i c a l  l o y a l t i e s ,  w hile t h e i r  
a ttem p t to  make the  P a r ty  appear a t t r a c t i v e  was no t 
c o n s ta n tly  sabo taged  by  a t ta c k s  from o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  
f o r c e s .  At the  tim es o f the campaigns f o r  b o th  th e  1955 
and th e  1957 e le c t io n s ,  PKI was in  a l l ia n c e  w ith  PNI, the  
o n ly  o th e r  major p a r ty  a c t iv e  among the  abangans, and
1
The s a n t r i s  in  g en e ra l were expected  to  vo te  f o r ,  and 
a p p a re n tly  d id  vo te  f o r ,  th e  s p e c i f i c a l ly  Moslem p a r t i e s .
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<1neither party attacked the other. That is, the abangan 
electorate was presented with little anti-communist 
propaganda. The attacks made on PKI by one wing of 
Masjumi in fact only served to increase abangan sympathy 
for the communists.
The Aidit leadership early oriented its organization
to act as an election machine. For the 1955 elections,
Party election committees were formed by mid-May 1954 at
every level of the organization down to the ket jama tan
while at that time committees were already being formed
2in the villages. PKI*s campaign for the 1957 elections
3was under way by February 1957» Large numbers of full­
time election workers were employed by the Party, and the 
mass organizations were also drawn on extensively for 
assistance. At least SOBSI, BTI, Pemuda Rakjat and 
Gerwani assisted in propaganda work and mobilized people 
to attend Party meetings and to vote. LEKRA artists 
designed banners and posters, and helped to provide the 
popular entertainment that served to attract large crowds 
to election meetings.
1
At the local level some PNI leaders did attack PKI, but 
their attacks were inhibited further by the widespread 
belief that to be anti-communist was to be pro-imperialist. 
2 3
RI, February 1957, p.6.HR, May 19, 1954
The large funds available to PKI were used not only
to gear the organization for election work but also to
exploit a wide variety of techniques for winning the
1attention and support of the populace.
Endorsed by the fifth national congress in March
1954> the PKI election manifesto for the September 1955
parliamentary elections was designed to indicate the
Party*s concern for the welfare of the nation as a whole
and of the different sections of *the people*. By
November 1954» already over one quarter of a million
copies of the manifesto had been printed in Indonesian,
Javanese, Sundanese, Batak, and Indonesian in the Arabic 
2script. For the local elections, the central committee
ordered the Party organization in each electoral district
3to prepare its own election programme. Thus the
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1
An account of the campaigns for the 1955 elections is 
given in Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955. p.9 
et seq.
2
HR, November 4> 1954*
3
Examples of province-level programmes may be found in 
H R : for East Java on June 13, 1957; for Central Java on 
June 20, 1957; for West Java on July 1, 1957; and for West 
Kalimantan on April 29 $ 1958. As examples of programmes 
for autonomous towns, see Program Secom PKI Kota Pradja 
Surabaja untuk Pemilihan DPRD Kota Pradja Surabaja, 19 p.; 
and Manlfes Pemilihan Urnurn PKI untuk DPRD Kotapradja 
Jogjakarta (PKI General Election Manifesto for the 
Jogjakarta City Representative Council), Jogjakarta, 1957> 
48 p. As an example of a programme for a kabupaten, see 
Program Seksi Comite PKI Sleman untuk Pemilihan Umum DPRD
e le c t o r s  were p r e sen ted  w ith  programmes d e s ig n e d  s p e c i f i ­
c a l l y  fo r  t h e i r  own l o c a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  programmes th a t  
a n a ly zed  th e  problem s fa c in g  each  l o c a l i t y  and th a t  
p r e sen ted  p la n s  fo r  t h e ir  s o lu t io n .
As th e  e l e c t i o n  campaigns were d ev e lo p ed , urban and 
r u r a l a rea s  were p la s te r e d  w ith  th e  h am m er-an d -sick le , 
p o s te r s  were d is p la y e d  w ith  pop u lar  s lo g a n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
and econom ic c o n te n t ,  mass m eetin gs were o r g a n ize d , 
pam phlets and b roch u res p r in te d  fo r  mass s a le  and d i s t r i ­
b u t io n , s lo g a n  banners were hung a c r o ss  roads and a l l e y s ,  
k i t e s  were flow n  p a in te d  w ith  th e  P arty  sym bol, and huge 
b i l lb o a r d s  were r a is e d  in  prom inent lo c a t io n s .
An im portant fe a tu r e  o f  PKI*s e l e c t i o n  campaigns was
the u se  o f  p op u lar t r a d i t io n a l  forms o f  en terta in m en t to
1
a t t r a c t  crowds and p u t a c r o ss  p o l i t i c a l  propaganda. 
'P e o p le d  f e s t iv a l s *  were o rg a n ized  in  towns and v i l l a g e s ,
Sleman (The Programme o f  the Sleman PKI S e c t io n  Committee 
fo r  th e  E le c t io n s  fo r  th e  Sleman R e p r esen ta tiv e  C o u n c il) ,  
typed  m an u scrip t, 1957> 6 p .
1
In  A p r il 1955 the s e c r e ta r y  o f  PKI*s C en tra l Java  
p ro v in ce  com m ittee r ep o rted  th a t  ’p e o p le * s  a r t i s t s *  n o t  
o n ly  had c r e a te d  many k in d s o f  son gs and dances propa­
g a n d iz in g  PKI, b u t th e y  a l s o  had g iv e n  p o l i t i c a l  c o n ten t  
to  o ld  son gs and d a n ces . The C en tra l Java com m ittee was 
a t  th a t  tim e h o ld in g  a cou rse  fo r  two p erson s from each  
o f  th e  s ix t e e n  s e c t io n  com m ittees to  t r a in  them as 
d a n c in g , s in g in g ,  p e r c u ss io n  and gamelan c a d r e s . S isw o jo ,  
"Seni untuk Menang dalam P em ilihan  Urnum*' (A rt fo r  B r in g in g  
V ic to r y  in  the G eneral E le c t io n s ) ,  KP, A p r il 1, 1955» P«57«
The festivalsand occasionally lasted several nights.^ 
consisted of songs, Indonesian boxing, folk opera, and 
dancing, but they began with a short political speech, 
while the actual entertainment was given a political 
slant. Another method of election campaigning that PKI 
used far more than any other party was social welfare 
work: cleaning kampongs, the construction and repair of 
bridges, public lavatories, public bathing places and 
irrigation channels, and assistance at such times as 
births, marriages and funerals.
PKI also endeavoured to canvass every potential
communist voter during the election camapigns. An article
in "Boletin PKI Djawa Timur’' (East Java PKI Bulletin)
2showed how and why canvassing was done. In order to 
attract and 'control' voters, the article explained, the 
Party first visited every voter to remind them to register 
and to tell them how. In this way, 'they know and feel 
for themselves that there is somebody assisting them'.
1 For accounts of people's festivals, see Boyd R. Compton, 
The Silent Election, Institute of Current World Affairs 
Report, New York, 1955, P*4; also Selosoemardjan, "Social 
Changes in Jogjakarta" (Cornell University, Ph.D. thesis, 
1959;» p.216. I also received information from members 
of the Indonesian rural administrative service.
2
Typed translation of Soekarman, "How to Win the General 
Elections for PKI", which had appeared in Boletin PKI 
D.jawa Timur, September 195Ö.
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Once registration was completed, the Party kept close 
contact with the voters in order to answer any queries 
that might arise. By this close personal contact the 
’voters concerned remain nurtured and controlled 
properly1. Because the PKI machine was much more 
extensive and efficient than those of other parties, PKI 
was far more thorough in personal canvassing than its 
competitors. The effect of personal contacts on the 
underprivileged Indonesian masses with no traditional 
political orientation, must have been much greater than 
the effect of canvassing among the majority of voters in 
Western countries who are politically committed and who 
are used to being wooed by different political parties.
2. The Election Results
PKI won fifth place in the September 1955 elections, 
receiving 6,176,914 (or 16.4 per cent) of the total votes."*
1
The results of the Constituent Assembly elections of 
December 1955 are largely ignored in the following para­
graphs because they showed only minor changes compared 
with the September 1955 elections. For discussions of 
the results of the September 1955 elections, see Peith,
The Indonesian Slections of 1955, p.57 et seq.; Justus 
Maria van der Kroef, ’’Indonesia's First National Election: 
a Sociological Analysis”, The American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, vol.XVi, part I, no.3 (April 
1957), PP.237-1+9; part XI, no.U (July 1957), pp.407-20; 
and A. van Marie, ’’The First Indonesian Parliamentary 
Elections”, Indonesia, 1956, vol.IX, pp.257-64*
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Ahead of PKI were FNI with 8,434,653 votes, Masjumi with 
7>903,886 votes, and Nahdatul Ulama with 6,9551141. The 
fifth largest party, PSII, trailed far behind the big 
four, receiving 1,091,160 votes,
5,477>707 (or 88*7 per cent) of PKI's votes were 
received in Java, 435>775 (or 7*05 per cent) in North and 
South Sumatra (the former an area of estate agriculture 
and Javanese immigration, the latter an area of oil 
extraction and Javanese immigration), and only 263,432 in 
the rest of Indonesia. PKI received less than 10 per 
cent of the votes cast in each of nine of the fifteen 
electoral districts: Central Sumatra, the three districts 
of Kalimantan, the two districts of Sulawesi, the two 
districts of Nusatenggara, and Maluku.
Within Java, communist support was most heavily 
concentrated in a rough quadrilateral within the line 
Gunung Kidul-Semarang-Madiun-Patjitan. Within this 
quadrilateral, PKI received over 50 per cent of the total 
votes in the towns of Semarang and Surakarta, and in four 
kabupatens. In eight of the other eleven kabupatens and 
autonomous towns within the quadrilateral, PKI received 
between 40 and 50 per cent of the total votes. Outside 
this area, PKI received between 40 and 50 per cent of the 
total votes only in the city of Surabaja and in the 
kabupatens of Blitar and Tjilatjap. Communist support
was particularly weak in the whole of West Java, in a 
belt of Central Java running south from Tegal and 
Pekalongan, and in the eastern part of East Java, 
including Madura, PKI received less than 10 per cent of 
the total votes in 28 of the 80 kabupatens in Java: 13 in 
West Java, 7 in. Central Java, and 8 in East Java.
A notable feature of the election results in Java 
was the similar intensity of communist support in the 
urban and rural areas. With two exceptions, communist 
support was only fractionally higher in the autonomous 
toms than in the surrounding or adjacent rural areas.
The two exceptions were Surabaja, where PKI received 
1+1.8 per cent of the votes in the town compared with only 
29.6 per cent in the kabupaten; and Pekalongan, where PKI 
received a lower percentage of the votes in the town than 
in the kabupaten.
In the 1957 local elections in Java, PKI received 
7,514*197 votes. This represented an increase of 
2,036,1+90, or 37*2 per cent, compared with the September 
1955 elections. The increase took place in all of the 
one hundred autonomous towns and kabupatens. Regionally 




a .  v o te s
b .$  o f  
t o t a l a .  v o te s
b .$  o f  
t o t a l
D ja k a r ta  R a ja 96,363 12.6 137,305 19.4
W est J a v a 755,634 10.8 1,297,689 16.2
C e n tr a l  Ja v a * 2 ,326 ,108 25.8 3 ,126 ,448 32 .8
E a s t  J a v a 2,299,602 23.3 2,952,555 29.3
T o ta l  Ja v a 5 ,477 ,707 20.6 7 ,514,197 27 .4
S o u th  Sum atra 176,900 12.1 228,965 15.7
K alim an tan 42,543 3 .0 71,076 5.1
* C e n t r a l  J a v a  in c lu d e s  th e  S p e c ia l  T e r r i t o r y  o f  J o g ja k a r t a .
P o u r r e a s o n s  w ould seem to  e x p la in  t h i s  r a p id  and 
co m p reh en s iv e  i n c r e a s e .  F i r s t ,  th e  P a r ty  and  i t s  mass 
o r g a n iz a t io n s  had  expanded  b e tw een  1955 and th e  m idd le  o f  
1957« S econd , th e  l e a d e r s  o f  th e  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
d id  n o t  c o n s id e r  th e  l o c a l  e l e c t i o n s  t o  b e  w orthy  o f  th e  
i n t e n s iv e  e f f o r t  made f o r  th e  1955 e l e c t i o n s ,  and th e  
cam paign work o f  th e  o th e r  p a r t i e s  d e c l in e d  r e l a t i v e  to  
P K I 's .  T h ird , th e  PKI l e a d e r s  en d ea v o u re d  to  e x p l o i t  th e  
in c r e a s in g  p u b l ic  sym pathy  o f  P r e s id e n t  S ukarno  f o r  th e  
P a r ty ,  to  p o r t r a y  th e  P a r ty  and S ukarno  a s  a r a d i c a l  
n a t i o n a l i s t  team  in  o r d e r  to  a t t r a c t  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  
b ro a d  m asses who s t i l l  c o n s id e re d  him  to  b e  th e  l i v i n g  
sym bol o f  a c t i v e  In d o n e s ia n  n a t io n a l i s m .  F o u r th ,  PNI had  
n o t  fo llo w e d  up i t s  e l e c t o r a l  s u c c e s s  o f  1955 w ith  o rg a n i­
z a t i o n a l  w ork, w h ile  by th e  tim e  o f  th e  1957 e l e c t i o n s  
b o th  th e  p r e s t i g e  an d  th e  m orale  o f  th e  p a r t y  had  d e c l in e d  
a p p re c ia b ly .
A comparison of the voting patterns of 1957 and 1955 
indicates that the socio-cultural division between santrls
and abangans is important in explaining the political 
behaviour of the Javanese. It appears that the santri 
electorate of the Moslem parties proved remarkably 
resistant to communist advances, in marked contrast to 
the ready disintegration of PNI*s abangan electorate: 







East Java Total Java
+ 40,942 - 27,076 - 62,131 - 58,417+ 542,255 -134,528 + 22,678 +155,453+ 800,340 -335,944 +108,022 +524»650+ 652,953 -191,128 -156,490 +202,646+2,036,490 -688,676 - 87,921 +824,332
Ä This comprises the votes received by Masjumi, NU and 
PSII.
The above table indicates that, in general, the FNI vote 
declined sharply, the Moslem vote remained stable, while 
the PKI vote increased rapidly. If the 1957 votes are 
compared with the votes in the December 1955 Constituent 
Assembly elections, the contrast is even more marked: a 
PKI increase in Java of 2,024*894 votes, a FNI decrease of 
985,747» and a Moslem increase of 51,296. In short, it 
appears that PKI increased its votes among the non-santri 
population, and that because FNI was the only other large 
party with support among the non-santris, a large PKI 
increase involved a sharp fall in PNI*s electoral support.
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An analysis of the 1955 and 1957 election results in the 
hundred autonomous towns and kabupatens seems to confirm 
this conclusion.
When the 1957 elections were held, PKI was able to 
capture a large segment of the former PNI electoral 
support. Whereas the communist leaders had followed up 
electoral successes in 1955 with organizational work to 
convert electoral support into organized support (in the 
Party or in the mass organizations), the PNI leaders did 
not do so. That is, PNI had done little to shape its 
1955 electoral support into a conscious and organized 
body, and many of its former supporters readily trans­
ferred their votes to PKI, whose organized presence was 
felt, and whose organizations were usually the only ones 
to defend the interests of the different sections of the 
community. PKI's gains at the expense of PNI were 
facilitated also by the belief among the leaders of PNI, 
as among the leaders of all parties except PKI, that the 
local elections were unworthy of the effort made for the 
1955 elections to parliament and the Constituent Assembly. 
But perhaps of greater importance in explaining the large 
decrease in PNI votes was the demoralization taking place 
within PNI's ranks. In 1955» according to the claim of 
PNI leaders, government officials and schoolteachers had 
been instrumental in mobilizing the large PNI vote. By
th e  m idd le  o f  1957, th e  f u tu r e  o f  p a r l i a m e n ta r y  dem ocracy
was i n  g ra v e  d o u b t , th e  p r e s t i g e  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s
h ad  f a l l e n  s h a r p ly ,  FNI no lo n g e r  seem ed a b le  to  m a in ta in
i t s  fo rm e r l e a d in g  r o l e  in  th e  g o v ern m en t, and a s  PNI*s
h o ld  on th e  governm ent d e c l in e d ,  so  d id  i t s  a b i l i t y  to
d is p e n s e  p a t r o n a g e .  The r e s u l t  was t h a t  many o f  th o s e
who h ad  w orked h a rd  t o  m o b il iz e  v o te s  f o r  FNI in  1955
e i t h e r  w orked l e s s  h a rd  o r  n o t  a t  a l l  i n  1957*
The o n ly  com m unist g a in s  t h a t  seem ed to  have b e en
made a t  th e  e x p e n se  o f  th e  Moslem p a r t i e s  were s m a l l ,
1
e x c e p t  i n  a few o f  th e  h e a v i ly  Moslem a r e a s .  The 
d e t a i l s  o f  th e  1955 and  1957 e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  b o th  PKI and FNI w ere a b le  to  make a l i t t l e  headw ay 
a t  th e  expense  o f  th e  Moslem p a r t i e s  in  a sm a ll  num ber o f  
th e  h e a v i ly  Moslem a r e a s .  In  o th e r  Moslem a r e a s ,  in  
c o n t r a s t ,  th e  Moslem v o te  in c r e a s e d  more th a n  PKI*s -  a s  
in  th e  k a b u p a te n s  o f  P ek a lo n g an  and  Demak. In  s h o r t ,  
t h e r e  a r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  where th e  s a n t r i s  a r e  in  an  
overw helm ing  m a jo r i t y  th e  n o n - s a n t r i  p a r t i e s  c an  g a in  a 
few  v o te s  from  th e  Moslem p a r t i e s ,  b u t  w here th e  s a n t r i s
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In  t h r e e  e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t s ,  D ja k a r ta  R a ja , D jem ber 
( E a s t  J a v a )  and Sumenep (M ad u ra), th e  t o t a l  Moslem ( t h a t  
i s  M asjum i, NU and  P S II )  v o te  f e l l  b y  161 ,7 8 2 , w h ile  th e  
PKI v o te  in c r e a s e d  b y  7 4 ,8 6 9 . T h is  i s  n o t  p r o o f ,  
how ever, t h a t  many fo rm e r Moslem v o te r s  sw itc h e d  to  PKI, 
b e c a u s e  in  th e  th r e e  same d i s t r i c t s  th e  PNI v o te  f e l l  b y  
3 5 ,9 7 4 , and th e  t o t a l  v o te  f e l l  by 111 ,891 .
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a r e  f a c e d  w ith  a s i g n i f i c a n t  num ber o f  n o n - s a n t r i s ,  t h e i r  
c o h e s iv e n e s s  i s  su c h  t h a t  th e  n o n - s a n t r i  p a r t i e s  c an  make 
few  g a in s  among them .
The i n c r e a s e  in  com m unist v o te s  in  J a v a  o c c u r re d  a t  
a f a i r l y  s i m i l a r  r a t e  in  u rb an  and  r u r a l  a r e a s .  In  te rm s 
o f  r e g io n s ,  th e  m ost r a p id  i n c r e a s e  was i n  W est Ja v a  (71*8 
p e r  c e n t ) ,  fo l lo w e d  b y  D ja k a r ta  R a ja  (4 2 .5  p e r  c e n t ) ,  
C e n t r a l  J a v a  (34*4  p e r  c e n t ) ,  and E a s t  J a v a  (2 8 .4  p e r  
c e n t ) .  The n u m e r ic a l  i n c r e a s e  was g r e a t e s t ,  how ever, i n  
C e n t r a l  J a v a .  PKI r e c e iv e d  o v e r  50 p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  v o te s  
c a s t  i n  e le v e n  o f  th e  e ig h ty  k a b u p a te n s , and i n  s i x  o f  
th e  tw e n ty  autonom ous to w n s. Betw een 40 and 50 p e r  c e n t  
o f  th e  t o t a l  v o te s  was r e c e iv e d  in  e ig h t  k a b u p a te n s  and 
in  fo u r  to w n s . N ot o n ly  d id  PKI em erge as  th e  l a r g e s t  
p a r t y  in  Ja v a  a s  a  w h o le , b u t  i t  was th e  l a r g e s t  p a r t y  in  
44 o f  th e  one h u n d red  l o c a l  c o u n c i l  d i s t r i c t s  in  J a v a ,  and 
th e  se co n d  l a r g e s t  in  17 o f  them :
P K I*8 ELECTORAL POSITION BY ELECTORAL DISTRICTS : 1957
l e s s  th a n
D ja k a r ta  R a ja
PKI 1 s t 2nd
1
3 rd 4 th f o u r t h T o ta l
1
W est Ja v a 5 5 7 4 2 23
C e n t r a l  J a v a 20 5 12 2 39
E a s t  J a v a 19 6 7 1 4 37
T o ta l  Ja v a Ml 1 2 26 z 6 100
1
In  th e  k a b u p a te n  o f  M agetan (E a s t  J a v a ) ,  PKI r e c e iv e d  
49*99 p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  v o t e s ,  b u t  was g iv e n  a m a jo r i ty  o f  
th e  c o u n c i l  s e a t s  b e c a u se  i t  h ad  form ed an  e l e c t o r a l  
a l l i a n c e  w ith  P e rm a i, w hich  r e c e iv e d  0 .7 2  p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  
v o te s .
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The maps showing the geographical distribution of 
PKI, PNI and the Moslem parties* electoral support in
A1957 indicate the limits of communist electoral support
at that time and suggest the possibilities for later
communist advance. If the abangan-santri thesis does
hold in terms of political behaviour, as is indicated by
the comparison of the 1957 and the 1955 election results,
the santri population could be expected to form an
effective block to large communist gains in the near
future in areas of West Java, along the north coast of
Central Java, and in parts of East Java, especially in
2Madura and adjacent parts of the mainland. That is, PKI 
could not expect to make a rapid advance among the 38.0 
per cent of the Javanese electorate that voted Moslem in 
1957. On the other hand, PKI could expect to make 
considerable inroads among the 6,275»919 PNI voters - who 
were fairly evenly distributed throughout Java, and who 
were in higher proportions in the rural areas. Since the 
1957 elections, PNI has not increased significantly its
1 For the distribution of PKI, PNI and Moslem (that is, 
Masjumi, NU, PSII, Perti and AKUI combined) votes, see the 
maps at the end of the thesis.
2 It is as yet too soon to know what the former supporters 
of Masjumi will do now that the party is banned. It is 
not to be expected, however, that many of them will turn 
to PKI.
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o rg a n iz a t io n a l  a c t i v i t y  among the mass o f  e i t h e r  the  
urban  o r th e  r u r a l  p o p u la tio n , so th a t  i t  can be assumed 
th a t  th e  netw ork o f  the P a r ty  and i t s  mass o rg a n iz a tio n s , 
which con tinued  to  expand a f t e r  1957» has a lre a d y  drawn 
in  many o f  th o se  who vo ted  fo r  FNI in  1957* That th e  
communist g a in s  a re  n o t l im ite d  to  Java is  shown by the 
rap id  in c re a s e  in  communist v o te s  in  South Sumatra and 
the  fo u r p ro v in ces  o f  K alim antan.
PART POUR:
THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE OTHER POLITICAL FORCES
PART POUR
THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE OTHER POLITICAL FORCES
The general outline and goals of the Aidit leader­
ship’s national united front policy as applied to the 
Party’s relations with the other political forces have
ialready been given. The following chapter seeks to 
show how the political situation in which the policy was 
formulated guided the Party leaders in their choice of 
foes, friends and potential friends. It then describes 
the style of political behaviour that the policy has 
entailed for PKI, and, finally, discusses the imple­
mentation of the policy.
I. THE SEARCH FOR THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT
1• The Experiences of 1950
In the year between the transfer of sovereignty to 
Indonesia on December 20, 1949 and the assumption of 
complete control over PKI by the Aidit leadership in the 
first week of January 1951» three major political develop-
T“ ~  '
See above, p.93 et seq.
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ments of importance to PKI took place: a split appeared 
between the two largest parties, the secular nationalist 
PNI and the Moslem Masjumi; some political parties showed 
a willingness to cooperate with PKI; and other political 
forces demonstrated their strong antagonism to the 
Communist Party.
When the federal state was dissolved and a unitary 
state inaugurated on August 17, 1950, discussions were 
held between PNI and Masjumi for the formation of a new 
cabinet. A dispute arose not over the cabinet’s 
programme but its composition. When Natsir, of Masjumi, 
finally formed a cabinet which included members from 
Masjumi and four minor parties, PNI was excluded from 
cabinet office for the first time since 1946. This was
the beginning of the division between PNI and Masjumi 
that was to increase during the succeeding years. PNI, 
bitter at its exclusion from office, declared that
Western capitalists had exerted some influence in the
2formation of the cabinet, and began to work with the 
other opposition parties, including PKI, towards the 
downfall of the government.
1
Herbert Peith, "Indonesian Politics, 1949-1957• the 
Decline of Representative Government" (Cornell University, 
Ph.D. thesis, 1961), p.227.
2
Sin Po, September 12, 1950»
In the period of the federal republic, from December 
27, 19U9 to August 17, 1950, PKI had cooperated, both 
inside and outside parliament, with PNI and many of the 
lesser parties on a variety of matters. After the 
formation of the Natsir cabinet, PNI was much more 
willing to cooperate with the communists.
The first opportunity PKI had after the creation of 
the unitary state to demonstrate its usefulness to the 
non-communist parties came on August 19 and 21, 1950 when 
the new parliament met to elect its speakers. Due to 
PKI votes, Sartono of PNI was able to defeat the Masjumi 
candidate for the post of first speaker, and Arudji 
Kartawinata of PSII was elected second deputy speaker.
The new Natsir government won a vote of confidence on 
October 25 by 118 votes to 73, but, by coincidence or not, 
the general alignment of parties in the vote has continued 
down to the present: Masjumi, the Sjahrir socialist party 
PS I, and the Protestant and Roman Catholic parties on the 
one hand, and PNI, PKI, and the minor Moslem parties PSII 
and Perti on the other. Cooperation between PNI and PKI 
in the formulation of motions to embarrass and harass the 
government continued until January 1951 when the Aidit 
leadership gained full control of PKI.
The third major political development of importance 
to PKI that had occurred by the beginning of 195*1 was the
display of antagonism towards PKI by Vice-President 
Hatta, Masjumi, and many army officers.
Hatta (unlike Sukarno) and Masjumi (unlike PNI) had 
no inhibitions against attacking PKI and its associated 
organizations, and indeed led an outright attack on them. 
Hatta, for example, on October 25» 1950 declared PKI to 
be a Russian tool.*5 Natsirfs cabinet demonstrated its 
strong hostility to PKI in a series of actions. In 
November 1950, for example, a ban was placed on a 
proposed SOBSI demonstration to mark the reburial of a 
communist leader shot during the Madiun rebellion; then 
PKI was forbidden to hold mass meetings to celebrate the 
anniversary of the 1926 communist rebellion; and on 
November 19, the Djakarta military command twice raided 
the PKI and SOBSI headquarters. Towards the end of the 
year, after a SOBSI-directed wave of strikes, many 
regional army commanders prohibited strikes in ’vital’ 
enterprises and offices - a ban which the central 
military authority made nation-wide on February 13» 1951*
Sin Po, October 27, 1950.
1
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2. The Aidit Leadership Takes Over
During their first few months in full control of 
PKI, the new Party leaders did no more than watch 
political developments in order to sense more clearly the 
demarcation between foe and friend or potential friend.
As yet they had no new approach to the other political 
forces, continuing ad hoc cooperation wherever possible.
Towards the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951 a 
division became visible between PNI and Masjumi on matters 
of policy. The division stemmed, basically, from their 
attitudes to the revolution and, from this, to the Western 
powers. For Masjumi, the transfer of sovereignty marked 
the end of the revolution and the beginning of what should 
have been a period of cons truetion; for PNI and other 
nationalists, including Sukarno, the transfer of 
sovereignty was merely a stage in the revolution because 
the revolution would be completed only when all forms of 
* imperialist’ political, economic and cultural power in 
Indonesia had been eradicated.^ For Masjumi, once 
sovereignty had been transferred the Dutch and the West 
in general were looked upon as friends or potential
1
This sentence is, of course, a broad generalization and 
ignores the many differences of opinion in all parties.
It does, however, hold for the attitudes of the dominant 
groups in Masjumi and PNI.
friends, while for FNI and Sukarno they remained 
imperialist opponents. From this major difference in 
concepts of the revolution arose major differences in 
question of policy - economic policy, foreign policy, 
and the means of liberating West Irian. The transfer 
of sovereignty meant that the Indonesian government and 
parliament had to formulate a wider range of internal 
and international policies than they had during the 
revolutionary war. It was inevitable that the different 
attitudes of FNI and Masjumi to the revolution and to the 
Western powers would result in disagreement over many 
concrete issues which emerged and that, as a result, the 
gap between the two parties would be widened further.
PKI naturally lent its support to FNI in its dispute 
with Masjumi because FNI was evidently more anti-Dutch, 
anti-imperialist, and, unlike Masjurai; was willing to 
cooperate with PKI when convenient and was circumspect in 
references to the Madiun rebellion.
In January 1951 PKI was presented with the 
opportunity to lend its support to FNI on two important 
parliamentary motions. The first, jointly sponsored by 
PNI and PSII, called for the immediate entry of West 
Irian into Indonesia with the same status as the other 
regions, the immediate abolition of the Indonesian-Dutch 
Union, and the cancellation of the Round Table Conference
a g re e m e n t  w i t h i n  t h r e e  m on ths . T h is  m o tion  was narrow ly- 
d e f e a t e d  on J a n u a r y  10, 195i by  66 v o te s  t o  33» FNI had  
i n i t i a l l y  a c c e p te d  th e  Round T ab le  C o n fe re n ce  a g re e m e n t ,  
b u t  soon  changed  i t s  m ind. Even a s  e a r l y  as  J a n u a r y  
1951 c o o p e r a t i o n  b e tw ee n  PNI and PKI f o r  th e  c a n c e l l a t i o n  
o f  th e  ag reem en t was n o t  c o n f in e d  t o  p a r l i a m e n t ,  f o r  i n  
t h a t  month a 2+0,0 0 0 -p e rs o n  d e m o n s t r a t io n  was o r g a n iz e d  
b y  49 p a r t i e s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s  in  S u r a b a ja  to  demand 
c a n c e l l a t i o n . ^
On J a n u a r y  19, 1951 d i s c u s s i o n s  began  in  p a r l i a m e n t  
on a j o i n t  m o tio n  o f  PNI, PKI, P S II  and t h r e e  l e s s e r  
p a r t i e s  which l e d  e v e n t u a l l y  t o  th e  d o w n fa l l  o f  th e  
g o v ernm en t.  The m otion  c a l l e d  f o r  th e  c a n c e l l a t i o n  o f  
a governm ent r e g u l a t i o n  w hich  had become law  on A ugust 
14, 1950 and w h ich  p e r m i t t e d  th e  governm ent t o  a p p o in t  
l o c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  c o u n c i l s .  The m otion  was p a s s e d  
on J a n u a ry  22 ,  1951 "by 76 v o te s  t o  48.  PNI, PKI, P S I I ,  
t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  communist Murba, th e  Labour P a r t y  and  a 
number o f  n o n - p a r t y  members b o y c o t t e d  th e  s e s s i o n  o f  
March 20 which was c a l l e d  t o  d i s c u s s  the  g o v e r n m e n t s  
s t a t e m e n t  on th e  m o tio n .  A quorum c o u ld  n o t  be fo u n d .
1
E d i t o r i a l ,  ,fS e lu r u h  R a k ja t  Anti-KMB*' (The Whole P e o p le  
A g a in s t  th e  RTC), BM, F e b ru a ry  1, 1951, P*56.
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On t h e  same day th e  m inor  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t y  PIR w i th d re w
i t s  s u p p o r t  from th e  g overnm en t ,  and th e  c a b i n e t
1
t h e r e u p o n  r e s i g n e d .
The PKI p a r l i a m e n t a r y  group  im m e d ia te ly  announced  
t h a t  the  P a r t y  would s u p p o r t  t h e  n e x t  c a b i n e t  i f  th e  
c a b i n e t  would c a n c e l  the  Round T able  C o n fe re n c e  a g re em en t  
and  would p u r s u e  an i n d e p e n d e n t ,  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  f o r e i g n
p
p o l i c y .  On March 21 ,  t h e  PKI c e n t r a l  com m it tee  
p r o p o s e d  a p r o v i s i o n a l  n a t i o n a l  government  o f  a 
c o a l i t i o n  n a t u r e *  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  p a r t i e s ,  
g ro u p s  and p e o p l e ' ,  t h a t  would  f i r s t  c a n c e l  th e  ag re em e n t  
a s  m ajo r  s t e p  tow ards  c r e a t i n g  a ' t r u l y  f r e e  n a t i o n a l ,  
p o l i t i c a l ,  econom ic ,  c u l t u r a l  and d e fe n c e  s y s t e m . T h e  
c e n t r a l  com m it tee  p r o p o s e d ,  t o o ,  t h a t  t h e  c a b i n e t ' s  
programme be j o i n t l y  f o r m u l a t e d  by  the  d e m o c r a t i c  p a r t i e s  
and g ro u p s .  "S in  Po" ,  t h e  p ro -com m unis t  n ew sp a p e r ,  
r e p o r t e d  t h a t :
we have  th e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  PKI i s  p r e p a r e d  t o  
s i t  i n  t h e  c a b i n e t  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t h e  programme 
i t  p r o p o s e s  i s  a c c e p t e d  as  t h e  c a b i n e t ' s  
p rogram m e.1 2*4
1
For  an  o u t l i n e  o f  e v e n t s  l e a d i n g  t o  th e  f a l l  o f  t h e  
N a t s i r  c a b i n e t ,  see  "The R e s i g n a t i o n  o f  th e  N a t s i r  
C a b i n e t " ,  I n d o n e s i a n  A f f a i r s , March 1951» p p . 1 - 4 .
2 3
S in  Po, March 21 ,  1951. S in  Po, March 2 2 , 1951 •
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PKI thus offered its support for a cabinet with a 
basic programme acceptable to PNI. Apparently the Aidit 
leadership also hoped that its cooperation with PNI 
during the Natsir cabinet would be sufficient to restore 
PKI to its pre-Madiun place in Indonesian politics, that 
is, to participation as any other party in the process 
of cabinet formation and in the cabinet itself. The PKI 
leaders were eventually to realize the futility of this 
hope, and this realization, combined with other factors, 
was to stimulate a profound re-thinking on the tactics 
and purpose of the national united front policy. For a 
while, however, it appeared possible that PKI might gain 
admittance to the government in the not too distant 
future.
On March 30, 1951» due to PSII initiative, a 
Political Parties 1 Consultative Council was formed to
Aseek a way out of the cabinet crisis. PNI, after some 
hesitation, had withdrawn from the negotiations leading 
to the formation of the council, but the council did 
include, besides PKI, the Moslem parties PSII and Perti, 
Murba, the Labour Party, and three small nationalist 
parties. PKI was pleased with the new council, and the 




persuaded, to issue a statement showing that sufficient 
votes could he mustered to exclude Masjumi from the next
Acabinet. PKI’s jubilance quickly disappeared when 
Sukarno appointed PNI and Masjumi cabinet formateurs, and 
when it became clear that the only purpose of the council 
for the non-communist parties was to increase their 
bargaining power for cabinet seats.
Sartono of PNI was the first formateur, but he 
failed to reach agreement with Masjumi not only on the 
composition of the cabinet but also on policy matters, 
primarily the question of Indonesian-Dutch relations and 
the implementation of the motion halting the appointment
of representative councils. "Sin Po" also reported that
/
PNI objected to Masjumi!s insistence on giving the pro-
pWestern PSI control of foreign policy. On April 18, 
1951» PNI and Masjumi joint formateurs were appointed, 
and on April 26 the new Sukiman cabinet was announced.
Of the twenty cabinet members, five were PNI, five 
Masjumi, and the rest were either non-party or from 
minor parties.
PKI at first abused the new cabinet which disap­
pointed its hopes. On May 31 and during the first two 
weeks of June, communist members of parliament roundly
1 2
Sin Po, April 13, 1951 Sin Po, April 11, 1951
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rejected the cabinetfs composition and programme.^ They 
expressed disgust at PNI’s participation and hinted that 
PNI was interested only in obtaining posts, attacked 
Sukarno for Undemocratic’ practices in choosing the 
cabinet formateurs, and strongly intimated that the 
United States and Britain had exerted great pressure, 
particularly on Sukarno, to have this cabinet formed.
But even during the period of greatest disappointment, 
the PKI leaders declared that they were not being 
negatively oppositionist. Aidit, for example, stated on 
May 23 that PKI was always ready to cease its opposition 
the moment the government stopped implementing the Round
pTable Conference agreement.
By the formation of the Sukiman cabinet the Aidit 
leadership was posed the question: did the new cabinet 
mean that the national bourgeoisie, represented by PNI 
and Sukarno, had once more allied itself with the anti­
communists, and would it again be part to an anti­
communist drive as in 1948? The young leaders could not 
yet see the fundamental division within the other
1
See the speeches made in parliament by Sakirman on May 
31, June 11 and June 15, 1951, given in Risalah 
Perundingan 1951 (Indonesian Parliamentary Debates), 
vol.X, pp.4242-54; vol.XI, pp.476O-72, and pp.5116-17*
2
Sin Po, May 24, 1951.
political forces, and overestimated the anti-communist 
forces. For example, Sukarno was believed to be among 
the Party’s enemies. Throughout 1951> and particularly 
in the first three quarters of that year, he was attacked 
for his part in choosing the cabinet formateurs, for
Abeing a false and demagogic Marxist, for playing a
2primary role in the Madiun affair, and for selling out
his country in the Round Table Conference agreement. He
was always identified in Party speeches and documents
with first the Natsir and then the Sukiman cabinet.
Fears of a second Madiun provocation became intense
at the beginning of July 1951* On July 3 the politbureau
protested the searches made of the homes of many prominent
3progressives, and also some arrests that had taken place. 
It called to all democrats ’to cooperate as closely as 
possible in order to defend democratic rights, to prevent 
Indonesia’s becoming a military or police state.’ Then,
1 D.N. Aidit, Perd.juangan dan Adjaran-Adlaran Karl Marx 
(The Struggle and Teachings of Karl Marx), Djakarta, 1950» 
p.5; Njoto, ’’Pemalsuan Marxisme” (Falsification of 
Marxism), BM, January 1-15» 1951> p.17*
2 ’’Keterangan CC PKI tentang Peristiwa Madiun” (PKI 
Central Committee Statement on the Madiun Affair), Sin Po, 
February 10, 1951; Mirajadi, ”Tiga Tahun Provokasi Madiun” 
(Three Years since the Madiun Provocation), BM, August- 
September 1951* pp.40, 45-6, 48.
Sin Po, July 7, 1951.3
on A ugust 6 , an  arm ed a t t a c k  was r e p o r te d  to  have b een  
made on a p o l i c e  s t a t i o n  i n  T and jung  P r io k ,  th e  p o r t  o f  
D ja k a r t a ,  b y  p e rs o n s  u s in g  th e  h a m m e r-a n d -s ic k le  as a 
sym bo l.
The PKI c e n t r a l  com m ittee  s e c r e t a r i a t  a t  once d e n ie d  
PKI p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  a t t a c k  and w arned P a r ty  members 
to  be on th e  a l e r t  a g a in s t  p o s s ib l e  p r o v o c a t io n .^  On 
A ugust 11 many l e a d in g  PKI c a d re s  i n  Medan were a r r e s t e d ,  
on  th e  1 5 th  a r r e s t s  and s e a r c h e s  b eg an  i n  D ja k a r t a ,  and 
th e  a r r e s t s  th e n  s p re a d  th ro u g h o u t In d o n e s ia  u n t i l ,  
a c c o rd in g  to  PKI in f o r m a t io n ,  a b o u t 2 ,0 0 0  ’com m unists and
p
o t h e r  p r o g r e s s iv e s  ’ w ere im p r is o n e d . I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
t h a t  a l th o u g h  th e  governm ent j u s t i f i e d  th e  a r r e s t s  on th e  
g ro u n d s t h a t  a coup  was b e in g  p r e p a r e d ,  none o f  th e  
a r r e s t e d  was b ro u g h t  to  t r i a l  and  no e v id e n c e  i n  su p p o r t  
o f  th e  a l l e g a t i o n  was e v e r  p r e s e n te d .
A i d i t ,  Lukman and N jo to  evaded  a r r e s t  and w ent i n t o  
h id in g .  T h e ir  r e a c t i o n  t o  th e  a r r e s t s  was v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  
from  t h a t  ta k e n  by  Musso i n  1948. In  th e  w ords o f  a 
c e n t r a l  co m m ittee  s ta te m e n t  o f  A ugust 24» 1951» PKI had 
’a l r e a d y  begun to  be a d u l t  and knows how to  f a c e  th e
1
HR, A ugust 7» 195*1®
2
PKI, 40 Tahun PKI (PKI 40 Y e a r s ) ,  D ja k a r ta ,  1960, p . 69 . 
See a b o v e , p . 122, f o o tn o te  1 .
i m p e r i a l i s t s 1 c r im in a l  p r o v o c a t io n s 1, and th e r e f o r e  c o u ld
n o t  be  d ra g g e d  i n t o  a se co n d  Madiun a f f a i r .  The
l e a d e r s  in  h id in g  d e c la r e d  t h a t  PKI w ould n o t  a t te m p t a
c o u p , and o rd e re d  th e  P a r ty  to  c o n tin u e  a b o v e-g ro u n d  
2a c t i v i t y .
The b lam e f o r  th e  *f a s c i s t  coup d ’e ta t*  a t te m p t  was 
n o t  f i x e d  on th e  governm ent a s  a w h o le , b u t  o n ly  on ’a 
s m a ll  g roup  i n  th e  governm ent t h a t  w ish e s  to  c a s t r a t e  
d e m o c ra c y . '3  The g ro u p  was named a s  ’th e  Sukim an- 
W ib iso n o -S u p ra p to  c l i q u e ’^- -  Suleiman and  W ibisono b e in g  
members o f  M asjum i, S u p ra p to  o f  th e  L abour P a r ty .  No 
PNI c a b in e t  m in i s t e r s  were im p l i c a te d .
In  t h e i r  s e a r c h  f o r  a l l i e s  t o  demand j u s t i c e  f o r  th e  
a r r e s t e d ,  th e  PKI l e a d e r s  met a m ixed re s p o n s e  w hich 
p ro v id e d  p o l i t i c a l  l e s s o n s  t h a t  w ere a s t im u lu s  t o  th e  
fo r m u la t io n  o f  a new c o n c e p t o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i te d  f r o n t .
1
HR, A ugust 25 ,  1951; A ia m p u tra , ’’M en g a ta s i K elem ahan- 
K elem ahan" (O vercom ing W ea k n esse s), BM, A u g u st-S ep tem b er 
1951, P . 2 2 .
2
S o b ro m a lis i ,  "T en tan g  P e re b u ta n  K ekuasaan" (C o n c e rn in g  
S e iz u r e  o f  P o w er), BM, A u g u s t-S ep te m b e r 1951» p p .12-15;  
A ia m p u tra , "M e n g a ta s i” , BM, A u g u s t-S ep te m b e r 195*1»
p p .2 0 -1 .
3
Imam, "R azz ia  A g u s tu s : S a tu  B a g ia n  d a r i  R e n tja n a  
P e n g e lu a sa n  P e ran g  A m erika" (The A ugust A r r e s t s :  a P a r t  
o f  th e  A m erican W arm ongering P l a n ) ,  BM, A u g u st-S ep tem b er 
1951, p . 9 .
4
HR, A ugust 24 ,  1951
P ro m in en t members o f  PN I, P S I , P S I I ,  P e r t i  and  th e  
P r o t e s t a n t  P a r ty  ’w ith  s i n c e r i t y  and c o u ra g e  s to o d  on 
th e  s id e  o f  dem ocracy  i n  fa c e  o f  th e  d a n g e r  o f  f a s c i s m .^  
B ut PNI a s  a p a r t y  r e f u s e d  to  v o te  a g a i n s t  th e  governm ent 
on a p a r l i a m e n ta r y  m o tio n  o f  November 1, 1951 e x p re s s in g  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  g o v e rn m e n ts  e x p la n a t io n  o f  th e
p
a r r e s t s .  On th e  o th e r  h a n d , PSI ,  a l th o u g h  an  ’a g e n t o f  
i m p e r ia l i s m ’ , was th e  s ta u n c h e s t  non-com m unist opponen t 
o f  th e  a r r e s t s .  T hese v a r io u s  r e a c t i o n s  and a l s o  th e  
e x p e r ie n c e  o f  p re c e d in g  m onths w ere u se d  b y  th e  A id i t  
l e a d e r s h ip  in  r e a c h in g  th e  c o n c lu s io n s  t h a t  i t  was 
p o s s ib l e  f o r  th e  P a r ty  to  w in sym pathy  and c o o p e r a t io n  
e x te n d in g  f a r  a c r o s s  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s p e c tru m , though  n o t  
in c lu d in g  M asjum i, b u t  t h a t  n o t  enough work had  b een  done 
to  w in and  c o n s o l id a te  su ch  sym pathy  and c o o p e r a t io n ;  
t h a t  th e  governm ent p a r t i e s  were n o t  c lo s e l y  u n i te d ;  and 
t h a t  i t  was p o s s ib le  to  e x p lo i t  d i v i s i o n s  ev en  among th e  
i m p e r i a l i s t  a g e n ts .
In  th e  m onths f o l lo w in g  th e  A ugust 1951 a r r e s t s ,  th e  
new c o n c e p t o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  was fo rm u la te d .^
1
HR, Decem ber 19> 1951•
2
R is a la h  P e ru n d in g a n  1951» v o l.X IV , p.7415 
3
See a b o v e , p p .89 -97
I I .  THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT POLICY IMPLEMENTED
1 • P K I ' s  P o l i t i c a l  B e h av io u r  u n d e r  t h e  N a t io n a l  U n i te d  
F ro n t
The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  w i th o u t  th e  
t o l e r a n c e  and  a l l i a n c e  o f  th e  non-com m unis ts  i t  would he  
im p o s s ib le  to  g a in  t im e  f o r  th e  grow th  o f  th e  P a r ty  and 
i t s  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t o  i s o l a t e  and  d e s t r o y  th e  a n t i ­
communist f o r c e s ,  and e v e n t u a l l y  to  win p o w er .  M ention 
h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  made o f  how, i n  o r d e r  t o  w in mass s u p p o r t  
a s  w e l l  a s  th e  t o l e r a n c e  and sym pathy  o f  th e  non-com m unist 
p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s ,  th e  P a r t y  b u i l t  an image o f  i t s e l f  a s  
p a t r i o t i c ,  s y m p a th e t i c  to  r e l i g i o n ,  m i l i t a n t l y  d e m o c r a t i c ,  
s t r o n g l y  opposed  to  t h e  u se  o f  f o r c e  i n  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and  s e l f - e f f a c i n g  and  r e s p o n s i b l e
A
i n  s e e k in g  t h e  n a t i o n a l  good. But PKI had  a l s o  t o  a l t e r
i t s  b e h a v io u r  to w a rd s  th e  non-com m unis t  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s .
The PKI l e a d e r s  have  f r e q u e n t l y  r e p e a t e d  s e n t im e n t s
a ro u n d  th e  theme e x p re s s e d  by  A i d i t  a t  t h e  end  o f  1954:
P K I ' s  p o l i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  tow ards  a p e r s o n  o r  a 
p a r t y  a t  a g iv e n  tim e depends on th e  p o l i t i c a l  
a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  p e r s o n  o r  p a r t y  a t  t h a t  t im e .
In  d e te r m in in g  i t s  p o l i c y ,  PKI i s  n o t  m o t iv a te d  
by  f e e l i n g s  o f  g r ie v a n c e  o r  r e v e n g e .1 2
1
See ab o v e ,  p p . 240 -56 .
2
D.N. A i d i t ,  T ig a  I n t e r v i u  (T hree  I n t e r v i e w s ) ,  D j a k a r t a ,  
1954, p p . 1 3 -1 4 .
In other words, PKI would treat as enemies only those 
who were openly anti-communist*
Aidit took every occasion to stress that care should 
"be taken not to antagonize unnecessarily what he called 
the middle force, those elements which were ostensibly 
non-communist and anti-imperialist. In 1956 he admitted 
that contradictions, that is, differences of interest, 
existed and would arise between the progressive and the 
middle forces, especially between the workers and the 
national capitalists and between PKI and the parties of
Athe national bourgeoisie. 'But it would be wrong for
these contradictions to be sharpened.* He said they:
must and can be solved by means of discussion, 
by means of mutual concessions, and in a 
mutually beneficial manner. In this way the 
contradictions between the progressive force 
and the middle force can be prevented from 
harming national unity, and from benefiting 
the reactionary force.
Aidit promised that PKI would not take steps which could
harm other democratic parties - provided those parties
did not attempt to harm national unity. Furthermore,
PKI would always show restraint towards the other parties
The communists must be skilled at restraining 
themselves in criticising the statements and 
actions of people from democratic parties.
Statements or actions that may hurt our
1
D.N. Aidit, "Bersatu untuk Menjelesaikan Tuntutan 
Revolusi Agustus 1945" (Unite to Realize the Demands of 
the August 1945 Revolution), HR, August 1, 1956.
feelings but are not important need not be 
criticized. The communists only criticize 
statements or actions that promote disunity, 
divide the strength of the masses and show 
vacillation in carrying out the anti­
imperialist and anti-feudal policy. It is 
also important that the manner of criticism 
must truly concern the problem and not give 
vent to passions and feelings.
The PKI leaders have also recognized that under the 
national united front policy PKI and its mass organi­
zations must support the 'reasonable interests' of the 
national bourgeoisie. PKI and SOBSI, for example, have 
been loud in their demands for government protection of 
national industrialists and businessmen in their struggle 
against foreign competition."1 23 Aidit's concern to help 
the non-communists led him to tell the PKI central 
committee in December I960 that 'It is also our duty to 
look after non-Party cadres and cadres of the other 
democratic parties ..., to assist them with complete 
sincerity.
Having established the importance of restrained and 
friendly behaviour towards the non-communist political
1 M.H. Lukman, Tentang Front Persatuan Nasional (Concerning 
the National United Front), Djakarta, i960, p*39«
2
See above, p.291 et seq.
3 D.N. Aidit, "Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisme dan 
Feodalisme.* " (Continue to Advance to Destroy Imperialism 
and Feudalism.’), HR, January 2, 1961.
forces, the Aidit leadership was faced with the problem 
of how to avoid *tailism*, avoid merely following the 
non-communists. How could PKI be restrained and 
friendly and yet at the same time foster the growth 
among the non-communists of those leftwing elements and 
sentiments most sympathetic to PKI and most eager to 
eradicate the remnants of imperialism and crush the 
internal reactionaries? The answer was given by Lukman 
in a course guide for use in the Party central school and 
province-level schools. 1
Lukman pointed out that in view of the *vaciliating 
and two-faced* nature of the national bourgeoisie with 
respect to the revolution (that is, it wished to oppose 
imperialism but at the same time feared the continuation 
of the revolution because it would bring victory to the 
working class), PKI must avoid two major errors in its 
dealing with the national bourgeoisie. The Party must 
avoid right opportunism, that is, concentrating on the 
need for unity without waging a struggle against the 
undesirable characteristics of the middle group; and left 
opportunism, that is, concentrating on fighting such 
undesirable characteristics without giving sufficient 
attention to the question of unity. Lukman reminded
1
Lukman, Tentang Front, pp.36-9.
P a r t y  c a d re s  t h a t  i n c o r r e c t  c r i t i c i s m ,  a s  i n  th e  f i r s t  
s e v e n  m onths o f  1948, c o u ld  a l i e n a t e  th e  n a t i o n a l  
b o u r g e o i s ie  and even  d r iv e  i t  to  a c t  a g a i n s t  th e  P a r ty .
He th e n  showed how th e  c o r r e c t  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  * u n ite  and f i g h t 1, e n co u rag e  and c r i t i c i z e ,  
c o u ld  f o s t e r ,  o r  h e lp  f o s t e r ,  th e  d e s i r a b l e  e le m e n ts  i n  
th e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o is e ,  i n  th e  non-com m unist p o l i t i c a l  
f o r c e s  :
B e s id e s  b e in g  s k i l l e d  a t  c o r r e c t l y  c r i t i c i z i n g  
th e  v a c i l l a t i o n s  and e r r o r s  o f  th e  p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  
n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s ie ,  we m ust a l s o  be a b le  c o r r e c t l y  
to  e n co u rag e  and p o p u la r iz e  th e  p r o g r e s s iv e  
a t t i t u d e s  and m easu res  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s ie .  
By c o r r e c t  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  v a c i l l a t i o n s  and 
e r r o r s  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s ie ,  and  b y  
encou ragem en t and p r a i s e  o f  w hat i s  good o f  t h a t  
c l a s s ,  e v e ry  s ta te m e n t  o f  th e  w o rk in g  c l a s s  sind 
i t s  p a r ty  w i l l  have a c o n v in c in g  f o r c e ;  in  o th e r  
w ords, th e  w o rk in g  c l a s s  and i t s  p a r t y  w i l l  h o ld  
th e  i n i t i a t i v e .  In  im p le m e n tin g  t h i s  m ethod , a 
p rob lem  t h a t  i s  a lw ays im p o r ta n t  t o  remember i s  
th e  c h an g in g  s i t u a t i o n :  when, and  a b o u t w h a t, 
m ust c r i t i c i s m  be  em p h asized  and when, and ab o u t 
w h a t, m ust en co u rag em en t be  em p h a size d .^
T h is  was th e  way, he c o n c lu d e d , to  f o s t e r  th e  p r o g r e s s iv e  
g ro u p  w i th in  th e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e ,  to  en co u rag e  th o se  
in  th e  c e n t r e  to  move l e f t ,  and  to  i s o l a t e  th e  s tu b b o rn .  
In  o th e r  w o rd s , t h i s  was th e  way in  w hich PKI c o u ld  a v o id  
*t a i l i s m 1 and c o u ld  draw  th e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o is ie  l e f t ­
w ards w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e  b e in g  m o d era te  and  f r i e n d l y .
1
I b i d . , p .3 8
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2 .  The A pproach to  PNI
At th e  end  o f  June  1951 t h e r e  had  b e e n  r e p o r t s  o f
Masjumi d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i th  th e  new r e g i o n a l  g o v e rn o rs
a p p o in t e d  b y  th e  PNI M i n i s t e r  o f  I n t e r n a l  A ffa irs ,"*  b u t
t h e  f i r s t  s e r i o u s  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  th e  two main p a r t i e s
d i d  n o t  a r i s e  u n t i l  a d e c i s i o n  had to  be  made w h e th e r  to
s i g n  th e  J a p a n e s e  Peace  T r e a ty  drawn up i n  San F r a n c i s c o .
On S ep tem ber  8 ,  195*1 F o re ig n  M i n i s t e r  S u b a rd jo  s ig n e d  th e
t r e a t y ,  b u t  th e  c a b i n e t  was d i v id e d ,  w i th  Masjumi f o r ,
2and PNI a g a i n s t .  S ig n in g  th e  t r e a t y  was w id e ly  con­
s i d e r e d  to  be  an  abandonment o f  I n d o n e s i a ' s  in d e p e n d e n t  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a l ig n m e n t  w i th  t h e  U n ite d  
S t a t e s .  The governm ent d i d  n o t  f a l l  im m e d ia te ly  b e c a u se  
a compromise was re a c h e d  b e tw een  PNI and M asjum i: th e  
governm ent d i d  n o t  s e e k  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  t r e a t y ,  and 
PNI d id  n o t  demand th e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  th e  governm en t.
The Sukiman c a b i n e t  f i n a l l y  f e l l  o v e r  a new f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  m a t t e r :  th e  s i g n a t u r e  by  F o re ig n  M i n i s t e r  S u b a rd jo ,  
b u t  w i th o u t  th e  c a b i n e t ' s  know ledge, o f  a M utual S e c u r i t y
1
S in  P o , June  3 0 ,  1951*
2
Even th e  Masjumi e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee  d e c i d e d  t o  s ig n  
th e  t r e a t y  by  a v o te  o f  o n ly  17 to  14, w i th  two 
a b s t e n t i o n s  and 27 a b s e n t e e s ;  George McTurnan K ahin , 
" I n d o n e s ia n  P o l i t i c s  and N a t io n a l i s m " ,  i n  W il l ia m  L. 
H o l la n d  ( e d . ) ,  A s ian  N a t io n a l i s m  and th e  W est , New York, 
1953, p p . 191-2 .
Aid agreement with the United States on February 2, 1952* 
All major parties condemned the agreement not only because 
of its contents but also because it had been negotiated 
secretly. On February 23 the cabinet resigned. So far 
PKI had done no more than play the role of a vocal 
bystander, condemning those who were ready to betray the 
principles of Indonesia's foreign policy, and cheering 
on the true patriots, the opponents of the Japanese Peace 
Treaty and the MSA agreement. But as soon as the cabinet 
had fallen, PKI made an active bid to win the confidence 
of FNI and to draw that party away from Masjumi.
On February 25, 1952 the PKI central committee 
called for a 'progressive and anti-fascist cabinet* that 
would include PNI, PSI, members of the Political Parties' 
Consultative Council, and 'other groups who agree with 
the programme of the progressive, anti-fascist cabinet, 
Acceptable to all but Masjumi, the proposed cabinet 
programme envisaged rejection of MSA aid, the return of 
West Irian, the release of all arrested in August 1951» 
the guarantee of full freedoms, direct and free general 
elections, and the eradication of the Darul Islam Moslem 
rebels. Furthermore, PKI called for the rejection of 
Masjumi participation in the next cabinet because of
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HR, February 25 and 26, 1952,
1
M a sju m i*s c l o s e  c o n n e c t io n s  w i th  th e  D a ru l  I s la m ,  and 
b e c a u s e  one o f  i t s  m i n i s t e r s  had  s ig n e d  th e  MSA a g re e m e n t.  
I n  s h o r t ,  PKI o f f e r e d  PNI th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  fo rm in g  a 
c a b i n e t  w i th o u t  M asjum i.
On March 1 , i 952 Sukarno  a p p o in te d  P raw oto  
M angkusasm ito  o f  Masjumi and S i d i k  D jo jo s u k a r to  o f  PNI 
a s  f o r m a t e u r s .  PKI, a la rm e d  l e s t  a n o th e r  Masjumi-PNI 
c o a l i t i o n  governm ent would be form ed w i th  Masjumi 
p re d o m in a n c e ,  e x p r e s s e d  i t s  d i s q u i e t  a t  th e  * lack  o f  
r e s o l u t i o n *  b e in g  shown by * s e v e ra l  n a t i o n a l i s t  l e a d e r s *  
i n  d e fe n c e  o f  P N I’s s t a n d  f o r  th e  c a n c e l l a t i o n  o f  th e  
J a p a n e s e  Peace  T r e a ty ,  th e  MSA agreem en t and th e  Round 
T ab le  C o n fe re n ce  a g re e m e n t ,  f o r  th e  e r a d i c a t i o n  o f  the  
D a ru l  I s la m  r e b e l s ,  and f o r  s t r o n g  m easu re s  to  e f f e c t  th e  
r e t u r n  o f  West I r i a n . 1
When Praw oto and S i d i k  f a i l e d  to  r e a c h  a g re e m e n t,  
Sukarno  a p p o in te d  P N I 's  W ilopo a s  f o r m a te u r .  PKI gave 
him a g u a rd e d  welcome and o f f e r e d  s u p p o r t  i f  he chose  a 
t r u l y  p r o g r e s s i v e  and  a n t i - f a s c i s t  c a b i n e t . 2 Once 
W ilopo*s c a b i n e t  was i n s t a l l e d ,  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  
e x p re s s e d  i t s  d i s a p p o in tm e n t  a t  th e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  M asjumi, 
b u t ,  i n  l i n e  w i th  th e  new and e v o lv in g  c o n c e p t  o f  th e  
n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  tim e d e c l a r e d  th e
1 2
HR, March 10 , 1952. HR, March 2 4 , 1952.
Party’s willingness to support a cabinet that did not
include ’progressive* ministers:
apart from the question of whether or not PKI 
sits in the cabinet, PKI is ready, with honesty, 
to give its support to the Wilopo cabinet 
provided that the cabinet follows an entirely 
new political course. PKI will support the 
Wilopo cabinet provided that the government has 
courage and acts to abandon the old political 
course, that is, the war policy and the anti­
national, fascist policy, and follows a new 
political course, a national policy founded on 
democracy and peace ...
PKI wishes that the Wilopo cabinet, following 
a new political course, will have a long life.1
For the first time PKI offered support to other 
political parties without asking the price of partici­
pation in government. In other words, PKI offered its 
cooperation and alliance to those parties and groups 
which were not anti-communist and which were most 
opposed to 1imperialism*. In return it asked only that 
they should implement part of their anti-imperialist 
policy, and that they should permit PKI and its mass 
organizations freedom from repression. Such easy terms 
for communist support strongly attracted many nationalists 
who themselves wished *to complete the revolution* by 
eliminating imperialist power, who were becoming 
increasingly antagonistic towards and fearful of Masjumi, 
and who placed a high premium on ’office*.
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1
HR, April 23, 1952
During the period of the Wilopo cabinet, which was 
installed on April 3, 1952 and which resigned on June 3» 
1953» four major political developments occurred that 
were of significance to PKI: the further widening of
the breach between Masjumi and the nationalists; an 
increasing willingness on the part of a growing number of 
nationalists to cooperate with PKI; increased antagonism 
between Hatta, Masjumi and PSI on the one hand and PKI 
on the other; and the breakaway from Masjumi of the 
Nahdatul Ulama.
It became evident to PNI that its cooperation with
2Masjumi and PSI was often injurious to its own interests* 
For example, changes in the structure and size of the 
army which were envisaged by the pro-PSI Minister of 
Defence would have reduced the influence of the PNI 
supporters in. both the officer corps and the ranks* The 
cabinet also moved towards the organization of early 
general elections which PNI feared because it was 
generally believed that as Masjumi had the best grass­
roots organization the Moslem party would win a majority
1
The political developments during the period of the 
Wilopo cabinet are covered by Herbert Feith, The Wilopo 
Cabinet, 1952-1953; a Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary 




of votes. Furthermore, due to an adverse balance of 
trade, the cabinet, which included a PS I member as 
Minister of Finance, initiated budget, credit and import 
policies which burdened primarily the social groups most 
closely associated with PNI, that is, the civil servants 
and the new group of Indonesian importers and exporters.
Thus a large and increasing number of nationalists 
came to view cooperation with Masjumi as harmful to their 
own and their party’s interests. At the same time, the 
religious issue was of great importance in generating 
antagonism towards and fear of Masjumi. In general the 
nationalist leaders were oriented towards traditional 
Javanese culture and disliked and feared the militant 
Islam of many Masjumi leaders. For many nationalist 
leaders, an Islamic state was the greatest threat to 
what they liked of Indonesia, to what they wanted for 
Indonesia, and to their own positions. In the first 
four months of 1953 a bitter feud broke out between some 
of the more radical Masjumi members and nationalist 
leaders over the issue of an Islamic state. Hypocritical 
Moslems were roundly denounced, and hot rejoinders flew 
back and forth. Feith concludes that the radicalism 
exhibited by some of the Masjumi leaders ’heightened the 
fears of the P.N.I. - and of President Soekarno - of
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Masjumi strength.*^  This fear made PKI*s task of 
winning the nationalists* friendship much easier.
As the general elections drew nearer, the 
nationalists looked for allies who could help them to 
postpone the elections as long as possible and to 
consolidate PNI*s hold on government officials, whose 
influence in the elections could be, and eventually was, 
decisive. PKI*s offer of support with minimal con­
ditions gained in attractiveness. Peith considers that 
in 1952 the Sidik group in PNI decided on a more thorough 
exploration of the possibilities of cooperation with PKI, 
and that some of the chief PNI leaders were perhaps
already working towards a FNI-led cabinet excluding
0Masjumi - a development PKI had propounded since the
fall of the Natsir cabinet. In Peith*s opinion:
it is clear that a section of the P.N.I. leader­
ship was henceforth prepared to assist in a 
strengthening of the P.K.I.*s position, and in 
particular to help the party regain nationalist 
respectability.
For such nationalists, PKI*s low-price offer seemed 
to show that PKI was weak and of no immediate threat, 
whereas Masjumi was a direct and powerful threat. *To 
strengthen the P.K.I. and weaken the Masjumi was demanded 
by the very mechanics of the P.N.I.*s power position.*
1 2
Ibid., p.161 Ibid., p.97
Sukarno^ support of FNI also gave the nationalists 
confidence that they could hold their own against even 
a considerably stronger PKI. As a result, many 
nationalists increased their cooperation with PKI until 
towards the end of the Wilopo cabinet a major section of 
PNI was working in close alliance with PKI in order to 
bring down the government*
During the period of the Wilopo cabinet hostility 
increased between PKI and Hatta and Masjumi, and strong 
antipathy developed between PKI and PSI* Hatta and 
Masjumi attacked PKI as the tool of the new imperialism. 
The closer PKI moved to PNI, the more virulent became 
the exchange of abuse, with Hatta and Masjumi anxious to 
warn the nationalists of the dangers inherent in any 
alliance with the communists, and PKI endeavouring to 
denigrate the anti-communists on its own account and in 
order to please its new-found nationalist friends. In 
March 1953, Masjumi-leader Sukiman issued a much- 
publicized appeal that Indonesia, like India, should 
adopt a firmly anti-communist policy in internal affairs.
PKI's attitude to PSI varied before the formation of 
the Wilopo cabinet. The PSI leaders were not liked 
because they had, early in 1943, split away from the 
Socialist Party which later fused with PKI; and because 
they were aware of PKIfs tactics and not hesitant to
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explain them to other non-communists. On the other
hand, during the Sukiman cabinet PS I had been a staunch
opponent of the August 1951 arrests, and had opposed
signing the Japanese Peace Treaty. As late as February
1952, PKI sent warm greetings to the PSI congress.1
Then, on May 25, 1952, Aidit attacked PSI for creating
its own trade unions, for ridiculing the peace movement,
and for refusing to join PKI-led national unity actions.^
This was the end of PKI's vacillations, and the Party
later explained PSI’s policy during the Sukiman cabinet
in terms of a conflict within the imperialist camp: PSI
being a tool of the British, whereas Sukiman was a tool 
■5of Washington.
The violence of PKI’s attacks on PSI by the end of 
1952 are partly explained by three factors. First, the 
period of the Wilopo cabinet witnessed the growth of ties 
between Masjumi and PSI. Second, PSI had much support 
in the army and connived on October 17, 1952 in an 
attempted coup d*etat that would have led to some form 
of dictatorship, and probably an anti-communist dictator-
1
PKI-B, February 15» 1952, p.2.2
HR, May 27, 1952.
3 Sakirman, "Beberapa Pengalaman Fraksi PKI dalam DPRS 
RI ...” (Some Experiences of the PKI Parliamentary 
Group ...), BM, January 1956, p.12.
ship because many of the higher* and pro-PSI army officers 
had become strongly anti-communist as a result of the 
Madiun rebellion. Third, as PNI and Sukarno considered 
PS I an enemy, PKI attempted to curry more favour with them 
by attacking PSI.
A major political development during the Wilopo 
cabinet was the breakaway of Nahdatul Ulama from Masjumi. 
In one blow Masjumi lost almost fifty per cent of its 
popular support, and a new, large Moslem party was 
established that did not adhere to Masjumifs political 
line. The NU leaders consisted mostly of politically 
inexperienced religious leaders, and as the party*s 
prospects brightened came to include a smattering of 
opportunists who joined for personal profit. Unlike 
Masjumi, NU was to show itself ready to cooperate with 
the nationalists and communists when cooperation could 
serve personal or party interests. In fact, NU has 
shown itself more ready to work with the nationalists and 
communists than with the Masjumi leaders towards whom the 
break left much bitterness.
1
The reasons for the breakaway are outlined in Peith,
The Wilopo Cabinet, pp.44-5; and Munawir Sjadzali, 
"Indonesians Muslim Parties and their Political Concepts" 
(Georgetown University, Master's thesis, 1959)> pp.29-30.
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The appearance of NU altered considerably the 
political picture* Not only was Masjumi weakened, but 
the nationalists were encouraged to form a government 
without Masjumi. Neither PNI nor Sukarno dared form a 
government that completely excluded the Moslems, but now 
the amenable NU could be brought into the cabinet and 
Masjumi could be excluded. Such an arrangement could 
not be labelled anti-Islam.
On June 19» 1952, Sakirman told parliament that PKI 
would support the new Wilopo cabinet while retaining the 
right to criticize sharply any measures Conflicting 
with democratic rights, national interests, and the 
interests of the people.’  ^ Some Party members were 
bewildered by the new tactic of conditional support for 
a government without communist representatives, but as 
early as mid-July the central committee explained that 
the advantages of the tactic were already being felt:
'a rather broad opportunity1 had been opened to PKI and 
*other people’s organizations’ to work openly, not in 
semi-secrecy as formerly, and the leadership of PKI
1
HR, June 20, 1952.
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and its mass organizations had been able to emerge 
from hiding.^
At the same time as they gave the government their 
support, the PKI leaders sought to bring together PKI 
and PNI. At first collaboration was on small matters. 
For example, PKI and PNI were among the 62 parties and 
organizations which formed a joint committee to celebrate 
National Awakening Day on May 20, 1952. The committee 
issued a statement containing a condemnation of 
colonialism, an agreement on the need for democracy in 
all fields, and demands for security (meaning the 
eradication of the Darul Islam rebels), the return of 
West Irian, and the cancellation of 'all agreements with 
other states that harm the people and the s t a t e . I t  
was significant that neither Masjumi nor PSI signed the 
statement. Other early forms of PKI-PNI collaboration 
included parallel statements by leaders of both parties 
urging strong action against the Darul Islam rebels, 
vigilance in face of foreign subversive activities, and 
determined retaliation against Dutch insults
1 “
"Apa Sebab PKI Member! Kesempatan Bekerdja pada Kabinet 
Wilopo" (Why PKI Gives the Wilopo Cabinet the Opportunity 
to Work), HR, July 14, 1952.
2
HR, May 21, 1952.
Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, p.94.
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On J u l y  2 8 ,  1952 a d e b a te  began  i n  p a r l i a m e n t  t h a t  
was t o  l e a d  t o  an  a t t e m p te d  coup , and t o  much c l o s e r  
r e l a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  PKI and PNI. The im m edia te  r e a s o n s  
f o r  t h e  d e b a te  were th e  s u s p e n s io n  by  C o lo n e l  N a s u t io n ,  
th e  army c h i e f  o f  s t a f f ,  o f  an i n s u b o r d i n a t e  o f f i c e r ,  
and  th e  p l a n s  draw n up by  th e  M in i s t r y  o f  Defence and  
th e  armed f o r c e s 1 l e a d e r s h i p  f o r  th e  d e m o b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
8 0 ,0 0 0  t r o o p s .  The d e m o b i l i z a t i o n  would have re d u c e d  
e s p e c i a l l y  th o s e  g roups  w i th  l i t t l e  o r  no fo rm a l  
e d u c a t i o n ,  which b y  and l a r g e  c o n s i s t e d  o f  t h o s e  w i th  
th e  c l o s e s t  p e r s o n a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  t i e s  w i th  Sukarno and 
PNI. The n a t i o n a l i s t s  and com m unists q u i c k l y  tu r n e d  
th e  d e b a te  i n t o  an  a t t e m p t  t o  remove from th e  M i n i s t r y  
o f  D efence  and armed f o r c e s  th o s e  p e r s o n s  who were p r o -  
PSI o r  were b e l i e v e d  to  be s o ,
PK I’s p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  d e b a te  had  two p u r p o s e s :  
to  s t a y  c l o s e  t o  PNI; and t o  weaken PSI*s p o s i t i o n  i n  
th e  M in i s t r y  o f  D efence  and th e  army -  b u t  w i th o u t  
c a u s in g  a c a b i n e t  c r i s i s .  The b a la n c e  o f  f o r c e s  was 
s t i l l  su ch  t h a t  a c r i s i s  m igh t have r e s u l t e d  i n  a new 
S uk im an-type  governm en t.  The com m unists f i r s t  a t t e m p te d  
t o  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  t h e  m ajo r  governm ent p a r t i e s  b e h in d  
p r o p o s a l s  t h a t  would have opened  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  




arm ed f o r c e s .  But a f t e r  S ukarno  i n t e r v e n e d  to  p r e s s u r e  
h e s i t a n t  PNI l e a d e r s  to  be  more r e s o l u t e  a g a i n s t  P S I ,  PKI 
swung f u l l y  b e h in d  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  PNI, NU and PSI I  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  s p o n s o re d  a m o tio n  c a l l i n g  f o r  a 
com m ission  to  r e p o r t  on th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  im p ro v in g  th e  
d e fe n c e  l e a d e r s h i p .  T h is  was p a s s e d  on O c to b e r  16 by  
91 v o te s  t o  5 4 , PNI, PKI, NU and  P S II  v o t i n g  f o r ,
M asjum i, PSI  and th e  P r o t e s t a n t  and  Roman C a th o l i c  
p a r t i e s  v o t i n g  a g a i n s t .  F o r  th e  moment i t  a p p e a re d  t h a t  
PNI and PKI had su c c e e d e d  i n  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e .  And th e n ,  
on O c to b e r  17, a s e c t i o n  o f  th e  army a t t e m p t e d  a coup .
The coup  f a i l e d  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  th e  army was d i v i d e d  
and  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  Sukarno  r e f u s e d  t o  be  i n t i m i d a t e d .
When th e  coup h ad  f a i l e d ,  lo w e r  o f f i c e r s  removed p r o -  
coup commanders i n  E a s t  J a v a ,  E a s t  I n d o n e s i a  and N o r th  
S u m a tra .  PNI and  PKI worked c l o s e l y  i n  dem anding th e  
rem oval o f  a l l  who had  b e en  i m p l i c a t e d  i n  th e  coup 
a t t e m p t ,  and s u b s e q u e n t ly  many p e r s o n s  were rem oved.
C o lo n e l  N a s u t io n  was removed a s  army c h i e f  o f  s t a f f  on 
December 5 ,  1952, th e  p ro -P S I  M i n i s t e r  o f  D efence
1
T. Mangunsumbogo, F a k ta  dan Dokumen-Dokumen u n tu k  
M enjusun Buku " I n d o n e s ia  Memasuki G-elanggang I n t e r n a s i o n a l " :  
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resigned on January 1, 1953» the PSI secretary-general 
of the Ministry of Defence was replaced on March 31,
1932, and, finally, the pro-PSI armed forces chief of 
staff was eliminated when his post was abolished on 
November 4> 1953« The advantage PNI and pro-PNI 
officers gained by the removal of those implicated in 
the coup further estranged Masjumi from the nationalists.
One of the principal demands of the October 17 group 
had been the dissolution of the appointed parliament and 
the holding of general elections. PKI strenously 
opposed the dissolution of parliament because action at 
the parliamentary level was providing it with the 
opportunity to establish cooperation with the nationalists 
and certain Moslem groups, and because the Party feared 
that the dissolution of parliament at that time could 
lead to a dictatorship. The nationalists feared a 
dictatorship and also elections in the near future - and 
PKI was quite willing to help stave off elections in 
order to win PNI*s favour.
Hundreds of petitions poured in, mainly from joint 
local action committees, evidently sponsored by PNI and
APKI, calling for parliament to continue. The electoral 
1
Herbert Peith, "Towards Elections in Indonesia",
Pacific Affairs, September 1954> vol.XXVII, no.3> pp.243-4.
bill was presented to parliament in February 1953» By 
the 27th some two hundred amendments had been proposed, 
and the debate showed signs of dragging on indefinitely. 
PKI also seemed to be employing delaying tactics for 
PNI's advantage and proposed, for example, that a census 
be held before the elections, which would have delayed 
them for at least two years. Due to strong public 
pressure against further delays and due to the taunts 
of Masjumi leaders that the nationalists were afraid of 
elections, PNI, and therefore PKI, changed tactics.
The bill was rushed through by April 1, 1953- The 
nationalists presumed that if the government was weak and 
a cabinet crisis possible, then the bill could be passed 
but its implementation delayed by other means.
In the first part of April 1953 a motion was 
introduced in parliament, with PNI support, calling for 
the opening of an embassy in Moscow before the end of 
the year. Masjumi was strongly opposed to the motion, 
but when it was passed by 82 votes to 43 on April 9, 
Masjumi declared that it would resign from the cabinet 
only when the embassy was established. The main forces 
in PNI were now eager to bring down the government and 
they used a communist motion as the means.
On March 16, 1953> five peasant squatters were shot 
and killed by police in Tandjung Morawa, near Medan,
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w h i le  r e s i s t i n g  e v i c t i o n  from e s t a t e  l a n d s .  The PNI 
i n  N o r th  S um atra  was e a g e r  t o  e x p l o i t  th e  s h o o t in g  i n  
o r d e r  t o  e m b a r ra s s  an d ,  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  remove th e  Masjumi 
g o v e r n o r  o f  th e  p r o v in c e .  In  mid-May th e  p ro -com m unis t  
l e a d e r  o f  t h e  p e a s a n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  SAKTI in t r o d u c e d  a 
m o tio n  o f  no c o n f id e n c e  in  th e  M i n i s t e r  o f  th e  I n t e r i o r ,  
M a s ju m ifs Mohamad Rum who was blam ed f o r  th e  s h o o t i n g .  
T h is  was soon  m o d i f ie d ,  p r o b a b ly  to  win s u p p o r t  from 
PNI, b u t  Rum d e c l a r e d  t h a t  he s t i l l  c o n s id e r e d  th e  m o tio n  
t o  be one o f  c o n f id e n c e .  As l a t e  a s  May 23 PN I!s 
o f f i c i a l  a t t i t u d e  to  th e  m o tion  was s t i l l  unknown, b u t  
th e  N o r th  Sum atran  s e c t i o n  o f  th e  p a r t y  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  
s e c e d e  u n l e s s  the  m o tio n  was s u p p o r t e d .  PNI th e n  made 
a l a s t  o f f e r  t o  a b s t a i n  from  v o t in g  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  Masjumi 
a p p r o v a l  o f  P N I’s c a n d id a t e  f o r  M i n i s t e r  o f  I n f o r m a t io n  -  
an o f f e r  t h a t  was r e j e c t e d .  F i n a l l y ,  th e  W ilopo c a b i n e t  
r e s i g n e d  on June  3> b e f o r e  a v o te  c o u ld  be ta k e n  on th e  
m o tio n .
A m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  PNI l e a d e r s  had  a t  l a s t  d e c id e d  
t h a t  th e  c a b i n e t  c o u ld  b e  r e p l a c e d  by  one more advan­
ta g e o u s  t o  th e m s e lv e s .  T h a t  th e y  were p r e p a r e d  t o  s e e k  
PKI*s c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  th e  su b s e q u e n t  c a b i n e t  c r i s i s  was 
shown by  th e  s t a t e m e n t s  i n  March and A p r i l  by  th e  PNI 
s e c o n d  d e p u ty  cha irm an  and ch a irm an  t h a t  th e  p a r t y  was 
n o n -co m m u n is t , n o t  a n t i - c o m m u n is t ,  and t h a t  i t  was
prepared to cooperate 'with all political tendencies in 
the community.’^  PKI was willing to bring down the 
cabinet because it was fairly certain that the balance 
of power in Indonesia was far more in the progressives' 
favour than when the cabinet was formed, so that there 
was little fear that a more rightwing government would 
be formed*
PKI's first proposal after the fall of the cabinet 
was that a PNI member be made the formateur and that both
pMasjumi and PSI be excluded from the next cabinet. At 
the same time, PKI called for a united front cabinet, 
including PKI. Prom June 15 to June 21, formateurs 
from PNI and Masjumi unsuccessfully tried to reach 
agreement on a new coalition cabinet. When they failed, 
PKI at once repeated its demand that a PNI member be made 
the sole formateur, but, significantly, PKI now dropped 
its request for communist representation in the future 
cabinet.^ On June 23, after the appointment on the 
previous day of PNI's Mukarto Notowidigdo as formateur, 
PKI called for PNI to resist courageously any attempted
1
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i n t i m i d a t i o n  by  M asjumi and P S I, r e p e a te d  i t s  demand f o r  
a governm en t w ith o u t  Masjumi and P S I, and c h a rg e d  t h a t  
th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  has a l r e a d y  earm ark ed  f o u r  h u n d red  
m i l l i o n  ru p ia h s  f o r  u se  by  M asjumi and  th e  o th e r
.4
r e a c t i o n a r y  p a r t i e s  in  th e  fo r th c o m in g  e l e c t i o n s .
A week l a t e r ,  A i d i t  w ro te  an  a lm o s t h y s t e r i c a l  a r t i c l e  
d e s c r i b i n g  th e  h o r r o r s  a  M asjumi governm ent w ould 
u n l e a s h .1 2
When M ukarto  f a i l e d  to  form  a c a b i n e t ,  PKI d e c la r e d  
t h a t  i t  was now p ro v ed  t h a t  any  a t te m p t  to  e s t a b l i s h  a 
PN I-M asjum i c o a l i t i o n  w ould f a i l .  A gain  PKI p ro p o se d  
a PNI member a s  f o rm a te u r ,  b u t  S ukarno  a p p o in te d  to  t h i s  
r o l e  B u rh an u d in  H arahap  o f  M asjum i. T h is  l e d  PKI to  new 
h e ig h t s  in  i t s  a t t a c k s  on M asjum i and P S I. W hile M ukarto 
had  b e e n  f o rm a te u r ,  26 p a r t i e s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  i n ­
c lu d in g  PK I, PN I, PSI I  and th e  com m unist mass o r g a n i ­
z a t io n s ,  had  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  J o g j a k a r t a  an a c t i o n  com m ittee  
t o  f i g h t  f o r  a c a b in e t  e x c lu d in g  M asjumi and P S I. When 
th e  M asjumi fo rm a te u r  was a p p o in te d ,  PNI moved much 
c l o s e r  to  PKI and j o i n t  d e m o n s tr a t io n s  w ere h e ld  th ro u g h -
1
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out the country to demand a PNI-led cabinet and the 
eradication of the Darul Islam rebels.
The increase in the strength of PNI and its allies 
compared with Masjumi that had occurred during the Wilopo 
cabinet, and PNI!s ability to use PKI support without 
giving any obvious concessions, emboldened PNI to demand 
of Masjumi a distribution of cabinet seats that the 
latter found unacceptable. On July 18 Harahap returned
his mandate, and on the 20th Sukarno appointed as 
formateur Wongsonegoro of the minor nationalist party 
PIR. Joint demonstrations and delegations continued,
PKI expressed its support for Wongsonegoro in his efforts 
to form a new cabinet, negotiations lengthened, and it 
became clear that PNI was prepared to take the major role 
in a coalition cabinet that would exclude Masjumi and 
PSI. The PNI leaders at last risked a complete break 
with Masjumi and a leftwards shift of alliances. But 
the risk seemed slight and the gain immense. No one 
really believed that PKI would be able, in the foreseeable 
future, to challenge the government, while PNI control of 
the government apparatus would bring personal and party 
enrichment as well as the means to face general elections 
with some confidence.
On July 30, 1953 the new cabinet was announced. The 
Prime Minister was Ali Sastroamidjojo, of PNI, and the
o t h e r  members o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  in c lu d e d  t h r e e  from  FNI, 
t h r e e  from  NU, two from P S I I ,  and e le v e n  who were from 
o t h e r  m ino r  p a r t i e s  o r  were n o n - p a r t y .  PKI h a i l e d  th e  
c a b i n e t  a s  ’a g l o r i o u s  v i c t o r y  o f  dem ocracy  o ve r  
f a s c i s m . ’ ^
The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  c o u ld  lo o k  b a c k  w ith  s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  o v e r  th e  p e r i o d  o f  th e  Wilopo c a b i n e t .  C o n d i t io n a l  
s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  had  h e lp e d  r e - e s t a b l i s h  th e  P a r t y ’s 
r e s p e c t a b i l i t y ,  and i t  had  been  r e p a i d  by  freedom  from 
governm ent r e p r e s s i o n .  At th e  tim e th e  Sukiman c a b i n e t  
h ad  f a l l e n ,  th e  PKI l e a d e r s  were e i t h e r  i n  p r i s o n  o r  i n  
h i d i n g ,  and t o t a l  P a r ty  m em bership  was abou t 8 ,0 0 0 .  But 
d u r in g  t h e  Wilopo c a b i n e t  a l l  th o s e  a r r e s t e d  i n  August 
1951 were r e l e a s e d ,  a l l  P a r t y  and mass o r g a n i z a t i o n  
l e a d e r s  came b a c k  i n t o  th e  open , and th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  th e  
P a r t y  was b e g u n .  By th e  t im e  th e  W ilopo c a b i n e t  f e l l ,  
P a r t y  m em bership  was o v e r  1 3 0 ,0 0 0 . In  s h o r t ,  th e  
’p r o g r e s s i v e  f o r c e ’ had  c o n s o l i d a t e d  i t s e l f  and begun  a 
r a p i d  e x p a n s io n .
What o f  t h e  'm id d le  f o r c e ’ , the  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e ?  
A i d i t ,  s p e a k in g  t o  th e  f i f t h  PKI c o n g re s s  i n  March 1954* 
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  th e  c o r r e c t  P a r t y  t a c t i c  tow ards  th e  W ilopo
1
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c a b in e t  had improved and widened the road fo r  u n ity  w ith
th e  n a t io n a l  b o u r g e o is ie ,  a u n ity  broken s in c e  1948 when
th e  n a t io n a l  b o u r g e o is ie  had s id e d  w ith  the *com pradores*
1
a t  the tim e o f  the Madiun r e b e l l i o n .  In o th e r  w ords,
PKI had s u c c e s s f u l l y  e x p lo it e d  th e  grow ing  FNI o p p o s it io n  
to  Masjumi p o l i c i e s  and FNI fe a r  o f  th e  f a n a t ic a l  M oslems. 
PKI had e x a ce rb a te d  p o l ic y  d i f f e r e n c e s  betw een PNI and 
Masjumi in to  antagon ism s by s tr e n g th e n in g  FNI*s hand to  
th e  p o in t  where PNI was in c r e a s in g ly  u n w il l in g  to  
compromise w ith  Masjumi. And PKI had su g g e s te d  th a t  
PNI i n t e r e s t s  would b e s t  be serv ed  by a F N I-led  c a b in e t  
e x c lu d in g  Masjumi and PSI ,  f i n a l l y  making such a c a b in e t  
p o s s ib le  and a t t r a c t iv e  by  o f f e r in g  PKI su pp ort a t  no 
g r e a te r  p r ic e  than fr ie n d s h ip  and to le r a n c e .
At the same tim e as the growth o f  th e  p r o g r e ss iv e  
fo r c e  and th e  a t t r a c t io n  o f  the m iddle fo r c e  le f tw a r d s ,  
th e  R e a c t io n a r y  fo rce*  had been fu r th e r  i s o la t e d  from 
the m iddle fo r c e  and had been c o n s id e r a b ly  weakened. The 
PSI p o s i t i o n  in  th e  army and th e  M in is tr y  o f  D efence had 
been  g r e a t ly  red u ced . Masjumi and PSI had been  fu r th e r  
se p a r a ted  from PNI, and even  exc lu d ed  from o f f i c e  -  a 
f a c t  which in  i t s e l f  in c r e a se d  t h e ir  antagonism  towards
1
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PN I, th e  more so  as  PKI s u p p o r t  f o r  PNI was in  p a r t  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e i r  e x c l u s i o n .  Masjumi i t s e l f  had  
s p l i t ,  and t h e  f r i e n d l i n e s s  shown by  PNI and PKI tow ards  
NU e n c o u ra g e d  a f u r t h e r  w id en in g  o f  th e  s p l i t .  F i n a l l y ,  
a b low  had  been  s t r u c k  a g a i n s t  t h e  i m p e r i a l i s t s  b ecau se  
th e  new A l i  c a b i n e t  was l e d  b y  a PNI com m itted  to  th e  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  i m p e r i a l i s t  econom ic and p o l i t i c a l  power, 
and  to  a ’f r e e  and a c t iv e *  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .
3 .  A l l i a n c e  w i th  PNI
A f t e r  t h e  f o r m a t io n  o f  th e  A l i  c a b i n e t ,  many o f  th e  
p ro m in e n t  PNI l e a d e r s  came to  acknow ledge o p e n ly  and to
I
j u s t i f y  t h e i r  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i th  PKI. F o r  exam ple , PNI 
ch a irm an  S i d i k  D jo jo s u k a r to  r e a d i l y  a d m i t te d  a t  the  
b e g in n in g  o f  O c to b e r  1953 t h a t  he had r e c e n t l y  s e n t  an  
i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  a l l  p a r t y  b r a n c h e s  which r e a d :  ’E s t a b l i s h  
c lo s e  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  th e  PKI and c o o p e ra te  c l o s e l y  w i th  
th e  NU. I  am c o n f i d e n t  you w i l l  c a r r y  ou t t h i s  t a s k  
t a c t f u l l y . ’  ^ S i d i k  c la im e d  t h a t  th e  i n s t r u c t i o n  fo l lo w e d  
l o g i c a l l y  from  the  ’c lo s e  c o o p e r a t i o n  w ith  b o th  p a r t i e s ’ 
i n  p a r l i a m e n t  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  NU’s p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  and 
PK I’s s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  c a b i n e t .  On May 19> 1954» th e  
West J a v a  PNI l e a d e r  G a to t  M angkupradja  even  p ro p o se d  a
1
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common front between the nationalists and communists in 
the coming elections in order to defeat * the opposite 
side. ’1 The alliance with PKI was advantageous not 
only because it helped maintain FNI in and Masjumi out 
of the government. It also meant that PKI withheld 
criticism of the worsening economic situation and 
corruption, and that PKI turned its fire of vicious 
denunciation against the party FNI considered to be its 
most dangerous rival.
The advantages to PKI of its alliance with PNI were 
obvious: freedom from government repression, regained 
respectability, and the separation of the non-communists 
from the anti-communists. But the Aidit leadership had
to take care that support for the government in general 
did not hide PKI's own identity as a revolutionary party. 
This problem became more acute when the Ali cabinet 
demonstrated corruption and economic ineptitude. The 
solution was a combination of support and criticism: 
defence of the government against reactionary attacks, 
which helped promote alliance with the nationalist and 
non-Masjumi Moslem participants in the government; but 
enough criticism for the Party to maintain itself as the 
nucleus of social protest, and to make quite clear to
1 TI, May 25, 1954; HR, May 22, 1954.
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members and  th e  p u b l ic  i n  g e n e r a l  t h a t  a l th o u g h  th e  
c u r r e n t  governm en t may b e  b e t t e r  th a n  p re v io u s  r e a c t i o n ­
a r y  o n e s ,  o n ly  a p e o p le ’s d e m o c ra tic  governm en t c o u ld  
s o lv e  th e  m a jo r  s o c ia l -e c o n o m ic  and p o l i t i c a l  p rob lem s 
f a c in g  th e  c o u n try «  T h is  c o m b in a tio n  o f  s u p p o r t  and  
c r i t i c i s m  h as  b e e n  m a in ta in e d  down to  th e  p r e s e n t ,  e x c e p t 
f o r  th e  b r i e f  p e r io d  o f  th e  M a sju m i-led  c a b in e t  from  
A ugust 12 , 1955 to  M arch 3 ,  1956*
S a k irm a n , s p e a k in g  i n  p a r l ia m e n t  on S ep tem ber 7> 
1953> s e t  th e  to n e  f o r  P K I’s a t t a c k s  on th e  o p p o s i t i o n ’s 
c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  governm en t when he denounced  Masjumi 
and PSI  f o r  m ou th ing  o ld  u t t e r a n c e s  o f  Van Mook ( th e  l a s t  
D u tch  L ie u te n a n t-G o v e rn o r  o f  th e  E a s t  I n d i e s ) ,  H i t l e r  and  
th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s ’ In fo rm a t io n  S e rv ic e .* ' Towards th e  
end  o f  S ep tem b er, when r e b e l s  d e c la r e d  A tje h  t o  be  a 
p a r t  o f  th e  D a ru l I s la m , PKI la u n c h e d  a s u i t a b l e  a t t a c k  
on th e  ’c o l o n i a l - m i l i t a r i s t - f e u d a l - f a s c i s t  e le m e n ts  i n  
A t j e h ’ an d  o f f e r e d  f u l l  s u p p o r t  to  c ru s h  them . On 
Decem ber 3 1 , 1953» A id i t  l i s t e d  se v e n  im p o r ta n t  and 
d e s i r a b l e  a c t i o n s  ta k e n  b y  th e  c a b in e t  i n  th e  b r i e f  
p e r io d  s in c e  i t  to o k  o f f i c e , ^  and  th e n  t o l d  th e  P a r ty
1 2
HR, S ep tem ber 8 , 1953. HR, S ep tem ber 24> 1953*
3
D.N. A i d i t ,  " P e rk u a t  Kedudukan R ep u b lik .’ Tugas Pokok 
R a k ja t  I n d o n e s ia  d i ta h u n  D a ta n g ” (S tre n g th e n  th e  P o s i t i o n  
o f  th e  R e p u b lic .’ The B a s ic  T ask  o f  th e  In d o n e s ia n  P eo p le  
i n  th e  N ext Y e a r ) ,  PK I-B , Decem ber 31» 1953> p .2 0 2 .
c o n g re s s  i n  March 1954 t h a t  th e  governm ent was n o t r e a l l y  
to  b lam e f o r  econom ic c o n d i t io n s  b e c a u se  i t  h ad  to  b e a r  
th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  d i s a s t e r o u s  econom ic and f i n a n c i a l  
p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  H a t ta ,  N a t s i r  and  Sukim an governm en ts as 
w e l l  as o f  th e  PSI F in a n ce  M in is te r  i n  th e  W ilopo
A
c a b i n e t .
At th e  same tim e a s  d e fe n d in g  and co m p lim en tin g  th e  
g o v e rn m en t, h o w ev er, PKI p r e s e n te d  th e  governm ent w ith  
t e n  demands to  be met d u r in g  1954*2 and th e  P a r ty  c o n g re ss  
o f  M arch 1954 p u t  fo rw a rd  tw e lv e  demands to  be met by  th e  
governm ent i f  i t  w ished  to  c o n tin u e  to  r e c e iv e  com m unist 
s u p p o r t . 3 The PKI l e a d e r s  d id  n o t  e x p e c t  th e  governm ent 
to  ta k e  th e  demands to o  s e r i o u s l y  b e c a u s e , f i r s t l y ,  th e  
governm ent was n o t  c a p a b le  o f  im p lem en tin g  them f u l l y ,  
a n d , s e c o n d ly , i f  i t  c o u ld  have im p lem en ted  them th e  
econom ic s i t u a t i o n  w ould have b e en  im proved and  r e a l  o r  
p o t e n t i a l  d i s c o n te n t  re d u c e d . The demands w ere fo r  
p o p u la r  c o n su m p tio n , t o  show t h a t  th e  P a r ty  had th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  p e o p le  a t  h e a r t ,  and to  show t h a t  th e
1
A i d i t ,  D ja la n  ke D em okrasi, p .2 8 .
2
A i d i t ,  "P e rk u a t K edudukan", PKI-B, December 3 1 , 1953* 
p .2 0 3 .
3
PKI, Program  PKI (P K I 's  P rogram m e), D ja k a r ta ,  1954> 
p p .2 5 -9 .
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government was incapable of solving the major problems 
facing the country.
During February 1954» Masjumi made a show of strength 
in Djakarta that was countered by joint PKI-FNI action. 
Masjumi announced that it would hold a demonstration on 
the 13th to demand a change in the recently-appointed 
Djakarta Raja election commission, which included only 
one Masjumi member. Nine political parties, including 
PKI, PNI, NU, PSII and Perti, and eight mass organi­
zations immediately issued a statement declaring Masjumi*s 
intention to be the removal of PNI's mayor and the 
creation of an all-Masjumi election commission.1 2 On the 
13th Masjumi held a rally attended by 30,000. One week 
later, 27 parties and mass organizations combined to 
hold a giant rally, addressed by speakers from PKI, PNI,
NU and Perti, and attended by 250,000. The rally 
adopted a resolution which rejected MasjumiTs demand and 
called for alterations in the Masjumi-dominated city
pcouncil. Masjumi in turn replied with a rally of half 
a million people on the following day, and used it to 
attack what were considered insults to Islam made by 
nationalist leaders.
1
HR, February 12, 1954*
2
HR, February 19 and 22, 1954*
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An army captain was killed during the second Masjumi 
rally, which led PKI to emit loud cries of horror and to 
request that the government ban all Masjumi demon- 
strations. The anti-Masjumi parties could not compete 
with Masjumi's crowd-raising, but on April 12 a joint 
delegation, including PKI and PNI representatives, 
visited the Minister of Internal Affairs to discuss the 
matter of changing the composition of the Djakarta city
pcouncil. The government obliged by increasing the 
number of council members from 25 to 60 on June 18, thus 
giving large representation to the non-Masjumi groups.
At some time around the beginning of June 1954, a 
Committee for Cooperation between Parties and Organi­
zations in Djakarta was established, probably on the 
basis of the joint anti-Masjumi actions. It contained 
a broad range of parties and mass organizations, including 
all government parties plus PKI, but excluding Masjumi and 
PSI.3 The committee was active in demanding stern 
measures against the Dutch, the unilateral abrogation of 
the Indonesia-Netherlands Union, and the immediate 
creation of a province of West Irian.^ Boyd Compton
T
PKI-B, March 1954» pp.28-9.
2 3HR, April 13, 1954. TI, June 23, 1954.
TI, July 5, 1954.4
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r e p o r t e d  t h a t  l o c a l  p a r t y  c h i e f s  i n  o t h e r  c i t i e s  were 
f o r c e d  by  t h e i r  D ja k a r t a  h e a d q u a r t e r s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
s i m i l a r  c o m m it te e s ,  b u t  t h a t  i n  a t  l e a s t  S u r a b a ja  th e  
l o c a l  com m ittee  soon  d i s a p p e a r e d  a m id s t  d i s p u t e s  be tw een
A
m em bers. I n f o r m a l  c o o p e r a t io n  c o n t in u e d  where th e  
f o r m a l  c o m m ittee s  d i s a p p e a r e d ,  and to o k  th e  form o f  j o i n t  
m a n i f e s t o s ,  s t a t e m e n t s  and a few mass m e e t in g s .
M eanwhile t h e  cam paign  f o r  th e  1955 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  
was u n d e r  way. In  i t s  e l e c t i o n  m a n i f e s to ,  e n d o rs e d  i n  
th e  March 1954 c o n g r e s s ,  PKI e a r l y  d e m o n s t r a te d  i t s  
s e l f - e f f a c i n g  f r i e n d l i n e s s  tow ards  th e  p a r t i e s  o f  th e  
’m id d le  fo rc e *  by  c a l l i n g  on th e  e l e c t o r s  ’to  v o te  f o r  
PKI and th e  o t h e r  d e m o c ra t ic  p a r t i e s , ’ and n o t  m ere ly  f o r  
PKI.2 On May 18, 1954» A i d i t  u rg e d  a l l  d e m o c ra t ic  
p a r t i e s  who were c o n v in c e d  o f  th e  n eed  to  d e f e a t  M asjum i- 
PSI i n  th e  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  to  e i t h e r  p o o l  t h e i r  s u r p l u s  
v o te s  o r  a g re e  n o t  to  a t t a c k  one a n o th e r  d u r in g  th e  
cam p a ig n .^  No v o t e - p o o l i n g  was a r r a n g e d  be tw een  PKI and
1
Boyd R. Compton, In d o n e s ia n  Communism: F r i e n d s  and 
A l l i e s , A m erican U n i v e r s i t i e s ’ F i e l d  S t a f f  R e p o r t ,  New 
York, 19555 p p .6 - 7 .
2
PKI, M anife s  P e m il ih a n  Umum PKI (P K I’s G e n era l  E l e c t i o n  
M a n i f e s to ) ,  D j a k a r t a ,  1954, p .2 0 .
3
PK I-B, May 1954, p .5 5 .  Under th e  v e r s i o n  o f  p ro ­
p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a s  p r a c t i s e d  in  th e  1955 
e l e c t i o n s ,  two o r  more p a r t i e s ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o r  
i n d i v i d u a l  c a n d id a t e s  c o u ld ,  i n  each  e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t ,  
p o o l  t h e i r  s u r p l u s  v o te s  a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
s e a t s .
r o o  r? ^ o
an y  o t h e r  m a jo r  p a r t y ,  b u t  by  an unspoken  ag reem en t  none 
o f  t h e  governm en t  p a r t i e s  o r  PKI engaged  i n  m u tu a l  
r e c r i m i n a t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  cam p a ig n .  T h e i r  combined f i r e  
was a imed e s p e c i a l l y  a t  Masjumi,  and even  NU j o i n e d  i n  
t h e  a t t a c k  on i t s  f e l l o w  Moslem p a r t y .
In  O c to b e r  1954 th e  A l i  c a b i n e t  was t h r e a t e n e d  by 
d i s s e n s i o n  w i t h i n  i t s  own r a n k s .  On O c to b e r  17 t h e  
m inor  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t y  PIR c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  
o f  th e  c a b i n e t ,  and  PIR s p l i t  i n t o  an  o p p o s i t i o n  f a c t i o n  
l e d  b y  what PKI was a l r e a d y  c a l l i n g  ’ th e  T a d ju d d in  Noor 
c l i q u e , 1 and a p r o -g o v e rn m e n t  f a c t i o n  l e d  b y  Deputy Prime
.4
M i n i s t e r  Wongsonegoro. In  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  c a b i n e t  
r e s h u f f l e ,  P e r t i  e n t e r e d  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t .  Sukarno  worked 
h a r d  t o  drum up s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t ,  p e r s u a d e d  t h e  
w a v e r in g  P S II  l e a d e r s  t o  k e ep  i n  l i n e ,  and c a l l e d  th e  
g o v e r n m e n t ’s o p p o n e n ts  t r a i t o r s .
PKI r e a c t e d  by  d e n o u n c in g  t h e  PIR a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t  
g ro u p  a s  ’f u l l y  s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  D u tch  and American 
i m p e r i a l i s t s ,  t h e  Kuomintang and  t h e i r  a c c o m p l i c e s , ’ by  
a s s u r i n g  th e  governm ent  o f  t h e  P a r t y ’s s u p p o r t ,  and by  
t h r e a t e n i n g  t h a t  i f  t h e  governm en t  f e l l  PKI would demand
1
For  a c c o u n t s  o f  the  s p l i t  i n  PIR, s e e  F e i t h ,  ’’I n d o n e s i a n  
P o l i t i c s ” , p p . 629-30 ;  and J u s t u s  M aria  van d e r  K ro e f ,  
I n d o n e s i a  i n  the  Modern W o rld , p a r t  I I ,  Bandung, 1956, 
pp .  347-8^
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Aparticipation in the next cabinet. When Masjumi 
introduced a motion of no confidence in the government*s 
policy to liberate West Irian, Aidit in parliament 
declared that if a Masjumi-PSI cabinet were to replace 
that of Ali, then the general elections would be held 
according to procedures applied by Bao Dai, Syngman Rhee,
pZahedi and Mohammed Ali. Aidit's words were no mere 
rhetoric as far as PKI was concerned. The memory was 
still fresh of the August 1951 arrests and of Sukiman's 
proposal for a stern anti-communist policy, while the 
Anti-Communist Front, sponsored by a wing of Masjumi, 
was leading a strenuous anti-communist campaign.
Fortunately for both PNI and PKI, the Masjumi 
motion was defeated on December 14 by 115 votes to 92 
with 6 abstentions. After the split in PIR, total 
government support in parliament was only 119 votes, 
including 17 PKI, 2 each of SOBSI and BTI, and 9 
Progressives, including several fellow-travellers; the 
opposition held 101 votes; and the Murba party, with 4 
votes, remained neutral.^ Thus, from October 1954 the 
Ali cabinet was directly dependent on communist votes.
1
D.N. Aidit, "For Broad Unity of All National Forces in 
Indonesia", FALP, December 31, 1954» p.4; HR, October 15, 
18 and 20, 195^7 
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TI, December 10, 1954» TI, October 29, 1954*
This did not give PKI a special lever because PNI was 
fully aware that PKI needed the cabinet in order to 
prevent a possible Masjumi-led, anti-communist alterna­
tive; but it did demonstrate to PNI the benefits of 
cooperation with the communists. The PSI newspaper 
"Pedoman" reported that the PKI central committee meeting 
of November 8 to 10,  1954 decided to sound out Ali as to 
the possibility of the Party*s receiving the post of 
Minister of Agrarian Affairs,-* but nothing further was 
heard of this.
As the PNI leaders found it increasingly necessary
to appeal to anti-Dutch feeling as a means of winning
support and diverting attention from their obvious
failures in the economic field, joint West Irian action
committees were established throughout Indonesia and
included PNI, PKI and other political parties and mass
organizations, though usually excluding Masjumi and PSI.
The first major action by one of the committees was in
Djakarta where a mass demonstration of over half a
million people was organized on December 5> 1954 .  The
2speakers included two communists.
1
Reported in TI, November 17> 1954«2
HR, December 1 2 ,  1954#
At the beginning of May 1955, PKI and SOBSI proved 
of service to the government by breaking a strike of the 
PSI-led KBSI trade union federation. The strike began 
in Djakarta on May 7 as a protest against deteriorating 
economic conditions, PKI and SOBSI leaders denounced 
the strike as 'reactionary, anti-worker,' and as 'a 
sabotage effort,' and claimed it was part of the 
imperialist plot to overthrow the Republic,*1 2 SOBSI used 
its members as strike-breakers, and the strike collapsed. 
The end of the Ali cabinet was approaching, not 
because of opposition within parliament but because of 
unrest within the army leadership at the government's 
'interference' in army affairs. In brief, many high 
army officers were becoming increasingly concerned at the 
application of the political spoils system to the army. 
Opposition crystallized especially against the Minister 
of Defence, Iwa Kusumasumantri, a close friend of both 
Sukarno and the communists. When the army chief of staff
1
HR, May 9 and 11, 1955; Buletin SOBSI, May 15, 1955,
PP.3-5.2
For accounts of what became known as 'the June 27 
affair', see Robert J. Myers, ’’The Development of the 
Indonesian Socialist Party” (Chicago University, Ph.D. 
thesis, 1959), pp.144-52; and Justus Maria van der Kroef, 
’’The Place of the Army in Indonesian Politics”, Eastern 
World, January 1957, vol.XI, no.1, p,15»
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resigned, Iwa did not consult the army but appointed a 
Colonel Bambang Utojo as the new chief. Bambang Utojo 
was considered a partisan of PNI and Sukarno, and the 
other officers did not believe him to be professionally 
qualified for the highest post in the army. PKI 
welcomed the appointment under the headline ’'Tactics of
Athe '17th Octoberists' Again Defeated,” and the Party 
was particularly relieved because the acting chief of 
staff, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, was an adamant anti­
communist.
The central army leadership boycotted the 
installation of Bambang Utojo on June 27> 1955# and 
refused to recognize his appointment. Iwa summoned 
Lubis to his office, Lubis refused to go. Iwa dismissed 
him, Lubis refused to accept dismissal, and the army 
regional commanders backed Lubis despite strong pressure 
from Sukarno to accept Utojo. In the midst of the 
events PKI proposed disciplinary measures against the 
insubordinate officers, and called on the people to give 
’the greatest possible assistance’ to the government ’in 
order to remove the danger of military dictatorship, the
pdanger of fascism.’ Party members and sympathizers 
were mobilized to state their conviction of the sagacity
1 2 
HR, June 22, 1955. HR, June 30, 1955.
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o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t 's  a p p o in tm e n t  o f  Bamhang U to jo  as  army
1
c h i e f  o f  s t a f f .
On J u l y  18 Sukarno  l e f t  on a p i lg r im a g e  to  Mecca, 
and  one o f  th e  c a b i n e t ' s  c h i e f  p ro p s  was rem oved. I t  
became c l e a r  t h a t  th e  army l e a d e r s  w ould r e j e c t  any 
com prom ise w i th  t h e  c a b i n e t ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  r e s i g n a t i o n  
o f  Iwa who had  d e p a r t e d  f o r  Mecca w i th  th e  p r e s i d e n t .
F i r s t  t h e  m inor n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t y  P a r i n d r a  and th e n  NU 
d e c id e d  t h a t  th e  c a b i n e t  s h o u ld  r e s i g n  -  w hich  i t  d id  on 
J u l y  2 4 .
The f i r s t  A l i  c a b i n e t  had  s t a y e d  i n  power f o r  o v e r  
two y e a r s ,  a r e c o r d  f o r  I n d o n e s i a .  The b e n e f i t s  PKI 
r e a p e d  from  i t s  a p p a r e n t l y  s e l f l e s s  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  
c a b i n e t  i n  g e n e r a l  and PNI i n  p a r t i c u l a r  were c o n s i d e r a b le .
F i r s t ,  th e  governm ent had p e r m i t t e d  PKI and  i t s  mass 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  to  work w i th  a minimum o f  governm ent 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  and  o b s t r u c t i o n .  I t  was d u r in g  th e  p e r i o d  
o f  th e  A l i  c a b i n e t  t h a t  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  d e v e lo p e d  
what was th e  l a r g e s t  n o n -g o v e rn m e n ta l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  in  
I n d o n e s i a :  PKI grew from a b o u t  130 ,000  members t o  a lm o s t
p
one m i l l i o n ;  SOBSI c o n s o l i d a t e d  i t s  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  th e  
1
HR, J u ly  12, 1955.
2
In September 1953» the governm ent gave a b o o s t  to  th e  
SOBSI e s t a t e  w ork ers' un ion  by su b m ittin g  to  a s t r i k e -  
backed demand fo r  a change in  a major award by the c e n tr a l  
labou r d is p u te s  a r b i t r a t io n  and c o n c i l i a t io n  com m ittee.
communist-led peasant organizations fused, and their 
claimed membership increased from about 400,000 to about 
3i millions; Pemuda Rakjat*s claimed membership rose from 
less than 70,000 to about 500,000; and Gerwani claimed 
that its membership rose from about 43>000 to about 
400,000.
Second, the advantages of cooperation between 
nationalists and communists was demonstrated to an 
important section of PNI, and also to Sukarno. Third, 
cooperation with the nationalists permitted PKI to regain 
its nationalist respectability, to promenade alongside 
prominent nationalists in campaigns demanding militant 
action against Dutch imperialism. Fourth, an unstated 
agreement was reached between PKI and the government 
parties not to attack one another during the election 
campaign - which made the communists* task of winning 
mass support much easier.
Fifth, communist support of the Ali cabinet permitted 
the cabinet to remain in office for many months longer 
than it would otherwise have done, and each month of the 
PNI-led cabinet which excluded Masjumi increased the rift 
between those two parties. This was especially so when 
the cabinet depended directly upon PKI votes. Sixth, 
communist support permitted the cabinet to remain in 
office longer, and so allowed PNI to consolidate its hold
q ru O J
over the civil service, particularly over the rural 
administrative service, with which it was to emerge as 
the largest single party in the September and December 
1955 general elections. This meant that the future 
parliamentary balance was tipped away from Masjumi.
Seventh, PKI support of the government gave the 
Party full freedom to attack the anti-communists, 
especially Masjumi and PSI, with little fear of government
Aaction against the attacks.' On the other hand, the 
government in September 1953 banned demonstrations by 
anti-communists to celebrate the outbreak of the Madiun 
rebellion.
The PSI leader Sjahrir has suggested that the 
communists supported the Ali cabinet ’because they 
believed it would lead the country into a blind alley
pmore quickly than any other.* Certainly the period of 
the Ali cabinet was marked by extensive corruption, 
inflation, and general decline in standards of living.
1 Aidit was belatedly brought to court at the end of 1954 
and the beginning of 1955 for defaming Hatta in a 
statement on the Madiun rebellion. A three-months 
suspended gaol sentence was finally given, and the Party 
was not prevented from publishing Aidit’s defence which 
repeated and embellished the original defamation.
2
Sutan Sjahrir, "Problems the Country Faces", in 
"Perspective of Indonesia", a supplement to Atlantic 
Monthly, June 1956, p.24*
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But what might he called the economic incapacity of the 
groups in the Ali cabinet was merely a fortunate 
coincidence for PKI, who chose to support them primarily 
because they were less hostile to PKI and more hostile to 
Western colonialism than Masjurai and PSI.
NU had taken its place on the political scene by 
joining the Ali cabinet. Because the NU leaders were 
prepared to take opposite sides to Masjumi, and showed 
their willingness to cooperate with any political group 
as long as they felt cooperation could benefit themselves 
their party or their Islamic principles, the Aidit leader 
ship extended a hand of friendship. Early in September 
1954, for example, PKI sent warm greetings to the NU 
congress.-1 The "Harian Rakjat" editorials always 
included NU among the 1democratic parties.!
As soon as the Ali cabinet resigned, PKI proposed 
that instead of a completely new cabinet there should be 
a reshuffled Ali cabinet entrusted with carrying out the 
elections and opening new discussions with the army 
leadership. Vice-President Hatta, acting in Sukarno*s
absence, appointed three formateurs on August 1, i955 2 
Wilopo, Sukiman, and Assaat, an independent politician
1 2 
HR, September 9, 1954. HR, July 27, 1955.
*j u  5
closely linked with Masjumi and PSI. They failed to
reach agreement, and on August 3, Hatta appointed
Burhanudin Harahap of Masjumi as formateur. PKI
thereupon mobilized the Party and its mass organizations
to flood the head of state with petitions and telegrams
demanding the preservation of parliamentary democracy
and rejecting a Masjumi-led government. On August 7»
Aidit proposed an all-party cabinet, though one not led
by Masjumi, that could settle the dispute with the army
and carry out * truly free and honest elections.
However, Harahap succeeded in forming a cabinet,
which was installed on August 12, 1955 and included
members of NU, PSII, PSI, and four smaller parties as
well as Masjumi. PNI and PKI moved into the opposition.
Aidit declared that Masjumi and PSI ’collaborate
with the federalists, the hirelings of the Dutch
imperialists,’ and that this reactionary combination:
threatens the democracy and unity of the 
Indonesian Republic. At the bidding of the 
Dutch imperialists, these parties are inciting 
the Darul Islam and other terrorist gangs to 
anti-democratic activities.
1
HR, August 8, 1955«2
D.N. Aidit, ’'The General Elections and the Tasks of the 
Indonesian Communist Party”, PALP, September 9, 1955>
p.3.
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But A i d i t  was wary o f  o f f e n d i n g  th o s e  p a r t i e s  o th e r  th a n  
M asjumi and  PS I  which were i n  th e  governm en t. He 
t h e r e f o r e  e x p la in e d :
The CPI /Comm unist P a r t y  o f  I n d o n e s i a /  h o l d s ,  
h ow ever ,  t h a t  t h e s e  f a c t s  do n o t  d e t r a c t  from 
th e  m e r i t s  o f  c e r t a i n  m i n i s t e r s  o f  th e  c a b i n e t  
who b e lo n g  t o  th e  p a r t i e s  t h a t  f o r m e r ly  
b e lo n g e d  to  th e  A l i  S a s t r o a m i d j o jo  governm ent 
and  t h a t  showed good w i l l .
I n  k e e p in g  w i th  i t s  p o l i c y  o f  s e l e c t i v e  a t t a c k s  on 
th e  g o v e rn m e n t,  PKI c r i t i c i z e d  th e  H arahap  c a b i n e t  f o r  
i t s  f i n a n c i a l  and  econom ic p o l i c y ,  i t s  d e fe n c e  p o l i c y  and 
i t s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  -  b e c a u s e  th e  m i n i s t e r s  i n  ch a rg e  o f  
th o s e  p o l i c i e s  were members o f  M asjum i, PSI o r  th e  Roman 
C a th o l i c  P a r t y ,  E s p e c i a l l y  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  r i s i n g  
p r i c e s ,  n o t  a new phenomenon i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  was u se d  
th ro u g h o u t  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  c a b i n e t  to  win b ro a d  s u p p o r t  
and to  e m b a r ra s s  th e  g o v e rn m e n t.
When th e  new c a b i n e t  b eg an  to  t a k e  a c t i v e  s t e p s  t o  
b r i n g  t o  t r i a l  t h e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  o f  th e  m ost b l a t a n t  
exam ples o f  c o r r u p t i o n  u n d e r  th e  p r e v io u s  c a b i n e t ,  PKI 
d i s p l a y e d  t h e  v a lu e  o f  i t s  f r i e n d s h i p  to  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  
I n s t e a d  o f  p r a i s i n g  th e  a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n  d r i v e ,  PKI 
a t t a c k e d  i t .  S a k irm a n , s p e a k in g  i n  p a r l i a m e n t ,  d e c l a r e d  
t h a t  ’To combat c o r r u p t i o n  i n  a d i s h o n e s t  way i s  to
4
c r e a t e  g r e a t e r  c o r r u p t i o n . ’ He d e fe n d e d  D jody
1
HR, A ugust 22 , 1955«
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Gondokusumo, th e  PRN M in is te r  o f  J u s t ic e  in  th e  A li  
c a b in e t ,  who was th e  f i r s t  prom inent person  brought to  
a c c o u n t, f o r  h i s  courage in  f ig h t in g  th e  ‘Kuomintang 
p l o t 1 2 and r e a c t io n a r y  e lem en ts in  h is  m in is tr y . "Harian 
R ak jat" , in  an e d i t o r i a l ,  commented th a t  the a n t i ­
c o r r u p tio n  s lo g a n  c o u ld  be used as a f i r s t  s te p  towards 
f a s c i s t  pow er, as w itn e ss  the D im itrov c a se  in  H it le r * s  
Germany. Such d e fen ce  o f  the n o to r io u s ly  corru p t must 
have r a is e d  doubts among the l e s s  p o l i t i c a l l y  s o p h i s t i ­
c a te d  P arty  members, b u t  A id it  rem inded them th a t  ‘In  
p u rsu in g  th e  u n ity  p o l ic y  we must n o t do a n y th in g  s tr a n g e  
or deform ed in  the e y e s  o f  th o se  who sh o u ld  u n ite  w ith  
u s . * In o th e r  w ords, u n ity  was param ount, and, i f  
n e c e s s a r y , e v en  c o r r u p tio n  had to  be e x cu sed .
Two i s s u e s  t i e d  PKI and FNI c lo s e r  to g e th e r :  the  
q u e s t io n  o f  n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  th e  D utch, and, more 
im p o r ta n tly , the q u e s t io n  o f  fo r c in g  the government to  
r e s ig n  once th e  p r o v is io n a l  r e s u l t s  o f  the Septem ber 1955 
p a r lia m en ta ry  e l e c t io n s  were known.
In December th e  government opened n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  
the N eth er lan d s in  order to  s e t t l e  p e a c e fu l ly  the retu rn
1
HR, August 23 ,  1955.
2
D.N. A id i t ,  Pertahankan R epublik  P roklam asi 1945» 
(D efend th e  1945 P roclam ation  R e p u b lic ! ) , D ja k a rta , 1955» 
P .3 1 .
540
o f  W est I r i a n ,  th e  a b ro g a t io n  o f  th e  In d o n e s ia -  
N e th e r la n d s  U n ion , and  a change in  th e  te rm s o f  th e  
Round T ab le  C o n fe re n ce  a g re e m e n t. NU and th e n  PSI I  
o b j e c te d  to  th e  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  and on J a n u a ry  18 , 1956,
PSI I  w ith d rew  from  th e  go v ern m en t. PNI, PKI and PSI I  
d e m o n s tra te d  t h e i r  j o i n t ,  m i l i t a n t  o p p o s i t io n  to  
im p e r ia l is m  in  g e n e r a l  and  D utch  im p e r ia l is m  in  p a r t i c u ­
l a r  by  o r g a n iz in g  a g i a n t  a n t i - c o l o n i a l  r a l l y  i n  D ja k a r ta  
on J a n u a ry  15, 1956. The s p e a k e rs  a t  th e  r a l l y  were 
A li  S a s t r o a m id jo jo ,  A i d i t  and a P S II  l e a d e r ,  and  th e  
r a l l y  a l s o  c a l l e d  f o r  a c a r e t a k e r  governm ent to  r e p la c e  
th e  H arahap  c a b in e t .
The p r o v i s i o n a l  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  Sep tem ber 1955 
p a r l i a m e n ta r y  e l e c t i o n s  w ere known b y  th e  f i r s t  week in  
O c to b e r  1955* A id i t  c a l l e d  f o r  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  a 
n a t i o n a l  c o a l i t i o n  governm ent t h a t  w ould be le d  by  PNI 
and  NU, w ould a l s o  in c lu d e  PKI, M asjum i, P S I I ,  th e  
P r o t e s t a n t  P a r ty  'a s  w e ll  as o th e r  p a r t i e s  and g r o u p s , ' 
and  would p u rsu e  th e  'a n t i - c o l o n i a l  p o lic y *  o f  th e  A li
A
c a b i n e t .  On November 14, PNI, PKI and some s m a l le r  
g ro u p s b eg an  a b o y c o t t  o f  p a r l i a m e n t .  N ext d a y , how ever, 
th e  governm ent su c c e e d e d  in  r e c e i v i n g  s e v e n te e n  v o te s  
more th a n  th e  n e c e s s a r y  quorum , and on th e  1 7 th  th e
1
HR, O c to b e r 11, 1955.
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g o v e rn m en t p a r t i e s  v o te d  to  advance  th e  d a te  o f  th e  
p a r l i a m e n ta r y  r e c e s s  from  December 10 to  November 21 .
The governm en t c o n tin u e d  in  o f f i c e ,  th o u g h  PKI p o in te d  
o u t  t h a t  o n ly  83 o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n ts  v o te s  were v a l i d  a s  
th e  r e s t  came from  g ro u p s  and i n d iv i d u a l s  who had 
r e c e iv e d  no p o p u la r  s u p p o r t  i n  th e  e l e c t i o n s .
When PNI showed no r e a d in e s s  to  c o n s id e r  PKI f o r  
i n c l u s i o n  i n  th e  n e x t  c a b i n e t , 2 PKI c h an g ed  i t s  p r o p o s a l s .  
On November 3 0 , 1955 A id i t  s t a t e d  t h a t  b e c a u se  Masjumi 
h a d  r e j e c t e d  th e  id e a  o f  an  a l l - p a r t y  c a b i n e t ,  PKI now 
p ro p o se d  a c a b in e t  o f  PN I, NU, P S II  and  P e r t i  w ith  
com m unist s u p p o r t  b u t  n o t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n . ^  PKI w ould
g iv e ,  he  s a i d ,  ' r e a l  and c r i t i c a l *  s u p p o r t  f o r  su ch  a 
c a b in e t  i f  i t s  programme was a c c e p ta b le .
E a r ly  in  1956, th ro u g h o u t th e  c o u n try  j o i n t  PNI-PKI 
m e e tin g s  w ere h e ld  and j o i n t  d e le g a t io n s  form ed to  demand 
a t r a n s i t i o n a l  c a b in e t  whose c o m p o s it io n  was more in  l i n e  
w ith  th e  e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s .  On F e b ru a ry  16, PN I, NU,
P S II  and  P e r t i  t a b l e d  in  p a r l ia m e n t  a j o i n t  m o tio n  o f  no
1
HR, November 16, 1955«2
S a rm id i M angunsarko ro , PNI g e n e r a l  c h a irm a n , f o r  exam ple, 
on J a n u a ry  7> 1956 r e j e c t e d  th e  id e a  o f  PKI p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  th e  n e x t  c a b i n e t ,  b u t  s a i d  t h a t  PKI s u p p o r t  was 
p o s s ib l e ;  T I , J a n u a ry  9 , 1956.
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confidence in the government, and on the 27th PNI and 
NU issued an ultimatum to Masjumi that unless the cabinet 
resigned by March 2, then both parties would refuse to 
consider future cooperation with Masjumi* When the 
official announcement was made, on March 1, of the 
distribution of seats according to the September 1955 
elections, 68 members of parliament resigned - including 
those from PNI, PKI, NU and PSII. Two days later the
cabinet returned its mandate.
The general elections had not led to a simplification 
in the number of parties, and after the new distribution 
of parliamentary seats the two largest parties combined
Astill could not command a majority. Multi-party 
coalition government was still necessary.
The PKI leaders expressed their relief at the fall 
of the * reactionary * Harahap cabinet, and again proposed 
an improved version of the Ali cabinet in which neither
pPKI nor Masjumi would participate. 'But if Masjumi 
must sit in it, then so also must PKI in order to
1
The distribution of seats in the new, elected parliament 
was: PNI - 57, Masjumi - 57, NU - 45, PKI - 39, PSII - 8, Protestant Party - 8, Roman Catholic Party - 6, PSI - 5, 
IPKI - 4, Perti - 4, seventeen small parties - 23, and 
one individual.
2
HR, March 7, 1956
counterbalance Masjumi policy.’ The PNI leaders, 
reportedly under pressure from NU, whose representation 
in parliament had increased from 8 to 45» and presumably 
afraid that Masjumi and NU together with such as the 
Protestant and Roman Catholic parties, IPKI, and several 
smaller groups, might form a cabinet to the exclusion of 
themselves, negotiated with Masjumi for a broad coalition 
cabinet.
Ali Sastroamidjojo as formateur presented his 
proposed cabinet to Sukarno for ratification on March 16, 
but the president delayed ratification for four days 
because, according to "Harian Rakjat", he was dissatis­
fied with the composition and wanted to have included 
either Professor Purbodiningrat, a well-known fellow- 
traveller, or Sadjarwo, who for many years was a member 
of the BTI leadership - which Masjumi refused. The 
PKI politbureau on March 18 welcomed Ali as formateur 
and the cabinet programme he put forward, but criticized
the proposed inclusion of Masjumi and the weak attitude
2taken by PNI and NU towards Masjumi. The politbureau 
approved Sukarno’s hesitation over ratifying the 
proposed cabinet, and called on ’the democratic parties* 
to improve its composition. Peith reports that PKI
1
HR, March 19, 1956.HR, March 21, 1956
2
tried to have Purbodiningrat, Sadjarwo or the pro- 
communist Hanafi included in the cabinet. This sounds 
plausible as none of the three was openly a PKI member, 
and would therefore not raise violent objections from 
the non-Masjumi parties, while any of the three might 
have served as a listening post in the cabinet, ready to 
warn the Party of any impending government repression,
Ali*s proposed cabinet was finally installed, 
unaltered, on March 24, 1956. It consisted of five PNI 
members, including Prime Minister Ali also in charge of 
the Ministry of Defence, five Masjumi members, five NU, 
two Protestant Party, two PSII, two Roman Catholic Party, 
one IPKI, one Perti, and one non-party, PKI could do 
no more than offer critical support, for opposition might 
have meant forfeiting the goodwill of PNI in particular, 
and might also have given Masjumi the opportunity to 
persuade the rest of the cabinet to pursue an anti­
communist policy.
4« The Approach to Sukarno
The second Ali cabinet, which was to return its 
mandate on March 14» 1957, proved to be a turning point 
in Indonesian politics. Pour major political develop-
1 Peith, ’’Indonesian Politics”, p.771
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ments occurred that forced the Aidit leadership to seek 
a basic alliance with Sukarno rather than with PNI.
The first development was the drastic decline in the 
prestige of the parliamentary system and of political 
parties in general. When the second Ali cabinet took 
office, the political parties were still the most 
important and decisive political forces. Many 
deficiencies in the actual practice of parliamentary 
democracy were recognized - for example, widespread 
corruption and the spoils system, the failure to promote 
economic development, and frequent cabinet changes due 
to disputes between and within the many parties - but 
hopes had been pinned on the general elections as a 
means of somehow removing them. Then, after the new 
cabinet was installed, and the new parliament two days 
later, nothing seemed to have changed. There were still 
the squabbling parties, the same old faces in the cabinet, 
the same economic gloom. As a result, there developed 
among the politically conscious Indonesians a widespread 
feeling that the parliamentary system - *free fight 
liberalism* as Sukarno was to call it - had failed and 
must be replaced. The political parties did little to 
defend the parliamentary system.
The second major political development was closely 
related to the first. As the political parties virtually
surrendered their authority and admitted their inability 
to solve Indonesia's economic and political problems, 
two extra-parliamentary political forces rose to fill 
the power vacuum: Sukarno and the army. By the time the 
Ali cabinet resigned, these two political forces dwarfed 
the parties.
The third development was the removal from the 
central government of the last representatives of what 
PKI calls the reactionary force, which included Hatta, 
Masjumi and PSI. After Sukarno had made it plain that 
he no longer wanted Hatta as vice-president, Hatta 
resigned at midnight on November 30, 1956. Masjumi 
withdrew from the cabinet on January 9 , 1957* With the 
removal from the central government of Hatta and Masjumi, 
who by and large represented much of the population 
outside Java, and the implacable opposition of Sukarno 
(and therefore PNI) and PKI to their return, important 
segments of the population of the outer islands came to 
feel increasingly that the government in Djakarta in no 
way represented their interests. This feeling was one 
of the factors which led many of the leaders of the outer 
islands to reject, with varying degrees of politeness, 
the authority of the central government.
The fourth development, also closely related to the 
others, was a political realignment by Sukarno. Until
the September 1955 elections, Sukarno had identified 
himself closely with the party he had helped establish, 
PNI. Then, at first hesitantly, in 1955 he began to 
seek the alliance of PKI. Two factors help explain his 
leaning towards the communists.
First, Sukarno felt that the hegemony of the 
political parties was drawing to a close, and he wished 
to diminish his identification with what had proved to 
be a corrupt, basically conservative, and clearly 
incompetent PNI. Sukarno may have felt that PKI was 
the only party able and willing to help him towards his 
major goal, ’the completion of the revolution’. What 
Sukarno conceives as the completion of the revolution is 
difficult to ascertain, but it includes maintaining the 
people in a state of nationalist fervour through mass 
actions towards the elimination of all imperialist (that 
is, Western) economic, cultural and political power in 
Indonesia. And PKI, which combined a vociferous anti­
colonialism with an efficient organizational network, was 
the only party that could be of much assistance to him.
Second, particularly during the period of the second 
Ali cabinet when the end of parliamentary democracy was 
in sight, Sukarno sought allies to help counterbalance 
the other emerging political power, the army, which he 
viewed with suspicion as it included many persons who
would be glad to oust him, PNI, despite rare floutings 
of his wishes, was so dependent upon him for its mass 
support and his backing in political manoeuvres that he 
was sure it would stand by him whatever happened. As 
PNI was not strong enough to counter Masjumi and the 
army, Sukarno sought the alliance of the largest and 
best-organized party, PKI. PKI could collect enormous 
crowds for his speeches, and so apparently demonstrate 
to the army his great popularity and strength. The 
threat of bringing PKI into the cabinet or other 
governmental positions could also force concessions from 
the army. Sukarno reportedly believes that the growth 
of PKI can only add to his own strength, and that if 
the PKI leaders became truculent he could remove their 
mass support with one speech, as he did in September 1948.
The changing political situation created serious 
tactical problems for the Aidit leadership. As will be 
seen, PKI worked hard to assist the second Ali cabinet 
and thus to save parliamentary democracy or at least 
stave off its demise. But when it was clear that the 
regime would be drastically overhauled, PKI was forced 
to adapt its basic national united front policy to the 
special circumstances of a political situation in which 
the role of parliament would be greatly reduced, and in 
which the chief power centres would be the army on the
one hand and Sukarno on the other. The old parliamentary 
alliance might still serve a useful purpose, but a new 
alliance obviously had to be established with either the 
army or Sukarno in order to safeguard the existence of 
the Party. Within the army there arose loud voices 
advocating the abolition of all parties, and many 
prominent officers, both in the central command and in 
the regions, were outspokenly anti-communist. Therefore 
the PKI leaders, in private reluctantly, but in public 
eagerly, accepted Sukarno’s proffered hand.
Alliance with Sukarno had clear drawbacks. It 
enabled him to consolidate his own power and proceed 
towards the creation of a one-man dictatorship or an 
oligarchy; but there was no alternative. The alliance 
with him would, however, have its advantages too. Not 
least, it would strengthen Sukarno’s hand in his efforts 
to prevent a military dictatorship. The PKI leaders 
must also have presumed that the president’s balancing 
game with the army and other enemies meant that in the 
last resort he would have to retain those political 
parties that provided him with support. If he 
eliminated them he would tilt the balance in favour of 
his extra-parliamentary political rivals. Another 
advantage was that the identification of PKI with Sukarno 
would greatly enhance the Party’s popular prestige and
s u p p o r t ,  w h i le  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  on PNI and NU would p r e v e n t  
t h o s e  p a r t i e s  from  t a k i n g  an  a n t i - c o m m u n is t  l i n e .  
F u r th e r m o r e ,  Sukarno  was p r i m a r i l y  c o n ce rn e d  w i th  
m a in t a i n in g  n a t i o n a l i s t  f e r v o u r ,  n o t  w i th  th e  economic 
d e v e lo p m e n t t h a t  p o s s i b l y  c o u ld  have removed much o f  th e  
b a s i s  o f  communist s u p p o r t .
The rap p ro ch em en t be tw een  PKI and  Sukarno  was n o t  
su d d e n ,  b u t  was th e  r e s u l t  o f  d ev e lo p m en ts  o v e r  s e v e r a l  
y e a r s .
S t ro n g  a t t a c k s  on Sukarno  had  c o n t in u e d  d u r in g  th e
f i r s t  few m onths a f t e r  th e  A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  g a in e d
1
c o n t r o l  o f  PKI. Then, as  th e  new form o f  th e  n a t i o n a l
u n i t e d  f r o n t  was f o r m u la te d  and im p lem en ted , th e  a t t a c k s
on him were h a l t e d  when i t  was r e a l i z e d  t h a t  he was a
p o p u la r  n a t i o n a l i s t  symbol and t h a t  he was opposed  to
Masjumi and P S I ,  th e  m ost a r d e n t  a n t i - c o m m u n is t  p a r t i e s .
A lim in ,  a t  a cerem ony on May 25» 1952 to  c e l e b r a t e  th e
fo u n d in g  o f  PKI, even l e d  c h e e r s  f o r  S t a l i n ,  Mao T s e - tu n g
2Kim I I  Sung and . . .  S u k a rn o .
In  h i s  A ugust 17 s p e e c h  i n  1952, S ukarno , much t o  
P K I 's  d e l i g h t ,  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  
s o v e r e i g n t y  was n e i t h e r  co m p le te  n o r  u n c o n d i t i o n a l ,  and  
t h a t  th e  f i g h t  a g a i n s t  im p e r ia l i s m  i n  In d o n e s ia  was as
1 2
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y e t  u n f i n i s h e d .  At th e  t im e  o f  th e  O c to b e r  17, 1952 
a f f a i r ,  Sukarno p ro v ed  h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  to  m i l i t a r y  
d i c t a t o r s h i p  and was i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n  the  rem oval  o f  PSI 
members and s y m p a t h i z e r s  from i m p o r t a n t  p o s t s  i n  th e  
army and th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  D e fe n c e .  B u t ,  w i t h  th e  memory 
s t i l l  f r e s h  i n  t h e i r  minds o f  S u k a r n o ' s  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  th e  
a n t i - c o m m u n i s t s  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  th e  Madiun r e b e l l i o n  and 
d u r i n g  t h e  Sukiman c a b i n e t ,  t h e  PKI l e a d e r s  s t i l l  c o u ld  
n o t  r e g a r d  him a s  a t r u e  p o l i t i c a l  a l l y *  In  November 
1952 he was c a t e g o r i z e d  w i t h  t h e  o l d  g roup  o f  i n t e l ­
l e c t u a l s  who had  ' c e a s e d  t o  be  p r o g r e s s i v e  th e  moment 
t h e y  t h e m s e lv e s  o c c u p i e d  p l a c e s  o f  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  s o c i e t y '  
who d e f e n d e d  th e  s t a t u s  quo and were a f r a i d  o f  th e  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  f o r c e s ,  and 'who, i n  g e n e r a l ,  can  a t  th e
ji
most  be  n e u t r a l i z e d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  t i m e s ' .
D u r in g  t h e  f i r s t  A l i  c a b i n e t ,  however ,  S u k a r n o ' s  
a c t i o n s  opened  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  he m ight  become an 
i m p o r t a n t  a l l y  f o r  PKI. I t  was p a r t l y  due t o  S u k a r n o ' s  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  t h a t  Masjumi and PSI were e x c lu d e d  from th e  
c a b i n e t ,  and he d i d  h i s  u tm o s t  t o  d e fe n d  t h e  c a b i n e t ,  
even  a c c u s i n g  i t s  o p p o n e n ts  o f  b e i n g  f o r e i g n  a g e n t s .  On 
August  17> 1953 he o u t s p o k e n l y  a t t a c k e d  th e  D a r u l  I s l a m
1
"B ek erd ja  d i k a l a n g a n  I n t e l e k t u i l "  (Working among th e  
I n t e l l e c t u a l s ) ,  BM, October-November  1952, p p . 1 21-2 .
as an enemy of the state and people, which the government 
had previously been afraid to do. And from December 
1954 he began to advocate national unity specifically 
embracing the communists. In that month he proposed a 
congress to include all parties and tendencies in order 
to create the power with which to liberate West Irian.
The formation of the congress was left to the parties. 
Masjumi, and the two PSI Christian parties refused to 
cooperate from the beginning, and PNI withdrew in about 
July 1955» after which the congress organization fell 
under communist control. Although the congress never 
came to anything important, the very idea of such a 
congress, which would bring the parties together, 
increase nationalist, anti-Dutch agitation, and strengthen 
the identification of PKI with Sukarno’s charisma, was 
most attractive to the PKI leaders.
Sukarno’s actions during the Burhanudin Harahap 
cabinet further increased PKI’s readiness for and 
decreased its fear of alliance with him. He made his 
opposition to the cabinet quite clear, intervened in a 
dispute among airforce officers in order to save the pro- 
communist airforce chief, and prior to the Constituent 
Assembly elections toured the country speaking on West 
Irian and Pantjasila. More than this, he expressed his
belief that:
It is ... illogical that the Indonesian Communist 
Party, whose ideology and ideals are supported by 
six million.people, should be excluded from the 
government.1 2
On January 15, 1956, he told the mass rally against
colonialism that had been addressed by Ali, Aidit and
PSIIfs Arudji Kartawinata:
Now facing me is the Triple-A: Ali-Arudji- 
Aidit ... The present Triple-A is an anti­
imperialist Triple-A, an anti-colonial Triple-A, 
a Triple-A defending the people*s rights. This 
makes me happy, this is why my heart is alight 
to receive the present Triple-A.
This Triple-A represents three groupings. As 
has just been said by Mr. Dipa Nusantara Aidit, 
your giant meeting is indisputable proof that 
there can be Moslem-nationalist-communist 
unity.
For 37 years I have worked for unity. There­
fore I am happy to see unity now created ...
How can I, who have worked for unity for 37 
years, how can I say, fHeh, Indonesian people, 
unite, unite, but twenty per cent, sixteen 
millions, that is, the communists, are not 
included ...f? Can we create unity while 
bunging twenty per cent, sixteen millions, 
the communists, down a mouse-hole?^
Then, at the time of the formation of the second Ali
cabinet, Sukarno, as has been seen, is said to have
1
Boyd R. Compton, Indonesia, 1955» Institute of Current 
World Affairs Report, New York, 1956, p.11.
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HR, January 16, 1956. Sukarno presumably included in 
the figure of sixteen million communists the families of 
the six million who voted for PKI in the 1955 general 
elections.
delayed endorsement of the cabinet while he unsuccessfully 
attempted to have several fellow-travellers included in 
it.
The ground was therefore prepared for the shift in 
PKI’s basic alliance from PNI to Sukarno. The ideal 
situation for PKI would have been the continuation of 
parliamentary democracy and the paramount role of the 
parties, but also an alliance with Sukarno. When this 
was impossible because of the changed political situation, 
the PKI leaders threw in their lot with the president.
The second Ali cabinet was soon faced with grave
Ainsubordination from prominent army officers. The 
first major affront to the government occurred on August 
13 > 1956, when the Foreign Minister, Ruslan Abdulgani of 
PNI, was arrested by the West Java military commander on 
charges of corruption. In November, Colonel Zulkifli 
Lubis of the central army command planned an unsuccessful 
coup. And on December 20 the first of the regional 
councils in defiance of Djakarta’s authority was set up
1
For an account of the army officers’ grievances against 
the government, see Justus Maria van der Kroef,
"Instability in Indonesia”, Far Eastern Survey, April 
1957y vol.XXVI, no.4> pp.49-62. For a quite full chronology up to September 1957 of the disputes between 
the regional army commanders and the central government, 
see Report on Indonesia, August-October 1957» pp.11-25*
when former members of the long-demobilized Banteng 
Division, led by Lt. Colonel Achmad Husein, took over
r r ro O J
the government of Central Sumatra. Two days later, 
Colonel Simbolon, the army commander in North Sumatra, 
announced that he had taken over the government in this 
region and that he refused to recognize the Ali 
government. The central government acted quickly and 
successfully against Simbolon, replacing him by his 
second-in-command who effected a counter-coup on December 
27* This did not deter other regional commanders. On 
March 2, 1957» Lt. Colonel Sumual took over the government 
of East Indonesia; and, after some months of rumblings, 
the military commander of South Sumatra did likewise in 
his area on March 9.
PKI’s fear of the army was justified by the arrest 
of members of the Party and its mass organizations by 
the councils established by the dissident army commanders. 
PKI was therefore the first party militantly to oppose 
the regional councils. On December 23» 1956 the PKI 
politbureau issued a statement denouncing Husein's action
Aas ’anti-democratic * and Simbolon’s as 'rebellion*.
1
PKI, "Bersatu dan Bantu Pemerintah untuk Mengatasi 
Peristiwa Sumatera Tengah dan Sumatera Utara" (Unite and 
Assist the Government to Overcome the Central and North 
Sumatra Affairs), HR, December 24» 1956.
The politbureau blamed Masjumi and PSI for the creation 
of the councils and for Lubis ’ attempted coup, and 
declared that the regional commanders’ action ’divides 
and stabs the Indonesian Republic from within; in this 
way they directly benefit the Dutch and American 
imperialists’. Finally, the politbureau called on the 
people to assist the government and armed forces in 
settling the two Sumatran affairs.
At the same time as the acts of insubordination by 
the regional army commanders, the government coalition 
was falling apart. On December 26, 1956, the small 
party IPKI, which had close ties with many high army 
officers, withdrew from the government; on December 30, 
the Protestant Party called for the dissolution of the 
cabinet; and on January 9, 1957» Masjumi withdrew into
Athe opposition. Many leaders of the army as well as
Masjumi and many smaller parties sought a solution to the
crisis in a fresh period of cooperation between Sukarno
and Hatta, and there was much talk of making Hatta Prime
Minister. This prospect was a grim one for PKI which at
once claimed that the withdrawal of Masjumi actually
2strengthened the government. On January 11, 1957»
1 For the official Masjumi explanation of its withdrawal, 
see Suara STII (Voice of STII), January 1957» pp.6-7*2
HR, January 11, 1957
A i d i t  e x p r e s s e d  PK I’s c o n t in u e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  
governm en t and d e c l a r e d  t h a t  th e  P a r t y  would n o t  a sk
A
f o r  c a b i n e t  p o s t s .  On F e b ru a ry  7 > a PKI member t o l d  
p a r l i a m e n t  t h a t  th e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  th e  c a b i n e t  would
p
mean c a p i t u l a t i o n  b e f o r e  th e  ’m i l i t a r y  coup p l o t ' . - 
A cross  th e  c o u n t r y  PNI, PKI and th e  communist mass 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  h e ld  m e e tin g s  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  governm ent.
At t h i s  p o i n t  Sukarno  announced  h i s  c o n c e p t  f o r  
s o l v i n g  I n d o n e s i a ’s p o l i t i c a l  t r o u b l e s ,  and PKI tu r n e d  
to  th e  p r e s i d e n t  as  th e  o n ly  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e  c a p a b le  o f  
p r e v e n t i n g  th e  em ergence  o f  e i t h e r  m i l i t a r y  d i c t a t o r s h i p  
o r  a r i g h tw in g  a n t i - c o m m u n is t  governm ent headed  b y  H a t ta .  
A f t e r  th e  com bined o p p o s i t i o n  o f  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  
e x c e p t  Murba t o  h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  o f  O c to b e r  2 8 , 1956 to  
’dream away th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  so  many p a r t i e s ’ , Sukarno  
on F e b ru a ry  2 1 , 1957» announced  h i s  lo n g - a w a i te d  c o n c e p t .  
I t  c o n ta in e d  two main p o i n t s :  a ’m u t u a l - c o o p e r a t i o n ’ 
c a b i n e t  t h a t  would  r e f l e c t  th e  p a r t i e s ’ r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
i n  p a r l i a m e n t  and  would th u s  e l i m i n a t e  o p p o s i t i o n ;  and 
a N a t io n a l  C o u n c i l  t h a t  would in c lu d e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
from  a l l  im p o r ta n t  f u n c t i o n a l  g ro u p s  i n  s o c i e t y ,  would 
a d v is e  th e  c a b i n e t  i n  i t s  w ork, and would be h ead ed  by  
h i m s e l f .  I n  answ er  to  t h e  q u e s t i o n  why comm unists
1 2
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sh o u ld , he  i n c l u d e d ,  he  r e p l i e d  t h a t  a p a r t y  t h a t  had 
won s i x  m i l l i o n  v o t e s  c o u ld  n o t  he  i g n o r e d ,  and t h a t  
’e v e ry b o d y  i s  n eed ed  i n  th e  work tow ards  n a t i o n a l  
p r o g r e s s ’ .^ The c o n c e p t  was S u k a r n o ’s f i r s t  s t e p  
to w a rd s  'g u id e d  d e m o c rac y ’ .
The PKI l e a d e r s  gave S u k a rn o ’s c o n c e p t  a joyous
p
welcome b e ca u se  i t  was a r e b u f f  to  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  an
a r m y - le d  o r  H a t t a - l e d  c a b i n e t ,  and b e c a u s e  i t  p ro m ised
e a r l y  communist p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  c a b i n e t ,  so m e th in g
t h a t  th e  a l l i a n c e  w i th  FNI had n o t a b l y  f a i l e d  to  p ro d u c e .
F o r  S u k a rn o ’s b e n e f i t ,  and p e rh a p s  a s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  to
o r d i n a r y  members o f  th e  P a r t y ’s new a l l i a n c e  w i th  a
h i g h l y  dub ious  ’d e m o c r a t ’ , th e  p o l i t b u r e a u  c la im e d  t h a t :
th e  W estern  sy s tem  o f  dem ocracy  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  
In d o n e s ia  up to  th e  p r e s e n t  h a s  b e en  h a rm fu l  
t o  th e  d eve lopm en t o f  th e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  and 
d e m o c ra t ic  movement,
t h a t  th e  W este rn  sy s te m  had  p ro v ed  u n a b le  t o  s o lv e  th e  
fu n d a m e n ta l  p rob lem s in  s o c i e t y ,  and t h a t  i t  had  b e en  
u se d  by  ’ th e  f o r e i g n  i m p e r i a l i s t s  and  t h e i r  p u p p e ts  
w i t h in  th e  c o u n t r y ’ t o  p l a y  o f f  one g roup  a g a i n s t  
another.3 The p o l i t b u r e a u  c la im e d  t h a t  th e  c o n c e p t  i n
1 2
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P roblem s F aced  by  th e  I n d o n e s ia n  P eo p le  T oday” , i n  
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n o  way d i s t u r b e d  th e  p a r t y  sy s te m  o r  th e  p a r l i a m e n ta r y  
s y s te m ,  and t h a t  i t  p e r m i t t e d  th e  developm ent o f  
dem ocracy* I t  m ust a l r e a d y  have  b e en  e v i d e n t ,  how ever, 
t h a t  th e  f u t u r e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  dem ocracy  was s e v e r e l y  
l i m i t e d .
W hile Masjumi e x p r e s s e d  o p p o s i t i o n  to  th e  c o n c e p t ,  
and  su c c e e d e d  i n  p e r s u a d in g  NU, P S I I ,  PIR and th e  Roman 
C a t h o l i c  P a r t y  to  i s s u e  a j o i n t  s t a t e m e n t  r e j e c t i n g  i t ,  
a n d  w h i le  FNI h e s i t a t e d  o v e r  i t s  c h o ic e  o f  a p o l i c y ,  th e  
PKI l e a d e r s  la u n c h e d  i n t o  f e v e r i s h  a c t i v i t y  to  a ro u s e  
mass s u p p o r t  f o r  S u k a r n o 's  p r o p o s a l .  An A c t io n  
Com m ittee o f  S u p p o r t  f o r  Bung K a r n o 's  C oncept was 
im m e d ia te ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  D ja k a r t a  w i th  communist 
S u h a r to  Rebo as  c h a irm a n .  D e m o n s t ra t io n s  and r a l l i e s  
were o r g a n iz e d  th ro u g h o u t  th e  c o u n t r y  to  e x p re s s  s u p p o r t  
f o r  th e  c o n c e p t .  The l a r g e s t  m e e tin g  was o r g a n iz e d  i n  
D j a k a r t a  o n ly  t h r e e  days  a f t e r  th e  o f f i c i a l  announcem ent 
o f  th e  c o n c e p t ,  when a m i l l i o n  p e o p le  were g a th e r e d  
t o g e t h e r .
The governm ent f i n a l l y  r e s ig n e d  on March 14> h a v in g  
been  u n a b le  to  cope w i th  th e  r e g i o n a l  a c t s  o f  in s u b ­
o r d i n a t i o n  and h a v in g  l o s t  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  many o f  th e  
o r i g i n a l  member p a r t i e s .  Sukarno  p l a c e d  th e  whole 
c o u n t r y  u n d e r  a s t a t e  o f  war and  s i e g e  w hich  gave g r e a t  
powers to  t h e  army commanders i n  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  a s  war
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administrators. Sukarno attacked those who wished to 
exclude PKI from a coalition government, commenting ’They 
want me to ride a horse, but insist that they must first 
chop off one foot of the horse. I cannot and will not 
ride a three-footed horse.’"' SOBSI, probably made brave 
by expressed or presumed support from Sukarno, led a 
24-hour strike in South Sumatra on March 18 to demand the 
restoration of civil government there.^ On the following 
day the SOBSI leaders told formateur Suwirjo that if a 
cabinet were formed including Masjumi but not PKI, ’SOBSI 
will not hesitate and is always in readiness to lead a 
total strike action all over Indonesia.*3
PKI wanted Suwirjo to succeed because the alterna­
tives, ranging from Hatta to Sukarno as formateur, were 
much less attractive. Aidit therefore told Suwirjo that 
PKI accepted his proposed programme, that PKI would 
support a cabinet based on PNI and NU, and that PKI 
would demand a mutual-cooperation cabinet only if Masjumi 
was brought into the next cabinet.^ The PKI leaders
1
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knew that the army and NU were strongly opposed to commu­
nist participation in the cabinet, and so they renounced 
PKI’s claim in order to encourage NU to accept another 
cabinet that excluded both FKI and Masjumi* But NU was 
adamant in its insistence on including Masjumi, and 
Suwirjo returned his mandate on April 2* Two days 
later Sukarno appointed himself, ’citizen Sukarno’, as 
formateur of an ’emergency extra-parliamentary business 
cabinet’* Masjumi at once condemned Sukarno’s action 
as illegal, but PKI called on ’the entire people and 
armed forces to give the fullest assistance to our 
President-Supreme Commander’. On April 7, the polit- 
bureau declared Sukarno’s action to be fully legal, but 
also raised the slogan ’prevent all abuses of the state 
of war and siege
The new cabinet, the Djuanda cabinet, was installed 
on April 9. It included four PNI members, four NU, two 
Masjumi, one each from PSII, IPKI, SKI, Murba and the 
Protestant Party, and eight non-party persons* Masjumi 
rejected the cabinet outright as unconstitutional and 
expelled its two members who had joined the cabinet; NU 
refused to identify itself with the cabinet, but
1
Editorial, HR, April 5, 1957.
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permitted its members to participate as individuals* 
Significantly, Sukarno did not choose any of the PNI 
leaders as ministers, and the 23 cabinet members were 
almost all political nonentities who owed their position 
to the president and who would be amenable to Sukarno’s 
commands*
Within the new cabinet, PKI could count at least 
five progressives1 who were considered at least quite 
friendly towards the Party: Sudibjo, the PSII Minister of 
Information, Sadjarwo, ex-BTI Minister of Agriculture, 
Prijono, Murba Minister of Education and Culture, Chairul 
Saleh, the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, and Hanafi, 
the Minister for the Mobilization of the National Strength 
for Reconstruction*
5• Alliance with Sukarno
The period of the Djuanda cabinet, from April 9, 1957 
to July 6, 1959, marked the transition from parliamentary 
democracy to guided democracy, that is, to the formal 
assumption of power by Sukarno. In April 1957, however, 
Sukarno still preferred to rule indirectly and once he 
had formed the cabinet stepped back into the guise of 
constitutional president. Prime Minister Djuanda 
declared that although he led an ’extra-parliamentary 
business cabinet’ he felt he was responsible to parliament.
One of the first major acts of the Djuanda cabinet 
heartened PKI and indicated that Sukarno might truly be 
aiming at a mutual-cooperation cabinet and not just 
talking about one in order to win communist support* On 
July 12, 1957, the National Council was installed as an 
adviser to the cabinet. Its forty-five members 
represented what Sukarno calls ’functional g r o u p s a n d  
included nine persons who were either communist or known 
to be sympathetic to PKI. The newspaper ’’Indonesia 
Raja” reported that the president’s original list of 
members had been mostly ’leftists’, but that it had been
pmodified by the cabinet.
In April 1957, Aidit explained that the Djuanda 
cabinet was not the 100 per cent implementation of 
Sukarno’s concept, but that ’it is a phase which, according 
to the hard facts of the situation, must be traversed 
before 100 per cent implementation’.-^ While supporting 
the cabinet, PKI raised as its major slogan, ’Implement
1
The ’functional groups’ represented in the national 
council were: workers, peasants, intellectuals, youth, 
national industrialists, artists, citizens of foreign 
descent, reporters, women, religious groups (Moslem, 
Protestant, Roman Catholic and Bali-Hindu), the generation 
of 1945, the armed forces (including the police), the 
attorney-general, the cabinet, and the regions.
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Efforts were madeBung Karno’s Concept 100 Per Cent.’1 
to identify the Party as closely as possible with the 
president. Communist policies, programmes and requests 
came to be justified by suitable quotations from Sukarno 
speeches and writings of thirty years. This close 
identification served several purposes at that time. It 
strengthened Sukarno’s friendship with PKI, and it made 
it very difficult for PKI’s opponents to attack the 
Party without appearing to attack the president. 
Furthermore, it permitted PKI to exploit his tremendous 
personal appeal in order to win votes in the local 
elections held from June to November 1957 in Java, and 
then in some of the outer regions.
PKI’s identification with Sukarno played some part 
in enabling the Party to emerge as the largest party in 
the local elections. In Java, the communist vote was 
increased from 5,477>707 in September 1955 to 7>514>197* 
PKI was now the largest party in Central Java, and the 
second largest in the other regions of Java. It 
appeared that at least some of the communist gains were 
made at the expense of FNI.
1
In the September 1955 parliamentary elections, PKI had 
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the third in West Java, and the fourth in Djakarta Raja. 
For a brief discussion of the 1955 and 1957 election 
results, see above, pp.469-78*
The communist gains caused much resentment among
the other political parties. As soon as the results of
the first, the Djakarta Raja, elections were known, a
"Harian Rakjat" editorial stated in reply to charges that
PKI-PNI-NU cooperation was benefiting only PKI:
PKI does not like it if cooperation benefits 
only the other side, but neither does PKI 
like it if cooperation benefits only its own 
side. This is the elementary principle of 
cooperation: the principle of equal status 
and mutual benefit.-’
Aidit advised PNI and NU that they had lost votes because 
they had not been resolute enough in adhering to the path 
of democracy and unity with the people, nor in attacking 
the reactionaries.2 He said that the results showed 
’a shift to the left of the Indonesian people’, and that 
only parties that realized this and also swung left 
would gain the people’s confidence.
Some of the regional leaders of PNI in particular 
were angered by PKI’s electoral gains. First the 
Central Java section of the party and then the East 
Java, North Sumatra and West Java sections instructed 
their branches to cease cooperation with PKI.*^  Worse 
still for PKI, on August 10, 1957» the PNI secretary- 
general declared PNI’s readiness to cooperate with
1 2 
HR, June 27, 1957. HR, June 28, 1957.
3 TI, November 1 and 6, 19575 February 5, 1958.
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Masjumi and NU 'in the interest of the defence of
democratic principles1,”1 and although PNI-Masjumi
cooperation did not materialize on a national level, the
PNI regional councils in West and Central Java and North
2Sumatra expressed their desire for such cooperation.
PNI national and local leaders attacked PKI as a Soviet 
tool, while the PNI newspaper on November 14 declared 
that PKI was trying to create a 'second Yenan' in East 
Sumatra as a prelude to an armed takeover of all 
Indonesia.^ NU leaders also said harsh things about 
PKI.U
In the developing situation, in which the regional 
army-led councils were taking stern anti-communist 
measures at the same time as apparently strengthening 
their position vis-a-vis the central government, and in 
which important elements in PNI and NU were becoming ever 
more critical of PKI and were seemingly moving towards a
1
TI, August 12, 1957«2
TI, November 1 and 6, and December 28, 1957*
3 Editorial, Suluh Indonesia, November 14» 1957«
4 For example, Abdulwahab, a member of the NU executive 
council, was reported as saying that PKI's advances were 
bringing Indonesia close to civil war, and as demanding 
that PKI and other communist organizations be outlawed; 
Justus Maria van der Kroef, "Disunited Indonesia", Far 
Eastern Survey, part I, April 1958» vol.XXVII, no.4» 
PP.57-8.
rapprochement with Masjumi, the PKI leaders could only 
maintain their support of the government and endeavour 
to move even closer to Sukarno.
Lavish praise of Sukarno became a regular feature 
of PKI statements and speeches, and is widely believed 
to have made a favourable impression on the flattery- 
loving president. In August 1957» when Sukarno launched 
a ’New Life Movement', a vaguely defined movement to 
renovate the life of the Indonesian people, the PKI 
central committee at once ordered all Party leaders in
Athe regions to join in it. On August 19> Aidit was
among the president's party which did a little but much
publicized work in cleaning one of Djakarta's markets.
On October 20, Aidit declared PKI's acceptance of the
2Pantjasila unchanged as the basis of the state. As 
Sukarno created the Pantjasila and was currently striving 
to have it accepted by the Constituent Assembly, PKI's 
acceptance of it unchanged, despite objections to the 
first sila, the belief in God the Almighty, was a gesture 
of friendship towards the president.
Apart from praising Sukarno and giving support to 
his ideas and to the government he had appointed, the PKI
1
HR, August 6, 1957»2
RI, October-November 1957> pp.19-20.
leaders also increased their attacks on the common 
enemies, the army-led regional councils, Masjumi and PSI. 
The increasingly derogatory attacks on the councils was 
illustrated by a booklet, written by the communist 
leader in West Sumatra, which attacked ’the fascism of 
the "Banteng Council - PSI”’ for its ’little warlord 
government’, its protection of Dutch capital, and its 
efforts to bring down both Sukarno and the cabinet.
PKI opposition to the councils was not limited to words.
A 24-hour general strike was launched by SOBSI against 
the Garuda Council in South Sumatra on March 18, 1957* 
and on August 21, PKI organized a giant rally in Bukit 
Tinggi, the capital of West Sumatra, in protest against 
the Banteng Council. These were the only non-verbal 
actions taken by political parties against the councils, 
and afforded evidence for Sukarno that PKI would stand 
bravely at his side in his dispute with the councils.
Communist attacks on Masjumi and PSI continued, 
especially for their alleged complicity in the creation 
of the regional councils. In November 1957* both 
’’Harian Rakjat" and another communist newspaper in
1 Nursuhud, Meniingkap Tabir *Dewan-Banteng’ (Lifting the 
Banteng Councils Curtain), Djakarta, 1958» 36 p. The 
Banteng Council was the council established in Central 
Sumatra by Lieutenant-Colonel Husein.
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Djakarta, "Bintang Timur", published a report from China 
which had originated in the Indian periodical "Blitz" 
and which linked Masjumi and PSI with * the American plot
Ato overthrow the Sukarno regime*. The report also 
claimed that Masjumi had requested Taiwan to furnish 
more assistance to the Darul Islam rebels.
An anomaly in PKI*s political line was a temporary 
halt towards the end of 1957 in attacks on Hatta. This 
occurred for one of two reasons, or for a combination of 
both. First, a conference of national and regional 
military and civilian leaders, held at the beginning of 
September, had shown that many important persons wanted 
renewed cooperation between Sukarno and Hatta. The 
possibility of a new period of cooperation between the 
two seemed possible, and PKI, unsure of Sukarno*s 
intentions or his ability to keep Hatta out of a top 
government post, played safe by not antagonizing Hatta 
too much. Second, Hatta had visited China in October, 
and not only had been well received by the Chinese 
leaders but had also made favourable comments on China*s 
development under communist rule. PKI*s leaders might 
have felt that he had experienced a genuine change of 
heart, or they might have wished not to embarrass the
1
Reported in TI, November 22 and 28, 1957*
Chinese government or themselves by attacks on him at 
that time. Prom September attacks on Hatta were 
dropped, and Lukman, speaking in parliament on a reso­
lution to establish a commission to re-create the 
Sukamo-Hatta duumvirate, expressed support for the 
resolution and even his gratitude that there were
«1meeting points in the views of Hatta and the Party. 
Fortunately for PKI, events were to take a rapid turn 
which irrevocably separated Hatta from Sukarno and 
strengthened Sukarno's hand sufficiently so that he 
could continue to ignore Hatta.
It should be noted that at the same time as it gave 
support to the Djuanda cabinet, PKI also made sufficient 
criticisms of the government in order still to present 
itself to its members and society at large as a critical 
and revolutionary party. SOBSI strongly criticized a 
regulation of August 24> 1957 which banned all strikes 
in ’vital* industries, enterprises and offices.2 On 
August 27> parliament voted 94 to 81 against a government 
draft state of emergency law and for amendments proposed 
by PKI.3 A popular campaign was waged to urge the
1
TI, December 2, 1957*
2
RI, September 1957> pp.28-9*
3 RI, September 1957» PP*15-16*
government to implement SOBSI and BTI proposals for the 
distribution of rice at low prices, and in October 
"Harian Rakjat" called on the government to end the ban 
by local and regional army commanders on the shipment of
Arice from their areas. Towards the end of the year, 
communist representatives in parliament criticized the 
governments budget for its low allocations for such as 
the Ministry of Education and Culture, thus implying that
pexpenditure on the armed forces was too high. Such 
criticism was, however, kept very much in check so that 
it would not alienate the government or its supporters, 
or provoke repression by local army commanders.
Towards the end of 1957 an anti-Dutch campaign 
spread across Indonesia in preparation for the United 
Nations' discussion of the West Irian question at the 
end of November. In the second week of November, Sukarno 
went so far as to warn that if the United Nations did not 
back Indonesia's claim for West Irian, then Indonesia 
might use methods that 'would startle the world' in order 
to win West Irian. On November 18, Sukarno and several 
political leaders including Aidit addressed a Liberate
1
Editorial, HR, October 12, 1957«
2
RI, December 1957» p*25.
West Irian rally in Djakarta* The rally endorsed a 
resolution which demanded that if the United Nations did 
not uphold Indonesia’s claim, then the government should 
nationalize the vital enterprises owned by the Dutch and 
accelerate the participation of Indonesians in the
amanagement of all Dutch enterprises* When the United 
Nations failed to give the necessary two-thirds vote in 
favour of the Indonesian claim, the government on December 
1 ordered a general strike for the following day against 
all Dutch enterprises. Local boycotts against Dutch 
companies and nationals had already begun in different 
parts of Indonesia. On December 3> workers began taking 
over Dutch concerns.
The extent to which PKI was responsible for the 
course of events which led to the take-over of all Dutch 
enterprises is difficult to ascertain. Certainly the 
communists were happy to encourage or foment anti-Dutch 
feelings, and communist mass organizations had called 
for stern measures and boycotts, while PKI gave its 
support to the government’s threat to take ’the other 
road’ to liberate West Irian. On October 21, however, 
the "Harian Rakjat" editorial, while it agreed that 
’clear measures must be begun’ against Dutch capital,
1
HR, November 19, 1957
r; ^  o
*j t j
pointed out that Indonesia was in no position to 
confiscate at one stroke all Dutch capital in the
Acountry. ' On November the central committee issued 
a statement by Aidit which also spoke vaguely of ftaking 
action in proportion to the Dutch stubborn and insolent 
attitude', but put forward no concrete proposals for 
action. It would appear that Sukarno was one if not 
the prime mover in the campaign to seize all Dutch 
enterprises,* 2 and that PKI gladly followed him, though 
always careful never to get one step ahead in case that 
would bring retribution. The actual take-over was 
effected by the trade unions, of which the majority 
belonged to SOBSI.
Hearsay has it that many members of the cabinet, and 
probably including Djuanda, were opposed to such drastic 
action against the Dutch partly because they feared the 
economic disruption that was expected to ensue. But 
once the take-over had taken place they were presented 
with a fait accompli that they had to support. The 
first government reaction to the workers' take-over was
-
HR, October 21, 1957.2
Sukarno told Louis Fischer that he had given the order 
for the take-over and that he had urged the confiscation 
of Dutch properties as early as 1950 when he had been 
opposed by the Natsir cabinet; Louis Fischer, The Story 
of Indonesia, London, 1959> p.300.
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t o  d e c l a r e  a l l  Dutch e n t e r p r i s e s  t o  be  u n d e r  government  
management .  The PKI l e a d e r s ,  p r o b a b l y  a f r a i d  t h a t  th e  
w o r k e r s ’ a c t i o n  m igh t  f r i g h t e n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  
an d  t h e  army i n t o  an a l l i a n c e  w i th  Masjumi,  c a l l e d  on 
t h e  w o rk e r s  i n  t h e  s e i z e d  e n t e r p r i s e s  t o  a v o id  ’a d v e n t u r ­
i s t ’ a c t s ,  t o  m a i n t a i n  f i r m  work d i s c i p l i n e ,  t o  a s s i s t  
t h e  new management ’w i t h  a l l  t h e i r  e n e r g y ’ , and  t o  h e l p  
p r e v e n t  s a b o ta g e *  On December 13, N a s u t i o n ,  as  army 
c h i e f  o f  s t a f f ,  o r d e r e d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t o  t a k e  o v e r  and
s u p e r v i z e  d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  name o f  t h e  R e p u b l ic  a l l  Dutch
2
e n t e r p r i s e s  -  a m easure  t h a t  PKI welcomed as ’g o o d ’ .
PKI a l s o  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  ’ In  o r d e r  t o  p r e v e n t  s a b o t a g e ,  t o  
i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i o n  and  t o  r a i s e  q u a l i t y  i t  would be  v e r y  
w i s e ’ f o r  t h e  governm ent  t o  i n t r o d u c e  worker  p a r t i c i -
3
p a t i o n  i n  th e  management c o u n c i l s  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s .
T h is  t h e  army r e f u s e d  t o  c o u n te n a n c e .
C r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  t a k e - o v e r ,  which  came from H a t t a  
and  Masjumi,  m o s t ly  condemned t h e  l a c k  o f  p r e p a r a t i o n  
which was r e s u l t i n g  i n  economic d i s o r d e r .  PKI, i n  o r d e r
1
E d i t o r i a l ,  HR, December 7 ,  1957*
2
PKI, "Memasuki Tahun 1958 dengan Ease  Baru P e rd ju a n g a n  
A n t i - K o l o n i a l i s m e ” ( E n t e r i n g  1958 w i t h  a New Phase i n  t h e  
A n t i - C o l o n i a l  S t r u g g l e ) ,  BM, J a n u a r y  1958, p . 6 .
3
L o c . c i t .
t o  d e m o n s t r a te  i t s  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  governm ent and to  
p u r s u e  i t s  b a s i c  p o l i c y  o f  i s o l a t i n g  th e  r e a c t i o n a r i e s ,  
denounced  a l l  o p p o n e n ts  o f  th e  governm ent as  t r a i t o r s , " '  
and  had  A b u l h a j a t ,  a ’n o n - p a r t y ’ member o f  p a r l i a m e n t  
e l e c t e d  on th e  PKI l i s t ,  i n t r o d u c e  a m otion  o f  c o n f id e n c e  
i n  th e  s a g a c i t y  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t’s e f f o r t s  to  f r e e  West 
I r i a n .  The m otion  was c a r r i e d  on F e b ru a ry  28 , 1958 by 
95 v o te s  t o  20 , w i th  PNI, NU and PKI v o t in g  f o r ,  Masjumi 
and  PSI a g a i n s t ,  and  IPKI and th e  P r o t e s t a n t  and Roman
p
C a th o l i c  p a r t i e s  a b s t a i n i n g .  Meanwhile th e  PRRI- 
P e rm e s ta  r e b e l l i o n  had b ro k e n  o u t .
An a s s a s s i n a t i o n  a t t e m p t  on Sukarno on November 3 0 , 
1957 marked th e  end o f  e f f o r t s  a t  rap p ro ch em en t be tw een  
Sukarno and h i s  D juanda c a b i n e t  on th e  one hand and th e  
d i s s i d e n t  r e g i o n a l  c o u n c i l s  on th e  o t h e r .  Sukarno  l e f t  
on a f o r t y - d a y  ' r e s t  to u r*  o f  th e  w o rld  on J a n u a r y  6 , 
1958. W hile he was away th e  B an teng  C o u n c il  on F e b ru a ry  
10 p r e s e n t e d  th e  c e n t r a l  governm ent w i th  a f i v e - d a y  
u l t im a tu m  e i t h e r  t o  w ith d raw  th e  m andate  o f  th e  D juanda 
c a b i n e t  and d e s i g n a t e  H a t ta  and th e  S u l t a n  o f  J o g j a k a r t a  
as f o r m a te u r s ,  o r  to  s e e  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a s e p a r a t e  
s t a t e  i n  C e n t r a l  S u m a tra .  N ext day th e  c a b i n e t  r e j e c t e d  
th e  u l t im a tu m  a n d  d i s h o n o u r a b ly  d i s c h a r g e d  th e  l e a d in g
1 2
I b i d . , p .11 HR, March 1, 1958
arm y o f f i c e r s  who had d r a m  up th e  u l t im a tu m . The r e b e l  
go v ern m en t was announced  on F e b r u a r y  1 5 . Sukarno  
r e t u r n e d  t o  I n d o n e s ia  on th e  f o l lo w in g  day  and was 
a p p a r e n t l y  th e  c h i e f  v o ic e  dem anding s t e r n  m easu res  
a g a i n s t  th e  r e b e l s .  A i d i t ,  on th e  1 7 th ,  c a l l e d  f o r  
im m ed ia te  and f i r m  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  th e  ’c o r r u p t  and 
t r e a c h e r o u s  " r e v o l u t i o n a r y  g o v e rn m e n t" ’ and a g a i n s t  i t s  
s u p p o r t e r s .  H is  c a l l  was echoed  by  th e  communist mass 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  B oth  PNI and NU a l s o  demanded th e  s p e e d y  
e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  th e  r e b e l s .
The c e n t r a l  governm ent a c t e d  w i th  s u r p r i s i n g  s p e e d .  
L arge  num bers o f  t r o o p s  la n d e d  i n  E a s t  Sum atra  on March 
7 ,  and on th e  w es t  c o a s t  o f  S um atra  on A p r i l  17* The 
r e b e l  f o r c e s  were q u i c k l y  pushed  i n t o  th e  ju n g le  where 
t h e y  have c o n t in u e d  to  e x i s t  a s  g u e r r i l l a  b a n d s .  PKI 
n o t  o n ly  gave v e r b a l  s u p p o r t  t o  th e  c e n t r a l  go v e rn m en t,  
b u t  a l s o  c la im e d  t h a t  i n  C e n t r a l  S um atra  members o f  t h e  
P a r t y  and  o f  Pemuda R a k ja t  to o k  to  t h e  h i l l s  and  a c t i v e l y
p
fo u g h t  th e  r e b e l s .  W id esp read  r e p o r t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
th e  com m unists s e r v e d  as s o u r c e s  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  f o r  th e  
a d v a n c in g  governm ent t r o o p s  and  were o f  a s s i s t a n c e  i n
1
R I, March 1958» p .7*
2
T h is  c la im  was made t o  me by  PKI and Pemuda R a k ja t  
c a d r e s .  See a l s o  th e  r e f e r e n c e  t o  ’p e o p l e ’s g u e r r i l l a s ’ 
f i g h t i n g  th e  PR R I-Perm esta  r e b e l s ,  i n  PKI, 40 Tahun PK I, 
P .Ö7.
helping re-establish an administration in the cleared 
areas. Persons from North Sulawesi also reported that 
communists from Tondano organized guerrilla units to 
harass the Permesta rebels there. Communist support to 
the government forces can have been of only peripheral 
importance, but it did demonstrate PKI's support for the 
Djakarta regime. It also resulted in the government 
forces tolerating organizational activities by PKI and 
its mass organizations in the cleared areas at a time 
when all political activity was theoretically banned
Athere.
In the heat of the first weeks of the rebellion,
PKI was unwilling to make criticisms of the government.
The central committee, in its meeting from March 31 to 
April 3, 1958, blamed the rising price of rice on the 
rebels, Kuomintang agents, commission agents and
plandlords - but not on the government. When a cabinet 
reshuffle occurred in June 1958, Aidit pledged even
1 See above, p.162, for PKI's claim that during the period 
from August 1956 to August 1959 it increased membership 
t>y 38 per cent in West Sumatra and 1+0 per cent in North 
Sulawesi.
2
"Resolusi tentang Penurunan Harga Beras" (Resolution on 
Lowering the Price of Rice), BM, March-April 1958, p.178.
A
s t r o n g e r  s u p p o r t .  Once th e  d a n g e r  o f  th e  r e b e l l i o n  was 
p a s t ,  how ever, PKI resum ed i t s  p o l i c y  o f  s u p p o r t  p lu s  
c r i t i c i s m .  I n d i v i d u a l  governm ent m easu res  t h a t  r e c e i v e d  
c r i t i c i s m  in c lu d e d  th e  a l i e n  t a x  a c t ,  o f  J u l y  1958, w hich  
im posed  a s e v e r e  head  t a x  on a l l  a l i e n s ,  which in  e f f e c t  
m eant on th e  C h in e s e ;  th e  f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t s  a c t ,  o f  
S e p te m b e r ,  which i f  im p lem en ted  would have e s t a b l i s h e d  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  th e  r e g u l a t e d  in f lo w  o f  f o r e i g n  p r i v a t e  
c a p i t a l ;  th e  1959 b u d g e t ;  and a d e c r e e  o f  May 1959 w hich  
s t a t e d  t h a t  l i c e n c e s  f o r  f o re ig n -o w n e d ,  t h a t  i s ,  C h in e s e -  
owned, shops i n  a l l  v i l l a g e s  and  s u b - d i s t r i c t  c a p i t a l s  
would  b e  w ithd raw n  b y  th e  end o f  1959*
The econom ic s i t u a t i o n  gave th e  P a r t y  th e  g r e a t e s t  
o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  governm ent t h a t  w ould  be 
o f  b ro a d  p o p u la r  a p p e a l .  The t a k e - o v e r  o f  D utch  e n t e r ­
p r i s e s  had  c a u s e d  c o n s i d e r a b le  econom ic d i s r u p t i o n ,  and  
t h e n  t h e  r e b e l l i o n  c au se d  ev en  more. Enormous q u a n t i t i e s  
o f  new money were p r i n t e d  to  f in a n c e  th e  a n t i - r e b e l  
o p e r a t i o n s ,  and  i n f l a t i o n  r o c k e t e d .  Prom th e  b e g in n in g  
o f  Sep tem ber 1958, SOBSI waged a cam paign  to  p r e v e n t  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  th e  p r i c e  o f  r i c e .  At th e  end  o f  O c to b e r ,
1
D.N. A i d i t ,  " P id a to  d ih a d a p a n  Kongres ke-V  P a r t a i  
P e r s a t u a n  S o s i a l i s  D jerm an" (S p eech  b e f o r e  th e  F i f t h  
C ongress  o f  th e  German S o c i a l i s t  U n i ty  P a r t y ) ,  BM,
A ugust 1958, pp .384 -5*
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Lukraan w arned th e  governm ent t h a t  u n l e s s  i t  w ish e d  t o
f a c e  g r e a t  o p p o s i t i o n  i n s i d e  and  o u t s i d e  p a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e n
i t  s h o u ld  c a n c e l  p r o p o s a l s  to  f u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e  th e
o f f i c i a l  p r i c e  o f  r i c e  -  w hich  th e  governm ent d id  on
November 5« When th e  SOBSI n a t i o n a l  c o u n c i l  met from
December 22 t o  28 , 1958, i t  p o in te d  to  th e  c o n fu s e d
n a t u r e  o f  th e  g e n e r a l  econom ic s i t u a t i o n  and o f  s t a t e
f i n a n c e s ,  and to  th e  m arked d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in  th e  w orke rs*
2l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s .  I n s t e a d  o f  b la m in g  o n ly  th e  r e b e l s ,  
t h e  i m p e r i a l i s t s  and th e  c o r r u p t ,  t h e  c o u n c i l  a t t r i b u t e d  
th e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  p a r t  t o  t h e  governm en t*s  in a d e q u a te  
econom ic  and f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c i e s .
The A i d i t  l e a d e r s h i p  was p resu m ab ly  f o r c e d  to  
c r i t i c i z e  th e  governm ent o r  e l s e  r i s k  l o s i n g  th e  s u p p o r t  
o f  i t s  c a d r e s  and th e  p o p u la c e  in  g e n e r a l  who were 
d i r e c t l y  s u f f e r i n g  th e  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  economic c o n d i t i o n s .  
As f o r m e r ly  and i n  th e  f u t u r e ,  how ever, PKI had  t o  t r e a d  
w a r i l y  l e s t  i t s  c r i t i c i s m s  became so  h a r s h  as  t o  a l i e n a t e  
th e  r u l i n g  g roups  and d r i v e  them to w ard s  th e  a n t i ­
com m unis ts .
1
HR, November 1, 1958»
2
" R e s o lu t io n  on th e  G e n e ra l  R e p o r t  o f  th e  C e n t r a l  B ureau  
o f  SOBSI", ITUN, J a n u a r y  1959, P - 3 .
The rapid removal of the PRRI-Permesta as a threat 
to the central government greatly strengthened the 
position of both Sukarno and the central army leadership, 
and enabled the former to move further towards guided 
democracy, the latter towards greater participation in 
government. Parliamentary democracy suffered in the 
middle and was finally eliminated.
PKI was without the strength to effect any major 
change in the course of political events, but decided on 
a line that was designed to try to influence the course 
as far as possible away from dictatorship, and yet at the 
same time retain Sukarno’s now all-important protection 
and not bring down army repression. This line, which 
was to continue beyond the end of the Aidit leadership’s 
first ten years in control of PKI, has consisted of 
rearguard action in defence of parliamentary democracy 
and the party system, promotion of Sukarno’s main policy 
decisions (though at the same time trying to influence 
them along channels more desirable to PKI), and the 
expression of strong opposition to dictatorship, military 
dictatorship in particular.
The major political force which was most intolerant 
of the political parties and of the parliamentary system 
was the army. Army participation in extra-military 
affairs had been greatly increased under the state of war
5g:_
and  s i e g e  d e c r e e  o f  March 14» 1957 b y  which th e  army 
commanders had  become war a d m i n i s t r a t o r s .  Then, 
b e g in n i n g  in  Ju n e  1957» th e  army e s t a b l i s h e d  c o o p e r a t i o n  
co m m ittee s  b e tw ee n  th e  army and  th e  f u n c t i o n a l  g ro u p s ,  
su c h  a s  y o u th ,  w o rk e r s ,  p e a s a n t s  and women, w hich  
c o n ta in e d  a l l  e x i s t i n g  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  f i e l d s  and were d e s ig n e d  p r i m a r i l y  so  t h a t  
th e  army c o u ld  k eep  w a tch  and  some c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  
f u n c t i o n a l  g r o u p s .  When th e  D utch  e n t e r p r i s e s  had  b e en  
s e i z e d ,  army o f f i c e r s  e n t e r e d  t h e i r  management, and on 
F e b ru a ry  10 , 1958 an a rm y - le d  N a t io n a l  F r o n t  f o r  th e  
L i b e r a t i o n  o f  West I r i a n  was e s t a b l i s h e d  to  c h a n n e l  a l l  
a c t i v i t i e s  in  t h e  cam paign . I t  lo o k e d  p o s s i b l e  a t  
f i r s t  t h a t  t h e  F r o n t  m igh t become a p o w e r fu l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
u n d e r  army c o n t r o l ,  b u t ,  r e p o r t e d l y  due t o  S u k a rn o ’s 
o p p o s i t i o n ,  i t  f a i l e d  to  become s i g n i f i c a n t .  As o f  May 
Day 1958 , th e  army b r o u g h t  t h e  May Day t r a d e  u n io n  
r a l l i e s  u n d e r  c o n t r o l ,  b a n n in g  p a ra d e s  and v e t t i n g  th e  
t e x t s  o f  s p e e c h e s .  I t  was a l s o  s u s p e c t e d  b y  th e  commu­
n i s t s  t h a t  t h e  army was b e h in d  th e  A ugust 2 4 » 1957 ban  
on s t r i k e s  i n  ’v i t a l ’ e n t e r p r i s e s  and o f f i c e s ,  and a l s o  
th e  p o s tp o n e m e n t,  announced  on Sep tem ber 2 2 , 1958 , o f  
th e  1959 g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n s .
The PKI l e a d e r s  n a t u r a l l y  v iew ed  w i th  a la rm  th e  
grow ing  army p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  n o n - m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s ,
r o o ,
O  O '
e s p e c i a l l y  as  th e  army w a s ,  by  and  l a r g e ,  a n t i - c o m m u n is t , 
a n d  a s  t h e r e  were rum ours t h a t  many im p o r ta n t  o f f i c e r s  
w a n te d  a  m i l i t a r y  d i c t a t o r s h i p .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a t  th e  same 
t im e  a s  h a i l i n g  th e  e t e r n a l  u n i t y  o f  th e  a rm y -p e o p le  
’d w i t u n g g a l ’ ( t w o - i n - o n e ) ,  PKI waged an i n t e n s i v e  cam paign  
among P a r t y  members to  warn a g a i n s t  t h e  f a s c i s t  d a n g e r  
p r e s e n t e d  by  th e  arm y, and  p u b l i c l y  opposed  army 1i n t e r ­
f e r e n c e  ’ i n  n o n - m i l i t a r y  a f f a i r s .  The f i r s t  o u tsp o k e n  
o p p o s i t i o n  to  army i n t e r f e r e n c e  was made by  b o th  PKI and 
SOBSI i n  November 1958.
A i d i t ,  s p e a k in g  to  th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  on November 
19» 1958, s a i d  t h a t  t h e  p e o p le  were w i l l i n g  to  g iv e  
c e r t a i n  pow ers t o  t h e  armed f o r c e s  so  lo n g  as  th o s e  
pow ers were n o t  m isu se d ,  b u t  he c o m p la in ed  o f  ’ th e  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  by  c e r t a i n  o f f i c e r s  i n  econom ic , f i n a n c i a l
A
and g o v e rn m e n ta l  p o l i c y  m a t t e r s ’ .
In  b r i e f ,  th e  grow ing  i n t e r f e r e n c e  o f  c e r t a i n  
o f f i c e r s  i n  economic and  f i n a n c i a l  m a t t e r s  c an  
l e a d  t o  d e m o r a l i z a t i o n ,  can  g iv e  b i r t h  to  
w a r lo r d s ,  and i s  a t h r e a t  to  th e  p u r i t y  o f  th e  
p a t r i o t i c  armed f o r c e s  o f  th e  R e p u b l ic .
A i d i t  a l s o  a t t a c k e d  th e  a rm y ’s u se  o f  th e  s t a t e  o f  war
and  s i e g e  to  r e s t r i c t  d e m o c ra t ic  l i b e r t i e s  b y  su c h
1
D.N. A i d i t ,  ’’B e r s a tu  Menempuh D ja la n  Dem okrasi T e rp im p in  
Menudju P e la k s a n a k a a n  K o n sep s i  P r e s id e n  Sukarno  100%” 
(U n i te  A long th e  Road o f  G uided  Democracy to w ard s  t h e  
100% Im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  P r e s i d e n t  S u k a rn o ’s C o n c e p t ) ,  HR, 
November 20 , 1958.
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measures as the prohibition of political meetings and
the prohibition of strikes. Aidit's v/ords were echoed
by Njono, the SOBSI secretary-general, on November 29^
The PKI central committee^ New Year message, issued on
December 31, 1958, went further to state that the
communists must resist all efforts towards the creation
2of a military dictatorship.
During December 1958, the extension of the state of 
war and siege for another year was accepted unanimously 
by parliament, probably because opposition would have 
been futile and might have antagonized the army into 
increased pressure for an end to parliamentary activities. 
Shortly afterwards, at the beginning of 1959» PKI 
reportedly struck a blow which threatened to remove 
Nasution from his post as army chief when it leaked the 
news of massive army illegal trade dealings through 
Tandjong Priok, the port of Djakarta.  ^ Nasution should 
have taken the blame, but it was placed on officers around 
him who were moved to other posts. If this report is 
correct, it would mean that PKI greatly antagonized the
1
ITTJN, December 1958, pp.7-8.
2
HR, December 31, 1958.
3 My source for this report was a prominent politician, 
but one who must remain anonymous.
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army leadership but at the same time earned the thanks 
of Sukarno who was attempting to reduce the power and 
prestige of the central army command.
Communist opposition to the army became more 
courageous during the first months of 1959> and one 
suspects that the courage derived from Sukarno’s 
connivance. On January Lukman stated the Party’s 
opposition to the appointment to parliament of unelected
Arepresentatives of the armed forces, while in May Aidit 
declared that:
There has never yet been, nor will there ever 
be, anything to prove that a military dictator­
ship can save the people and further advance 
world developments.
If a military dictatorship were established, Aidit
2warned, then the Indonesian communists would fight it.
The PKI fear of and shadow boxing with the army 
forced the Party to a greater reliance on Sukarno as its 
protector against the military. The essential nature 
of the alliance in turn compelled PKI to support Sukarno’s 
moves towards guided democracy, while at the same time 
pleading for the maintenance of the party system and for 




D.N. Aidit, ’'Building the Organization is Important, 
but Building Ideology is Even More Important”, supplement 
to RI, June-July 1959> pp.4-5*
In  a s t a t e m e n t  i s s u e d  on O c to b er  24» 1958» A i d i t  
a t t e m p t e d  t o  show t h a t  s u p p o r t  o f  g u i d e d  dem ocracy  was
A
’ t h e  most  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p o l i c y ’ . He acknow ledged  t h a t  
l i b e r a l  democracy had  f a i l e d  t o  s o l v e  I n d o n e s i a ’s m ajor  
p r o b le m s  and was a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c o r r u p t i o n  and 
b u r e a u c r a c y .  As an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  PKI a c c e p t e d  g u id e d  
dem ocracy  on th e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  i t  was opposed  t o  
b o t h  d i c t a t o r s h i p  and l i b e r a l i s m .  He t h e n  d e f i n e d  th e  
a n t i - l i b e r a l  a s p e c t s  o f  g u id e d  dem ocracy  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
f i e l d  a s  t h e  100 p e r  c e n t  i m p l e m e n ta t i o n  o f  S u k a r n o ' s  
c o n c e p t ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a c a b i n e t  b a s e d  on 
p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ;  and i n  t h e  economic f i e l d  
a s  b u i l d i n g  t h e  s t a t e  s e c t o r  o f  t h e  economy t o  a do m in an t  
p o s i t i o n .  A i d i t  c la im e d  t h a t  o n l y  Sukarno  s h o u l d  be  t h e  
g u id e  i n  g u id e d  dem ocracy ,  an d  ' n o t  a s  a d i c t a t o r ,  b u t  as  
a d e m o cra t  who r e s o l u t e l y  o b s e r v e s  t h e  p a r t y  sy s te m  and 
t h e  r i g h t s  o f  p a r l i a m e n t ' .  Sukarno would r e q u i r e  s p e c i a l  
r i g h t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  g u i d e ,  b u t  A i d i t  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h i s  
was 'The o n ly  way to  d e f e a t  m i l i t a r y  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  
d i c t a t o r s h i p  on th e  one h a n d ,  and t o  d e f e a t  l i b e r a l i s m  
on th e  o t h e r ' ,  t h e  o n l y  way t o  b r i n g  S u k a r n o ' s  c o n c e p t  
i n t o  e x i s t e n c e .
1
D.N. A i d i t ,  "Mendukung Demokrasi  T e rp im p in  Ada lah  
P o l i t i k  j a n g  P a l i n g  R e v o l u s i o n e r " (To S u p p o r t  Guided 
Democracy i s  th e  Most R e v o l u t i o n a r y  P o l i c y ) ,  HR,
O c to b e r  25,  1958*
Just what Sukarno meant by guided democracy had not
been revealed, and here Aidit was attempting to formulate
a definition for the president and then to use the Party
and its mass organizations to popularize it. Aidit’s
definition involved relinquishing a little of democracy
in order not to antagonize Sukarno or strengthen the
hand of those demanding the complete abolition of the
party and parliamentary system. In short, an attempt
at a tactical retreat to a position chosen by the Party.
But the retreat was to continue. At the end of December
1958 and in January 1959» the PKI leaders were vocal in
their defence of parliament. They praised it for the
record amount of work done in 1958, spoke of ’the great
prestige of parliament*, and declared that ’Only fascists
and foul thieves do not respect a parliament chosen by
the people.*1 2 On January 11, 1959» however, when
Sukarno bluntly asked for PKI’s opinion of his proposal
for the inclusion of functional groups in parliament,
Aidit was forced to declare the Party’s support ’in 
2principle’.
On February 19, 1959> the cabinet reached important 
decisions on the implementation of guided democracy.
1
HR, December 31, 1958; January 3> 1959«2
HR, January 12, 1959.
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The c a b i n e t  d e c i d e d  f i r s t ,  t o  a sk  t h e  C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly
•1
t o  r e s t o r e  th e  1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  s e c o n d ,  to  i n t r o d u c e  
an  a c t  t o  s i m p l i f y  t h e  p a r t y  s y s te m ,  t h i r d ,  t h a t  
f u n c t i o n a l  g roups  would he  i n c l u d e d  as  e v e r y  second  
c a n d i d a t e  i n  a l l  e l e c t o r a l  l i s t s ,  w i t h  t h e  armed f o r c e s  
r e c e i v i n g  35 a p p o i n t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  a n d ,  f o u r t h ,  
t h a t  a N a t i o n a l  F r o n t  would  he  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t .  F iv e  days  l a t e r  th e  PKI p o l i t h u r e a u  
announced  i t s  s u p p o r t  f o r  a r e t u r n  t o  th e  1945
p
c o n s t i t u t i o n .
S a k i rm a n ,  w r i t i n g  i n  1960,  g a v e  t h e  o f f i c i a l  PKI 
v e r s i o n ,  and one w i t h  a  r i n g  o f  t r u t h ,  o f  why t h e  P a r t y  
d e c i d e d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  r e t u r n  t o  th e  1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n . - ^
He e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  a t  t h e  t im e  t h a t  t h e  c a b i n e t  d e c i d e d  
to  u rg e  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  PKI 
had  l i t t l e  c h o ic e  h u t  t o  a g r e e .  The C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly
1
I t  sh ou ld  he n oted  a g a in  th a t  under th e  1945 c o n s t i ­
tu t io n  the p r e s id e n t  h o ld s  powers rou gh ly  e q u iv a le n t  to  
th ose  o f  th e  p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s .  The 1945 
c o n s t i t u t io n  was s o  b r i e f  and vague, how ever, th a t  th e  
p r e s id e n t  co u ld  take to  h im s e lf  powers fa r  beyond th ose  
o f  h is  American c o u n te r p a r t.
2
N j o t o , "Hold High th e  S p i r i t  o f  1945”, RI, A pri l -M ay  
1959, p .1 7 .
3
Sak i rm an ,  "Apa A r t i  Sokongan PKI kepada  UUD 1945 dan  
Demokrasi  T e rp im p in "  (The Meaning o f  P K I ' s  S u p p o r t  f o r  
th e  1945 C o n s t i t u t i o n  and Guided Dem ocracy) ,  p a r t  I I ,  
BM, J u l y - A u g u s t  1960, p p . 3 2 0 -8 .
had been meeting for two years but had made little 
headway towards a new constitution because the Pantjasila 
and Moslem blocs were unable to compromise. At the same 
time, certain groups outside the assembly were putting 
forward the demand, which ’greatly endangered democratic 
life’, for the complete dissolution of political parties. 
In such a situation, according to Sakirman, PKI was faced 
with three possibilities: to unite with the anti- 
Pantjasila bloc, led by Masjumi, and so permit the 
assembly to continue, with the possibility of completing 
its work by compromises harmful to the people’s struggle; 
to take a passive attitude, or reject Sukarno’s appeal 
for the restoration of the 1945 constitution, which would 
have meant in effect uniting with the anti-Pantjasila 
forces, continuing the assembly meetings, or supporting 
the continuation of the 1950 constitution; or to unite 
with ’the democratic groups’ led by Sukarno by accepting 
his appeal unconditionally but at the same time fighting 
outside the assembly for conditions to prevent the misuse 
of the 1945 constitution by 'reactionary groups'.
Sakirman explained that for PKI the third possibility 
was the best, bearing in mind the national united front 
policy of isolating the reactionaries. To agree with the 
reactionaries to continue the Constituent Assembly was not 
possible either politically or psychologically. To agree
t o  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  th e  1950 c o n s t i t u t i o n  was a l s o  
i m p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  th e  cam paign 
a g a i n s t  l i b e r a l  d em ocracy  and f o r  th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  
p a r t i e s .  To a g re e  to  th e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  1950 
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  S ak irm an  c la im e d ,  would have s t r e n g t h e n e d  
t h e  hand  o f  th e  * f a s c i s t  e l e m e n t s ’ who w ished  t o  d i s s o l v e  
t h e  p a r t i e s .  T h e r e fo r e  i n  o r d e r  to  i s o l a t e  f u r t h e r  th e  
r e a c t i o n a r y  g ro u p  and to  s t r e n g t h e n  th e  u n i t y  o f  th e  
d e m o c r a t ic  g r o u p ,  PKI to o k  q u ic k  and  c o n c r e t e  s t e p s  to  
overcom e th e  c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  b y  u r g i n g  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  
o f  th e  1945 c o n s t i t u t i o n .
On A p r i l  2 2 ,  1959» Sukarno  a sk e d  th e  C o n s t i t u e n t  
A ssem bly  to  a p p ro v e  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  th e  1945 c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n .  Masjumi s u c c e e d e d  i n  r a l l y i n g  th e  o t h e r  Moslem 
p a r t i e s ,  NU, P S I I  and P e r t i ,  to  p r e s e n t  a s o l i d  f r o n t ,  so  
t h a t  when t h r e e  v o te s  were t a k e n  i n  th e  a ssem b ly  on May 
30 and Ju n e  1 on a p r o p o s a l  t o  r e s t o r e  th e  o ld  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n ,  th e  p r o p o s a l  f a i l e d  t o  o b t a i n  th e  n e c e s s a r y  tw o-
i
t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y .  In  th e  l a s t  s e s s i o n  o f  th e  a sse m b ly ,
1
FNI l e a d e r  A l i  S a s t r o a m i d j o jo  i s  r e p o r t e d  t o  have  s t a t e d  
t h a t  PKI, unhappy  w i th  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  1945 c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n ,  s p r e a d  rum ours d e s ig n e d  to  f r i g h t e n  NU i n t o  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n ;  I r e n e  T in k e r  and M i l l id g e  
W alker ,  " I n d o n e s i a ’s P a n a c e a :  1959 M odel" , F a r  E a s t e r n  
S u rv e y , December 1959, v o l .X X V III ,  n o . 12, p . 179* i t  
c o u ld  be  a rg u e d  t h a t  PKI hoped  to  p r e v e n t  th e  p r o p o s a l  
from  r e c e i v i n g  th e  t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  f o r c e  
Sukarno  to  com prom ise w i th  t h e  p a r t i e s  and g r a n t  them a
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Aidit proposed the dissolution of the assembly on the 
grounds that it had failed to draft a new constitution 
and was no longer representative of the balance of
Aforces in society. He also pointed out that there 
were now two ways of legalizing the 1945 constitution. 
Either a new Constituent Assembly could be elected, which 
was the democratic and constitutional way, or the 
president could decree the restoration of the old consti­
tution, a course that PKI could accept because the 
constitution had the support of a majority in the assembly.
On June 4, 1959* the central war administrator 
placed a temporary ban on all political activities.
Aidit at once instructed all Party members to observe 
the ban, ’the purpose of which is none other than to 
prevent unnecessary contradictions from arising among the
pranks of the people.’ He called on members to intensify
greater status and authority than given by the 1945 
constitution. But it would seem that the communist 
leaders were genuinely afraid that if the 1945 consti­
tution was not approved, then the forces that wished a 
complete end to all party and parliamentary activity 
might have won the presidents support. Therefore if the 
report of All’s statement is correct, it would appear 
that he made it in order to sow discord between Sukarno 
and PKI as a means of restoring Sukarno’s decreasing 
sympathy with PNI.
1
RI, June-July 1959, pp.16-17«
RI, June-July 1959, p.11«
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their education, and to:
ponder deeply over the steps that we have taken 
up to the present and ... give serious thought 
to the future steps so as to further strengthen 
national unity.
Sukarno returned from a two-month world tour on June 29, 
and on July 5 decreed the restoration of the 1945 consti­
tution. The Djuanda cabinet resigned on the following 
day, and Sukarno was left to form his own presidential 
cabinet which, under the terms of the 1945 constitution, 
would not be responsible to parliament.
6. Towards an Impasse?
Sukarno announced his cabinet on July 12, 1959*
The civilian ministers were either non-party persons or 
party members who could not be expected to go against the 
presidents wishes. Prominent party leaders were 
conspicuously absent. The armed forces were represented 
by eleven ministers. PKI could count five ministers who
might act as listening posts for the Party: Sadjarwo, 
Minister of Agrarian Affairs, Yamin, minister in charge 
of social-cultural affairs, Prijono, Minister of Education 
and Culture, and Sudibjo and Sudjono, the two ministers in 
charge of Mobilizing the people’s energy1.
In the rapid turbulence of events that occurred in 
the following eighteen months, a fairly simple pattern
was d i s c e r n i b l e .  On th e  one hand , i t  became e v id e n t  
t h a t  S ukarno  was d e p en d e n t  on th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  PKI, i n  h i s  b a l a n c i n g  a c t  w i th  t h e  arm y. He 
t r i e d  t o  d o m e s t i c a te  th e  p a r t i e s  t o  become th e  i n s t r u ­
m ents  o f  h i s  own w i l l ,  b u t  he p r o t e c t e d  a g a i n s t  
d i s s o l u t i o n  th o s e  t h a t  d e c l a r e d  th e m s e lv e s  t o  be  h i s  
a l l i e s .  On th e  o t h e r  h a n d , s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  was a p p l i e d  
by  th e  army to  cu rb  th e  power o f  th e  p a r t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
PKI. The f o l lo w in g  s e c t i o n  i s  c o n ce rn e d  w i th  f o u r  
a s p e c t s  o f  th e  e v e n ts  o f  th e  e i g h t e e n  m on ths : P K I 's  
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  th e  g o v e rn m en t,  t h e  P a r ty * s  r e a r g u a r d  
a c t i o n  in  d e fe n c e  o f  p a r l i a m e n ta r y  dem ocracy  and 
p o l i t i c a l  f ree d o m , an  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  th e  P a r t y ' s  g a in s  
and  l o s s e s  u n d e r  g u id e d  dem ocracy , and th e  e f f e c t  w i t h i n  
th e  P a r t y  o f  t h e  c o n t in u e d  a l l i a n c e  w i th  Sukarno  and  th e  
move to  g u id e d  dem ocracy .
On J u l y  13, 1959, A i d i t  announced  P K I 's  a t t i t u d e  to
-1
th e  new go v e rn m en t.  He s a i d  t h a t  PKI would do e v e r y ­
t h i n g  p o s s i b l e  to  e n s u re  th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e
p
c a b i n e t ' s  t h r e e - p o i n t  program m e, and t h a t  th e  P a r t y ' s
-
S to p  p r e s s  su p p le m e n t  to  R I, J u n e - J u l y  1959, p p .2 -3 »
2
The programme was fo o d  and c l o t h i n g  f o r  th e  p e o p le ,  
s e c u r i t y  (m eaning th e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  r e b e l  and  b a n d i t  
g r o u p s ) ,  and  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m .
attitude was basically the same as that taken towards the 
Djuanda cabinet: unreserved support for measures of 
benefit to the people, criticism of wavering measures, 
and strong criticism of ministers * actions harmful to 
the people* Subsequently, the Party was to maintain 
its eulogies of Sukarno himself, but, perhaps aware that 
the power situation forced Sukarno to protect the Party, 
to take greater freedom in outspoken criticism of 
government measures.
As Sukarno was the only barrier preventing stern 
anti-communist repressive measures by the army, PKI has 
taken care to continue its praise of him, its support 
for his leadership of the revolution* Aidit went so 
far as to show that it would be quite compatible with 
Marxism for a non-proletarian, such as Sukarno, to become
Athe leader of a socialist Indonesia* After all, neither 
Marx nor Engels was a worker.* In the communist criti­
cisms of the government, Sukarno was never implicated, 
and in turn he never defended those of his ministers who 
were criticized.
As early as August 6, 1959» Aidit expressed disap­
pointment at the composition of the cabinet, suspicion at
_
D.N. Aidit, Peladjaran dari Sedjarah PKI (Lessons from 
PKI*s History), Djakarta, i960, pp.22-3«
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the inclusion of so many military personnel, and his 
determination to work for communist inclusion in the
Acabinet. Communist participation in the government, 
he said:
is just as certain as the fact that the 
Indonesian people will wake up tomorrow to 
see the sun rising in the east, and to see 
it setting in the west in the evening.
In September, SOBSI warned of ’secret counterrevolutionary
2passengers’ in the cabinet. The first major attack on 
the government was launched in December 1959 and January 
i960 when the Party and its mass organizations led a 
massive campaign to protest the government’s economic 
measures, and to demand a 25 per cent increase in wages 
with a 50 per cent cut in the price of essential 
commodities. Delegations, petitions, letters and 
telegrams flooded in - until Nasution ordered strict 
measures against demonstrations held under the cloak of 
economic grievances.
In the midst of the agitation against the govern­
ment’s economic measures, Lukraan on January 10, 1960, 
declared that the people had lost its hope and trust in
T D.N. Aidit, "Back to the 1945 Constitution for a Change 
in Politics and Living Conditions", in supplement to RI, 
September-October 1959, pp.3-11*
2
Editorial, "After the Proclamation of the Presidential 
Decree", ITUN, September 1959, pp.2-3.
t h e  c a b i n e t s  a b i l i t y .  Sukarno  was r e q u e s t e d  t o  
r e p l a c e  th e  d e f i c i e n t  m i n i s t e r s .  The r e q u e s t  f o r  an  
a l t e r a t i o n  i n  th e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  c a b i n e t  was con­
t i n u e d  u n t i l  Sukarno l e f t  t h e  c o u n t r y  f o r  a n o t h e r  w o r ld
p
t o u r  on A p r i l  1. The moment Sukarno  l e f t ,  PKI a t  once 
d r o p p e d  t h e  r e q u e s t ,  and denounced  e f f o r t s  to w ard s  a 
c a b i n e t  r e s h u f f l e  a s  aimed a t  c r e a t i n g  new te n s io n s .^
I t  was f e a r e d  t h a t  w i t h o u t  Sukarno  a r e s h u f f l e  might  
mean a sw ing  t o  t h e  r i g h t .  Once he  r e t u r n e d ,  th e  
r e q u e s t  was resumed.
The most  th o r o u g h  a t t a c k  on t h e  c a b i n e t  was made on
J u l y  8 , 1960 when t h e  PKI p o l i t b u r e a u  i s s u e d  a document
e n t i t l e d  "An E v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  K e rd ja  C a b in e t  a f t e r  One
Year  i n  O f f i c e " . ^  A c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  p o l i t b u r e a u :
a y e a r  i s  l o n g  enough t o  know which o f  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t s  a s s i s t a n t s  o r  m i n i s t e r s  a r e  
c a p a b le  and which o f  them a r e  n o t ,  o r  do n o t  
w ish  t o  c a r r y  o u t  the  t h r e e - p o i n t  programme o f  
th e  K e r d ja  c a b i n e t  i n  a l l  e a r n e s t n e s s .
1
BB, J a n u a r y  1 5 , 1960,  p . 1; HR, J a n u a r y  11, 1960.
2
See ,  f o r  exam ple ,  HR, F e b r u a r y  11, 1960; and RI ,  A p r i l
1960, pp.4-5*
3
B in ta n g  T imur,  A p r i l  22 ,  1960.
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PKI, An E v a l u a t i o n  o f  th e  K e r d ja  C a b in e t  a f t e r  One Year 
i n  O f f i c e , mimeographed, D j a k a r t a ,  i 960",' 14 p .  K e rd ja  
(Work) C a b in e t  i s  t h e  name g iv e n  t o  S u k a r n o S  c a b i n e t .
Of c o u r s e  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  c r i t i c i z e d  i n  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  had  
b e e n  p r e v i o u s l y  s u b j e c t  to  c r i t i c i s m  by PKI.
r,; t) r
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I t  th e n  w en t on to  a t t a c k  ’ th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  th e  M i n i s t e r
o f  T ra d e ,  A r i f i n  H arahap* ; th e  M i n i s t e r  o f  L ab o u r ,  Ahem
E r n i n g p r a d j a ,  who ’does n o t  d e fe n d  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e
w o r k e r s ’ ; Yamin, f o r  ’h a r b o u r in g  d a n g e ro u s  i l l u s i o n s
a b o u t  t h e  i m p e r i a l i s t s  *; F o re ig n  M i n i s t e r  S u b a n d r io  f o r
p u r s u i n g  a f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  t h a t  ’i s  more one o f  n e e d in g
im p e r ia l i s m  th a n  o f  o p p o s in g  i t ’ , and  f o r  e x a c e r b a t i n g
I n d o n e s ia n - C h in e s e  r e l a t i o n s ;  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  I n t e r n a l
A f f a i r s ,  I p i k  Gandamana, f o r  i s s u i n g  a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c
r e g u l a t i o n s ;  and th e  M i n i s t e r  o f  I n f o r m a t io n ,  M a la d i ,
f o r  h i s  t o l e r a t i o n  o f  th e  r e a c t i o n a r y  D em o cra tic  L eague .
As f o r  th e  army, th e  p o l i t b u r e a u  c la im e d  t h a t  ’i t  i s  n o t
su c h  a d i f f i c u l t  t h i n g ’ to  smash t h e  r e b e l s ,  ’so  lo n g  a s
a s e r i o u s  a t t e m p t  i s  made to  do s o ’ , so lo n g  a s  th e
s e c u r i t y  f o r c e s  c e a s e d  ’a l s o  w aging  a f i g h t  a g a i n s t  th e
p e o p le  and  t h e  c o m m u n is ts ’ . However:
In  c o n t r a s t  w i th  some o f  h i s  m i n i s t e r  
a s s i s t a n t s  . . .  we se e  t h e  e f f o r t  made by  
P r e s i d e n t  Sukarno  to  pave t h e  way f o r  th e  
im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  programme o f  h i s  
c a b i n e t .
The p o l i t b u r e a u  ended w i th  a p l e a  f o r  changes  i n  th e  
c o m p o s i t io n  o f  th e  c a b i n e t .  In  th e  l a t e r  months o f  1960 
S u k a rn o ’s new s lo g a n  ’Nasakom ’ , s t a n d in g  f o r  n a t i o n a l i s t -  
r e l ig io u s - c o m m u n is t  u n i t y ,  was u sed  by  PKI to  demand a
Nasakom c a b i n e t
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PKI*s hardest battle during the first eighteen 
months of the Sukarno cabinet was a continuous one against 
restrictions on political freedom. It was a losing 
battle because the Party was not strong enough to with­
stand the combined pressure of Sukarno, who wanted to 
domesticate the parties for his own use, and the army, 
which in general was eager to ban the parties, especially 
PKI, or, if that was not yet possible, to severely 
restrict their freedom of action*
The temporary ban on all political activities, 
imposed on June 4, 1959, was eased in the areas free of 
rebels on August 1, 1959* Public meetings and demon­
strations were still forbidden, but closed meetings were 
allowed on the sole condition that the authorities be 
informed in advance of the intention to hold one* In 
practice, however, many, if not all, war administrators 
retained the power to prohibit closed meetings, and if 
one was permitted, to send along a representative of the 
military. At the end of July 1959, all higher govern­
ment officials were given until August 31 to resign from 
political parties - a measure which met ineffectual 
communist protest. Then, at the beginning of September, 
it was announced that henceforth the heads of autonomous
HR, July 29, 1959; RI, September-October 1959, p.8.
1
cnoJ u ' U
provinces, kabupatens and towns would be appointed, not
elected as formerly, and that they and the members of
their executive councils would have to resign from party
membership. This new measure brought a storm of protest
from all political parties, which led the government to
agree to review the system after a trial year.
At this point, the PKI congress in September 1959
courageously endorsed the statement that:
the people of Indonesia not only love 
democracy, but under the alert leadership 
of the Party the people actively defend 
democracy.
For the progressive development of Indonesia,PKI will continue to fight against the danger 
of military dictatorship or individual 
dictatorship, and at the same time to defend 
and extend democracy. But in case a 
military or individual dictatorship cannot 
be prevented, ... the duty of every commu­
nist will be to fight it with all his 
strength.'
Despite the words of courage, primarily intended to boost 
the morale of the congress delegates, the retreat con­
tinued. PKI had no weapons with which to fight.
Under the 1945 constitution the powers of the 
president are not clearly defined, and Sukarno took the 
right to rule by presidential decrees and decisions
1
PKI, Resolusi tentang Lappran Umum CC PKI kepada 
Kongres Nasional ke-VT (Resolution on the PKI Central 
Committee fs General Report to the Sixth National 
Congress), Djakarta, 1959, PP-33-4.
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without requesting parliaments approval. This meant, 
in fact, that parliament was being reduced to complete 
impotence. On October 2, 1959» FKI described what it 
considered to be the important role of parliament under 
the 1945 constitution,^ and, made bolder by PNI support, 
asserted, during the parliamentary debates of December
1960 through February 1961, parliament’s right to control
2the budget, Sukarno thereupon demonstrated his power 
by dissolving parliament and announcing his intention to 
appoint a new one.
At the same time that Sukarno was removing the power 
of parliament, the army was increasing its harrying 
tactics against the communists. Examples are many. 
"Harian Rakjat” was suspended for a total of 65 days from 
January to September 1960 inclusive, and it was tempo­
rarily banned in several regions; the communist news­
service, INPS, was closed for several months; the small 
pro-communist Djakarta newspaper "Republik” had its 
licence cancelled on April 26; and SOBSI’s periodical, 
"Bendera Buruh", had its licence cancelled in October 
1960. Several central and regional Party leaders were
_
Editorial, HR, October 2, 1959.
2 The main speeches of the communist representatives in 
the budget debates are given in abbreviated form in RI, 
February 1960, pp.10-15«
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im p r is o n e d  f o r  s h o r t  term s o r  i n t e r r o g a t e d  on s e v e r a l  
p r e t e x t s ;  many SOBSI c a d re s  w ere a r r e s t e d  f o r  i n c i t i n g  
o r  a l l e g e d l y  i n c i t i n g  w o rk e rs  to  s t r i k e ;  and  in  M arch, 
s t r i k e s  in  th e  p o r t s  o f  T and jong  P r io k ,  S em arang , and  
S u ra b a ja  w ere q u ic k ly  s u p p re s s e d  by  th e  arm y, t h e i r  
SOBSI l e a d e r s  a r r e s t e d .  In  E a s t  J a v a  th e  w ar a d m in is ­
t r a t o r  o rd e re d  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and  t h e i r  s u b s id i a r y  
o r g a n iz a t io n s  to  rem ove a l l  s ig n s  and  nam eboards from  
p u b l ic  v iew . D u rin g  th e  se c o n d  h a l f  o f  A ugust 1960, a 
s e r i e s  o f  d e m o n s tr a t io n s ,  a p p a r e n t ly  le d  b y  Moslem and 
PSI y o u th s ,  dem anded a ban  on PKI and i t s  mass o rg a n i­
z a t i o n s .  On A ugust 22 , th e  r e g io n a l  w ar a d m in i s t r a to r  
i n  S o u th  K a lim an ta n  im posed su c h  a b a n , and  was soon  
fo llo w e d  b y  h i s  c o l le a g u e s  in  S o u th  S u m a tra /D ja m b i, and  
S o u th  and S o u th -E a s t  S u la w e s i .
PKI r e a c te d  a t  once to  th e  b an s  b y  a s k in g  Sukarno
to  r e p e a l  them and  to  p u n ish  t h e i r  p e r p e t r a t o r s  f o r
1
c o n tr a v e n in g  th e  law  and f o r  s l a n d e r i n g  PK I. The 
com m unist mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  a l s o  p r o t e s t e d  th e  b a n s .  
S ukarno  r e c e iv e d  A id i t  on S ep tem ber 1 , and  th e n  c a l l e d  in  
a l l  r e g io n a l  w ar a d m i n i s t r a t o r s .  The com prom ise b e t  ween 
S u k a rn o , who opposed  a b an  on PKI, and  th e  arm y, m ost o f  
w hich  w an ted  o n e , was a d e c i s io n  on S ep tem b er 13 to
R I , S e p te m b e r-O c to b e r 1960, p .7*
1
s u s p e n d  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  u n t i l  December* 1, 1960. 
When th e  ban  was l i f t e d  a new r e g u l a t i o n  went i n t o  
e f f e c t  u n d e r  which  m e e t i n g s ,  g a t h e r i n g s  o r  p a r a d e s  o f  a 
p o l i t i c a l  n a t u r e  would be  p e r m i t t e d  o n l y  i f  t h e  
a u t h o r i t i e s  h a d  b e e n  in fo rm ed  72 h o u r s  i n  advance  and 
i f  t h e  agenda  had  f i r s t  b e e n  s u b m i t t e d .  P resum ab ly  th e  
l o c a l  s t a t e  o f  emergency a u t h o r i t i e s ^  s t i l l  e x e r c i s e d ,  i n  
p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  r i g h t  t o  p r o h i b i t  m e e t in g s  o r  t o  s e n t  
s p e c t a t o r s  a l o n g .  I n  Sou th  S u m a tra /D ja m b i  and So u th  
K a l im a n ta n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  emergency a u t h o r i t i e s  c o n t i n u e d  
t h e  ban  on a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  b y  PKI and  i t s  mass o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n s .
Thanks to  S u k a r n o ’s p r o t e c t i o n ,  PKI su c c e e d e d  i n  
a v o i d i n g  com ple te  s u p p r e s s i o n  b y  t h e  army. But th e  
P a r t y  c o u l d  n o t  evade  S u k a r n o ’s own e f f o r t s  t o  d o m e s t i c a t e  
t h e  p a r t i e s  and p a r l i a m e n t  f o r  h i s  own u s e .  As h as  b een  
s e e n ,  he d i s s o l v e d  t h e  e l e c t e d  p a r l i a m e n t  on March 5» I960 
b e c a u s e  i t  c l a i m e d  t h e  r i g h t  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  b u d g e t .  On 
March 7> A i d i t  s e n t  a t e l e g r a m  t o  S ukarno  e x p r e s s i n g  
ex t re m e  r e g r e t  a t  t h e  a c t i o n  w h ich ,  he w r o t e ,  ’s e r i o u s l y
p
e n d a n g e r s  d e m o c r a t i c  l i f e  i n  our  c o u n t r y ’ . A i d i t  
1
With a change i n  t h e  s t a t e  o f  war and  s i e g e  law ,  t h e  
war a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  a r e  now c a l l e d  s t a t e  o f  emergency 
a u t h o r i t i e s .
2
601
RI, A p r i l  1960, p . 9
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proposed that either a new parliament be elected or a 
temporary parliament be nominated in conformity with the 
balance of forces among the people. PKI's "Review of 
Indonesia" commented that the guided part of guided 
democracy had already been elaborated; 'it now remains
Afor the "democracy" aspect of it to be established1 2.1
In order not to alienate the parties too far, Sukarno
invited the chairmen of PKI, PNI and NU to his palace in
Bali to discuss the composition of a new parliament. On
March 29 > I960 the appointed parliament was announced.
Of the 261 members, 131 were from functional groups,
including 35 representatives of the armed forces, and
130 were from the political parties, including 30 from
PKI. Masjumi and PSI were excluded. General elections
for a new parliament were promised for before the end of
1962, security conditions permitting.
Aidit announced PKI's reluctant acceptance of the
new parliament, commenting that an appointed one was
2better than none. He said that including communists 
in the functional groups, PKI would have 50 votes, or 
just under 20 per cent of the total. NU leaders
1 RI, April 1960, p.11.
2
RI, April 1960, p.12, Suara Ibukota, year III, no#7> 
(April 1959), p.1•
estimated communist representation to be between 65 and 
70, and due to their protests at the low number of 
Moslems, Sukarno added an extra 22 members, mostly 
Islamic leaders. That the appointed parliament would 
have only minor power was made clear by the government 
announcement on April 20 that the 1960 budget was in 
operation by decree. The appointed parliament was 
installed on June 25, 1960.
Once parliament had been 're-tooled*, it was only 
a matter of time before the regional and local repre­
sentative councils were similarly dealt with. A 
presidential decree ordered that as of September 30, 1960 
all councils would be brought in line with guided 
democracy. Functional groups were to receive half the 
seats. Former members of the now-dissolved Masjumi and 
PSI were excluded unless they had proved their loyalty 
to Sukarno's goals. The Minister of Internal Affairs 
proceeded to appoint the members of the provincial 
councils, the province heads to appoint the members of 
lower councils. As the new councils were announced,
PKI and its mass organizations raised cries of protest 
because communist representation was often greatly
603
TI, April 22, 1960; also interviews with NU leaders.
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r e d u c e d , S ukarno  e a r l y  in  J a n u a ry  1961 a g re e d  to  a 
re v ie w  o f  th e  a p p o in te d  c o u n c i l s ,  b u t  even i f  PKI and 
i t s  mass o r g a n iz a t io n s  were to  g a in  more s e a t s ,  u n d e r 
g u id e d  dem ocracy  th e  c o u n c i ls  c o u ld  be  e x p e c te d  to  
e x e r c i s e  even  l e s s  a u t h o r i t y  th a n  fo rm e r ly .
As p a r t  o f  h i s  p la n  t o  d o m e s tic a te  th e  p a r t i e s ,  
S u k arn o  w ish ed  to  b r i n g  th e  n ew sp ap ers  u n d e r  c o n t r o l .
The army was e x e r c i z in g  i t s  pow er u n d e r th e  s t a t e  o f  
em ergency  to  su sp e n d  o r  even b an  new sp ap ers  and p e r i o d i ­
c a l s  f o r  p u b l i s h in g  news o r  o p in io n s  i t  d id  n o t  l i k e .
T hen , on F e b ru a ry  15, I960 a d e c re e  was announced  u n d e r 
w hich  th e  governm ent c o u ld  w ith h o ld  n e w s p r in t  from  any 
n e w sp a p er o r  p e r i o d i c a l  whose c o n te n ts  f a i l e d  t o  d e v e lo p  
p u b l ic  o p in io n  a n d /o r  a n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e  a lo n g  th e  l i n e s  
l a i d  down by  Sukarno  in  h i s  A ugust 17 , 1959 s p e e c h . On 
O c to b e r  12 , 1960, p u b l i s h e r s  w ere t o l d  t h a t  t h e i r  
n ew sp ap ers  and  p e r i o d i c a l s  m ust s u p p o r t  and d e fe n d  th e  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  th e  A ugust 17» 1959 s p e e c h , a s s i s t  i n  th e  
a b o l i t i o n  o f  l i b e r a l i s m ,  im p e r ia l is m  and s e p a r a t i s m ,  
prom ote  a f r e e  an d  in d e p e n d e n t f o r e i g n  p o l ic y  and  n o t  
be in s t ru m e n ts  o f  th e  c o ld  w ar, and  prom ote th e  In d o n e s ia n  
p e r s o n a l i t y .  On O c to b er 3 1 , th e  l i c e n c e s  o f  s e v e r a l
1
S e e , f o r  ex am p le , HR, December 3 ,  6 ,  19» 2 1 , 23 and 
2 7 , I9 6 0 .
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Djakarta newspapers were revoked, including that of the 
communist ’’Pantjawarta", formerly called "Sin Po". In 
short, the government issued decrees with conditions so 
vague as to permit it to ban any newspaper if it is so 
desired. "Harian Rakjat" was saved from extinction by 
Sukarno’s protection, but the army continued to harass it 
with frequent suspensions.
Of greater concern for PKI has been Sukarno’s effort 
to simplify the party system. On January 12, 1960, 
Sukarno issued a law entitled "Conditions and Simplifi­
cation of the Party System". Pour stipulations in the 
law could cause trouble for PKI:
1. political parties must accept and defend the 
1945 constitution and the Pantjasila, and must use 
peaceful and democratic methods to attain their political 
goals;
2. political parties may receive assistance from 
abroad only with the consent of the government;
3. the president may order an investigation into the 
administration, finances and wealth of any party;
4« the president may dissolve any party whose 
programme is aimed at undermining the principles and 
objectives of state policy, or which has not officially 
condemned the actions of any member of the party who has 
acted in support of a rebellion.
The PKI leaders were in no position to condemn the law
out of hand. Lukman explained that the best way, the
democratic way, to simplify parties would be through
general elections and changes in the electoral law so
that, for example, only parties receiving a certain
1percentage of votes could sit in parliament. At the
same time, he meekly declared that PKI's attitude to the
new law would depend on how the law was implemented.
Later in 1960 the parties were required to present the
government with a list of their branches and members -
2which PKI did on February 4* 1961.
In an assessment of PKI's losses and gains during 
the first eighteen months of the Sukarno cabinet, the 
most important loss was the eradication of most aspects 
of democracy. Even if elections were to be held in the 
future, neither parliament nor the regional and lower 
representative councils could be expected to exercise 
much authority. The block of appointed military 
representatives in parliament also reduced what likelihood 
there was of a communist majority there. Strikes were
1
RI, February 1960, p.16.
2 On April 25, 1961, the PKI politbureau announced that 
so far 694*633 Party members had been registered with 
the government; HR, April 27* 1961.
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repressed, BTI dared not lead any militant actions, 
demonstrations and rallies were forbidden except for 
causes chosen by the government, cadres were harassed. 
Worse still, the government now had laws by which it 
could ban PKI or its publications at will. And the 
importance for any communist party of presenting a non­
communist government with a list of its members cannot be 
exaggerated. However, in the power situation in which 
Sukarno needed PKI, the Party could make more criticisms 
than at first appeared possible - as was shown by the 
July 8, 1960 statement, the protests at the temporary 
bans on PKI in three regions, and the loud cries for a 
revision of the appointed regional and local councils,
PKI would appear to have alienated many PNI and NU 
leaders, especially in the regions. Important factors 
in this alienation were their jealousy at PKI*s obvious 
favours from Sukarno, and their resentment at PKI*s 
superior organizational ability. At the centre, however, 
PNI and NU were forced to maintain at least overt 
friendship towards PKI. This was due partly to Sukarno 's 
insistence on nationalist-Moslem-communist unity which to 
oppose, he declared, was treason, and partly to PNIfs 
fear of the army and the need for an alliance with PKI to 
oppose what both parties regarded as the greatest danger
to their existence
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An ominous developm ent f o r  PKI in  1960 was the 
a tte m p t "by th e  M in is te r  o f Labour to  c re a te  an a l l -  
em bracing tra d e  union f e d e ra t io n , to  be c a l le d  OPPI, 
which would n o t be under communist co n tro l*  Most o f  
th e  non-communist un ions ex p ressed  t h e i r  su p p o rt fo r  h is  
e f f o r t s ,  and com m ittees to  p rep are  such a f e d e ra t io n  were 
e s ta b l i s h e d  in  s e v e ra l  p ro v in ce s . SOBSI s tre n u o u s ly  
r e s i s t e d  the  m in i s te r ’s e f f o r t s .  Sukarno e i th e r  
su p p o rted  SOBSI or re a c te d  n e g a tiv e ly  to  the id e a  o f  
OPPI fo r  o th e rw ise  OPPI would a lre a d y  be in  e x is te n c e .
Of th e  advantages ac c ru in g  to  PKI from th e  f i r s t  
e ig h te e n  months o f  the Sukarno c a b in e t ,  th e  most im portan t 
was th e  co n tin u ed  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  P a rty  and i t s  mass 
o rg a n iz a t io n s .  The P a r ty  even in tro d u ced  a second th re e -  
y ea r p la n , BTI launched i t s  f i r s t  th re e -y e a r  p lan  o f  
o rg a n iz a tio n  and e d u c a tio n , w hile SOBSI in  August 1960 
fo rm u la ted  i t s  f i r s t  th r e e -y e a r  p la n . At the  same tim e , 
Masjumi and PSI were o rd ered  on August 17> I960 to  
d is s o lv e  them selves, and th e  Dem ocratic League, formed
1
The D em ocratic League was re p o r te d ly  formed by le a d e rs  
o f  Masjumi, PSI and IPKI w ith  th e  connivance o f c e r ta in  
s e c t io n s  o f  the  c e n t r a l  army le a d e rs h ip . I t s  sh o r t- te rm  
goal was to  p rev en t the i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f the  appo in ted  
p a r lia m e n t; i t s  lo n g -te rm  goal was to  b r in g  to g e th e r  the  
d iv e rse  elem ents d i s s a t i s f i e d  w ith  Sukarno’s le a d e rs h ip . 
Some members of NU, the C h r is t ia n  p a r t i e s  and even PNI 
were a t t r a c t e d  in to  i t .  B ut, ag a in  r e p o r te d ly , those
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in March 1960, was banned on February 27, 1961* The 
only anti-communist newspapers in Djakarta, "Abadi”, 
"Nusantara", "Pedoman” and "Pos Indonesia” were all 
closed*
In return for their support of Sukarno, the commu­
nists were given considerable representation in the three 
new governmental bodies: the National Advisory Council 
and the National Planning Council, installed on August 
159 1959» and the Provisional People’s Consultative 
Assembly, which began work on November 10, 1960. PKI 
was also given representation in the executive committee 
of the National Front, a Sukarno organization, installed 
on September 8, 1960. When the appointed heads of 
autonomous regions were announced in the first months of 
1960, communists obtained the posts of deputy governor 
in West and Central Java, and of deputy mayor in Djakarta. 
The communist mayors in at least Surabaja, Surakarta,
Magelang and Salatiga were re-installed, and a communist 
became mayor of Tjirebon, a post formerly held by NU.
It was widely rumoured that Sukarno had wanted to appoint 
communists as governors, but that he had retreated before 
army objections. None of the positions given to PKI
sections of the central army leadership which had 
supported the formation of the League soon withdrew their 
protection and the League failed to prosper.
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entailed, real power, but they did provide status rewards 
for important Party cadres, they allowed some extra 
pressure to be exerted on the government, they increased 
the Party’s knowledge of administrative procedures (which 
would be important if PKI should ever win control of 
Indonesia), and they provided apparent proof for Party 
members of the leadership’s assertion that PKI was moving 
ever nearer to power.
Of long-term importance to PKI was the retention of 
the key political position by Sukarno and the radical 
nationalists. Plans for economic development or land 
reform may have been talked about, but the emphasis 
was on continued nationalist agitation, diatribes against 
Western colonialism, and the struggle to liberate West 
Irian. Meanwhile the economy deteriorated. As several 
communists assured me in private, the ruling group was 
utterly incapable of making profound improvements in 
Indonesia’s social and economic condition, which meant 
that social tensions must increase and the basis of 
communist support must be both strengthened and broadened. 
The PKI leaders may also have been content to see the army 
participating but not dominant in the Sukarno cabinet.
If the cabinet failed to solve Indonesia’s major problems, 
and it gave no indication that it would succeed, then 
both Sukarno and the army might be discredited. PKI
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might then appear as the only alternative, the other 
political forces having tried and failed.
Sakirman, writing in May 1960, admitted that there 
was concern within the Party at the support given for 
the return to the 1945 constitution and for the establish 
ment of guided democracy. Some comrades were asking 
whether guided democracy was not in fact *a semi-fascist 
political and economic system more criminal than liberal 
democracy*. Others were concerned that the Party, by 
identifying with the Sukarno government, would be blamed 
by the people for the continuing economic deterioration. 
In reply, Sakirman said that since the failure of the 
Constituent Assembly to produce a new constitution, the 
Party *has tried hard to decide on a correct and true 
political attitude* on the basis of a Leninist analysis 
of the Party*s past and present experience. The situ­
ation *is difficult*, he admitted, especially as the 
middle group held state power, possibly a unique situ­
ation never before faced by a communist party. But the 
Party already had the correct strategy and main tactics 
of the Indonesian revolution. Where the Party was not
1 Sakirman, "Apa Arti**, BM, part I, May-June 1960, 
pp.194-219; part II, July-August 1960, pp.320-40, 348.
See especially pp.194> 325» 328-9> 339> 340«
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yet in complete agreement was Concerning problems of 
day-to-day tactics or short-term political tactics*. He 
repeated the official Party view that the contradictions 
between the ruling groups and the democratic forces 
outside the cabinet were not basic, but were contra­
dictions within the people. In order to reassure the 
doubtful, he declared that the Party*s general line, 
especially since the restoration of the 1945 constitution, 
*has given beneficial results and gives a perspective that 
will make the internal and external reactionaries tremble*.
The Party leadership was itself concerned at the 
behaviour of the ruling groups. When the Nehru govern­
ment evicted the communist-led cabinet in Kerala, Aidit 
warned that *even though the proletariat wants to take 
the peaceful path to win victory for its policy, the 
bourgeoisie will not voluntarily accept this path* but 
cast aside democracy when it was harmful to its interests."1 2
In February 1960, Aidit wrote of Indonesia that 'some 
groups of the national bourgeoisie, jointly with the
compradore bourgeoisie, want to take the road of
2military or personal dictatorship*.
1
RI, September-October 1959, pp.8-9*
2
D.N. Aidit, "For National Unity", World Marxist Review, 
February 1960, p.21.
In  h i s  sp e e c h  to  th e  c e n t r a l  com m ittee  plenum  a t  th e  
end  o f  D ecem ber 1960, how ever, A id i t  e x p re s s e d  o n ly
A
c o n f id e n c e  i n  th e  c o u rs e  o f  e v e n ts  i n  I n d o n e s ia .  He 
c la im e d  t h a t  ‘b a s i c a l l y  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  a t  home 
c o n t in u e s  to  s h i f t  to  th e  l e f t  i n  s p i t e  o f  th e  many 
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  o b s t a c l e s  and t r o u b le s * ,  and t h a t  th e  
com m unists 'h a v e  a c h ie v e d  c e r t a i n  e n c o u ra g in g  s u c c e s s e s  
i n  b u i l d i n g  th e  n a t i o n a l  f r o n t * .  He c a l l e d  on members 
to  i n t e n s i f y  t h e i r  work o f  b u i l d i n g  th e  P a r ty ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
b y  w ork among th e  p e a s a n t s ,  b u t  rem inded  them  t h a t  'The 
b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e  we m ust a d h e re  to  in  th e  c o n d u c t o f  th e  
n a t i o n a l  s t r u g g l e  i s  to  s u b o r d in a te  th e  c l a s s  s t r u g g l e  
to  th e  n a t i o n a l  s t r u g g le *  -  m a in ta in in g ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  th e  
in d ep e n d en c e  o f  th e  P a r ty .  In  s h o r t ,  A i d i t 's  sp e ec h  
c o n ta in e d  no h i n t  o f  an o v e rh a u l  o f  th e  form  o f  th e  
n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  p o l i c y  t h a t  had b e en  in  o p e r a t io n  
s in c e  e a r l y  in  1952. S u p p o rt f o r  S ukarno  would c o n tin u e  
b e c a u se  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  o p p o s i t io n ,  would s p e l l  th e  
e l im in a t io n  o f  th e  P a r ty  a t  l e a s t  a s  an ab o v e -g ro u n d  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  But was th e  o p tim ism  e x p re s s e d  b y  S ak irm an  
and  A i d i t  o n ly  in te n d e d  to  s t r e n g th e n  th e  f l a g g in g  m orale  
o f  P a r ty  members? The P a r ty  had  s u r v iv e d ,  and any
1
A i d i t ,  "Madju T e ru s " , HR, J a n u a ry  2 , 1961.
a l t e r n a t iv e  p o l ic y  would b r in g  s te r n  r e p r e s s io n , b u t was
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PKI, in  f a c t ,  making p r o g r ess  towards i t s  b a s ic  g o a l ,  
th e  assum p tion  o f  power?
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
1• The Situation in 1951
When the Aidit leadership won control of PKI in 
January 1951» certain factors made a militantly oppo­
sitionist policy seem to contain little if any likelihood 
of bringing the Party to power in the foreseeable future: 
the condition of the Party, the relative weakness of 
social antagonisms, the completion of the political 
revolution (except for the liberation of West Irian), the 
strong coercive power available to the government, the 
geographical nature of Java, and the international 
situation.
In January 1951* the total membership of PKI was 
about four or five thousands. Work to re-establish the 
Party organization, after the Madiun rebellion and the 
second Dutch attack, was being undertaken but was not far 
advanced. The lines of command from the centre to the 
members were, apparently, still tenuous, while many of 
the local and regional leaders were unsatisfactory to the 
Aidit leadership. Furthermore, the Socialist Party of 
Tan Ling Djie was still in existence, and the Indonesian 
Labour Party had been dissolved officially only in October
1950. The Aidit leadership therefore urgently needed 
time in order to re-establish an efficient Party organi­
zation, to weed out undesirable elements from within the 
central, regional and local leadership bodies, to effect 
the dissolution of the Socialist Party, and to sift the 
membership of the two ’cover parties* and incorporate 
into PKI those of their members who were found to be 
trustworthy.
The Madiun disaster had a profound and lasting 
psychological effect on all levels of the PKI leadership. 
Although at the outbreak of the rebellion PKI had had 
armed units at its command, these had been broken quickly 
by only a small part of the government forces. Most of 
the top-level leaders had been killed, and many thousands 
of communists and sympathizers had been imprisoned, 
escaping trial only because of the disorganization caused 
by the second Dutch attack. As a result, the surviving 
Party leaders dreaded the occurrence of a ’second Madiun* 
and they sought policies which could avoid another 
insurrection, either one planned by the Party or one 
provoked by the government.
At the same time as the Party was unprepared 
physically and psychologically for a militant policy, 
social conditions in Indonesia further discouraged mili­
tancy. The Indonesian revolution of 1945 to 1949» being
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primarily a struggle for national independence from a 
foreign power, was not fought for the radical alteration 
of society at all levels* Nor were *the masses*, the 
poorer sections of the urban and rural populations, 
aroused to demand a social revolution* Under Dutch rule 
the poorer sections of society were, on the whole, 
successfully insulated from political party activities or 
even from sectional mass organizations such as trade 
unions and peasant associations. Under the Japanese, 
political parties, trade unions and peasant associations 
were banned. And although the Moslems were encouraged 
to organize Masjumi and the nationalists were allowed to 
broadcast nationalist propaganda, neither group prepared 
its followers for radical social change. Masjumi was 
led by generally conservative Moslems, while nationalist 
propaganda was directed towards building a sense of Asian- 
ness, towards fomenting anti-white hatred.
During the revolution, from August 1945 to December 
19499 the Republican leaders could demand and receive 
support on the basis of nationalism alone. Vague, almost 
mystical, concepts of a future just and prosperous society 
were created, but few concrete programmes of social and 
economic re-organization. Where mass organizations and 
*people*s armies' were formed, the basic rallying force 
was either nationalism, religion, charisma or a combination
C i o
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of these, not the promise of social revolution. With 
the success of the political revolution, Indonesians 
moved in to fill the political and administrative posts 
formerly reserved for Dutchmen, but the condition of the 
workers and peasants was little affected. The political 
revolution led to neither a strong demand from the poorer 
levels of society for radical social change, nor a 
realization among those levels that by organization such 
a change could be effected.
In 1951, there were certain areas of the countryside, 
especially around estates and where peasant squatters had 
occupied estate and forestry lands, where a certain 
political consciousness and the makings of political 
radicalism were to be found among the rural poor. 
Elsewhere, in the great majority of villages, social 
antagonisms remained weak. Inequalities existed in both 
social and economic life, but, in Java at least, village 
society was able to absorb an increasing population with­
out creating a genuinely alienated agricultural prole­
tariat. It is significant that the political revolution 
was not accompanied by popular demands for land reform or 
by peasant attacks on landlords and moneylenders. Demands 
for the removal of inequalities were not made because, in 
general, the poorer peasants accepted the inequalities as 
natural, not as an injustice. Long after 1951 > the PKI
leaders complained that even some cadres were unable to
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see in what ways the peasants were exploited by the 
landlords. After over five years of extensive work 
among the peasants, the PKI leaders in 1959 admitted that 
'The task of cultivating the peasants 1 2 trust in the Party 
and of convincing the peasants of their own strength is 
a difficult one, especially in view of their backwardness', 
and that the task would be completed only after *a long 
time, facing difficult tests, and hard and diligent work'.^ 
In January 1960, the BTI leaders acknowledged the 
difficulty they were meeting 'to convince the peasants of
the justice of the 6:4 demand and of the power of the
2peasants' unity'. That is, the peasants were still 
unaware that they themselves could alter conditions, or 
even that it was just to demand a larger proportion of the 
harvest for the sharecropper.
In 1951 the situation in the towns resembled that in 
the villages: the 'tradition of open obedience* was still 
strong among the poorer sections of society, and social 
antagonism was no more than latent. There were few 
workers employed in large, impersonal undertakings and
1 PKI, "Laporan Mengenai Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan kaum 
Tani" (Report on Party Work among the Peasants), BM, 
April-May 1959, p.139*
2
ST, January 1960, p.3*
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few with experience in trade union work* Even during
the revolution, militant trade union action was at a
minimum: in the Republican areas it was regarded as anti-
patriotic, and in the Dutch-occupied areas it was not 
*1permitted. Other mass organizations among the poorer
classes were either small (such as Pesindo, which had
been badly broken by the participation of many of its
members in the Madiun rebellion), newly formed or as yet
unformed in January 1951- In short, the Indonesian
urban poor were in no condition for revolution or for
militant action of any description* Aidit, speaking in
May 1958 to the first national conference of communist
women, described the submissive, passive nature of the
workers as seen from the communists* point of view:
The greatest obstruction to Party work among 
working women is the old-fashioned belief, 
still dominant, that the present bad situation 
is predestined and cannot be altered. This 2 
old-fashioned belief also exists among the men.
1
It would, perhaps, be misleading to state that the Dutch 
repressed militant trade union action during the revo­
lution. The Indonesian workers in the Dutch-occupied 
areas did not attempt to engage in massive strike action, 
even for nationalist reasons. I have not heard, for 
example, of large scale strike action by the Indonesian 
dock labourers or transport workers in order to disrupt 
the flow of Dutch military equipment into Indonesia.2
D.N. Aidit, "Wanita Komunis Pedjuang untuk Masjarakat 
Baru" (Communist Women, Fighters for a New Society), BM, 
June 1958, p.247-
c o ^L» r-s
As for what the PKI leaders call the urban petty 
bourgeoisie, many of its members had joined non-communist 
political parties, mass organizations and armed groups 
during the revolution. Any propensity for political 
radicalism among them was considerably diminished by the 
status, if not material, benefits they reaped from the 
victory of the political revolution. The Indonesian 
petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie filled the 
administrative and political positions vacated by the 
Dutch, and the many new positions afforded by the 
burgeoning bureaucracy.
In both China and Viet Nam the communists were able 
to win the allegiance of broad sections of the indigenous 
society through the appeal of nationalism, resistance to 
the foreign invaders. In 1951 the political revolution 
in Indonesia was over, with the exception of the struggle 
for West Irian which at that time was not yet a focussing 
point of militant nationalist fervour. Political forces 
other than the non-communists had been brought to power, 
and non-communist radical nationalists could shout at 
least as hard as PKI in any future nationalist agitation 
over West Irian. Furthermore, the Indonesian government 
had at its command strong coercive power in case of 
communist attempts to seize power or disrupt the economy 
by sabotage and guerrilla bands. In January 1951» the
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PKI leaders had neither access to weapons nor more than 
a handful of supporters in the armed forces.
The geographical nature of Java also militates against 
a communist attempt at forceful overthrow or disruption of 
the government before there is strong PKI infiltration 
into the armed forces and government apparatus. All but 
about twenty per cent of the long, narrow island is 
occupied by cultivated land, towns, villages, roads, and 
rivers, while the scattered pockets of mountain and forest 
are mostly encircled by good rail or road communications. 
The relatively extensive tracts of more impenetrable 
country are in West Java (especially south of the line 
Bogor-Bandung-Banjumas) and in the extreme east of East 
Java - both areas with strongly santrl populations, while 
the anti-communist Darul Islam operates in the West Java 
area.
The international situation in ^95  ^ also discouraged 
a bid by the Indonesian communists to seize power through 
violence. The United States had made clear by the Korean 
War and the seventh fleet*s protection of Taiwan that it 
would fight to prevent a communist victory in eastern 
Asia, and it had the ability to stop large scale aid 
reaching communist rebels in Indonesia. In Malaya, the 
British were waging a ruthless war against the Malayan
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Communist Party that had chosen to start a war of 
liberation*
While in 1951 conditions were unfavourable for either 
insurrectionary action or a militant anti-government stand 
on the part of PKI, there were many factors in the 
situation which encouraged the leadership to choose a 
long-term policy of extending greatly its support among 
the masses, and exploiting the differences among the other 
political forces* These favourable factors were: the 
disunity of the national revolutionary leadership, the 
lack of rival political and mass organizations among the 
urban and rural poor, the lack of strong, vested *anti- 
people* political interests in the countryside and the 
towns, and the general socio-economic pressures apparently 
working against the prevailing social calm.
Indonesia has no ’liberator party*, such as the 
Congress Party in India, the Anti-Fascist People’s League 
in Burma, and the Viet Minh in Viet Nam, with an accepted 
right to govern and with an unrivalled organization* The 
Indonesian political elite was divided between person­
alities, between different concepts of the revolution, 
between santri and non-santri parties. Even the santri 
population was divided politically between the amorphous 
Masjumi, within which different groups were maintaining 
an uneasy alliance that was soon to break, and the smaller
PSII and Perti Within each party, santri or not,
cliques jockeyed for position and at times broke away to 
form new parties. The fragmented, clique nature of the 
revolutionary leadership was reflected in parliament where 
no two parties combined could command a majority, where 
parties struggled for office and the spoils of office, and 
where cliques within parties worked against each other.
In this situation, PKI was given the possibility of 
forging alliances with other political forces. This 
possibility was greatly increased by the emergent power 
conflict between FNI and Masjumi, in which PNI was to seek 
allies against what it considered to be its most dangerous 
rival.
In 1951» the santri population was already relatively 
well organized under the Masjumi party and the Moslem 
associations which were its associate members. But the 
lower levels of the non-santri population, in both urban 
and rural areas, were still largely untouched by political 
parties and mass organizations. The few mass organi­
zations of any size that existed, notably SOBSI, BTI and 
Pesindo, had fallen under communist control, despite PKI*s 
small size, because of the absence of other claimants.
The non-communist, non-santri political forces were 
engrossed in the in-fighting within the political elite, 
little concerned with developing strong grass-roots
(E2r>
organizations because they believed that ’the masses’
1were without important political effect. The Aidit 
leadership was therefore presented with the possibility 
of filling the political and organizational vacuum among 
the poorer non-santris.
Indonesia, and more specifically Java, lacked strong 
socio-economic vested interests, with political power, 
that could successfully oppose the spread of political 
parties and mass organizations in either rural or urban 
areas. Java had very few large landowners who could 
control the politics of their peasants. Most of the few 
areas with a significant number of large landowners were 
strongly santri, where PKI, anyway, could not be expected 
to make large advances. And neither the lurahs nor 
members of the pamong pradja were effective barriers to 
the growth of parties and mass organizations. This 
absence of strong ’class enemies* in the villages 
facilitated the growth of parties and mass organizations, 
as it also made more difficult the communists’ task of 
creating or increasing social antagonisms. In the towns 
and the estates, the large employers were mostly foreigners
-
The other non-santri forces did realize, of course, that 
mass support would be vital when elections were held, but 
they presumed that they could rely on traditional 
authorities to mobilize that support.
with little or no political power in newly-independent 
Indonesia, and the government, in general, encouraged the 
growth of trade unions and supported trade union demands 
against the foreigners. That is, there was no effective 
harrier to the growth of trade unions or other mass 
organizations and political parties in the towns.
Finally, despite the prevalence of relative social 
calm among the Indonesian poorer classes, both urban 
workers and peasants had many small problems which any 
organization could exploit in order to win support. 
Furthermore, expectations had been raised among certain 
sections of the poorer classes as a result of the revo­
lution and the subsequent increase in elementary education 
while the relentless population growth could be expected 
to create or exacerbate social conflict.
2. The National United Front Implemented
A communist party is not compelled to pursue a policy 
which seems from available evidence to be most suitable to 
its own growth in a particular situation. A party may 
take a line that leads to decimation or stagnation as a 
result of doctrinal rigidity, of the leaders* personal 
preference for a particular line, or of instructions or 
suggestions from Moscow. In the case of PKI, it appears 
that after the failure of the Madiun rebellion Moscow did
n o t  in te r v e n e  in  PKI p o lic y -m a k in g . The A id it  le a d e r ­
s h ip ,  em erging as th e  c le a r  v ic t o r s  in  an in t e r n a l  P arty  
d is p u t e ,  and fr e e  from fo r e ig n  in t e r f e r e n c e ,  was a b le  to  
d e c id e  what o v e r a l l  s t r a t e g y  was most l i k e l y  to  perm it 
th e  P a rty  to  grow and e v e n tu a l ly  to  win power. The 
s t r a t e g y  ch osen  was a lo n g -term  one d e s ig n ed  to  e x p lo i t  
th e  fa v o u r a b le  fa c to r s  in  th e  In d on esian  s i t u a t i o n .
The A id it  le a d e r s h ip ’s broad n a t io n a l  u n ite d  fr o n t  
p o l i c y  has e n t a i le d  two main ta s k s :  b u i ld in g  mass support  
among th e  p o l i t i c a l l y  uncom m itted and u n organ ized  m asses 
(and c r e a t in g  from th a t  su p p ort a mass p a r ty , d i s c ip l in e d  
and in d o c tr in a te d ) ;  and w in n in g  the c o o p e r a tio n  o f  a broad  
range o f  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s ,  in  f a c t  w ith  a l l  b u t the  
avowed a n ti-c o m m u n ists . The n a t io n a l  u n ite d  fro n t serv ed  
and s e r v e s  s e v e r a l  p u rp o ses , th a t  i s ,  i t  p rep ares fo r  
s e v e r a l  p o s s ib le  ways o f  a c h ie v in g  power. Mass support 
was n e c e s s a r y  fo r  a p o s s ib le  e l e c t o r a l  v i c t o r y .  I t  was 
n e c e s s a r y  to  in c r e a se  the P a r ty ’s b a r g a in in g  p o s i t io n  in  
the p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g le ,  to  make th e  P a r ty ’s a l l ia n c e  worth 
s e e k in g . I t  was a ls o  n e c e s s a r y  to  prepare fo r  v ic t o r y  by  
o th e r  m eans, b ecau se  in  1951 PKI had few  good c a d r e s , few  
members in  s t r a t e g i c  p o s i t io n s  in  th e  armed fo r c e s  and 
b u rea u cra cy , and l i t t l e  d i s c ip l in e d  su pport lo c a te d  in  
s t r a t e g ic  in d u s tr ie s  or s t r a t e g i c  g e o g r a p h ic a l a r e a s .
In ord er to  d i s c i p l i n e  th e  mass su p p o rt, th e  P arty  had to
be enlarged and to be trained in political and organi­
zational matters.
Cooperation with the broadest range of non-communist 
political forces was desirable for three reasons. First, 
it was probable that the recruitment of mass support and 
the building of a large Party would have been impossible 
without it. A disruptive, oppositionist policy could 
have brought down repressive government action, which PKI, 
small and weak, was in no position to withstand. Second, 
friendship with the non-communists might have prepared 
the way for communist participation in the government and 
an eventual bloodless seizure of power. Third, alliance 
with the non-communists opened the possibility of isolating 
and breaking the anti-communists as part of the piecemeal 
destruction of the other political forces.
These two basic tasks forced the Aidit leadership to 
build a certain image of the Party, without which neither 
task could have been accomplished: the image of PKI as 
militantly patriotic, sympathetic to religion, responsible 
and self-effacing, democratic, opposed to the use of 
violence in the attainment of political goals (other than 
the restoration of West Irian), and humanitarian.
In order to build mass support, the Aidit leadership 
has relied basically on a vast network of mass organi-
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zations; to consolidate, discipline and train that mass 
support, it has relied basically on the Party itself.
The great majority of the people that the Indonesian 
communists sought to attract and organize had such a low 
level of political awareness that they were unprepared for 
entry into a communist party. Therefore mass organi­
zations have been built, each aimed at a specific section 
of 'the people', each attuned to the simplest demands of 
its respective section, and each seeking to attract the 
largest possible number of people in that section. With 
the exception of Pemuda Rakjat, each mass organization has 
maintained the fiction of political independence largely 
in order not to alienate potential members. The Aidit 
leadership has attempted to raise the political conscious­
ness of the ordinary members of the mass organizations, 
and to create from out of the mass membership a well- 
trained body of cadres sind activists. Through 'small, 
insignificant, trifling* actions in defence or promotion 
of the people's interests, an attempt has been made to 
overcome 'the tradition of open obedience' of authorities, 
'the old-fashioned belief that the present bad situation 
is predestined and cannot be altered*. This work is 
slow, but it has been hoped to use each action to teach 
two lessons: that 'class enemies* are responsible for the
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existing inequalities, and that those class enemies can 
be successfully opposed by united, organized action*
Mass support has been viewed as the essential 
material from which to create a large body of trained 
cadres and activists. The more active members of the 
mass organizations have been brought into PKI and there 
given political and organizational education. Since August 
1956, when the PKI first three-year plan of organization 
and education went into effect, an education system has 
been established that reaches from the centre into the 
ordinary members* groups. As the Aidit leadership has 
become assured of the loyalty and capabilities of the 
Party members in the mass organizations, the larger mass 
organizations themselves have initiated their own Party- 
planned education systems. It is claimed that so far 
several hundred thousand cadres and activists have passed 
through the schools and courses of PKI and its mass 
organizations•
The Party and its mass organizations have worked 
together in the geographical spread of the communist 
movement. In fact, cadres often work for two or even 
more organizations. Where conditions are favourable, a 
Party organization is first established, which then helps 
establish mass organizations. In other places, mass 
organizations are established first, the more active
members trained, and then a Party organization created. 
Where Party and mass organizations exist together, the 
Party assists the mass organizations in matters of organi­
zation, while they in turn act not only as ’spheres of 
influence* for the Party, but also as recruiting grounds 
for Party members.
Although the Aidit leadership has at its disposal 
larger funds than any other Indonesian party, they are not 
inexhaustible and there has been the question of priority 
in the apportionment of funds and cadres. The Party 
itself has received first priority, but it is closely 
followed by SOBSI which is perhaps the major recruiting 
agent for Party membership, and which, with its membership 
in key industries, is certainly the best potential weapon 
in case of a political crisis. Since July 1953» the 
communist leaders have made repeated avowals of the 
agrarian nature of the Indonesian revolution, and in 
December i960 Aidit once more called on the Party to give 
special attention to work among the peasants. At the 
same time, BTI remains chronically short of money and 
cadres. Here, then, there seems to be a discrepancy 
between what the Aidit leadership says and the actual work 
carried out by the communist organization. Work in the 
rural areas has been hampered by the great difficulty of 
developing good cadres from the peasantry, and by the
reluctance of urban cadres and activists to go into the 
villages. It is also possible that the leaders of PKI, 
like the other political leaders in Indonesia, may in 
fact consider the peasantry to be really of little 
political importance in the foreseeable future, especially 
when the future of free elections and of the authority of 
parliament appears to be severely restricted. Pemuda 
Rakjat has received priority somewhere a little behind 
BTI, with Gerwani trailing far in the rear.
In viewing the other political forces, the young 
communists early drew a distinction between the non- 
communists, among whom PNI was the most important party, 
and the anti-communists, to be found mainly in Masjumi.
In 1951 PNI and Masjumi were already in disagreement over 
matters of policy, personality, and the distribution of 
government offices. PKI threw what weight it had in an 
attempt to widen the gap between the two main parties, and 
to exclude Masjumi from office. The PNI leaders welcomed 
PKI*s proffered friendship because its advantages were 
large, its cost apparently minor. The support of PKI 
strengthened PNI in its struggle first to be the major 
partner in a coalition government, and then to be the 
dominant party in a government that excluded what was 
considered to be its most dangerous rival, Masjumi. 
Alliance with PKI also meant that the communists withheld
criticism from PNI ministers and directed their attacks 
against PNI*s enemies, Masjumi and PSI. In return for 
its support, PKI asked for neither inclusion in the 
government nor a share in the spoils of office, hut merely 
government toleration of communist organizational and 
propaganda work, and a corner of the broad cloak of 
nationalist respectability. The PNI leaders also 
believed that should PKI grow large and become truculent, 
it could still easily be put back into place, especially 
with the help of Sukarno.
On August 1, 1953» PNI at last formed a cabinet that 
excluded Masjumi and PSI. The exclusion of Masjumi from 
government office during the long period of the first Ali 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet, the cabinet's direct dependence 
on communist votes from October 1954 to August 1955» and 
the PNI's open friendship with the communists, further 
exacerbated the hostility between the two main parties - 
particularly as PNI was using its position in the govern­
ment to fill the party's coffers and to consolidate its 
control of the bureaucracy in preparation for the general 
elections. After its control of the government for the 
two years preceding the general elections, PNI was able 
to emerge from the elections as the largest party although 
Masjumi had been expected to win. The PNI victory in 
turn affected the power balance after the elections.
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During the brief Burhanudin Harahap cabinet, PNI, PKI and 
Sukarno cooperated in attacks on the Masjumi-led govern­
ment, thus decreasing what possibility there remained for 
a true rapprochement between Masjumi and the nationalists. 
Masjumi was to withdraw from the second Ali cabinet after 
only nine months. In February 1958 many of the Masjumi 
leaders joined the unsuccessful PRRI-Permesta rebellion, 
and in August 1960 Sukarno ordered the dissolution of the 
party.
In short, PKI*s policy of low-price support for PNI 
was one of the factors that separated Masjumi further from 
PNI, and that permitted those nationalists tolerant of 
PKI to play the major role in the government, certainly 
during the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet. It is 
interesting to speculate what would have been the course 
of Indonesian politics if the Aidit leadership had 
pursued a militant, oppositionist and disruptive policy 
as the communist parties did in Malaya, Burma and the 
Philippines. If PKI had pursued a disruptive policy, not 
only is it likely that PKI would have been reduced to a 
minor, persecuted sect, but it is possible that PNI would 
have been forced to maintain the basic Masjumi-PNI 
coalition, and that Masjumi would have retained the major 
role in that coalition. And if Masjumi had continued to 
participate in, let alone dominate, the pre-election
cabinets, it is possible that the election results would 
have been far less in PNI's favour, which in turn would 
have had major repercussions on post-election politics«
During the second Ali Sastroamidjojo and the Djuanda 
cabinets, the power situation in Indonesia changed 
radically. The focus of power moved away from the 
parties and parliament to extra-parliamentary forces: 
Sukarno, the regionalists, and the central army command. 
PKI was too weak to stand alone in the new situation, and 
a mutually protective alliance was forged with Sukarno 
against first the regionalists and then the central army 
leadership. The price of Sukarno’s alliance was a 
certain domestication of the Party, servile praise of the 
president, and grumbling acquiescence to the curtailment 
of political freedom and of the power of parliament. In 
return, the Party received the presidents protection 
against severe repression by the army, it exploited his 
prestige in order to win wider support, and it enjoyed his 
patronage to gain substantial representation in a wide 
range of governmental bodies.
Communist support for Sukarno would seem to have 
influenced the course of events since 1956 - apart from 
ensuring that the large communist organization was kept 
intact. In order to demonstrate Sukarno’s apparently 
tremendous popularity, the communist organization has been
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u se d  t o  a sse m b le  huge crow ds to  h e a r  S ukarno  s p e a k , to  
se n d  f lo o d s  o f  p e t i t i o n s ,  l e t t e r s ,  d e le g a t io n s  and 
te le g r a m s  i n  p r a i s e  o f  th o s e  o f  h i s  p r o p o s a ls  t h a t  PKI 
f a v o u r s ,  and  to  e m b e l l i s h  w a l ls  w ith  h i s  l a t e s t  s lo g a n .  
S u k a rn o ’s p e r s o n a l  p o p u l a r i t y  i s  so  f o r c e f u l l y  demon­
s t r a t e d  t h a t  th e  arm y l e a d e r s  have  b e e n  a f r a i d  to  a t te m p t  
to  r e l e g a t e  him  to  a l e s s  e x a l t e d  p o s i t i o n .  And know ing 
t h a t  th e  arm y d a re  n o t  a t te m p t  to  r e p la c e  h im , S ukarno  h as 
u se d  th e  com m unists a s  a l e v e r  to  e x a c t  c o n c e s s io n s  from  
th e  m i l i t a r y :  e i t h e r  th e y  a c c e p t  a c e r t a i n  p r o p o s a l ,  o r  
th e  com m unists w i l l  b e  g iv e n  more o f f i c i a l  p o s t s ,  p e rh a p s  
ev en  s e a t s  in  th e  c a b i n e t .
Due i n  p a r t  to  a s s u r e d  com m unist s u p p o r t ,  th e  r a d i c a l  
n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  i n c lu d in g  S u k a rn o , have  o b ta in e d  a m a jo r 
p a r t  i n  g o v e rn m en t. They have em phasized  n a t i o n a l i s t ,  
a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  a g i t a t i o n  (w hich  PKI can  e x p l o i t  t o o ) ,  
n o t  econom ic g row th  and p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  t h a t  m igh t 
remove o r  re d u c e  th e  b a s e s  o f  com m unist s u p p o r t .  I t  i s  
m ost p r o b a b le ,  f o r  ex am p le , t h a t  a s s u r e d  com m unist s u p p o r t  
and good b e h a v io u r  e n co u rag e d  th e  r a d i c a l  n a t i o n a l i s t s  to  
s e i z e  a l l  D utch  p r o p e r ty  in  Decem ber 1957 d e s p i t e  s t r o n g  
o p p o s i t io n  even w i th in  th e  c a b i n e t .  E c o n o m ic a lly , in  th e  
s h o r t  ru n  a t  l e a s t ,  th e  ta k e - o v e r  was d i s r u p t i v e ,  and le d  
to  in c r e a s e d  unem ploym ent and  i n f l a t i o n ,  d e c re a s e d
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p r o d u c t io n ,  and  a g rav e  t r a n s p o r t  c r i s i s  in  many o f  th e  
e x p o r t - p r o d u c in g  o u te r  i s l a n d s .
Com m unist s u p p o r t  f o r  PNI and f o r  S ukarno  e n a b le d  
them  to  b e  more uncom prom ising  to w ard s th o s e  th e y  
c o n s id e r e d  to  b e  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  e n e m ie s : M asjum i, PSI and  
th e  r e g i o n a l i s t s .  M asjumi and PSI were f i r s t  f o r c e d  in to  
th e  o p p o s i t io n ;  th e n  S ukarno  s u c c e s s f u l l y  w ith s to o d  th e  
s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e  in  1957 to  r e s t o r e  H a tta  to  a m ajo r r o le  
i n  th e  g o v e rn m en t; a n d , f i n a l l y ,  th e  r e g i o n a l i s t s  and  
some l e a d e r s  o f  M asjumi and PSI w ere d r iv e n ,  b y  t h e i r  
c o n tin u e d  e x c lu s io n  from  a r o l e  in  th e  c e n t r a l  g o v ern m en t, 
i n to  th e  a b o r t i v e  PR R I-P erm esta  r e v o l t .  The armed 
s t r e n g t h  o f  th e  open a n ti-c o m m u n is ts  was q u ic k ly  e l i m i ­
n a te d ,  and  S u k arn o  was g iv e n  th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  ban  b o th  
M asjumi and P S I . Once th e  r e v o l t  was b ro k e n , com m unist 
s u p p o r t  f o r  S ukarno  was an  im p o r ta n t  f a c t o r ,  a s  we have 
s e e n ,  i n  e n a b l in g  th e  p r e s i d e n t  t o  r e t a i n  th e  p r im a ry  
p o s i t i o n  in  h i s  g o v e rn m e n ta l a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  c e n t r a l  
array l e a d e r s h i p .
W hile  many f a c t o r s  c o n t r ib u te d  to  th e  c o u rs e  o f  
e v e n ts  s in c e  th e  1955 e l e c t i o n s ,  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  t o  a s k  
w h e th e r th e  c o u rs e  w ould have b e en  d i f f e r e n t  i f  PKI i n  
th e  p o s t - e l e c t i o n  p e r io d  had b e e n  d i s r u p t i v e  and 
o b s t r u c t i o n i s t ,  n o t  c a l c u l a t i n g l y  f r i e n d l y  w ith  th e  
r a d i c a l  n a t i o n a l i s t s .  F o r ex am p le , c o u ld  S ukarno  and
PNI, without assured communist support, have successfully- 
resisted the demands for the restoration of Hatta to a 
prominent position in the government? If Hatta had been 
restored to such a position, would the seizure of Dutch 
property have been effected in such an ill-prepared 
manner, and would the rebellion have occurred? And if 
PKI had not supported Sukarno would he have been able to 
retain the leading position in his government coalition 
with the central army leadership?
3• The Situation in 1961
In January 1961, the Aidit leadership, after ten 
years in control of PKI, had cause for both satisfaction 
and for concern. An organizational network had been 
built which was claimed to include almost two million 
members in the Party itself and about nine millions in 
the mass organizations. These claims were exaggerated, 
but it is certain that several million people belonged to 
or were associated with one or other of the organizations 
led by PKI, and that the organizational network was 
strengthened by a large body of full-time, politically 
indoctrinated cadres. At the same time, PKI was in 
alliance with President Sukarno and had been granted 
substantial representation on a large number of govern­
mental bodies, ranging from parliament and the People’s
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C o n s u l t a t i v e  A ssem bly to  th e  N a t io n a l  A d v iso ry  C o u n c il ,  
th e  N a t io n a l  P la n n in g  C o u n c il ,  th e  N a t io n a l  F r o n t ,  and th e  
p r o v i n c i a l  and  l o c a l  c o u n c i l s .
On th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  were 
s t i l l  f a r  s t r o n g e r  th a n  PKI, and  th e  com m unists a p p e a re d  
to  be s t i l l  f a r  from  pow er. S ukarno  was an a l l y ,  b u t  
a s  an  a b le  p o l i t i c a l  m a n ip u la to r  he was c o n ce rn e d  w ith  
m a in ta in in g  PKI a s  a d o m e s tic a te d  fo r c e  and w ith  p r e v e n t in g  
i t  from  a c q u i r in g  s u f f i c i e n t  power t o  be  a b le  to  c h a l le n g e  
by  i t s e l f  th e  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s .  The o th e r  m ajo r 
p a r t n e r  in  th e  g o v e rn m en t, th e  army l e a d e r s h ip ,  seem ed 
w i l l i n g  and a b le  to  im pose c r i p p l i n g  r e p r e s s iv e  m easu res 
on PKI and  i t s  m ass o r g a n iz a t io n s  -  i f  S u k a rn o 's  v e to  on 
su ch  a c t io n  w ere rem oved. W hile th e  com m unist o rg a n i­
z a t io n  h ad  expanded  and  grown s t r o n g e r ,  th e  army to o  had  
im proved g r e a t l y  i t s  i n t e r n a l  u n i t y ,  i t s  e q u ip m en t, and 
i t s  f i g h t i n g  a b i l i t y .  PKI was i n  no p o s i t i o n  y e t  to  
f i g h t  th e  arm y, and th e  arm y a ls o  c o u ld  be  e x p e c te d  to  
r e c e iv e  th e  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  p o l i c e  and th e  pamong p r a d ja  
in  th e  e v e n t  o f  a showdown w ith  th e  co m m u n ists . Many 
l e a d e r s  o f  b o th  FNI and NU who had  e a r l i e r  b e en  open 
a l l i e s  o f  PKI w e re , in  J a n u a ry  1961, n o t  u n w i l l in g  to  se e  
th e  s u p p r e s s io n  o f  th e  com m unist o r g a n iz a t io n .  In  s h o r t ,  
th e  s i t u a t i o n  was v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from  t h a t  o f  th e  e a r l i e r  
y e a rs  o f  th e  A id i t  l e a d e r s h ip  when a l a r g e  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e
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political elite as it was then constituted would not have 
contemplated op condoned anti-communist action by the 
government.
Although the PKI leaders could point to their Party's 
impressive popular support, both in organizational member­
ship and electoral backing, they must have had misgivings 
about the quality of that support. As we have indicated 
particularly in the study of SOBSI and PKI's peasant 
support, it was extremely doubtful whether, in a crisis 
situation, PKI could count on the disciplined and militant 
action of its supporters. Given the general political 
conditions obtaining in January 1961, and given the 
dubious quality of their mass support, the PKI leaders 
had to envisage special organizational work in preparation 
for any one of three possible future situations: a con­
tinuation of the present situation, with legal recognition 
of the communist organization but restrictions on its 
freedom of action; severe repression by the central 
government or by sections of the army; and a situation 
providing an apparent opportunity to seize power.
It appears at the time of writing that even a con­
tinuation of the existing situation contains dangers for 
the communist organization. It is conceivable that if 
the cadres and members of the Party reach the conclusion 
that the national united front policy has brought the
P a r ty  in to  an im passe, then  in te r n a l  d is p u te s  cou ld  b reak  
o u t over q u e s tio n s  o f  d o c tr in e  and po licy*  I t  i s  a ls o  
co n ce iv ab le  th a t  th e  r e s t r i c t i v e  measures imposed on the 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  and mass o rg a n iz a tio n s  
and th e  th r e a t  o f sev e re  anti-com m unist r e p re s s io n  in  the 
fo re s e e a b le  fu tu re  could  hamper the  P a r ty  in  the  
re c ru itm e n t o f  new members and could even s c a re  away 
some p re s e n t members*
There i s  a ls o  the  danger fo r  PKI th a t  i f  th e  p re s e n t
s i t u a t i o n  c o n tin u e s , th en  cad res  and a c t i v i s t s  w ith
p o s i t io n s  o f  s ta tu s  in  the  P a rty  or mass o rg a n iz a tio n s  o r
governm ental bod ies from the n a t io n a l  p a r lia m e n t to  the
v i l l a g e  m ight become in fe c te d  w ith  b o u rg e o is  v a lu e s 1, a t
l e a s t  to  the  e x te n t o f  lo s in g  re v o lu tio n a ry  m ilitan cy *
That i s ,  i f  communist cad res  and a c t i v i s t s  o b ta in
p o s i t io n s  o f  s t a tu s  and lo c a l  o r even n a t io n a l  in f lu en c e
under th e  p re s e n t regime th ey  might lo se  what a rd o u r th ey
1
have fo r  th e  overthrow  o f  th e  regime* ' fB o u rg e o is if ic a tio n  
seems to  be a u n iv e rs a l  com plain t o f p r o le ta r i a n  p a r t ie s
1
In S u ra k a r ta , fo r  exam ple, I  met a communist member o f 
the  c i t y  c o u n c il .  He was a sc h o o lte a c h e r  and l iv e d  in  
a kampong house . As a c o u n c i l lo r ,  however, he had g re a t  
p r e s t ig e :  he mixed w ith  th e  s o c ia l  e l i t e ,  even in c lu d in g  
th e  Susuhunan, and re se rv e d  s e a ts  fo r  him and h is  w ife in  
the  f ro n t  two rows o f the  S riw ed ari wajang th e a t r e  
dem onstrated  h is  h igh  s ta tu s  to  a l l .  One wonders i f  he 
would be w i l l in g  to  r i s k  h is  en v iab le  p o s i t io n  under the  
p re se n t regime fo r  the gamble o f m i l i ta n t  ac tio n *
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w o rk in g  o p e n ly  in  b o u rg e o is  s o c i e t i e s ,  and PKI w ould seem 
to  be no e x c e p t io n .
PKI l e a d e r s  have h in te d  on o c c a s io n  t h a t  some o f  
t h e i r  c a d re s  have  become ’d e m o r a l iz e d 1 2 when th e y  have  
r e c e iv e d  p o s i t i o n s  o f  s t a t u s .  F o r ex am p le , th e  ch a irm an  
o f  th e  PKI g ro u p  in  th e  C e n tr a l  J a v a  r e g io n a l  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e  c o u n c i l  a d m itte d  in  A p r i l  1958 t h a t :
from  th e  moment th e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  l o c a l  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e  c o u n c i ls  w ere founded  / I n  19567» th e  
P a r ty  com m ittee  in  C e n t r a l  Ja v a  h a s  w itn e s s e d  
th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  symptoms o f  b u re a u c ra c y ,  
d e c re a s e d  g en u in e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  th e  i n t e r n a l  
l i f e  o f  th e  P a r ty ,  d e c re a s e d  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  
th e  c o n d i t io n  o f  th e  m a sse s , c o n c e i t ,  e a s y  
s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  d i s l i k e  o f  c r i t i c i s m ,  and  s l a c k e r  
P a r t y  d i s c i p l i n e . 1
At th e  v i l l a g e  l e v e l ,  th e  PKI l e a d e r s  have  a d m it te d  t h a t  
’som etim es P a r ty  members v o l u n t a r i l y  lo w er th e m se lv e s  to  
become la n d lo r d s  a f t e r  th e y  have  o b ta in e d  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f
p
l u r a h  o r  v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l ' .  B e a r in g  in  m ind th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  'r e v o lu t i o n a r y  d e m o ra l iz a t io n *  o f  
com m unist c a d re s  u n d e r th e  n a t i o n a l  u n i t e d  f r o n t  p o l i c y ,  
th e  p r e s e n t  a c t i o n  o f  S ukarno  i n  g iv in g  PKI and i t s  mass
1
M u sa jid , "Mengembangkan P im pinan P a r t a i  d ip e m e r in ta h a n  
D a e ra h ” (D e v e lo p in g  P a r ty  L e a d e rsh ip  i n  R e g io n a l G overn­
m e n t) , KP, A p r i l  1958, p .33*  M u sa jid  c la im e d  t h a t  th e  
P a r ty  c a d re s  i n  th e  l o c a l  c o u n c i l s  w ere b e in g  g iv e n  
s p e c i a l  e d u c a t io n  i n  p r o v i n c e - l e v e l  P a r ty  s c h o o ls  in  
o r d e r  to  overcom e th e  u n d e s i r a b le  t e n d e n c ie s .
2
PKI, "L a p o ra n " , BM, A pril-M ay  1959» p*135*
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organizations substantial but not conclusive represen­
tation in the appointed local, regional and national 
governmental bodies is not as rash as might at first 
appear to be the case. The president's policy may well 
accelerate revolutionary demoralization and thereby 
further reduce the Party's capacity to act militantly if 
necessary. To exclude the communists from positions of 
prestige could increase the militancy of cadres, and 
strengthen their resolve to replace the present regime by 
a new one.
As Sakirman acknowledged in 1960, there is the danger 
for PKI that continued support of a 'semi-fascist' govern­
ment which is, moreover, unable to improve the condition
of the people, could cause the people to place on the
1Party some of the blame for present conditions. Many 
questions arise from continued communist support, even 
with criticism, of the present government. Could this 
support lead to disgust or apathy among the cadres and 
members of PKI and its mass organizations who suffer most 
from the government's repressive measures and from the 
continued decline in living standards? Are cadres
1
Sakirman, "Apa Arti Sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan 
Demokrasi Terpimpin" (The Meaning of PKI's Support for 
the 1945 Constitution and Guided Democracy), part II,
BM, July-August 1960, pp.320-40, 348.
sufficiently trained to understand the need for the 
present tactics, and is the members1 loyalty still 
maintained by the communists * socio-economic activities? 
While PKI builds up Sukarno as the leader of the revo­
lution, are cadres and members sufficiently trained to 
realize that Sukarno's support is essential for Party 
survival, that the daily eulogies are meant to fool only 
the eulogized? Or does this constant praise of Sukarno 
in fact place many of the members under his ultimate 
leadership so that if the necessity arose he could, as 
some think him to believe, cut the mass support away 
from the Party leadership with a single speech as he did 
in September 1948?
Should PKI be faced with severe repression or a coup 
situation which would require or suggest a change in the 
national united front policy, it is possible that an 
intra-party dispute could arise over what action to take* 
The Party leaders must be more concerned, however, with 
the condition of the membership of the Party and of its 
mass organizations and of the Electoral communists'.
This condition is such that the leaders would experience 
extreme difficulties in adapting their large organization 
to a radically different situation or policy.
The present form of the national united front is in 
part the result of the unrevolutionary nature of the
social groups on which PKI depends for most of its 
support. But the front policy, with its friendliness 
towards the ’national capitalists’ and ’patriotic land­
lords’, its opposition to ’radicalism*, and its inhibitions 
against displays of militancy against ’the authorities’, 
is hardly likely to develop the degree of social antagonism 
that would be needed to prepare communist supporters and 
members for militant action. Severe repressive measures 
against the few signs of peasant or trade union militancy 
have also restricted the opportunity for the people and 
cadres to gain experience in militant action. Perhaps, 
but only perhaps, social tensions have increased since 
1951» "but the people in general and the great majority of 
the members of at least the communist mass organizations 
still do not feel that their inferior social, economic and 
political condition is grossly unjust or that they have 
the right and the strength to oppose the authorities.
The members of the Party and the cadres of the mass 
organizations are part of the wider society whose poorer 
sections are still largely free from strong social 
antagonisms and the belief in their own ability to alter 
conditions. All but about five thousand of the Party 
members and mass organization cadres have entered the 
Party or have become associated with it after March 1952. 
That is, they have not been attracted by clandestine work
or by militant action. And once within the sphere of 
PKI they have been subjected to a programme of education 
that explains and justifies the national united front 
policy, the moderation that must be displayed by the 
progressives, the tolerance that must be shown towards 
the national bourgeoisie, and the need for cooperation 
with other political and social groups. Education has 
also been aimed at creating organizational discipline, 
but it is very doubtful if a large segment of even the 
Party itself, raised on the broad national united front 
and existing within the wider society, could adapt readily 
to an abrupt change of Party policy that would be required 
by severe repression or a coup situation.
In short, the leaders of PKI cannot be satisfied with 
the ability of their organization to meet the demands of 
even a limited range of future situations: they have 
reason to suppose that its strength may not increase, and 
may even decrease, so long as the present general politi­
cal situation continues; they must doubt the ability of 
the organization to weather a period of severe repression 
and yet retain sufficient strength to remain within 
striking distance of power; and even without repression, 
they must doubt whether their organization is able to 
undertake a militant drive for power. In order to 
prepare the organization to meet any one of these three
contingencies, the Party leaders must work first to 
preserve the organization, to resist any attempt to ban 
the Party or to merge or dissolve any of the mass organi­
zations, especially the most important ones, SOBSI, BTI, 
and Perauda Rakjat. At the same time they must strive to 
strengthen both the Party and the mass organizations*
This will have to be done largely through education 
because overt action is repressible and repressed by the 
authorities, and because the Party leaders dare not risk 
the demoralizing effect of unsuccessful actions. Through 
education an effort will be made to prevent the spread of 
Bourgeois values * among cadres who obtain positions of 
prestige, to prepare cadres and members psychologically 
for government repression and militant action, and 
especially to weld a firm discipline among the cadres of 
the Party and its mass organizations so that they will 
act as instructed in the event of an emergency. The Party
leaders will also presumably continue to attempt to 
infiltrate government ministries and the armed forces, and 
to extend and consolidate SOBSI!s control of the workers 
in key work, especially in transport.
If the PKI leaders are able to accomplish the diffi­
cult tasks of preserving their organization and of 
strengthening it along the lines indicated, then they will 
still have to await a situation favourable to the acqui-
sition of power. At the time of writing, such a 
situation appears a remote possibility, but it could 
arise, international factors excluded, in one of three 
ways: the very unlikely development of an insurrectionary 
mood among the poorer sections of Indonesian society, an 
unlikely capitulation of the ruling groups as a result of 
their inability to rule well, and a more possible, but 
still improbable, disintegration of the ruling groups.
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The following bibliography is a highly selective 
one. It includes only materials that have direct 
relevance to the period 1951 to 1961. Only the most 
important or useful secondary sources for this period are 
cited. But although only the most important articles 
from Indonesian communist newspapers and journals have 
been included (because the newspapers and journals them­
selves are listed), the list of communist books, booklets 
and pamphlets excludes only the most irrelevant. In 
compiling this bibliography I made no attempt to dis­
tinguish between books, booklets and pamphlets because 
many of the materials dealt with do not fall readily into 
such categories.
Special mention ought to be made of the reports 
issued between 1952 and 1960 under the auspices of first 
the Institute of Current World Affairs and then the 
American Universities! Field Staff. The individual 
reports are too numerous to mention individually, but I 
found them most useful, especially those by Boyd R. 
Compton in the period 1952 to 1955* It should also be 
noted that I have not listed the following periodicals of 
which I was able to obtain only one or two scattered
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numbers: "Berita Gerwani” for 1959 and 1960, "Buletin 
Pemuda Rakjat” for 1955» and Gerwani's "Wanita Indonesia” 
for 1955 and 1956.
The English-language materials were, in general, 
readily available in Australian libraries. The Indo- 
nesian-language materials were more difficult to come by* 
Some were borrowed from Australian libraries and from 
colleagues in Australia, others were microfilmed in 
Cornell University library, but most were obtained or 
examined during my stay in Indonesia. The following 
libraries in Indonesia were found to contain a fair amount 
of political literature: the libraries of the Djakarta 
museum, of parliament, and of the Ministries of Infor­
mation and Labour, all in Djakarta; and the Hatta 
Foundation library in Jogjakarta.
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